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QUEER LAW 1999
INTRODUCTION
With this conference entitled "Queer Law 1999: Current Issues
in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Law," the Fordham
Urban Law Journal has undertaken an important responsibility and
met a critical need in both the academy and bar. There are few
areas of law that are as dynamic and fast-changing as that concern-
ing the rights of sexual minorities. As I have observed elsewhere,'
we stand at a critical moment of field formation, alternatively
called "Sexual Orientation and the Law," "Lesbian and Gay Law,"
"Sexuality and the Law" or "Queer Law."
Why might the proceedings contained in this issue comfortably
fit under the moniker "Queer Law," rather than one of the other
flags under which this legal movement has marched from time to
time? The answer is revealed in a perusal of not only the impres-
sive participants in this symposium, but of the categories into which
their remarks are organized. Ten, or even five, years ago, a confer-
ence such as this would have been constructed around topics such
as "lesbian and gay adoption," "gays in the military," "discrimina-
tion against lesbians and gay men in the workplace," and similar
sites in which "our" constituency has encountered bias and struc-
tural stigma.
The Queer turn that this conference reflects is one that rejects
the building of a social movement or legal strategies around static
identities such as lesbian, gay, bisexual or heterosexual, but rather
regards the interrogation of those categories of identity themselves
as one of its equality commitments. Framed in this way, a Queer
legal movement wants to keep alive a set of questions with respect
to the ways in which certain identities, like straight, gay or lesbian,
are shaped by the homophobic and heteronormative world in
which we live. It is for this reason that a Queer legal conference
sets its focus on the places where and means by which homophobic
and/or heteronormative power is at work in the service of normal-
izing heterosexuality and objectifying homosexuality, bisexuality
and transgenderism.
Thus, you do not see "Lesbian" or "Gay" figure in the title of
any of the panels that these papers were part of, although the pan-
elists may at times speak in terms of the rights of gays, lesbians,
1. Katherine M. Franke, Homosexuals, Torts, and Dangerous Things, 106 YALE
L.J. 2661 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUAL-
Ir'e, GENDER, AND THE LAW (1997); WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1997)).
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bisexuals or transgendered people. This is the narrow line queer
theorists must nimbly traverse: to at once recognize the ways in
which people experience their own identities and are discriminated
against as lesbians and gay men, etc., while leaving open a route by
which we can renegotiate the meanings and experiences of those
identities as a significant part of our struggles to greater freedom
and equality.
The contributions that follow represent a rich array of expertise
that has been brought to bear on this vital and difficult project.
QUEER LAW 1999
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION:
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDERED CIVIL RIGHTS
INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM
MR. HARMAN: Judge Batts is a District Court Judge in the
Southern District of New York and is the first openly lesbian mem-
ber of the federal judiciary. She was appointed in 1994 by Presi-
dent Clinton. Formerly a full- time professor at Fordham
University where she taught Domestic Relations, Pretrial Federal
Practice and Family Law, Judge Batts is now an adjunct professor
at Fordham and teaches Trial Advocacy and Domestic Relations.
Judge Batts is a tireless contributor to the University, to GALLA
(Fordham's Gay and Lesbian Law Association) and to the gay and
lesbian community in general.
JUDGE BATTS: Thank you very much. Look at this panel. If
we only had one of these people on this panel, this would be a
panel rich in experience, knowledge and information. When I first
looked at the list of panelists, my first reaction was, "Are you kid-
ding me? How can we possibly let each one of these people give to
the attendees of this conference what they have to give? There are
too many. Cut them in half." They did not say anything until I got
over that little hissy-fit. So I said, "Alright, we are gonna do this."
And so, my role here is to be referee so that I can make sure that
everybody has an equal opportunity to weigh in with their knowl-
edge and expertise.
I am going to give very brief introductions of the panelists before
I start with a lead off question, and I am going to invite the panel-
ists, if they wish, to enlarge on what I say about them, as they re-
spond to the first question.
Matt Coles, director of the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Pro-
ject, and a long time advocate and litigate on behalf of the lesbian,
gay, bisexual and transgendered ("L/G/B/T") communities.
Paula Ettelbrick, legislative counsel at the Empire State Pride
Agenda and national coordinator of Equality Begins At Home, a
project of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force.
Professor Nan Hunter, professor at Brooklyn Law School, au-
thor of a case book on law and sexuality and a founding director of
the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project.
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Evan Wolfson, director of the Marriage Project at Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, and one of our community's main
proponents of lesbian and gay marriage.
I will begin with Matt Coles. What do you think our priorities
ought to be as a community, and who should identify our goals and
determine how they are best achieved?
MR. COLES: Thinking about what our priorities are raises two
very different questions. The first is: Where do we think lesbians
and gay men are getting hurt most in society? That is a qualitative
and quantitative inquiry that might lead us to different places. The
second question is: Which of these problems are such that lawyers
might have something useful to contribute (I use the word "law-
yers" instead of "litigators" particularly because I do not think the
only useful thing lawyers can do is litigate)?
The problem that occurs when answering these questions is that
we, as lawyers, often focus in on answering the second question
before adequately dealing with the first question. Far too often our
sense of where people are getting hurt is driven by what we think
we can do well as lawyers and by our own experience of where the
problems lie.
Having said that, I would like to introduce some of the more
important areas that need to be addressed. The first problem area
is relationships. In defining "relationships," I refer to parents and
children because that is an area where people are hurt terribly and
where lawyers, particularly in litigation, are uniquely equipped to
assist the problem because much family and parenting law is made
in the courts.
Additionally, schools are places where people get hurt and
where lawyers can have some of the greatest impact. I think it is
the place in the post-Romer' world where it is actually possible for
lawyers to do things. Further, getting rid of sodomy laws would be
a benefit because they hurt the lesbian and gay community in non-
obvious ways. It is a clich6 among lawyers to say that the harm
these laws inflict is not necessarily through direct enforcement, but
through the role they play collaterally in proceedings like custody.
I actually think, however, that greater harm comes from the use of
these laws as a means of political dis-empowerment. In debates
over civil rights and domestic partnership laws that recognized re-
lationships, sodomy laws are consistently and somewhat effectively
invoked as a way of ignoring our voices. These laws suggest that
2. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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our claims and aspirations are not legitimate; and fighting these
laws is something that lawyers are capable of doing.
JUDGE BATTS: Thank you, Matt. Paula, do you have a differ-
ent perspective on what our priorities ought to be as a community,
and would you identify our goals and determine how they are best
achieved?
MS. ETrELBRICK: I tend to think of priorities in a different
way, not so much substantive, but in terms of the process we use to
achieve those goals. Having been at the Pride Agenda for the last
four-plus years doing legislative work, and at Lambda Legal De-
fense for the seven years prior to that doing impact litigation, my
perspective has changed a bit. I believe that we need to ratchet up
our resources in the legislative arena, which includes efforts to get
lawyers to work with state legislative advocacy and political organi-
zations to draft better laws. I am the only person in this country
who was hired by a state political advocacy organization as a law-
yer to do legislative advocacy and drafting. I would like to see a
world in which every state has a lawyer on staff, or at least a com-
mittee of lawyers who volunteer their time to work with legislators
at the state level. The state level is the heart and soul of the issues
that we are facing.
Matt mentioned sodomy laws and relationships. These are quin-
tessential state law matters. If legislators do not have the resources
to help them, we are working against the trend with them. What I
find, working with the state legislature in New York, is that there
are very few lawyers on staff. This requires legislators to rely on
central staff persons to draft laws. The result is the passage of laws
that we would never want to litigate under, and that make no sense
to us. Consequently, I work with those people to clean up some of
those statutes that do get drafted, and also look politically at how
to get some things passed.
As a strategy, I do not think we should put all our eggs in the
"we have to get a hate crimes bill or a non-discrimination bill" bas-
ket. While those are very important endeavors, there are hundreds
of bills that I think could get drafted, particularly in the family defi-
nition area, passed in the most conservative state legislatures, and
signed by even moderately conservative governors, that would be
beneficial. I do not want to overstate the case, but in that part of
the process we could make some headway in significant ways. Our
legislators are only as good as we are in getting involved in the
political process, and getting them elected or de-elected. And so, I
look at reality, in conjunction with the incredible work that my col-
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leagues on this panel have done at the ACLU and at Lambda, of
really trying to move forward in how can we address the concerns
at the place where we really live most, at the state legislative level.
JUDGE BATTS: Thank you, Paula. Now, one of the things that
Matt mentioned is relationships - he mentioned parent-child rela-
tionships, school relationships and sodomy laws. Evan, I want to
ask you, are there any other relationships that you might be able to
think of that perhaps might and should deserve our attention?
MR. WOLFSON: I think we are at a breakthrough opportunity
with regard to winning the freedom to marry, and I think that is
really important on two levels. I think to some extent we have lost
sight of what, in a way, is the most important level. On the one
hand, our fight for the freedom to marry is important because win-
ning marriage as a choice for gay people would be extraordinarily
important in concrete and real ways in people's lives and as a trans-
formative statement of our position in society. I do not think there
is any single thing we could achieve legally that would so substan-
tially transform our position in society as to win that choice and
cultural position. I also think the battle for the freedom to marry is
important because the process of the battle - what it will take to
win it - gives us unparalleled opportunities to engage non-gay
Americans and people around the world in a discussion about who
we are, what our lives are and what the possibilities are for us and
for other non-gay people in a vocabulary that is rich, sustained,
important and different from the stereotypes that have held us
down. So it is both the achievement itself and what it would take
to achieve it that gives us the extraordinary opportunities that I
think we must seize in order to maximize our opportunities to re-
ally move ourselves forward in the way that I think all of us on this
panel want.
I actually think we have two goals or priorities, if you want to
call them that. One, I think, is to eliminate barriers that impede
individual choices about how individuals want to live their lives
and how they want to build their relationships with their families
and loved ones. Particularly with regard to sex and sexual orienta-
tion, I think it is the mission of those of us who have chosen this
path in life, but I think generally we are all committed to eliminat-
ing those barriers.
The second thing that we also want to achieve is to enlarge the
sense of possibilities that all people, gay and non-gay, and people
who define themselves with other labels, have in life. I think all of
us are probably very committed to both equality and freedom and
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we want to make a world where we can achieve both. To me, the
great opportunity we have in our community and in our movement
right now, something we have labored for decades to achieve is to
get the attention of the majority, to get the attention of non-gay
people and engage them in dialogue to find them where they are
and move them.
To me, therefore, the single biggest priority of those of us who
are working on these issues full-time or part-time, is to both make
extraordinary contributions, and to engage non-gay people. Find
them, talk with them. Do not just talk amongst ourselves. Do not
just say things in which we believe that make us feel good in the
rhetoric or language we are familiar or enjoy, but find where they
are, engage them and bring them along, because that is how social
change occurs in a democracy spurred by the kinds of prods we as
litigators or as legislative tacticians use.
That is the opportunity we have right now, and marriage gives us
a powerful bridge into that challenge because nothing captures
their attention, changes the dialogue and gives us a renewed vocab-
ulary like fighting over the freedom to marry, not that that is the
only thing we care about, but that gets their attention and gives us
the biggest batch of opportunities and challenges.
JUDGE BATTS: I want to take these issues of the parent-child
relationship and marriage and put a more focused question to the
panelists as a basis for bridging into another general area that is
important. Frequently, marriage is inexorably linked to the issue
of having children. The question is, should it be this way, and if
not, how do we go about altering this association? Let me ask this
of Matt and Evan before we open it up for the entire panel.
MR. COLES: I think there is one sense in which the link be-
tween marriage and parenting (in a superficial way) is a construct
usually used by the opponents of opening marriage to try to keep
us out of it. Having constructed an institution that at least, on its
face, has not had much to do with raising children (in the sense that
it has not been thought to be a requirement for it in any sense for a
long time), to suddenly say that is the essential nature of it, that is
what defines it, I think in some ways is kind of a dodge.
By the same token, I think nothing brings lesbian and gay rela-
tionships to the forefront of public consciousness better than the
relationships of lesbian and gay couples with children. Thinking
3. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the Hawaii
Constitution does not give rise to a fundamental right of persons of same-sex to
marry).
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about it not in the way our opponents have used it, as a defense in
marriage cases, but in a way that we have been, such as the dia-
logue with America Evan was talking about regarding lesbian and
gay relationships. And while I think Evan and I do not totally
agree on the terms on which we ought to be having that dialogue, I
think we both agree very much that it is got to be going on.
One of the best ways to do it is to think about ways that present
lesbian and gay families to the rest of America so that they can
begin recognizing that we are here, that the families are here and
thinking about what we are really like. The best way to do that is
in terms of relationships with children. I love adoption cases, and I
love adoption as an issue. I like it because it brings lesbian and gay
relationships to the fore in a great way. In these situations, most
typically, there are two people working very hard to do something
for somebody else, and frequently, for somebody who nobody else
cares about. It brings the relationship to the fore in a way in which
it does not simply focus on the two individuals in the relationship,
what they want and what their sense of entitlement is. I do not
necessarily think that is inexorably linked in any legal way, but in
terms of that dialogue, I do think it ought to be at the core of it.
JUDGE BATTS: Evan?
MR. WOLFSON: I, as always, totally agree with Matt. I think
the distinction between legal and cultural is very important for us
to understand. The fact of the matter is we live in a culture where
most people talk culturally, not legally. When people hear the
word "marriage," when people hear the word "family," when peo-
ple think of children, they think of them all together and go about
talking about them. This is our opportunity to raise all of these
issues including the larger issue of equality and respect for families,
which is what we are fighting for. I do not think we need to put a
huge amount of energy into trying to figure out how to disentangle
it.
I do think that putting forth stories of lesbian and gay people
with kids in any manner, without kids, having commitment ceremo-
nies, living alone, are all important.
One of the things that I think is really critical that we need to get
over and move into the next phase of, is not giving ourselves false
choices. We do not have to sit here in our movement and in our
organizations and decide, "do we work on adoption or marriage,"
or "do we work on domestic partnership advances or fight for the
whole full range of equality under marriage and other opportuni-
ties?" We do not have to make those choices. We have to be tacti-
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cally smart, patient and persistent, keep using the word marriage,
keep engaging the dialogue, even while we take the components
along the way, and never accept any single thing as a substitute for
full equality.
JUDGE BATTS: Nan, I have a question then in terms of what
we have talked about so far. Obviously there is one consideration
here that is either a wet blanket or a limiting consideration, and
that is money. As a professor who is very good at theorizing, let
me ask you, if an organization that you supported won the lottery,
what would you do with the money?
PROF. HUNTER: One of the things that I would use the money
for, in terms of building an infrastructure or structuring an organi-
zation, would be to think about the process by which we come to
these decisions. Even if we understand that we do not have to pick
the magic bullet issue and that we have to be flexible enough to
adjust to the time, the question arises as to how we do that. What
is our obligation as lawyers to have a better and broader perspec-
tive? It is very important for us as lawyers to try and navigate this
tension. We are not doctors, and we are not activists, or social
workers, or whatever. We are lawyers who bring a certain set of
skills to this enterprise, which is what we ought to bring. We
should not be blinded by those skills. We need to figure out better
ways to structure in the broader perspectives and not just say,
"since I am a lawyer, I think this way, so this is what the organiza-
tion is going to do."
I would like to see lesbian and gay organizations consciously and
consistently build up links with client organizations. By that, I
mean with the kinds of organizing or community groups that do
not do law, but do direct organizing. I think that social change
lawyers are most effective when they have organized client constit-
uencies that themselves do political work and grass roots
organizing.
Let me give you a little example that is fresh in my mind because
I just heard him speak. A young man named David Pumo, who
graduated from Brooklyn Law School in 1997, went to work at the
Urban Justice Center. David now does a combination of legal and
organizing work there with gay youth, particularly homeless gay
youth. Arising from that work is a lawsuit against the City of New
York in which David is representing L/G/B/T youth in foster care,
which is where kids on the street go. That lawsuit is a really good
concrete example of litigation growing out of grass roots commu-
nity work - of seeing a problem on the street, a very crucial prob-
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lem to a very disadvantaged portion of the L/G/B/T community,
and translating that into a lawsuit.
That is what we as social change lawyers ought to do: translate
into lawsuits the injustices in our community. Sometimes the injus-
tices are obvious and we can trust ourselves to see them. We would
do a better job, however, if we more consistently developed rela-
tionships with those kinds of organized constituency groups.
JUDGE BATTS: Thank you. Let me ask some of the represent-
atives of the wonderful organizations we have here that same kind
of question: if the organization won the lottery, what would you do
with the funds? Paula?
MS. ETTELBRICK: I appreciate what Nan said about that be-
cause I think it is the engine of social change work for us as law-
yers. We are informed by the events that happen within our
community, to different segments of our community. I think it is
very easy to define the generic approach to our work. The reality
of our community is really different and much more than it used to
be. When younger people come out at younger ages, it represents
a whole new range of social reaction to them, a whole new reality
for their lives, a whole new thing that we need to address more
notably.
The lottery question is always a good one, because it forces a
person to set priorities and look at some of these things. I would
really look at stepping up our approaches and our work. What I
would love to do is hire a couple of lawyers in every state to work
on state legislative work, from and L/G/B/T community perspec-
tive: coalition building, working with state legislators, working to
craft legislation that can benefit our community because there is a
natural way in which litigation can occur with only a limited
context.
If we do not have statutes supporting our positions or entitling us
to certain kinds of rights in society, then there are always going to
be limitations on our rights. I think building more of the connec-
tion between our national and state groups in particular is
important.
Some of that started already through a group called the Federa-
tion of L/G/B/T Statewide Political Organizations where the state
groups have come together. Part of what we are building and
working with includes better connections and relationships with
national groups. Each state operates in a very different way, and
the broad base approach to where the law is or where it stands is
no longer going to work for us. In arguing some of these cases,
QUEER LAW 1999
even the family cases, we see a rush of anti-gay foster care and
adoption bills in almost a dozen states this legislative term. What
has come to the forefront is that people really need to know how to
fight those off. The language of rights does not work in the adop-
tion or parenting context as we as lawyers know. We do not go
into court and argue for the rights of lesbian and gay parents, we
argue for the interests of children. That is the legal standard, and
part of what the educational process of the activist community is:
to really understand the difference in dealing with family issues at
and in the legislative arena, in the legislative area, as opposed to
other kinds of issues. Therefore, I would really like to see those
connections drawn much more tightly and resources built up at the
state level.
JUDGE BATTS: Matt?
MR. COLES: If I actually won the lottery, I would first take the
money and try to figure out how to make the kind of connections
Nan talks about in a meaningful way. The problem with Washing-
ton D.C. is that people down there think having a meeting is an
accomplishment. Too often, the way we try to do what Nan was
talking about is talk to ourselves in our own organizations. I am
skeptical about how far that takes you.
I guess the first thing I would do with the money is hire some
smart people to help me figure out how to deal with that. The
other thing that I would say is that I would want to be attentive to
the other end of it as well. When you do public interest work for a
while, whether it be litigation or legislation, you realize quickly
that court orders and court decisions do not change society, and
neither does legislation. Just because the Supreme Court says we
are going to desegregate the schools with all deliberate speed, does
not mean it happens the next day. Just because Congress says we
are not going to have any sex discrimination in the workplace does
not mean it happens the next day.
In very practical terms, one of the limitations of the kind of work
that we all do is not only not getting the information up front, but
crafting and delivering the goods at the end. Too often we stop at
the level of getting a court decision or a piece of legislation and
saying, "We are there. We got it." We really are not there, we are
at best half way there and how you take and deliver the message
and make it reality seems to me to be not quite as big a problem
Nan was raising, but also one onto which I'd get my consultants
and say, "how do I take this now and deliver it and bring it home
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and make it work to the end?" Far too often legal organizations
just stop too short.
I actually think that organized constituencies can do that. I can
appreciate that there is a lot of talk and a lot of meetings, but I
think there are some organizations - service organizations, other
organizations - that are really out there. When I was doing abor-
tion rights work, we had repeat clients because we represented
abortion clinics. Having repeat clients is very helpful because it
keeps you very much in tune with certain segments of the
community.
MR. COLES: I do think there is a huge difference between ser-
vice organizations that are doing things directly and service organi-
zations that are not making that direct connection. I think that is
very well taken.
MS. ETrELBRICK: Well, part of it is the process. I agree that
we cannot just win a lawsuit or pass a single law and think that is
the end of the job. The legislative process is quintessentially an
educational process as well. There is no bill that supports the les-
bian and gay community that is ever going to get passed unless the
legislator and the legislator's constituency are educated.
So there is a way that the legislative process relies on education.
If we get a law passed, it demonstrates that we have brought peo-
ple along, and gotten them to understand some basic element of
our lives. Litigation does that as well. I think litigation can be very
educational. Lambda and the ACLU have made an art of filing
lawsuits and doing the educational work by getting the press atten-
tion on the issue, so that people can see a story in a context and
begin to talk about it and make up their minds about it. Therefore,
I think all of this is so much a part of a process, and keeping fo-
cused on what some of the ultimate goals are and making sure we
are reaching out in the broader processes will ultimately result in a
societal change.
JUDGE BATTS: Evan, I want to know what you would do if
your organization won the lottery?
MR. WOLFSON: If Lambda, as opposed to myself, won the
money, I think we would keep doing more of the work that
Lambda does, perhaps by opening one, two or three more regional
offices to closer serve the regions and to spark the kind of political
and public education mix that goes along with litigation. We would
launch more projects like my colleague, Doni Gewirtzman has
launched. Doni was specifically brought on to do an outreach to
older lesbians and gay men.
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We would also work on trying to do the kinds of. things Nan is
talking about, namely finding other areas of our community and
working to reach out to them. That is the kind of work I think that
Lambda and the ACLU have actually done very well, and will con-
tinue to do more of and would be willing to put money into.
If I won the lottery, and could actually decide how Lambda
would spend its money, of course I would do exactly what Lambda
suggested by funding more of Lambda, the ACLU and the other
organizations.
I would also put a large chunk of the money in a different direc-
tion than has been discussed here. I would use it to seed or spur
state and local groups to create more hands-on, small, local infra-
structures with the mission of doing outreach and engagement of
non-gay people.
The most exciting example of activism that I have seen in the last
couple of months took place about three weeks ago in Sacramento,
where two lesbians held a commitment ceremony. More than
ninety ministers from around the country flew in. These ministers
were not gay ministers. Rather, they were there to make a civil
rights statement by blessing the celebration, and by defying church
law, if necessary, in order to support their freedom to marry cultur-
ally and legally. Non-gay ministers made that statement. That is
what I would use the money to do to engage non-gay people in
dramatic dialogue. The good news about the lottery question is
that this type of activism does not cost a lot of money. Volunteers
can do it. Anyone can get up and engage non-gay people and find
something that will generate this kind of discussion. That is how I
would use the money and the energy, trying to focus people's
attention.
JUDGE BATTS: Matt, you wanted to say something before?
MR. COLES: It was a small point, but I wanted to actually reg-
ister a small disagreement with Paula on the educational value of
the legislative process because I think it is declining, although not
in every circumstance. I think legislatures across the country, like
Congress in the last thirty years, have gotten districted more and
more into safe seats. I think legislators are less and less worried
about their constituents. People got elected year after year, in the
era in which you had to educate constituents to make change re-
garding lesbian and gay rights. I am not sure whether that is neces-
sarily true anymore of many issues and legislatures.
If you look at those astonishing Gallop Polls, eighty-six percent
of the American public thinks there ought to be employment dis-
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crimination laws, but we cannot get past ten legislatures across the
country. I think one of the reasons we cannot get past those ten
legislatures is because many legislatures have become polarized
along safe seats, allowing them to be less responsive to constitu-
ents. There is still a lot that you can do with the legislative process,
but I think it has less of that great inherent, built-in educational
value that it did before that kind of districting took over.
MS. ETTELBRICK: I think that is a good point, Matt. I think
the other side of it, however, is that they do begin to listen when
you organize against them in their districts over some of the issues,
and part of the gap that I see, and that the Pride Agenda has been
working for years on developing, is exactly what Evan is saying -
building up the infrastructure at the local level; getting people in-
volved in political campaigns; getting them in there.
I have seen some legislators in New York who, because the last
ten out of the twelve people who worked on their last campaigns
came from the gay and lesbian community, have had to hold the
line on issues that I know they were not happy upholding. I think
people have been dis-empowered from even working in political
campaigns for the reasons Matt mentioned. New York has one of
the highest incumbency rates of any state legislature in the country.
It is disgusting. These people are not accountable to anyone, and
part of the process is getting people fired up and working strategi-
cally on this, which is part of what we do... I mean, we know that
the civil rights bill has the votes in the state senate here in New
York to pass. We cannot get the senate majority leader, however,
to allow a vote on the bill. This year is the twenty-ninth year that
New York State has tried to pass a civil rights bill banning sexual
orientation-based discrimination. The Assembly passes that bill
every year. The Senate majority leader, Joe Bruno, refuses to al-
low it to pass because he is in a rural district outside of Albany and
it is hard to capture his attention. He just hates us. But we have
slowly and methodically gone through and dragged some of these
people along by getting very involved in their re-election
campaigns.
In the midst of the international response to Matthew Shepard's
death,4 the Wyoming legislature killed the hate crimes bills this
past week. So did Utah and Montana. People are not accountable
4. Matthew Shepard was a gay college student who was killed in a hate crime.
See James Brooke, Gay Man Dies From Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at 1. He was kidnapped, robbed, pistol-whipped and left tied to
a fence for 18 hours in near-freezing temperatures. See id.
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because they do not believe there's really a political price to pay
for going up against the gay community. We have not really fo-
cused, and I think Evan is right on the mark when he says that we
really do need to get beyond ourselves. We need to strategize
about this. We need to get beyond our own community. We need
to talk to our supporters. They are out there. We know that they
are, and we need to use that polling data that says eighty-six per-
cent of the public believes non-discrimination laws pass, or should
be passed. Make this real to these people by taking a few of them
out of their jobs. That begins to send a message at the state level.
It is pure politics.
JUDGE BATI'S: Evan?
MR. WOLFSON: I think the way to do that is by going and
asking them for support. We are pretty good at demanding in our
community. We have organizations that do a great job of demand-
ing our rights in court, as we should. That work is very important
and valid. That kind of activism has a long and noble history, and
it is an important methodology, but demanding is not the same
thing as asking. Asking for support is critical. Saying the words:
marriage, equality, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender. Saying
the words, over and over, and giving people a chance to move and
to be fair. If we do not go and ask them, how do we expect them to
just do the right thing?
What I actually raised my hand to say was something different,
and it concerns another arena that we have left out because it has
been a very unsuccessful arena for us generally. I think, however,
it is one that we have to take seriously and deal with, and that is
the ballot measure - the initiatives. More and more there are ef-
forts to put our rights up to a vote. We have all seen this and we
have seen precious, important, heroic victories deferred or
snatched form our grasp when people get an opportunity to short
circuit them through the electoral process. We have to engage that.
We have to deal with it. We cannot ignore it, and the only way to
seriously engage it is with two important ingredients. One is to
mount intelligent, careful campaigns. The other ingredient is to
continue laying the groundwork by engaging more and more peo-
ple in that cultural dialogue. We must do this over time, because it
is a long process and every month that we do not do it is a month
we have not put ourselves in a position for the battle that is inevita-
bly going to come. In March 2000, there will be an anti-marriage,
anti-gay initiative on the in California ballot. People in California
know that. People nationally now know that. What are we doing?
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How many months are we going to wait before we engage in the
fight?
JUDGE BATTS: When you talk about the ballot initiative, you
are not talking about the ballot initiative as our friend, you are
talking about the ballot initiative as our enemy. How can we go up
against it?
MR. WOLFSON: I think historically it has rarely been our
friend, and I am uncomfortable with the notion that people's rights
should be put up to a vote in an affirmative way. Indeed, the dan-
ger is that it is used as an opportunity to tear holes in constitutions,
to polarize and to divide and attack. If we do not successfully fight
back, not only do we not have a chance of not winning, we do not
even move forward. When you move forward, you do not neces-
sarily win every battle. By engaging, reaching hearts and minds and
having discussions, however, you put yourself in a better position
to fight the inevitable next battle.
JUDGE BATTS: That brings me to the next question I wanted
to put forth, which is obviously sort of a continuum of what we
have been talking about. We have the Lesbian and Gay Lawyers
Association of Greater New York ("LeGaL"), which is obviously
one of the sponsors of this conference and for which we are eter-
nally grateful. By its name, we know that it is an association of
lawyers. A lot of the panelists have been discussing that "we as
lawyers" need to do things and reach out. I guess one of the ques-
tions is how should we, being primarily law-based organizations,
accomplish the interaction with and reach out to other organiza-
tions? If they are a professional organization, for instance ballot
initiative fighting, is there an organization of L/G/B/T advertising
executives that we could try and get together with and do some
sort of educational campaign in a way that catches the eye of the
community when we know of these issues? How do we know of
other organized groups that we can reach out to, and even if it is
not bringing a lawsuit but working in the policy area, how do we
actually go about doing this?
MR. WOLFSON: For the last several years, we have reached
out. By we, I mean Lambda and other groups who have seen what
the consequences of the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court ruling5 were.
After this, the world changed and we had to get involved and deal
with it. For the first time, we have reached out to every national
lesbian and gay organization to try to bring them together to meet
5. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44.
298
QUEER LAW 1999
regularly and to work on this change. We have reached beyond the
national organizations to state and local groups for the first time.
That had never happened before in a sustained way, and I think it
occurred in large part to the sustained effort that the Task Force is
exerting with regard to the Federation. We have reached out to
non-gay allied groups and tried to bring them into regular meetings
to actually move this forward. Anyone who has been within the
sound of my voice has heard tirelessly the need to do various
things. This message has been directed indiscriminately at every-
one. So, that is what we have done.
The results have been mixed. I think more has been achieved in
these ways than had ever been done before. The national dialogue
about the freedom to marry obviously has taken off. The fact of
the matter is people cannot only hear my voice, people cannot only
hear Lambda or these groups' voices, we need to enlarge that. In
an ironic way, we find ourselves at this juncture where non-gay
people, by and large, better understand the urgency and meaning
of this more than many lesbians and gay men do, because they live
in the world of marriage. Non-gay people understand why this is
important. They take that vocabulary seriously. Rather than try-
ing to find every last lesbian or gay person or try to break people
into working on something they do not want to work on, I think it
is important that those people who do understand the urgency of
the moment, and who care about this go out and find those non-
gay allies and the gay people who do understand and who do care
either affirmatively or because they understand the perils of losing,
and there are many of those as well. We do not have to attack each
other over this. This is not something people need to be forced to
do. It is something they want to do. There are plenty of people out
there who are reachable who have not been asked. Those are the
ones I would focus on.
JUDGE BATTS: It seems to me that there are issues that we
are talking about that individuals have very strong feelings about
one way or another. There are individuals who feel that being a
parent is something that the straight community does and that one
of the reasons that we revel in the freedom and individuality of our
sexual orientation is that we are away from that world where chil-
dren are included.
Another area of course is marriage; whether or not we should
marry. We do not want to marry because we eschew that whole
heterosexual way of doing things and we revel in our freedom and
individuality and do not want to get married. Once we say that
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there are individuals within our community who do want to have
children, who do want to get married, does this result in an inevita-
ble tension so that we cannot work together for things that one
individual or group of individuals may want and others do not? Do
we have to look for something that everybody agrees on as such a
basic a common denominator and those are the only things we
work on? What do we do when we feel strongly and differently on
issues upon which, if you will excuse a term from the judicial arena,
reasonable people can differ? How do you work still as a commu-
nity even when one member does not want to get married and does
not want to devote his or her resources to that, yet another mem-
ber of the community absolutely does want to get married and
wants to devote community resources to that? How do we arbi-
trate, mediate and adjust? How do we continue to work? What do
we do here?
MR. COLES: I am going to give you a very inadequate answer,
but it seems to me that you do not wait for something that every-
body can agree on because we will wait until hell freezes. You do
not need to do that, and in any sensible movement people not only
find lots of different ways to get to shared goals. I remember in a
ballot initiative in 1978, when a huge fight occurred about how to
fight California Proposition 6.6 Do we fight Proposition 6 by doing
mass advertising, do we fight by going through conventional polit-
ical party routes, or do we fight by going to the streets? What we
wound up doing was all three things. We had an organization
called the Coalition Against the Briggs Initiative that went through
the streets; we had the "No On 6 Organization" that went through
conventional politics; and we had another organization called
"SORE," that tried to go the advertising route, and it worked
pretty well.
I think you have to find ways to accommodate both people's dif-
ferences and goals and their different senses of how to get there.
However, at the very same time you have to recognize that there
are consequences to things that people do, both in terms of routes
they choose and in terms of issues that they choose for everybody
else. You know that when you wind up with a ballot initiative, for
instance on the ballot in California in 2000, that has enormous con-
sequences in terms of almost whatever you do about it; where re-
sources are going to go, what the law in a very important state is
6. CAL. PROPOSITION 6, § 3(b)(2) (1978). The Briggs initiative would have
amended the California Education Code to permit the state to refuse to hire/fire a
teacher who engaged in public homosexual activity or conduct.
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going to look like and what the debate is going to look like. I think
that what is critical to make that work is not to try to get everybody
on the same page either on methodology or on issues. People have
to pay attention to the consequences of what they do, what peo-
ple's different views are, and try at least to reach some level of
dialogue of how these different views are going to affect each
other. We cannot assume that the fight is going to be about this or
has to be about that or we are going to make it about this.
Like I said, an inadequate answer.
JUDGE BATTS: I do not agree with your characterization of
your answer. Evan?
MR. WOLFSON: Oh, I do not agree with that characterization
either. I think that it is a very good answer. I guess there are a
couple of things that it invokes in me. One is that Matt and the
other people who heroically fought against the Briggs Initiative
successfully, which was a California measure about twenty years
ago saying that gay people should not be allowed to work for
schools. Obviously, an incredibly hot button - a difficult, challeng-
ing issue twenty years ago. At the time, many gay people as well as
non-gay people said "you are out of your mind, you cannot defeat
it."
Of course, you went on to win. Those are important lessons and
I agree with Matt about the three kinds of campaigns we need to
be considering. I think the right answer is all three and we must
start now. Do not spend another six months discussing that be-
cause it will be too late and all you are left with is the opportunity
to do a crash course, rather than the kind of sustained, slow, pa-
tient, persistent engagement that we need to do in conjunction with
a media campaign and the fund raising that needs to be done.
So, I think those lessons that Matt evokes are very important
and real, particularly the lesson of: Do not listen to the people who
always say we cannot win. A second important lesson that I think
Matt mentioned in his answer is that the process of battling, ideally
will result in a victory. Hopefully, you will win that battle. If you
fight the battle, whether you win or lose that particular battle, you
have advanced your ability to win the war because you have at
least gone forward. If you do not fight, if you pretend that you
cannot, and instead want to change the subject, then all of the non-
gays will talk about us and say that through that battle, we lost. I
think that is unacceptable and I think that it is also one of the les-
sons of the Briggs Initiative fight.
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Going to Matt's point about consequences, I think that it is abso-
lutely true that people have, as I said earlier, a right to choose what
they want to work on and what they care about. I would correct
one thing in how you framed the question, Judge Batts. I have
never seen that what either we at Lambda, myself or others are
fighting for as "marriage" so much as it is the "freedom to marry."
I am not fighting for mandatory marriage. I think I would be a bad
apostle for the cause of telling every gay person they should get
married. However, I think what we are fighting for is the freedom
to marry and all that it signifies: choice, equality, opportunity to
make your own decisions about how to protect your family and not
be shut out of a central social and legal institution simply because
of your sex or sexual orientation. That is what I believe we are
fighting for, and those who chose not to put their energies into that
are entitled to make those choices and they have in many cases
from their own lights very good reasons to do so.
There are consequences, however, and to me the important thing
is not that people have to believe that marriage itself is so impor-
tant or that even the freedom to marry is the most important thing.
What people should pay attention to, in my view, is: what is the
opportunity at hand?; where are the break-through opportunities
at hand?; tactically, what if we do this now, will it put us in a better
position later? People should not simply think that we have the
luxury of historically changing the channel to having a dialogue
about something we want to talk about in our own language, when
society is reachable and engageable though engaged somewhere
else. That is an imperative that an activist must take seriously. An
activist must figure out how to achieve something because you just
do not like something or even avowedly have ideological concerns
about it. To make a real strategic choice based on the real oppor-
tunities you are giving up if you do not engage here and choose
instead to hold out for this or that.
PROF. HUNTER: I would like to just jump in because I think
Debbie you have touched a nerve. I think the nerve you touched
in framing your question is the range of views within the L/G/B/T
community about sexual politics. I think there are two things at
work here; one is very obvious, one is a little bit less obvious.
The obvious point is that we are a very diverse community ideo-
logically, and there is a tension built into a L/G/B/T group or any
group organized along identity terms, because you are by defini-
tion representing a community that is very ideologically diverse.
Not only is it ideologically diverse on an issue like NAFTA, but it is
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ideologically diverse on the issues that pertain to our rights and the
strategies to achieve those rights. Some of that is like the tensions
that will never go away about different modes of organizing, or
legislation v. litigation or whatever, but some of it really goes to the
heart of questions that we not only have strong political beliefs
about, but we experience very strongly in our own lives. People
are very deeply engaged with questions about whether the right to
marry really represents them in some kind of cultural sense, or rep-
resents what they think of being gay or lesbian is all about, and we
simply have no choice but to respect that. I am someone who feels
very strongly identified with what has traditionally been lesbian/
gay culture with it is urban focus and its orientation toward being
an outpost for sexual agency and freedom. That is something that
is very important to me. I also realize that the old phrase "we are
everywhere" is quite literally true and as more and more people
come out, which is wonderful, more and more people come out in
lots of places that I find surprising. I, for example, have to grapple
with the fact that gay republicans are as gay as I am.
I used to be in a position at the ACLU of representing the com-
munity and I no longer am. My life is easier; but my colleagues are
in the position of having to speak for a community that is diverse in
many ways, and that is no easy task. Particular battles, like the
California referendum battle, will force us to deal with this and
negotiate, hopefully in good faith, and come up with strategies that
take advantage of the differing skills that we bring to the table. I
think that we ought to try to be positive about this diversity in
presenting it to the outside world.
One thing that troubles me is the battle over what authentic gay-
ness is, because, of course, I do not think there is such a thing. The
question of framing this position or that position as not being suffi-
ciently gay is deeply problematic. I think we just have to face the
fact that the ideology and the identity are very different, and tell
the world that and not try to persuade the world that either what
we really represent is sexual freedom, or what we really represent
is wanting to be married like everyone else is.
The second point is somewhat less obvious, and that is that the
non-gay world is significantly more diverse and less monolithic
than we give it credit for. It is true that a huge proportion of non-
gay people are married at some point in their lives, but marriage
has served as a mask for a lot of very untraditional behaviors. The
unraveling of that that has accelerated over the last couple of de-
cades, presenting us with an opportunity that I think we should not
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pass up. In bringing our own very different traditions about rela-
tionships and sexuality to the broader cultural table, we should
point out the ways in which the mainstream is more like us than is
usually acknowledged.
One of the things for which we should call upon the non-gay
world is not simply tolerance of us as L/G/B/T people, but also
more honesty about themselves. Honesty about one's sexual life
- I do not mean in a personal sense, I do not want the Lewinski
issue to go on forever. That is not what I am calling for, but I am
calling for thinking about ways to take more of the hypocrisy and
dishonesty out of the presentation of non-gay life. I think there is
more of a meeting ground there than we sometimes think there is.
I think that an enormous part of the struggle of the right against us
is also a struggle to try and maintain what is increasingly a kind of
myth about what their lives are like. I think we ought to recognize
that and try and use that to our advantage.
JUDGE BATTS: I am going to open this up now to questions
from the audience.
AUDIENCE: Thank you for a very interesting morning touch-
ing on things that I have not thought of. Along those lines, in the
last year I formed a friendship at work with a straight woman and
one day she was particularly tickled when I said that in the gay
community there is a derogatory term sometimes used for people
that have children. They are called "breeders." She was enchanted
by that because she and her husband, although married, have de-
cided that they do not want to raise children. We have discussed
that theme a number of times, and at the same time I became
aware that there is prejudice in our society against women who
choose not to raise children, and yet who choose to get married. I
suppose it applies to men, although it probably affects women
more. The issue of selfishness just occurred to me. The prejudice
that that small segment of the straight community may suffer is one
little aspect that we may want to take into this consideration of
how we reach out to the straight community.
PROF. HUNTER: Your story reminds me of something I saw
when I was watching the 1996 Republican convention on televi-
sion. This was when Elizabeth Dole was walking through the audi-
ence and there was a color commentary about her. Someone
mentioned, and I must say it absolutely stunned me that this could
be said about a woman in 1996, that she had never had a child. She
is not a mother. Robert Dole has a child and she is a step mother
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to his child, but she never had a child. The newscaster thought that
was relevant.
Your comment reminds me that it may be very interesting now
that she has semi-announced a candidacy for the presidency, to
watch how that issue develops, whether it becomes an issue, which
it should not. Given that she is a Republican I predict it will,
within the party if not more broadly. I think your point goes to the
fact that although we often think in an easy or loose way about the
family lives of non-gay people being synonymous with parenting, in
fact they are not.
AUDIENCE: I wonder if you could comment on the role of the
church in the debate.
MR. COLES: In the early 1990s I actually went around the
country talking to people who had passed local gay rights ordi-
nances to find out how they did it. Something that occurred to me
early on is that when you get off the two coasts, religion is a much
more important part of politics in America than it is anywhere else
if you are going to have a cultural dialogue about who we are, and
you are going to have a cultural dialogue about relationships to let
the Church go is to give up what too much of the country is the
most important and the most influential institution. That would
just be completely suicidal and it ignores the fact that lots of people
in our own community are people of faith who go to churches and
take religion very seriously, and you have got to make religion part
of the dialogue and part of the dialogue on our side.
MS. ETTELBRICK: Also, the Catholic Conference takes posi-
tions on pieces of legislation, both federally and in state govern-
ment, and here in New York. We have worked very closely with
Dignity chapters in talking with Cardinal O'Connor and other
members of the Catholic Conference about moving them at least
into a neutral position on things like the Hate Crimes Bill and the
Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Bill, so there is a very
pragmatic political reason that we need to hook up with those or-
ganizations like Dignity that can advocate from within.
JUDGE BATTS: Evan?
MR. WOLFSON: Well I agree with those comments and I think
I will just add a couple others. One is that, in Hawaii and in
Alaska, particularly in Hawaii, in the anti-marriage, anti-gay cam-
paigns we just had to fight, the Mormon church and fundamentalist
Christian groups threw more than $2 million into that campaign.
They were by far the largest single contributors. They are our or-
ganized opponents, not the public at large. The public at large may
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not yet support us, they may still be in need of being reached, but
they are not the ones who are taking to the barricades, funding
huge campaigns against us. It is these organized opponents who
wrap themselves in the name of religion and to whom we cannot
concede that name of religion. They should not be the voice of
religion in America any more than any other single entity should
be.
The second thing I would say is that affirmatively we should not
concede that title. Many of us are religious. Many of us are moral.
Certainly our cause is moral. What we are fighting for is moral.
We are fighting for equality and the fulfillment of the American
commitment to individual liberty, the pursuit of happiness and re-
spect for all people. We are the moral ones and we should hold
that. I mentioned the Sacramento ceremony in which more than
ninety non-gay clergy made that civil rights statement. We should
be holding, inviting and engaging those people in dialogue all
across the country. Indeed, next week is the second annual Na-
tional Freedom to Marry Day, on which we have called on people,
gay and non-gay, in every community, school and entity to do
something to celebrate, denote and redouble our outreach to non-
gay people and, as of today, there are going to be more than sev-
enty events all across the country, many of which involve things
such as, inter-faith prayer breakfasts, statements by clergy, sermons
in congregations, and so on. We should not, cannot and need not
cede that arena, it is our arena, and what we are fighting for is
right.
AUDIENCE: As I was listening to the panel's discussion, I was
trying to figure out where the lessons were from the gays in the
military. I am wondering, since marriage seems to be a similar
kind of cultural issue, whether we are running against some mind
sets. Could the panel talk about that and how are we dealing with
the lessons?
MR. WOLFSON: Actually that is a question that a number of
us have taken very seriously. There have been deliberate efforts to
do this in a way to benefit from the experiences we had and the
successes and weakness we had in our work. I do not really have
time to go through all of them, but I will give you a few. One is
that it is very clear that we are not going to win our civil rights, we
are not going to win something as momentous as full equality -
whether betokened by inclusion in the military - which is a hall-
mark of citizenship and also the large single federal discrimination
- through one legislative "quick fix" or through delivery of our
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rights by the courts alone. It is a sustained long term effort and we
will not win if we do not sustain our energy and keep the momen-
tum going, keep fighting and not get bored, tired or overwhelmed
or decide we need to focus on a million other things. Unless we
commit to serious long term fight for these issues, we cannot win.
Furthermore, contrary to the mythology that Clinton "created"
these issues, we had been talking about these issues and bringing
them into the courts for some time already. It became a matter of
political and intense discussion. We went through this process with
a good deal of division and uncertainty, and there was no clarity on
exactly how the process should be handled. It was a good faith
effort in many cases, but we were overwhelmed. It was a very
short-term framework to do a lot of work, and in the end it could
not be done. Virtually all the organizations, with the exception of
the legal groups, were having problems, and it really failed at that
juncture.
There was no follow through, however, no continued discussion,
no effort to capitalize even on that failure. No one tried to leverage
for people who had said, "well, the military is different," and turn it
around and make a sustained, intelligent, persuasive argument
about, "well, then what about civilians." We just did not do it right
in that sense, and we cannot afford to repeat this with regard to the
engagement that has broken out and with regard to the freedom to
marry.
Another important lesson, I think, is that you can use that kind
of political battle to engage public discussion and to reach people
and educate them, but if you stop after just a few months, you will
not get the "full bang for your buck," so to speak. We took this
lesson seriously with regard to marriage. Long before it broke out
politically and legally, we were doing a lot of work on the political
front to try to shape the public dialogues, train the vocabulary and
engage spokespeople and have it register, so that when the public
began talking about gay people and marriage - something they
had not, talked about even a few years ago - they were talking
about it largely on our terms, and when the backlash campaign,
vicious and vigorous as it has been, busted out, we were more pre-
pared to deal with it in advance than we usually have been. So
those are, I think, two important ways in which we tried to benefit
from the experience and move it forward.
MR. COLES: Let me suggest two others quickly. One from a
narrow, parochial, legal approach. At the time the "Don't Ask,
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Don't Tell" legislation7 passed, Lambda and the ACLU tried very
hard to think about this problem: in all previous military litigation
we had seemed incapable of getting the courts to agree that the
question was not about the inability of lesbians and gay men to be
good soldiers and sailors, but it was really about other people's
attitudes.
We went to great efforts to structure a couple of pieces of litiga-
tion to this end, which I think we did successfully in the Able8 case
and little bit less so in the Phillips9 case on the west coast. The
lesson out of those cases, as I read the way they came to their final
circuit opinions, is that while we did succeed in getting rid of the
ways courts had used to grapple with that basic question, what we
got was essentially a stunning admission from the circuit courts that
they do not really review constitutional questions when they come
up in the military. Read Judge Noonan's opinion in Phillips or
Judge Walker's final opinion in the Able case, and I think you will
agree with me that this is what they come down to.
The lesson I take from these cases is that this was a necessary
fight and I am glad we did it, but you cannot reasonably expect
legal institutions, in most situations, to make social change way out
in front of where the political institutions are. I think we need to
remember this again and again in what is essentially a political
movement. What arises from the military cases in federal courts is
that when the courts are forced to look at these issues, they will
take a bye on them.
MS. ETTELBRICK: Matt, would you distinguish the pre-
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" arena of military litigation from the past,
because that is where the political structures had been decided
through Congress? Do you think that it put courts in a different
position in looking at this, because I seem to remember the feeling
in the pre-"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" era was that through the slow
whittling away of time, the courts would begin to come around to
recognizing this policy as being discriminatory and the govern-
ment's arguments upholding it were being chipped away very
dramatically.
MR. COLES: That was not my sense during that time. The only
thing that I suppose would give me that feeling would have been
7. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1999) (codifying policy concerning homosexuality in the
armed forces).
8. Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
9. Phillips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1996).
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the Meinhold1° case, but I thought the cases went better in the
early 1970s than they did later into the 1980s and toward the end of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" with the Steffan" case. No, I did not see
great progress beforehand.
PROF. HUNTER: Well, I think there was. I am not sure that I
would draw that time line distinction quite that way, but I do think
that the cultural impact of the litigation was growing. I think that
the Watkins12 case had an enormous impact. It was a stunning mo-
ment when the Ninth Circuit panel ruled in favor of Watkins on
equal protection grounds.' 3 Although that did not last as a matter
of law, it remains a stunning moment, a sign that something
profound had shifted. I think that the Steffan case, although it pro-
duced nothing in terms of legal victory, was an enormously useful
and powerful educational tool. I think that when Clinton was
elected and announced his intention to lift the ban, our community
basically ended up trying to surf a tidal wave. We were just over-
whelmed by a whole convergence of factors in a situation that was
pretty unique. I think that we collectively did the best we could.
One of the things that has interested me since then has been
looking at the impact of that debate and the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" statute on military policies covering non-gay members of the
military. Over the last couple of years, there have been many con-
troversies over adultery; often by high-ranking officers. These situ-
ations have caused a lot of grief in the military. Part of what has
driven those situations has been their sense that prosecutions have
to be fair. The services have been accused of applying a different
standard for prosecution when the officer being accused is a wo-
man or is African American. The military does not want to be seen
as so flagrantly discriminatory in how they treat sexual conduct.
They want to be able to say that they are going to apply sexual
rules across the board. What happens when they do try and apply
them across the board is that straight people find them ridiculous
and insane. I think that the issue of military policy about sexuality
is still completely up in the air and very much in flux, despite the
demise of gay challenges.
MR. COLES: If you stand back and think about the hearings
and look at this, even one step back away from military policy in
general, the hearings were an enormous cultural step forward. We
10. Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 123 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1997).
11. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
12. United States v. Watkins, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
13. See id. at 711.
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moved from an era of talking about lesbians and gay men as being
incapable, being criminals or being mentally disabled. I think the
hearings cut through all that with the entire country watching and
essentially came down to saying, "Now the real problem is that you
make us very nervous, so nervous that we really cannot do our jobs
when you are around." That was ten years of political progress and
I actually think that viewing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" as a failure is
a great mistake. I think it was a great cultural success.
We are still working out the details with policy, and I think that
is going to take a while, but I honestly think that once you gain
some perspective, the lesson we ought to take out of this is that this
was a huge success from a cultural standpoint. Ultimately this is a
battle to change the way people think about us and our relation-
ships more than anything else.
MR. WOLFSON: I just want to say I agree with that and that
was an example of advancement because we engaged in the battle.
Where I think we dropped the ball was actually afterwards. We
could have done things better but now we have learned and hope-
fully in the next battles we will do better. Where we have dropped
the ball in the military question is we have not engaged in the con-
tinuing public discussion. Here we are now, in 1999, in Nan's fa-
mous formulation, where the breakthrough win of the freedom to
marry, as she put it, either shimmers or lurks on the horizon.
We could still win that breakthrough within the next few months.
The lesson that we should be taking from 1993 and the battle in the
military is that we cannot just wait for these things to come to us
through the "deus ex machina" of President Clinton or the state
supreme courts or some cultural shifts. We should be out there
mounting the barricades, building the bridges, engaging people and
being prepared to withstand the battles in legislatures every day. If
we are committed to seizing the most out of every single one of
these breakthrough opportunities, be it the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" hearings, the breakthrough win of the freedom to marry or
horrible tragedies that nevertheless give us opportunities, like Mat-
thew Shepard's death, 4 it is not enough to wait for them to fall
from the sky. Every one of us, week by week, needs to be prepar-
ing to put ourselves in a good position to seize that luck and the
challenge of doing that is directly presented around our freedom to
marry.
14. See supra note 4.
QUEER LAW 1999
JUDGE BATTS: Does anyone have a final question to put to
the panel?
AUDIENCE: I work at the Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund, and we do the traditional race-based civil rights
litigation, and I personally do voting rights. I think we have done a
lot of good work in the community on looking at coalition projects
on legislation and public policy issues. What I have not really seen
is the co-litigation that traditional civil rights organizations can do
with L/G/B/T civil rights organizations through a litigation strategy.
Now I know the body of law is radically different, and there is
much more federal legislation that protects racial and ethnic mi-
norities than there obviously are of the L/G/B/T communities.
There have to be ways in which we can do more than just amicus
briefs for the U.S. Supreme Court in support of each other's posi-
tions. I would like to know what your thoughts are on some co-
litigation strategies between the different racial and ethnic civil
rights organizations.
MS. ETTELBRICK: It does not happen very often, because
that is where I first went in my thought. Years ago, I remember,
there was a case of two women who were assaulted on a subway
here in New York. They were a lesbian couple. They were latinas.
It was very difficult to form a coalition in terms of different priori-
ties that PRLDEF and Lambda had. Ten or twelve years ago, we
had not yet begun to work together. You just cannot put people
together over a piece of litigation if they have not tried to work out
some of the issues beforehand. And most litigation does come up
spontaneously or in response to something immediate that has hap-
pened to somebody. I think to work out some of the different per-
spectives in the course of representing a client or clients is often
very difficult. I actually think the amicus brief approach is a very
good approach as well, and I would be curious as to what thoughts
you had of how it would enhance the litigation to do it jointly. Is it
better to present to the court an intersection, or is it alliance build-
ing that can enrich each of the institutions later on to take on a new
area of the law?
JUDGE BATTS: Anyone else want to respond to that?
MR. WOLFSON: I will just say that I think there has been in-
creased resource and research sharing, and the amicus sharing that
does go on is not just in the U.S. Supreme Court. There has been
and there could still be more very important amici briefs that vari-
ous combinations of groups have done with each other and I would
not dismiss them as just amicus. I think that amicus briefs are an
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appropriate use of the resources that the groups have. I would ac-
tually like to see us figure out ways that we can work together on
the public education and outreach work around our respective
legal work. I think our constituencies ought to better understand
the intersection, whether through joint forums, letters or work. I
do not know that it is so much what we can do as lawyers in court
as what we can do as lawyers out of court together that would re-
ally benefit the shared commitments we have.
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SEXUALJGENDER IDENTITY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS
MS. BADEN-MAYER: My name is Alexis Baden-Mayer. I am
a third-year at City University of New York School of Law. Last
summer, I was the Dr. M.L. "Hank" Henry, Jr. Judicial Intern. The
"Hank" Henry Judicial Internship is a paid ten-week summer in-
ternship under the auspices of the Lesbian and Gay Law Associa-
tion Foundation of Greater New York ("LeGaL"). The program is
designed to give a student committed to lesbian and gay rights ex-
posure to a variety of courts and tribunals through placements with
openly gay and lesbian judges. The "Hank" Henry Fund for Judi-
cial Internships was established in memory of Dr. Henry whose
ground breaking work encouraged openly lesbian and gay lawyers
to seek and achieve judicial office.
I would like to introduce the panelists. Judge Paul G. Feinman
was elected to the Civil Court of the City of New York in the First
Municipal Court District in November 1996, after winning a con-
tested primary race. His election marked the first time that an
openly gay male succeeded in being directly elected to the civil
court. Since taking the bench in January 1997, he has been as-
signed directly to the Criminal Court of the City of New York for
Manhattan.
Before his election, Judge Feinman served for eight years as the
principal law clerk to the Honorable Angela M. Mazzarelli, Associ-
ate Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, of New
York's Supreme Court. During his tenure as Justice Mazzarelli's
law clerk, he worked in the Appellate Division, both in civil and
criminal trial terms in the Supreme Court and in the narcotics
court, all in New York County.
Prior to working in the court system, Judge Feinman was a staff
attorney for the Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid Soci-
ety in New York County, and there he briefly shared an office with
co-panelist Lori Cohen.
He began his legal career as a staff attorney for the Appeals Bu-
reau of the Legal Aid Society in Nassau County, Long Island.
Judge Feinman is a former president and board member of
LeGaL. He is a member of many bar associations and organiza-
tions and currently serves on the Criminal Courts Committee of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Com-
mittee on Lesbians and Gay Men in the Law of the New York
County Lawyers Association.
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Judge Feinman received his law degree from the University of
Minnesota in 1985. He was a research assistant in the area of com-
parative criminal procedure, a legal writing instructor and co-
founder and past president of the Gay and Lesbian Law Students
Association ("GALLA"). One of the legacies of his involvement
as GALLA's president of the University of Minnesota was the bar-
ring of the military and other employers who discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation from conducting on-campus interviews
in the Law School.
He graduated from Columbia College in Manhattan in 1981 with
an AB degree in French literature and language served as a chair
of what was then known as GPC - Gay People at Columbia.
Next, Judge Michael H. Sonberg graduated in 1968 from Queens
College and from Harvard Law School in 1971. He worked for
twenty years as a corporate attorney doing commercial litigation in
practice in Manhattan. He was appointed to fill an interim vacancy
on the Civil Court by Mayor Dinkins in August 1991, and re-ap-
pointed to fill interim vacancies by Mayor Dinkins and Mayor Giu-
liani. Appointed by Mayor Giuliani to the Criminal Court in April
1995 for a term ending in December 2001, he is the only openly gay
or lesbian judicial appointee of Mayor Giuliani.
He has been in the Bronx Criminal Court since his appointment.
He has been involved in the "Hank" Henry internship, and I had
the pleasure of spending a week with him last summer doing ar-
raignments. He has been nominated to serve a third one-year term
as the Secretary of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, and he is its first openly lesbian or gay officer. He has previ-
ously served as the Chair of the Committee on State Courts of Su-
perior Jurisdiction and Co-Chair of the Council on Judicial
Administration.
He is President of the Association of Lesbian and Gay Judges, a
New York-based group, and Secretary of the International Associ-
ation of Lesbian and Gay Judges. He is on the Executive Commit-
tee of the Harvard Law School Association and on the Board of
the Association's Gay and Lesbian and Bisexual Alumnae
Committee.
Next, Lori Cohen graduated from law school from the Univer-
sity of Buffalo in May 1986. She went to work at the Legal Aid
Society, Criminal Defense Division, where she stayed for three
years. Then she worked for a midsize firm, Mount Cotton & Wil-
len. While there, she says she was "outed" inadvertently by the
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New York Times in an article about a demonstration. They were
discussing lesbian and gay attorneys and quoted her.
She said it was really not a big deal, as she had been out to eve-
ryone but the partners, and they were okay about it, she says, but
not enthusiastic.
She left Mount Cotton in August 1989. At the time, she was
representing the Safe Sex Six, the folks who had entered St. Pat-
rick's Cathedral and engaged in an act of civil disobedience. Their
trial was held in the winter of 1989, and although they were ulti-
mately convicted, it was one of the first cases televised on "Court
TV." Additionally, the defendants were sentenced to a lesser pun-
ishment than they had been offered prior to trial.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, she represented over 5000
demonstrators from AIDS groups, lesbian and gay rights groups
and reproductive freedom groups. In 1990, she started her own law
firm with Karen Funk. They sought to start a practice that middle-
income families, gay and straight, could afford. In that sense, they
wanted to become the 1990s version of the small-town lawyer, the
lawyer you went to when you bought your house, when you wrote
your will, when your children got arrested, when your small busi-
ness needed a contract to be looked at, got divorced, et cetera, and
they have accomplished that goal. She specializes in criminal de-
fense work and handles primarily pattern robberies and homicides.
This morning, at the roundtable discussion, Judge Deborah A.
Batts asked the panelists how we, the queer community, choose
our issues. Matt Coles responded by saying that first we look at
where the harm is. I would like to ask our panelists, where are
queer people being harmed by the criminal courts? In the
processes of the criminal justice system? In discriminatory law en-
forcement? What are the harms that we can identify and how do
we eliminate them?
MS. COHEN: I think the greatest harm, or really injustice, done
to lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgendered ("L/G/B/T") folks in
the criminal justice system is that a lot of these alternative pro-
grams that are available to offenders are not available in any realm
that would deal with issues that specifically affect gays and lesbians.
For instance, same-sex domestic violence; there is a very popular
batterers program where people who are convicted or accused of
battering their spouses can go into the program, get treatment, and
then usually have their cases dismissed or reduced. Those pro-
grams specifically do not accept gay or lesbian folks.
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JUDGE SONBERG: And you would not want to send a gay or
lesbian batterer to that program, because they would not come out
in one piece.
MS. COHEN: There are several programs like that, which do
not really deal with the issues of the gay and lesbian community. I
think that is really where the biggest disservice to gays and lesbians
are.
JUDGE FEINMAN: I agree with what Lori just said, but that is
sort of a very specific issue in our time and place in New York City.
I think that if you broaden the question, you have to actually go
and look at the very nature of consensual sodomy laws. While con-
sensual sodomy laws have been falling state by state, slowly and
surely, across the nation, the fact remains that there are consensual
sodomy laws on the books in various jurisdictions. That is abso-
lutely, in my mind, the greatest harm to our community, because it
goes to the very essence of who we are, and it goes to the very
essence of our most intimate relationships and it criminalizes them
and it brands us as deviants, it brands us as non-persons, not enti-
tled to any sort of equal protection under the law.
So to the extent that those laws still exist, they are extremely
harmful, because it is then used as the underpinning for all sorts of
other laws and unlawful discrimination.
JUDGE SONBERG: The statute is still on the books in New
York, and I have actually seen it charged on a misdemeanor com-
plaint. After they peeled me off the ceiling, it was not there much
longer. I said, "Excuse me, do you know about People v.
Onofre?'1 5 The look was, "What?" I said, "Okay, it is before your
time. It is 1980. The Court of Appeals declared this statute uncon-
stitutional. It was dismissed." Surprisingly, I did not get an "Over
the People's objection," because they figured they really better go
read the case before they objected.
I think that in New York today the primary place where the
criminal law intersects with L/G/B/T people because of who they
are is in the domestic violence setting. I think that, to some extent,
part to the problem is invisibility, because I have a sense that we do
not always find out about the cases that are truly domestic disputes
as opposed to disputes between people who know each other. You
know, I will ask the question if I am doing an arraignment and I am
told these are roommates or they are something - sometimes
gaydar picks up - and the district attorney will say -
15. 405 N.E.2d 243 (N.Y. 1980).
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JUDGE FEINMAN: "How did you know, Judge?"
JUDGE SONBERG: No, the district attorney will say "no." I
say, "Is this a romantic relationship," and the assistant district at-
torney will say "no," and the defense attorney will say, "Well, can
we approach" or "that is not my understanding" - because fre-
quently, particularly with people of color, they do not want to give
that up, even if they are the victim, to the police. They are not sure
what the reaction will be if they have been assaulted and they tell
the police that the person who assaulted them is in a romantic rela-
tionship with them, and they are not going to share that with the
assistant district attorney who interviews them over a video
hookup, because they are not going to think to ask the question.
And unless the defendant says "that is my lover" and the police
happen to write it down and it is told to you, they will give notice
of it as the statement they intend to use in their case in chief, you
are not going to know about it when you are doing an arraignment.
I think we probably miss some number of cases, which makes the
disposition a lot easier, because you do not have to worry about the
absence of appropriate programs, because they are not pegged as a
domestic violence dispute and, therefore, no one is looking to put
the batterer in an alternatives-to-violence program. But it also
means you are not addressing the problem.
MS. COHEN: That goes back to Paul's point. Members of our
community are afraid of police in some way and afraid to identify
themselves as L/G/B/T folks, because they are afraid of the reac-
tion of the police. I think until we get that underlying fear or dis-
crimination because of how we have been treated by the police out
of society at large, we are going to always be faced with that
problem.
MS. BADEN-MAYER: So how does it come down differently
when the situation is not treated as a domestic violence dispute and
it is just plain violence? Is there an advantage sometimes to the
victim in those circumstances?
JUDGE SONBERG: Victim, no. For the defendant, yes.
MS. BADEN-MAYER: There is an advantage to the
defendant?
JUDGE SONBERG: Absolutely, because if the injury is not se-
rious - we are talking about soft tissue injury in all likelihood -
they will be permitted to plead to a violation, get a conditional dis-
charge, maybe a couple of days of community service.
JUDGE FEINMAN: Some of us do not generally give commu-
nity service on assault charges.
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MS. COHEN: Well, it is mostly viewed as a fight, a fight be-
tween people over some type of thing, as opposed to what domes-
tic violence really is, which is a power situation between people
who have intimacy, who are intimately involved. So it is treated
much differently in the criminal justice system, because there is no
feeling that there is an underlying need for treatment.
JUDGE FEINMAN: Very often, whether it is the district attor-
ney trying to convince the judge to go along with the disposition so
he can get his or her case out of the drawer and into the closed file,
or whether it is a defense attorney, it will be pitched as, "Oh, it was
just a bar fight," or "it is just a catfight between girls." You know,
men and women suddenly become "boys" and "girls," even though
they are adults in criminal court.
If it is pitched that way, it is going to be treated very differently
than if it is pitched that this is about an intimate relationship where
there are all sorts of complicated issues regarding economic power,
control, access to the home, property issues and things like that.
JUDGE SONBERG: The converse, of course, is that when the
police come, outing the other person can be part of the power play
between people in an intimate relationship, and it all gets fairly
complex. I know from a colleague of mine in Boston who is the
President of the International Association of Lesbian and Gay
Judges, Boston has wonderful protocols and training in terms of
teaching law enforcement and district attorneys how to try to spot
same-sex domestic violence. And I know that Anti-Violence Pro-
ject ("AVP") certainly has done a lot here in working with the po-
lice department. But I do not have a sense that we have come to
the same place.
JUDGE FEINMAN: It is not enough to just point the finger at
the police. I think we have to also look at ourselves and the re-
sponsibility that we as a community have to create and demand
awareness and training of the police, judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys and various counselors and providers. We as a commu-
nity have to recognize that this exists and that we have an obliga-
tion to address it. It is very easy to just point a finger at the police
and say, "Well, the police do not arrest or do not treat this the
same." But, you know, we have a responsibility to demand it and
to create a space in which people can actually address these issues
without having to layer on the whole issue of homophobia.
One of the programs that Michael was talking about very specifi-
cally was this violence recovery program that is conducted in Bos-
ton by the Fenway Community Health Center. It is just a model
318
QUEER LAW 1999
program, and we should be seeking to create things like that here
in New York.
JUDGE SONBERG: One other thought that Paul provoked:
The one place that victims do become disadvantaged is that where
you have a woman who is battered so severely that she is at the
point where she is prepared to move into a shelter. The shelters
are for straight woman, so then you are talking about forcing some-
one to go into the closet if they want that relief, because they are
just not going to be comfortable in most cases going into a shelter
situation with other battered women who are going to talk about
the man who beats them, where their situation is that they are be-
ing abused by their girlfriend.
And there are no shelters for men. There is no place for a man
who is battered in a relationship to go to be safe.
MS. COHEN: A shelter probably is not the safest place for a
gay man anyway.
JUDGE SONBERG: Right, unless there were beds for gay
men. This is where you started to get beds for gay youth who were
abused by their families. It is an analogous problem, with adults
rather than teenagers and children.
MS. BADEN-MAYER: Is this the responsibility of the state, or
are we, the queer community, going to have to create these pro-
grams and shelters ourselves?
MS. COHEN: I personally think it is the responsibility of the
state, but I do not see this state under this administration doing
that. I think the community would have to do it, just as they did in
Boston.
MS. BADEN-MAYER: Could we use litigation to make the
state responsible?
MS. COHEN: Well, the litigation is always a long process that
deals with an answer in the future. I think we need an answer now,
and I think it has to come from the community.
MS. BADEN-MAYER: Can you tell us a little about the vio-
lence recovery program in Boston at the Fenway Community
Health Center and how it might be copied here in New York?
JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, I think that what you primarily need
to do is you need to get a provider - and whether that is through
the center or through something like AVP or Callen-Lorde, in es-
sence, you need to get somebody who is going to administrate this,
and they tend to involve training, education and counseling ses-
sions, whether that is done in the form of group or individual
therapy.
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My only point in bringing that up was not so much to talk specifi-
cally about that program, but to sort of put out there that we as a
community need to demand from the state - whether it is de-
manding from your legislators or demanding from your police de-
partment or your criminal justice system - that these issues be
addressed.
It is a very real issue. Because I reside in New York County, if I
am in an all-purpose part, where you see, let's say, an average of
100 to 150 cases a day in the course of one week, I will see at least
one same-sex domestic case a week, and that is not an insignificant
amount of cases, because I am only one of six all-purpose judges.
Essentially, what you are saying is in at least six cases a week,
there is nothing out there to deal with these issues. I think you
need to create a groundswell, whether that be by demanding from
your local elected officials or through other agencies. That was my
point only in referring to the Fenway program, that I think that it is
something that came from the community.
MS. BADEN-MAYER: Are there any questions from the audi-
ence on this?
AUDIENCE: Yes, I have a question. I did an internship at the
Legal Aid Society Criminal Defense in Manhattan, so the discus-
sion comes out of that experience. It is, I think, a lot easier to talk
about services in the intimate violence context than when the de-
fendant has something else and I wondered what sort of things you
have thought about or done for criminal defendants who were ar-
rested on drug charges or something like that.
I am interested in transgendered people getting arrested, do they
get their hormones while they are in jail; or if they have HIV, do
they get their medications while they are locked up in the back and
all that. Are there any protocols for that?
JUDGE FEINMAN: When I was at the Legal Aid Society
Criminal Defense Division years ago in Manhattan, I remember a
colleague of mine bringing a writ, heard by Judge Berkman when
HIV sprang upon the scene in such a large way in the early-to-mid-
1980s, and defendants were shackled to beds in the hospital wards
and not getting any treatment whatsoever.
It has come a long way since those days. That does not mean
that we are in a situation where it is ideal. The reality is that in a
lot of the population that you see in criminal court, particularly
with the substance abuse issue, you have people who are going in
and out of the system constantly, and so you get to the whole issue
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of being denied your access to protease inhibitors or other kinds of
medications.
Then, you get into the whole concern about developing resist-
ance, and I know that, as a judge, I am reluctant to give any sort of
a jail sentence where you feel that there is going to bean inhibition
of the person to get appropriate medical treatment.
On the other hand, we are assured by the Department of Correc-
tion that, in fact, if people have prescriptions or can make them
aware of prescriptions, they will be given appropriate medical
attention.
JUDGE SONBERG: You cannot say that everyone who has
ever been a junkie and shared a dirty needle and has gotten HIV is
allowed to go out and commit crimes and not be punished. That is
the other side of it.
Within the last month I was arraigning a case, one I probably
would have looked for a short period of jail given the defendant's
fairly recent repetitive criminal history for the same offense, and
the lawyers said, "He is HIV-positive," and I said, "So?"
They said, "Well, medication is an issue." I asked what the meds
were. It helps to know - I do not think any of my non-gay col-
leagues would have had a clue - and the person was taking a
cocktail. I was not prepared on a case that I probably would have
been looking for ten days in jail, to take a risk on him getting an
inappropriate medical regimen. In this case, I decided I would give
this person a straight conditional discharge rather than the jail that
I had pretty much decided was appropriate, given the offense and
the record.
When it comes to more serious things, it is a situation where ad-
vocates from the community, rather than the court, really have to
go and make sure that medical treatment on Riker's is appropriate,
because there is a real public health issue; you do not want to be
creating drug-resistant HIV. Because the chances are, particularly
to the extent that we are talking about people who become HIV-
positive through IV drug use there is going to be a dirty needle in
his or her arm within days after release. That is just reality.
MS. COHEN: I think there are a couple of different issues.
One is the general health care issue of anybody who becomes
incarcerated. I think we can all agree that health care to inmates
across the country is at a woeful existence.
I get probably five to ten calls a week from colleagues who rep-
resent mostly teenagers at this point, who are involved in drugs or
robbery - or whatever it is, shoplifting, grand larceny cases - and
1999]
322 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
they are gay and lesbian. The judges want to give them some type
of alternative-to-incarceration program, and they want to know if
there are programs out there that can deal with some of these
issues.
Just this week, I had a gentleman call me. He had a young man
who was very effeminate and was having a very difficult time in
high school and had gone out and started shoplifting, and he had
gotten arrested about five times in five weeks, and now he was
looking at going to jail. The judge basically told him, "If you can
find me some type of program that can address some of his issues, I
will consider it."
There is not one specific program out there, but if you are willing
to look and you can piece together your own program - we had
him transferred to one of the gay and lesbian high schools. We had
him start working with Hetrick Martin. There are ways and re-
sources out there, but there are very few programs that deal with
gay and lesbian issues.
There are, for instance, residential drug treatment programs that
deal specifically with gays and lesbians. There are probably three
beds available. If you take the time to find them and if you get the
right judge - I have to say in New York County, you probably
convince most of them - you can especially try to help a kid,
somebody fifteen, sixteen, seventeen.
JUDGE FEINMAN: Every judge wants to believe that at that
young age you can still make a difference in turning a person
around and hopefully avoid a recidivism problem.
But there is a broader issue, which is that you do not have drug
and alcohol treatment on demand, you do not have the ability to
say, "Okay, what is going on here is a broader dysfunction in the
family unit and I need to send the whole family to counseling to
deal with the fact that they have a gay teenager."
Within the context of the way the criminal justice system has it
set up and the limits on resources and the powers of the judge,
there is only so much that you can do. I think that that is very hard
to begin to accept when you start dealing with criminal justice is-
sues for the first time.
There are only a finite amount of ranges of sentences. You have
certain restrictions on what you can do and what your powers are.
There is the ability to be creative, but part of it is what the legisla-
ture allows you to do or does not allow you to do.
JUDGE SONBERG: The other thing is that, other than same-
sex domestic violence and transgendered, or incredibly effeminate
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men, or someone with an HIV issue which the lawyers disclose to
you - at which point I generally say to them, "Did your client
authorize you to tell me this, or are you committing a Class E fel-
ony under the Public Health Law?' 1 6 - which makes a lot of jaws
drop. After they have it in open court, I call them up and say, "I
sure hope your client said it was okay for you to."
But other than those classes, I do not know who in front of me is
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and in some cases I do not know if they are
transgender.
That someone is L/G/B/T really does not have an impact on how
I deal with the case unless it is relevant to the case, and certainly
that is one of the issues that people first had when gays first came
up through the appointive system before we started getting elected
to the bench. One of the questions I am constantly asking myself
over seven years, which I have not come to an answer, is what does
it mean to be an openly gay judge?
I know that Dick Failla talked about his first interview at the
City Bar Judiciary Committee-when he was appointed. Dick Failla
was the first openly gay man appointed to the Criminal Court in
New York City. Someone named Bill Thom, who was one of the
founders of Lambda Legal, had been appointed to a number of
interim civil court vacancies, had run a couple of times and never
gotten elected. Dick was appointed to Criminal Court and was the
first openly gay person on Criminal Court, and then he was the first
openly gay person elected to the Supreme Court. He died in 1993.
But when he first went through the process, you know, he got
the same insulting, ignorant questions that I am sure that the early
African Americans who were appointed to the bench got, and
probably the first Asian Americans and Latinos, which is, "Well,
how would you deal with a case if the parties in front of you are
queer?"
JUDGE FEINMAN: I am sure they did not use that word.
JUDGE SONBERG: I am sure they did not. And the response
is, "What in the world are you talking about? You take an oath to
do equal justice, and the fact that you share a sexual orientation
with a victim, a defendant, a plaintiff, a lawyer, is of no more rele-
vance than if you share an ethnic heritage or a religious heritage or
gender, you just try to be a little more perceptive on the criminal
side in terms of a disposition if that is relevant to the disposition."
16. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1999).
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MS. COHEN: There are two stories, I think, that really show
how far - I mean, we are sort of in Doomsday here now, but I
think the criminal justice system has come so far even in the past
twelve years that I have been involved with it.
The first is a story I heard at Judge Vela's memorial about how it
was that he came out. He was a very prominent district attorney in
New York County, and he was handling a homicide case, and the
defense attorney said to him - and, of course, I have no idea if this
is really true, but this is the story that goes around - "Listen, if
you do not do this for my client, I am going to tell everybody that
you are gay." You know, in this day and age, I do not see that
happening. I do not see the Manhattan District Attorney's Office
having that big a view on whether their assistants are gay or not -
and in fact, they openly recruit gay assistants. So I think the atti-
tudes towards the participants themselves have changed in the
criminal justice system.
JUDGE SONBERG: In the Bronx there are either two or three
openly gay assistants out of 400.
MS. COHEN: The other story is about a judge who was sitting
in criminal court right when AIDS became a very big subject, and
court officers would put on masks and gloves if they had to deal
with anybody who they thought might have HIV or AIDS. The
court officers approached the judge on the bench and they said to
the judge, "Judge, we have this person coming in, he has AIDS,
you know, we have the gloves, we have the masks; you know, what
do you want us to do?" Court lore has it that she said to the court
officers, "I want to arraign him, not fuck him; just bring him in."
JUDGE SONBERG: I did a jury trial the beginning of this year
where one of the exhibits was a pair of bloodstained pants that the
complainant was wearing when he was allegedly stabbed, and he
was HIV-positive, and the assistant always put on gloves -
MS. COHEN: Well, I have seen that in trials where people are
not HIV-positive. I mean, I think if I had to touch an exhibit that
involved blood, I would wear gloves.
JUDGE SONBERG: Well except that, as a medical matter, the
fact is that viruses do not live on fabric for weeks on end. I was not
going to tell people they should not. But when I told the jury they
could look at the pants in the jury room, I said, "We will give you
gloves to wear if you want to handle this and you feel it is neces-
sary," but I said, "My understanding of the science is that any bac-
teria or virus on the pants would not be an issue at this point." A
little AIDS education, but it is a touchy issue.
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AUDIENCE: Can you talk a little about whether you think the
prosecution of public lewdness laws against gay men is just or un-
just? I am not talking about illegal entrapment by the police or
perjury or them lying about what they saw. I am just talking about
the enforcement of the laws that are on the books in a way that
does not involve misconduct on the part of law enforcement.
MS. COHEN: Well, let's be clear. The statute is the arresting of
anybody. I mean, I think that gay men are proportionately higher.
JUDGE SONBERG: Depends where. In the Bronx, the bulk
of the people I have seen on public lewdness charges are men who
appear to be acting in front of women and in front of children, and
not with other men.
MS. COHEN: Right. I was going to go on to say that there are
large sections of the city that there are prosecution of public lewd-
ness cases that clearly do not involve gay men.
MS. BADEN-MAYER: Could you make a distinction between
a sort of "consensual" public lewdness and -
JUDGE FEINMAN: There is no such thing as consensual pub-
lic lewdness.
AUDIENCE: I am talking about consensual public lewdness.
MS. COHEN: I do not think you can discuss it like that. I think
it goes back to Paul's initial point, the criminalization in this society
of consensual sex - whether it is consensual sex between a prosti-
tute and her john, or whether it is consensual sex between two
adults in a car, in a bathroom or wherever they may be.
AUDIENCE: Well, let's make it easier. What about sex in pub-
lic restrooms?
MS. COHEN: Between two consenting adults?
AUDIENCE: Two consenting men, yes.
MS. COHEN: I think it is a waste of time. I think it is a waste of
time to prosecute those people. But that is my own personal view,
and I do not think either of these two gentlemen, since they sit on
the bench, are either able under the law to comment on that or
would like to comment on that, given that they may have to be re-
appointed some day.
JUDGE SONBERG: What happens if you are with your six-
year-old nephew and you walk into the public john and there is
what is sometimes referred to as a "weenie whacker" at the urinal.
What message does that send to the child, and is not that some-
thing that society has the right to question?
MS. COHEN: I do not think the child notices.
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AUDIENCE: Well, see, that is where I am coming from. I do
not know what the statistics are or how disproportionate they are.
And certainly, if it is a problem in public restrooms and society
wants to stop that from happening for some of the very reasons
that you mentioned, short of illegal conduct on the part of the po-
lice, I do not have all that much of a problem with that.
JUDGE FEINMAN: Built into the statute is the notion that it is
actually public. In other words, if you are not doing this in a way
that is exposed to the public, the case law is clear: if somebody is in
a closed booth or something that is not public, then it is not public
lewdness. So the whole nature of the offense, the way it is defined
under the law, is that it is going to be in a way that is open to public
view.
There is the famous case involving a heterosexual couple that
went to the Court of Appeals -
JUDGE SONBERG: People v. McNamara.7
JUDGE FEINMAN: I remember cases by their facts.
JUDGE SONBERG: I cited it in a decision I wrote last year.
So I remember the case.
MS. COHEN: They should just get rid of urinals.
I take my six-year-old nephew into the women's room, so I do
not have that problem. But it seems to me that if we did not have
urinals, there would be no one standing in a place where people
can see them doing what they are doing.
JUDGE FEINMAN: That said, I just want to finish the point,
which is that I think that where the judge plays the role in this is
sort of, as in any case for any offense, reminding the parties of the
role of proportional punishment. I am often put in the situation of
having to remind young assistants, one of whom recently gave me a
lecture about the moral outrage of public lewdness, that there has
to be proportionality in sentencing and that very often, for a lot of
gentlemen that I see, particularly gay gentlemen who come in on
these kinds of offenses, is that the stigma of the initial arrest is
sufficient punishment and that you will not see them as repeat
offenders.
So you try to work out a disposition that will result in a non-
criminal disposition. Perhaps it is adjourned in contemplation of
dismissal or something of that nature. What I find offensive some-
times is that they will ask for a punishment that is actually more
severe than what they recommend in some first-arrest assault
17. 585 N.E.2d 788 (N.Y. 1991).
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cases. That is part of the judge's role, to make sure that there is
proportionality and that there is balance in how offenses are
treated.
JUDGE SONBERG: Yes, and one of the other pieces of it is
that there is literature that suggests that men who masturbate in
front of women is someone who has a high risk of going on to com-
mit other sex offenses. What are you going to say: "If you can
prove you are gay, it is one offense, and if you are not gay that it is
something else?" One of the nice things about the criminal law is
that things that seem easy on their face, when you start probing,
frequently end up being far more complex.
AUDIENCE: I was going to mention that I think it is a great
opportunity for parents when they take their children into public
restrooms to begin teaching them that when you go in a public rest-
room, you mind your own business and you do not involve yourself
with what other people are doing.
Also, they should ignore what is going on in closed booths, be-
cause there are a lot of activities that go on in public restrooms and
parks - drug use, dealing, that sort of thing, various other unsani-
tary conditions - that children should learn to go into a restroom,
do their business, and leave.
Secondly, I was going to mention that most of these cases are -
they are the perfect case to be adjourned contemplating dismissal.
Most prosecutors, community officers, do not follow up on these
cases.
JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, they definitely follow through in
New York County. Do not think otherwise. It does take the in-
volvement of the judge to get an adjournment in contemplation of
dismissal. The standard offer of the New York County District At-
torney's Office on a first arrest for public lewdness is disorderly
conduct, which is still a conviction for a violation, and a sentence of
a conditional discharge with some community service. It often re-
quires going to a bureau chief. It requires going over the line assis-
tant's head, because it is a so-called departure from the guidelines.
But it can be done, and it is done fairly regularly. It just takes a
little pushing.
That said, you know, I have had occasion to have people who -
I had one gentleman who was arrested four times in the same rest-
room, and my position was "I am not going to bat for you; you did
not get the message the first time. Sorry."
AUDIENCE: I am interested in the issue of people who have
been victims of assailants as the result of their gender identity.
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Where I am from, in El Paso, Texas, that happens a lot. Pretty
little boys get picked up by people who appear to be gay-friendly,
and then they wind up in the hospital for two weeks with two bro-
ken legs and a broken arm, and nine months later their assailant
walks. So I am just interested in what is going on here in this court
system in those sorts of circumstances.
JUDGE SONBERG: We have a hate crimes law that does not
address sexual orientation. My experience - and I have only sat
in the Bronx - is that if the case as it comes in clearly has a bias
basis, and it does not have to necessarily be a statutorily-recog-
nized bias basis, that the District Attorney's Office deals with it
differently than they would deal with another stranger-on-stranger
assault. If there is language used - you know, if you have a case
where there is no language that is used, if there is nothing on the
case that says this is a bias-based attack, if you do not have the
basis for it, you cannot talk about it.
But on the ones where there is language or there is something in
terms of the conduct, the nature of the assault is such that it is clear
that there is a sexual undercurrent to the crime, that they deal with
it that way and treat it more seriously than they would.
JUDGE FEINMAN: That being said, I think it is important not
to underestimate the importance of victim advocates in this situa-
tion. It would be dishonest of any judge to tell you that they do not
notice when their courtroom is full at sentencing.
JUDGE SONBERG: Victim advocates do not come to the
Bronx.
JUDGE FEINMAN: Or that if the AVP has submitted a memo
on behalf of the victim - by statute in New York State, every vic-
tim is entitled to make a victim impact statement.18 What you
often see, on felony, but even on the misdemeanors, the probation
department - if you are talking about a situation where there has
been a probation report, it will always include a so-called victim
impact statement, and what it usually says is "complainant not
reached."
MS. COHEN: Or the DA does not allow.
JUDGE FEINMAN: DA may not also allow, or whatever, the
file or the information as to how to reach the complainant. I can
think of at least two situations where I ordered an updated proba-
tion report because I wanted to know what the victim had to say.
In particular, in one situation, the reason I was alerted to the whole
18. See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW §§ 390.20, 390.30, 440.50 (McKinney 1994).
328
QUEER LAW 1999
issue is because there was a letter in the file from the Anti-Vio-
lence Project. So those kinds of organizations play a crucial role in
at least flagging the case to the judge, identifying that that is an
issue that has gone on.
Defense lawyers are not going to tell you that. They should not
tell you that. That is not necessarily their role. The prosecutor
should tell you that. That is their job.
So I cannot underscore enough the importance of groups like
AVP and other victim advocates groups, whether it is based on
gender or on sexual orientation.
On the whole issue of gay-bashing cases, I would have to say,
quite honestly, in my experience in New York County, that I have
never personally encountered a situation where a defense of homo-
sexual panic or anything like that that was successful. I mean, I do
not know if that is part of what you are asking.
MS. COHEN: We have not seen many of those. I cannot recall
any.
JUDGE FEINMAN: But that does not mean that it does not
happen or that it is not an issue.
MS. BADEN-MAYER: Is it technically possible under the law
of New York State to offer -
MS. COHEN: Anything is technically possible under the law.
When you are representing a defendant, you could try to make
any argument that you think the jury will buy. I have, in twelve
years, never seen that defense used and certainly never seen it used
successfully.
JUDGE FEINMAN: In yesterday's Law Journal, somebody
made the argument in a prostitution case that there can be no pros-
titution in same-sex relationships, because there is no sexual inter-
course, as defined in the law.19
MS. COHEN: It is the "Bill Clinton theory."
JUDGE FEINMAN: There the defense attorney is basically re-
lying on this concept of deviant sexual intercourse. In yesterday's
Law Journal this judge wrote a decision which basically said "that
is an outdated concept; we are not going to have any of that. 20
But the point is that it is up to the judiciary to sort of put the
brakes on those kinds of arguments and move us along.
JUDGE SONBERG: See, we could try to get the State Legisla-
ture to amend the statute and change the term from deviant sexual
intercourse to alternate sexual intercourse.
19. See People v. Medina, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 1999.
20. See id.
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AUDIENCE: I was just curious what effects you see sexism and
homophobia having on defendants who are either queer or per-
ceived as queer in their sentencing.
JUDGE FEINMAN: One of the myths about domestic violence
in L/G/B/T communities is that the batterer is always bigger,
stronger or more butch; victims will always be smaller, weaker and
more feminine. The reality is experience with heterosexual bat-
tering and attitudes about traditional sex roles lead many to fall
into stereotypes of how batterers and victims respectively should
look now.
Unfortunately, such stereotypes are of little actual use in helping
us to identify who the batterer is in a same-sex relationship. A
person who is small but prone to violence and rage can do a lot of
damage to someone who may be taller, heavier, stronger, and non-
violent. Size, weight, masculinity, femininity or any other physical
attribute or role is not a good indicator of whether a person will be
a victim or a batterer. A batterer does not need to be 6'1 ' and
built like a rugby player to use a weapon against you, smash your
compact disc, cut up your clothing or tell everyone at work that
you really are queer.
Sometimes you need to as the judge or the prosecutor or the
defense attorney, say, "Wait a minute. You know, let's not just go
based on what gut reactions and stereotypes might suggest."
JUDGE SONBERG: And you are just seeing - generally, you
are just seeing the defendant, you are not seeing the complainant.
And sometimes you may think that you have the most butch les-
bian you have ever seen in front of you as the defendant, and for
some reason the complainant will come in the next day, and she is
not only as butch, but she is six inches taller and 100 pounds
heavier.
MS. COHEN: You mean on any kind of case where - I mean, I
have seen enough butch women, some of whom are gay and some
of whom are not gay, that it really does not - I do not think it has
that great of an impact, what a person looks like.
JUDGE SONBERG: I think judges have learned, certainly in
New York City, that people come in all shapes, sizes, colors and
permutations. I think there is a lot less giggling and discomfort
with transgendered people than there was five years ago, although
that is probably still the one place that there is the largest problem
of homophobia in its broadest sense. I think people have pretty
much figured out that you cannot tell a book by its cover.
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MS. COHEN: That is not to say that sexism is not alive and well
and flourishing in the criminal justice system, because it is. I think
in that way it almost helps female defendants, whether they are
butch or not. I think they are almost always treated more lenient
than male defendants. I think sexism also affects the way female
lawyers are treated. I mean, I think sexism is very alive and well.
AUDIENCE: It seems like - maybe not necessarily in New
York, but overall - that in a lot of the more violent types of crimes
that women are sentenced heavier, though, to teach them a lesson.
MS. COHEN: I have not experienced that. I have not exper-
ienced that in New York nor in most of my readings.
MS. BADEN-MAYER: I will ask the panelists if they do not
mind taking one more question.
AUDIENCE: What is your opinion - for example, I know a lot
of cases where a straight family woman married with two, three or
four kids comes before a judge, and she has a favorable probation,
pre-sentence report. She has a husband present in the courtroom.
She gets a lesser sentence, and she is more likely to get less bail and
to get only parole and to be treated very leniently, as opposed to a
butch woman who has no friends in the courtroom but a bunch of
gay people - she is less likely to -
MS. COHEN: Absolutely. I think that is absolutely true. I
think that evolves out of society's own bias about families. "Fami-
lies equal stability, stability equals the fact that you are going to
come back to court." I do not agree with it. I think that you can
have -
AUDIENCE: What can we do about that?
MS. COHEN: We can change the way society views our rela-
tionships, the way society views our families, the way society views
our community.
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MARRIAGE: WINNING AND KEEPING THE FREEDOM TO MARRY
NATIONALLY AND IN NEW YORK
MR. WOLFSON: I am Evan Wolfson, Director of the Marriage
Project for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. What we
are doing in this panel today is trying to go beyond the general
discussion we had in the earlier panel and talk specifically about
how we - "we" meaning you - can win the freedom to marry,
both nationally and in New York. You have heard me say things
like this "freedom is within reach." The breakthrough is possible.
We can see the opportunities come within a matter of months.
There is obviously no guarantee in law or civil rights or history, but
this breakthrough possibility is real, it is urgent, and it is imminent,
and the opportunities for engagement are real, present and
compelling.
Given that, what can each one of us do to really make this hap-
pen, not just in our lifetime, which a few years ago seemed like it
would not even happen, but within the next few months and years?
How do we do that? How do we do that in New York? How do
we do it nationally?
To begin answering those questions and to engage you on how to
get involved, we have an incredibly distinguished group of people
here. I will just identify them very briefly. Tim Sweeney is Deputy
Executive Director of the Empire State Pride Agenda, and Tim is
also a very long-term activist. He began when he was eight and has
been working for this community and this set of communities ever
since, in a range of very important positions across the board, with
regard to the concerns and civil rights of lesbians, gay men, people
with HIV and AIDS, and others.
Patty Penelosa is the chair of Marriage Equality, which is New
York's grassroots marriage, education/marriage, outreach/mar-
riage, organizing organization, eagerly awaiting your involvement.
Peter Sherwin is an associate at Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Men-
delson, and, in addition, is chair of the City Bar Committee on Les-
bians and Gay Men in the Legal Profession. Peter is also the
author of the Bar Association's Report21 taking a position in favor
of gay people's freedom to marry, declaring what the law in New
York is and that it ought to be in our favor with regard to equality
on the freedom to marry, and he is leading the committee in efforts
to move it forward.
21. Same-Sex Marriage in New York, 52 REc. Ass'N B. N.Y.C. 343 (April 1997)
[hereafter Bar Ass'n Report].
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Peter, can you very quickly tell us what is the state of the law
today in New York State with regard to the freedom to marry?
MR. SHERWIN: Well, the state of the law is actually pretty
good. There is a very nice foundation that is somewhat unique to
New York.
Let's first mention the statute. A lot of states have statutes that
expressly require a marriage to be between a man and a woman.
New York does not have such a requirement. 22 It talks about par-
ties; it talks about individuals. It is more of a regulatory frame-
work, rather than one that sets out and defines marriage.
So if you look at the domestic relations law in Article 3, we have
a gender-neutral statute from which to work.23 That is a great
foundation, because we can argue to the court that it needs to ap-
ply the statute in a gender-neutral way in order to avoid constitu-
tional infirmities, which it may never have to reach.
What else do we have to support us? We have some pretty good
public policy pronouncements by the New York Court of Appeals.
We have Braschi v. Stahl Associates,24 which came down in 1989
and recognized that, for the definition of family, we were going to
include same-sex domestic partners. That was a great step forward.
We have In re Jacob,2 5 that says we are going to allow second-par-
ent adoption, whether that is by two parents of the same sex or
opposite sex, when it is in the best interest of the child, without
having to - as was a requirement before - cut off the parental
responsibilities of the maternal parent.26 So that was great.
We also have something that was not that wonderful: Alison D.
v. Virginia M.,27 which predates In re Jacob. There, the court of
appeals considered visitation rights in the context of a lesbian
couple who had broken up. They had had the child together, but
the court's problem was basically that, because there was no formal
family tie between the couple, it was not going to award visitation
to a "third person. '28
So all in all we have good public policy in New York.
Evan mentioned the Report that was published by the City
Bar.29 If anybody wants one of those, you can certainly get it
22. See generally N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW (McKinney 1988).
23. See id. § 10.
24. 54 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
25. 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
26. See id.
27. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
28. Id. at 656.
29. See Bar Ass'n Report, supra note 21.
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through your law library. I do not know if it is available online, but
you can always call me at Proskauer, and I will send you a copy.
We also have some good law in New York for the recognition of
sister-state, same-sex marriages. If this happens in Vermont, we
are well poised in New York for recognition of a New York couple
who had gone to Vermont, gotten married legally in Vermont, and
now want to have it recognized in New York. Basically, New York
has only voided a marriage as contrary to New York public policy
when it was polygamous.30 All the other types of marriage that
New York itself does not recognize if you try to engage in within
New York, New York courts nonetheless will recognize if they oc-
cur outside of New York and were lawfully entered into in that
other state. We are talking about consanguinity, proxy marriages,
common law marriages and all sorts of other things that New York
itself does not allow but nonetheless will recognize. So that gives
us heart.
What is going on right now? Where are we today? There was
one challenge in New York to an overtly same-sex marriage. That
was up in Ithaca, Tompkins County, and it is a case called Storrs v.
Holcomb.31 The court held that it did not violate the Constitution
for this statute to apply only to opposite sex-couples. It went up to
the Third Department, and the Third Department - on a proce-
dural issue - dismissed the case, saying that you cannot just sue
the County Clerk of Ithaca; you have to include the State; you have
to include the Department of Health, which is basically the State.32
That case has not yet been re-filed, but who knows, it may be
tomorrow.
Also, we have anti-same-sex marriage legislation that is pending.
There are bills in the Assembly, and in the Senate, and they could
be passed. Such legislation has been there in previous years, and
so far it has been successfully avoided. But who knows what will
happen this year.
That is basically what is going on.
MR. WOLFSON: Okay, let me just question you on just a
couple of points. You gave the positive version, how we will argue
as advocates when we are litigating, either an affirmative challenge
to allow people to get married in New York or - and I think it is
important, as you point out, to remember these are two separate
and important arenas - once we achieve the breakthrough some-
30. See id. at 355.
31. 666 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App. Div. 1997).
32. See id. at 837-38.
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where to defend people's lawful marriages against discrimination
or non-recognition by New York when they come back home or
travel through or go to school or whatever.
It is also true that there have been cases in which courts at lower
levels have opined in other settings that gay people do not have the
freedom to marry in New York or that same-sex couples do not
have the freedom?
MR. SHERWIN: That is true, and the two cases that come to
mind immediately are from the 1970s. I actually think that they are
relatively easy to distinguish, although on their face they say that
New York does not recognize, and the current law does not allow,
same-sex couples to get married.33
But the distinguishing factor there is that it was a mistake. One
woman went out and thought she was marrying a man and it turns
out, after they were married, that her husband was actually a wo-
man. The opposite thing happened as well: A man went out, got
married to this woman, and got her home and found out that she
was a man. The courts say we are not going to recognize this mar-
riage, and they do not just go on the mistake premise; they also say
as a matter of law this cannot be recognized.
Those cases are from the 1970s. Things are changing on the
court of appeals. Granted, we have to deal with those cases, and
they are out there. Also, because the statute itself only talks in
terms of regulating rather than defining, there are obvious argu-
ments that could be made for construction about what the Found-
ing Fathers were thinking at the time they were drafting the statute.
And there are one or two sections where they do talk about what
the bride and what the groom have to do.3 4 We can try to over-
come them, but they do exist.
MR. WOLFSON: On the statutory silence point, you correctly
said that New York's law is silent. I often get calls with people
asking, "Well, if it does not say we cannot get married, why can't
we just walk into court and do it?" Although that is an appealing
argument, and one that will obviously be made in litigation down
the road again, what has been the fate of that argument in courts
that have looked at it in New York and elsewhere? Have the courts
accepted the argument that the statute does not specifically say a
man and a woman; therefore, go ahead?
33. Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Anonymous v. Anon-
ymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
34. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (1)(a).
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MR. SHERWIN: I do not know if I am the best person to speak
to that, because I do not know a lot about what is happening
outside of New York State. In Starrs v. Holcomb, the court basi-
cally glossed over the plain language of the statute and went di-
rectly to the constitutional argument. It found that this is subject to
rational basis scrutiny and found sua sponte, that there is a rational
basis for not permitting same-sex marriages.
One of the things that the court in Ithaca based its decision on,
and we can expect to see in the next challenge that comes in New
York, is the Department of Health's pronouncement. Previously,
Ithaca's City Council had said "we don't see any reason why this
marriage should not be allowed, so why do not you [the County
Clerk] let them get married?"
The county clerk, to find out whether or not she is allowed to do
this, wrote to the Department of Health, which is basically her em-
ployer. The Department of Health wrote back a very simple, one-
and-a-half page opinion and did not talk about the statutory lan-
guage at all. I focused only on In re Cooper,36 which was an appel-
late decision and it was in the context of not whether or not the
marriage statute is gender-neutral, not whether or not same-sex in-
dividuals can get married, but it was for the definition of spouse in
- what was the context, Evan?
MR. WOLFSON: In the Department of Health?
MR. SHERWIN: No, in In re Cooper.
MR. WOLFSON: Oh, it was in spousal share. It was a spousal
share question. It was an estate question.
MR. SHERWIN: An estate question. So it is not very well pre-
mised, and not well reasoned. And one of the things that we can go
out and do, and we are in fact now trying to do, is to get the Attor-
ney General to overrule the Department of Health's pronounce-
ment and give us a better foundation for litigation, or at least to
knock that foundation out.
MR. WOLFSON: Okay, that is the litigation side.
Peter acknowledged that there is an anti-marriage bill pending.37
The Pride Agenda has, for several years, worked hard within the
Legislature to block New York's version of the anti-marriage bill, a
version of bills that we have seen launched in all but one state over
the last three to four years.
Tim, what is happening with the anti-marriage bill in New York?
35. See Starrs, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
36. 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993).
37. S. 5228, 222d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
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MR. SWEENEY: It is back. The bills up in Albany have a two-
year shelf life. So they have been reintroduced. This is what is
called the new legislative session. There is a copy of the bill over
here on the table, and the Assembly version has been put out.38 It
has been introduced by our dear friend, Assembly Member Tony
Seminerio, a Democrat from Queens, which is all of two miles from
here, I would like to point out. So this is not beyond our reach,
folks.
Let me tell you what has happened with the legislation over the
last four years. It really has not gone anywhere. There is a com-
panion bill to this in the Senate, which is by Senator Serphin Mal-
tese from Queens. These do not have a lot of sponsorship.
This issue has not taken off in the legislature because the polit-
ical clout of the gay and lesbian community and our allies is such
that people see this as a real problem. Even if they are not sure
about whether gay and lesbian people should get married, they do
not particularly want to anger a very well-organized community.
That depends on whether we in fact are well organized and get out
and vote, whether we do what we need to do to make our presence
known.
What I am going to try to get you to do is to think like you are in
Albany and you are a legislator. We have a legislature up there
that is far more conservative than people understand. If you have
never been up there, you would be shocked at how conservative
these people can be, and the relative clout of New York City has
diminished over the last decade up there.
Where before we might have been able to look at a legislature
that would just say "bills like this are dead on arrival," that is not
the case any more. If any of you have followed, for instance, HIV
legislation and watched what happened with the partner notifica-
tion bill this last year, they used to be able to say to us, "Do not
worry, it is dead on arrival, it is never going to go anywhere." But
last year they crumbled, and that thing went through, in spite of the
fact that there was a huge number of people in the Assembly who
were opposed to that bill.
What does that mean we need to do? Over here on our right-
hand side, there is something called an in-district lobby form.
There is one way we can stop this bill if it starts to move in Albany.
The first thing to remember is everything in Albany is controlled
by the leadership. The governor, Speaker Silver in the Assembly
38. A. 594, 222d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
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and Senate Majority Leader Joe Bruno control the entire game.
This is not an open democratic process up there. They literally can
open and close the process at whim. That makes those three play-
ers very critical. So let's analyze what we have with each one.
Let's start with the governor. We need to send a very clear
message to this governor, who thinks he is running for Vice Presi-
dent or President, that if he should see this bill move, we will cause
such a firestorm and embarrass him nationally as much as we possi-
bly can, just when he is out doing the chicken circuit, giving
speeches out in South Carolina to Republican primary voters. We
are going to have people hounding the hell out of him back home,
embarrassing him, pulling him back, and what we need to do is
make very simple commonsensical arguments.
What we find when we do polling on this issue is that Americans
are deeply divided over this issue. We need to exploit that division.
What politicians do is wet their finger, put it up in the air and try to
decide which way the wind is blowing. I am telling you right now,
what the polls are going to say - "do you think gay people should
have the right to get married?" - the wind is going to blow in the
wrong direction.
Let's reframe that question. The minute you reframe the ques-
tion, we can give a lot of pause to legislators who might want to
jump the wrong way. If you talk about Social Security, inheritance,
taxation, health benefits, sick leave, funeral leave, real concrete
things that we need in our lives, whether it is economic benefits or
relationship benefits when we have a partner, you see that support
for those can go as high as eighty percent of Americans who think
that gay partners should have the right to Social Security and
health benefits. We have very strong support.
What we need to do is reframe the issue, getting away from any
sort of religious context, getting away from any comparison - "are
we trying to be morally equivalent to heterosexual marriage" -
and all those things that people get all wrapped up about which are
really to our detriment most of the time. Instead we really need to
focus on some of the economic consequences of the discrimination
that we face.
When that happens, we see numbers of legislators say: "I think
this antigay marriage bill is mean, it is intolerant, it will promote
violence, it is not necessary; just leave it alone."
What we found right now is in the Assembly - which is going to
be the key battleground for us; the Assembly is where we are going
to stop this thing cold - Joe Bruno, in the Senate, has the votes to
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pass the antigay marriage bill, and believe me, he will ram that
thing through if he needs to. He is very good at that.
But, thank God, this year we have the first openly gay State Sen-
ator, Tom Duane, and a number of very good allies in Senator Dan
Hevesi and Eric Schneiderman, who I think are going to cause a
real problem, rather than just roll over and let Joe Bruno do what
he is going to do. We are going to exploit the opportunity and have
a big education campaign around marriage, because that is the only
thing we can do in a crisis - try to make an opportunity.
What do I mean by an "education campaign?" The vast majority
of people, when asked, think that gay people can get married.
They do not know. They watched an episode of "Friends," saw two
people get married, and conclude that gay people can get married.
They do not have a clue about our lives. We need to bring down to
reality these sort of questions, and we have someone, our legal in-
tern, here. We have done a series of Q&A things - and Patty is
going to talk about this in a minute - that literally start at the
beginning with people, because they do not have a clue.
They do not know we do not have any civil rights in New York,
civil rights protections in employment, housing and public accom-
modations. They have no idea we do not have a hate-related bias
and violence bill. They do not have a clue about where gay and
lesbian people are at. They get everything that they know about us
from television. You can go there if you want to, but it is a little
frightening. You know what I mean?
So what we need to do is walk them through the reality of our
lives and the reality of where the law is with us. I think that we
have a chance, if we put up a storm in the Senate, to try to drag the
bill, to make Joe Bruno pay a price, to educate the public, and basi-
cally have sort of a nucleus of the State Senate say, "Look, this is a
wrong, mean, intolerant thing to do." Then it will slow down the
vote and perhaps give us the opportunity to stop it in the
Assembly.
Now we have about forty-five votes in the Assembly as it exists
right now. We need a solid ninety. The Pride Agenda is organizing
these in-district visits. We are doing more than one hundred of
them in the next eight weeks. We have already started with people
all over the state. I cannot stress to you enough that going to see
your legislator in their home district and looking them in the face
and saying "do you really want to make me a second-class citizen;
do you really want to do this mean and intolerant thing?" - and
describe very concretely and emotionally, if you need to, what this
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bill means to you - will stick with them. It will give them the guts
to do the right thing. Most of them want to vote against this bill,
but they need a collective group to go into their speaker and say
"do the right thing; keep the backbone; we are not going to pay the
price at the polls."
The Pride Agenda's strategy on this all along is to be very in-
volved in what is called "marginal Democratic seats in the Assem-
bly." We go with a woman like Debra Mazzarelli out on Long
Island. She switched from being a Republican to a Democrat. She
is this amazing woman. She quit the Republican Party because
they were homophobic and sexist, and she told them that, and you
can imagine how that went over in the Republican Party.
Well, we went there and stood with her out on Long Island. She
got reelected by a huge margin. They put tons of money against
her and did not touch her. That is the kind of person that Sheldon
Silver is worried about, that if in fact we defeat the antigay mar-
riage bill, the Republicans are going to pour tons of money - and
believe me, they outspend us in this state about six-to-one in elec-
tions - and will take out anywhere from twelve to twenty-four of
these marginal Democrats; they will go Republican, and for the
first time they will in fact control the Assembly.
That is the worse-case scenario, and that is the mindset of
Speaker Sheldon Silver that we have to change and say, "Do not
worry about it. We, as people meeting and working in those dis-
tricts, will make sure that the people that stand with us will not be
defeated at the polls in the year 2000."
It is a good year in 1999 to have this vote, because there is no
election in November. For politicians, their worst nightmare is,
"Oh my God, I am going to have to deal with this vote in six more
months." At least they do not have to deal with this vote until
November 2000. But we really, really need your help to do these
in-district visits. I am telling you, we can win this fight. New York
has a shot to help stop this avalanche of legislation that is going
state by state. The fact that it has not moved is good.
So we need to do three things:
(1) We need to make this a big problem for George Pataki's
national ambitions - and, believe me, the last thing that man
wants is this battle going on in his state. If we just make that real
clear to him, I will bet he will say to Joe Bruno "just bury the damn
thing; I do not want to talk about it," which would be fine by us.
(2) We need to cause a stink and do a big education campaign
and make our state senators, who are going to have to vote against
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this thing in probably a losing vote in the State Senate, do a good
education campaign and help stiffen the spine of Sheldon Silver.
(3) Last, we need to get the progressive majority of people that
are in that State Assembly to say to Sheldon Silver: "Do the right
thing. Be a leader. Defeat this bad bill."
MR. WOLFSON: Okay, Tim, let me just ask you, quickly and
specifically, if people in this room call you up on Monday morning
in your office and say, "I want to volunteer a little time; I am a law
student and I do not have a lot of time, but I have a little time. I
want to work with the Pride Agenda to stop this bill, but I live in a
district that is represented by Tom Duane and Deborah Glick, so I
do not know that I need to do the in-district visit" and you say,
"Well, go visit that person, but that is an easy sell; we are pretty
comfortable with her or him" - what else can they do? How
would you put people in this room to work?
MR. SWEENEY: There are two things. Never forget there is
no such thing as an easy sell. I do not even care if you call
Deborah Glick six times and remind her that her job is to go to
Shelly Silver and say "for my community, stop this thing, you owe
this to me. Not housing, not development, not whatever other is-
sue I had - this is the top priority. Stick with this."
What often happens is we get caught in all the trading that goes
on. Well, this cannot be a trade. We cannot go down the tubes
because someone decided there is some other issue that is more
important. Never assume that Dick Gottfried, Deborah Glick and
all the rest of the liberals on the West Side do not need to be re-
minded about this. Every one of them needs to be reminded.
Make the call and make it clear. Be clear that we vote and we
can vote them out if they do the wrong thing. And, believe me,
they heard that in the Chuck Schumer/Alfonse D'Amato race.
They see us as the sleeping giant who has woken up. They are a
little nervous about us, and that is exactly where you want a
politician.
Secondly, we can use you to do phone banking and visits to other
politicians. This last year, we did about 15,000 calls on the sexual
orientation nondiscrimination bill. What we need to do is if Veri-
mont comes down and Serp Maltese and Joe Bruno stand up in the
Senate and start their little heterosexual swagger about, you know,
"Let's put this marriage thing to bed, we need to get 10,000 calls
into Governor Pataki the next day."
We can do it, and I know that is boring scut work, but that is
what organizing work is. That means you pull out your little black
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book where you keep all your addresses, and you call every one of
your friends, and you say to them: "Make this call. It takes exactly
one minute of your time." What they do in Albany is literally keep
a little checklist, and what they did on the sexual orientation non-
discrimination bill when we were bothering the hell out of
D'Amato last year is pretty soon we had the lines tied up for days
at a time. They would answer the phone and they would say,
"Hello, Governor's Office. Are you calling about the sexual orien-
tation nondiscrimination bill?"
That is exactly where you want them. That is our grassroots ver-
sion of a poll and a vote. If they think there is such a storm around
this, they will want it to go away. They want to be nice to you.
They want to give you money and make you feel good and make
you vote for them. But if you are screaming at them through the
phone lines, which is what we need you to do - and I am talking e-
mail networks, any way you get word out to the people and the
people get a word up to Albany or back to their in-district offices
- I am telling you, we can stop this thing. But it is going to re-
quire a real strong and persistent presence.
We did it this last year on the money. We got historic funding
for lesbian and gay health and human services. The Governor ve-
toed the damn thing twice, and we beat him back until he gave us
$1 million - $1 million for gay and lesbian youth out of a Republi-
can Governor running for President. That is change, but we did it
because we hammered the hell out of the guy. So that is the
message.
MR. WOLFSON: Okay, so there are at least two assignments,
ways the Pride Agenda can put you to work in your copious free
time.
But what Tim has mostly talked about is holding the line, hold-
ing against, playing defense and blocking the bad bill in the
Legislature.
Tim also mentioned, however, the importance of education, out-
reach and firestorm. And, frankly, even if every gay person gets on
the phone, we still need some non-gay people helping us there.
How do we do that? How do we enlarge? How do we bring in
more non-gay people?
Patty?
MS. PENELOSA: Well, at Marriage Equality, that is exactly our
job. He talked about getting the wind to change, and I like to think
of our organization as the wind machine. How we do this is step-
by-step, person-by-person, organization-by-organization. We start
QUEER LAW 1999
very small. I started with a couple of doctors of mine. I hounded
them. I left the press kit on their desk when I left the examination
room. I just got a letter in the mail where they signed the Marriage
Resolution, with a little note that said "good luck."
So the way we are going to build this is by starting with you -
you going to your friend and telling them about this movement,
telling them a story, a personal story of how you have been dis-
criminated against, because you have. You do not know it, but if
you are in a partnership, you have been discriminated against when
you go into the hospital, when you go to do your taxes. My partner
and I live together, of course, and we each pay two separate sets of
taxes. We are getting double taxed to get half the service. So we
are being discriminated against.
What we do is we started with our mothers, our fathers. I told
my father, "Do you want me to be treated like this?" My father
fought in Vietnam, so I used that on him. I said, "Why did you
fight in Vietnam if I am just going to be a second-class citizen, or
people like me?"
The first thing is to start at home - and when I say "home," I
mean home: your brothers, your sisters, your friends, your family,
next-door neighbor, et cetera. This is a very deep personal com-
mitment that you have to have to take to do this, but people re-
spond. I have received no negative responses thus far. That is the
first place.
The second place is organizations. Start with Fordham. I do not
know if they have signed the Marriage Resolution or they are in
support, but that is another place. Look to the professors here, the
professional organizations that surround the university and Lincoln
Center. If everyone in here would think of one organization and
bring the name up to me, I will make sure that they get a press kit
from Marriage Equality. That is how we are doing our outreach. It
is very simple; it is very basic. But you have to do it. You have to
start at home and then build.
The third thing is once you start building with the organizations,
you move next to bigger state organizations, and that is where we
are working with ESPA and legislators. At Marriage Equality, we
have a legislative branch of the organization that sends out letters,
where we also do the phone banking. We did work hand-in-hand
with ESPA and Lambda and other organizations to make sure that
we are all kind of following each other. So this shadowing has
been really effective for us, because people are starting to perk up.
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Mark Green keeps saying "Yes, yes," like Tim said, but I finally
want him to just sign it, say it, do it.
You can get people to do this on every level, but if you start
small, those are the biggest victories, in my mind, because this is a
mind-changing movement.
Now you are not going to go out and change the mind of some
clergy, but you can get others, and those are just as valuable. Look
at what is happening in California where the Episcopalians married
a lesbian couple, and now they are going to go - and that sends a
message to the rest of the people. So it started with one. It ended
up with thirty, now there are sixty, now there are ninety - we are
going to keep doubling.
Panels like these are also part of our outreach. We also want to
work with schools, elementary schools, perhaps making sure they
have textbooks available, and have sensitivity training. We want to
cover all of New York the best that we can, step by step, individual
by individual. It is very easy, but the work is grunt work. So if you
have a grunt persona, we invite you to join Marriage Equality. If
you do not want to be discriminated against, if you do not want to
be a second-class citizen, and if you are just plain sick and tired,
join us. This fight is for you.
Now I have a personal story to tell you. I had a miscarriage in
October, and my partner and I went into NYU Hospital. When we
walked into the emergency room, the intake nurse tells Linda, my
partner, that she cannot come in with me because she is not my
immediate family. Now, I am sitting there completely stressed out.
It was one of the saddest days of my life, and to have Linda not be
able to come there with me or just stand there by my side - I
could not believe it was happening. But you know what? I had no
fight in me that day; I had nothing. So I went into the emergency
room, and I heard some screeching down the hall. I peeked over
and then I see Linda arguing with the nurse, walking down. She is
coming in, she is going to stand there; it is just too damn bad.
By the time we left there, she had made nice with the nurse in
such a way that the nurse said, "You know, I just did not know; I
am really sorry." Something really terribly bad turned okay in the
end, because one person, one nurse, understood. If I had had the
presence of mind, I would have handed her a Marriage Resolution
and said, "Please sign and thank you for your support."
That is what is needed here. That is the type of grassroots we do
at Marriage Equality. You tell your personal story and you win the
hearts and the minds one by one.
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MR. WOLFSON: Okay, briefly and specifically, Monday morn-
ing people in this room call up and say, "I have a little free time. I
can think of my mother, who belongs to such and such a group, and
maybe I can have.her contact so-and-so." They call you and tell
you that. What do you do? How do people get involved?
MS. PENELOSA: Okay, first of all, I want to challenge every-
one in this room before you leave to leave me a name of an organi-
zation or somebody who you think will endorse the Marriage
Resolution or support Marriage Equality. That is number one.
The second thing is that if you call me, there are ways that you
can come in - literally, this is run out of my apartment and other
people's apartments - to stuff envelopes, to get marriage resolu-
tions. I will hand you ten and you can approach people and say,
"Oh, by the way, would you sign this Marriage Resolution? Yeah,
it is this organization I belong to, and we are trying to get the free-
dom to marry." People will sign. How can they not? You look so
good.
Finally, the little things really matter. Even if you just had an
hour, a half-hour, to put a label on a packet or collate the media
kit, all those things, you do not have to be the brainchild. Really, if
you can just come in and dedicate or volunteer a half-an-hour to
your personal freedom in the United States, it would really help
this organization, the state and yourself.
MR. WOLFSON: Okay, Peter, one example from you. You
wrote the Bar Association Report two years ago;39 the City Bar
took a position in our support. What are you doing now?
MR. SHERWIN: What are we doing now? We are not just sit-
ting on the Report. The Report is nice, but it is really an educa-
tional tool. It is something to hand out. It is something to say,
"Look, you know, the fight is worth fighting because the law is not
that bad, and in fact, it is pretty good."
What are we doing now? We are talking to other bar associa-
tions. We are in that process right now. We are writing letters to
the Queens Bar Association and to the Asian-American Law Coa-
lition. We are writing letters to the Philadelphia Bar and to the San
Francisco Bar. We are writing letters to the ABA. We are writing
letters to the New York State Bar Association.
We are following up with calls. We are saying, "Look, do you
have a lesbian and gay aspect to your organization? Do you have a
committee? Do you have a task force? What are they doing?" We
39. See Bar Ass'n Report, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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already got calls back when the report first came out from places
such as Utah and Arizona, saying "We want to do a report like this;
send us your materials." That is what we want to hear. That is
what we are encouraging people to do.
The most important thing that lights a fire is the beginning of
that letter to the other bar associations, which tells them that we
are on the cusp, just as Evan and everybody was talking about ear-
lier this morning. Vermont can come down in March. Hawaii
could come down any day. As soon as that happens, we are going
to have - again to steal from this morning - a tidal wave en-
gulfing us, and we need to be prepared. You guys are already in
the process of being prepared, because you are educating your-
selves. You are here today.
So what I am doing through the City Bar Association? My com-
mittee is trying to go out to other similar organizations and educate
them and get them to agree on that level that this is something, as a
matter of law, as a matter of what is just plain morally right, that
they should sign on to. But you can do that as well. I do not know
if you are all law students, but you are going to look for jobs, if you
have not already found them. You can go to your employers and
find out what they are up to.
I am sitting here listening, and I just realized that Proskauer has
not signed that resolution. I am going to go on Monday, and we are
going to get that resolution signed.
MR. WOLFSON: And then once Proskauer signs it, Proskauer
is going to do what?
MR. SHERWIN: Proskauer is going to go to Paul Weiss and
say, "Hey, guys, you are behind us on this one," which is exactly
what I like to say to Paul Weiss, and many other firms. And
Cravath - has Cravath signed on?
MS. PENELOSA: I am working on it. I had them update their
forms, because I had to sign - you know, with the domestic part-
nership, and sign all of that. I wrote to the head of the firm and I
said, "You know, domestic partnership is recognized in New York
City, and you are not in compliance, and toward fairness and in-
clusivity, can you please add domestic partners? On there next to
single, married, divorced, widowed, you know, I want domestic
partner."
So they wrote back within two or three hours. They e-mailed me
and said, "Thank you for bringing that to our attention," and about
three weeks later, the head of benefits stopped me in the elevator
and said, "Thanks a lot, you just increased my work."
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So that is a step in the right direction. And I know, that there are
a few lesbian partners and a few gay partners in that law firm. So,
hopefully, I will start working them over and start winning every-
body else over.
MR. WOLFSON: The dirty little secret of this form of activism
is that asking people to sign the Marriage Resolution, beginning to
engage them in that discussion, may result in them signing, and
then they become part of the list and we snowball that list. We
have a select illustrated example over there of the kinds of people
and groups that have signed, and that is great. That is the growing
coalition of fair-minded Americans that are increasingly supporting
our freedom to marry.
But the secret is that whether they say "yes" or not, the fact of
asking them is what we need to be doing. Even if they say, "Well,
you know, Proskauer does not sign resolutions; thank you, Peter,
but we really appreciate the opportunity to have discussed it," that
is an important gain. We have moved people to start thinking.
When Vermont happens, when Hawaii happens, when the break-
through happens, when the Legislature starts to move, when we
need people to start acting on our behalf, that is not the time to
begin talking with them. In advance is the time to begin talking
with them, and even if they do not say "yes" the first time, your
asking them again and again, patiently and persistently, is what is
moving this in our favor. That is the secret of the Marriage Resolu-
tion. It is the process, not just the results, that matters.
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Is SEXUAL ORIENTATION IMMUTABLE?:
PRESENTING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION TO GAIN
STRICT SCRUTINY
DR. BROOK: The idea of having a session about this topic of
immutability came to me because I am a physician, and I have been
in practice for fifteen years, and one of the reasons I am in law
school is I think there is a great need for communication between
doctors, lawyers and scientists, and this seemed to be a perfect
topic for such a collaboration.
Our first panelist is Suzanne Goldberg, who is a senior staff at-
torney for Lambda Legal Defense, and, as an expert on anti-gay
initiative issues throughout the country, she is part of the legal
team that successfully challenged the Colorado Anti-Gay Amend-
ment 240 and served as counsel for numerous other anti-gay meas-
ures, including the Cincinnati Anti-Gay Initiative 3.41 Suzanne
leads Lambda's challenge to criminal laws in Arkansas and Texas
banning same-sex sexual contact and also has been involved with
challenges to sodomy laws in Tennessee and Montana. She also
litigates and advises on issues involving lesbian and gay families,
including domestic partnerships and equal employment benefits.
She has just recently published a book, Strangers to the Law: Gay
People on Trial,42 about the Colorado Amendment 2 trial. I am
also pleased to say that she is adjunct professor here at Fordham
and teaches a seminar of law on sexuality and the law.
Please welcome Suzanne Goldberg.
MS. GOLDBERG: To me, this is a fascinating topic. I will be
talking this afternoon about the law and setting up the legal frame-
work to identify where immutability issues even fit in litigation.
Dan is going to discuss the science. Kate will present a social polit-
ical critique of some of these issues, which you will also get a bit
through my presentation. We are planning to leave a lot of time
for questions and discussion, and we look forward to that.
What I want to do here are three things: first, lay out the legal
landscape; second, talk about the use of scientific evidence related
40. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1993) (permanently enjoined by Evans v. Romer,
882 P.2d 1335 (D. Colo. 1993), affd, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
41. CINCINNATI CITY CHARTER art. X1I (1993) (constitutionally upheld by Equal-
ity Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998)).
42. LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEO-
PLE ON TRIAL (1998).
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to immutability at trial, in particular the Romer v. Evans case;43
and, third, offer a critique of the use of science-based immutability
evidence in litigation in light of my experience as co-counsel in
Romer.
For those of you who do not exactly remember everything you
learned in Constitutional Law in the most clear fashion, let me just
remind you that, the Supreme Court and lower courts occasionally
employ closer scrutiny of governmental classifications. Where a
law classifies or distinguishes between groups based upon a partic-
ular characteristic that has been deemed suspect or quasi-suspect,
the courts will employ closer review, known as strict or intermedi-
ate scrutiny.
Through various cases, the Supreme Court has announced that
there are a couple of factors that are taken into consideration in
making a determination about whether a classification is suspect or
quasi-suspect: whether the classification has been the basis for a
history of discrimination; whether the burdened group is relatively
politically powerless vis-A-vis the majoritarian political process;
and, whether a characteristic is obvious, immutable or distinguish-
ing. That last inquiry is obviously the one we are going to focus on
here.
Courts sometimes also ask the question - which I think is actu-
ally the most appropriate and important question - of whether the
characteristic bears any relationship to an individual's ability to
perform in or contribute to society. However, there is nothing in
any of the Supreme Court's decisions that says that these three or
four prongs, however you want to lay them out, are supposed to be
applied mechanically.
Instead, these prongs are supposed to be used as guideposts.
And so, if they are supposed to be used as guideposts and not abso-
lute requirements, why are we even talking about engaging in liti-
gation specifically to satisfy the immutability prong? What has the
court said about immutability? What is the significance of whether
a characteristic is immutable?
The Supreme Court has characterized in various ways its concern
with the nature of a characteristic that serves as the basis for gov-
ernment line-drawing. For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson"
sex discrimination case, the Court was centrally concerned with
whether the characteristic was an "accident of birth." In Plyler v.
43. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
44. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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Doe,45 a case about whether the children of undocumented immi-
grants could attend public schools, the Court talked about whether
the characteristic was outside of an individual's control. So clearly,
there is some concern with whether a characteristic is entirely voli-
tional or not, but there is nothing in these cases that talks about
whether the characteristic has to be genetically immutable. Obvi-
ously, being the child of an undocumented immigrant is not a ge-
netically immutable characteristic. There are some questions, as
well, about whether sex is biologically immutable or not.
So why would we even be talking about introducing scientific
evidence in litigation when the legal test does not seem to require
this sort of showing? Unfortunately, a number of lower courts
have taken these Supreme Court guideposts as mechanical rules.
In particular, several courts that have addressed the question of
whether sexual orientation-based classifications should be suspect
have said, "Well, homosexuality is behavioral; therefore, it is not
immutable, and the classification based on sexual orientation can-
not be suspect."
So the instinct on the part of some lawyers is to try to prove
scientifically that homosexuality is not behavioral, that it is in fact a
physically immutable characteristic. In light of the lower court
cases reinforcing this point, it is an understandable instinct. But,
again, I do not think it is the correct instinct for reasons I will de-
scribe as we are talking here.
This clash between the Supreme Court's test and lower courts'
application of the test brings me to our next question, which is
what does the trial look like if litigators decide to use scientific
evidence to try to satisfy the "immutability" test.
This fact was pursued in Romer, the case challenging a Colorado
amendment that banned state and local government entities from
ever prohibiting discrimination against lesbians, gays and bisexuals.
The Supreme Court ultimately struck down the amendment in 1996
as lacking a rational basis and therefore violating the U.S. Consti-
tution's equal protection guarantee.
In its earlier phases, the plaintiffs also urged that the court
should apply a heightened scrutiny to the classification on another
basis on the theory that sexual orientation classifications, like the
one embodied in Amendment 2, were suspect or quasi-suspect. 46
45. 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
46. See Evans v. Romer, No. CIV.A. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *5 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1993).
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There were very different views on the plaintiffs' legal team
about how we should go about proving this point- whether we
needed to prove facts related to our argument that heightened
scrutiny should be applied; and, if we did need to provide factual
evidence, how we should do so. Some of the lawyers on the team
wanted to make sure that the record was as complete as possible to
support any of our arguments on appeal - and, to be fair, that was
a reasonable and, I think, a conservative approach in some
respects.
Others of us, myself included, believed that it would be a big,
expensive and confusing mistake to try to scientifically prove the
immutability of sexual orientation to satisfy that obvious, immuta-
ble or distinguishing prong. Here are the reasons why:
(1) Expense. Whenever you try to prove this sort of scientific
theory in court, you have to have expert witnesses, and we did. We
had several. We had Richard Green, a psychiatrist who has been
studying these issues for a number of years; Judd Marmor, former
President of the American Psychiatric Association, who had com-
pleted extensive research, studies and writings on these issues; and
Dean Hamer, who at the time was a molecular biologist, and the
Chief of the Gene Structure and Regulation Section of the Labora-
tory of Biochemistry at the National Cancer Institute and has done
tremendous research in DNA and other things that Dan will
explain.
(2) Confusion. Why? How many people in the room have at
least a college-level background in any sort of science?
A fifth maybe. For most lawyers, the science is pretty confusing.
Consequently, both the direct and the cross examinations of the
scientists are being done by lawyers who do not really understand
the depths of the scientific issues, so the presentation of testimony
is not always the clearest, to say the least.
More significantly, introducing scientific evidence was also theo-
retically confusing. At the same time as we were telling the court
that the law did not require physical immutability and instead re-
quired only a showing that the characteristic at issue was obvious,
immutable or distinguishing, we were still offering a full-scale sci-
entific study of sexual orientation. We were, in a sense, undercut-
ting our argument that we did not have to prove physical
immutability by putting in a large body of testimony and scores of
exhibits, suggesting that we thought we did have to prove immuta-
bility as a matter of fact.
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(3) Setting Priorities. The third problem in introducing all of the
scientific evidence regarding immutability is that it took a huge
amount of trial time - more than twenty percent of the trial was
spent with experts on these issues. The heavy level of attention
suggests that immutability and, more generally, suspect classifica-
tion was a very, very important issue to our winning the case, and it
was not. As at any trial, you have to weigh the question of "How
important is what you are trying to prove?" versus "How does the
presentation of information reflect the priorities of your overall
trial strategy?"
That having been said, what did this all look like at trial? Rich-
ard Green reported on a number of studies that Dan is going to
discuss, including his own work showing that a biological marker
exists for sexual orientation, including Simon Levay's brain studies
showing that the hypothalamus of gay men was a different size
from the hypothalamus of straight men and women (who were not
identified by sexual orientation). Very interesting material.
Judd Marmor, the former President of the American Psychiatric
Association, talked less about the science and more about the
American Psychiatric Association's decision in 1973 to declassify
homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder, which caused a major shift
in our ability to pursue equality in legal forums for lesbians and gay
men.
Dean Hamer, a molecular biologist, really gave us the most ex-
tensive discussion about science. He talked about the DNA studies
that he had done, and attempted to explain to a room full of law-
yers his finding of a genetic marker for sexual orientation on the
Xq28 region of the X chromosome in men. He managed to do a
terrific job of explaining this clearly, analogizing DNA to a long
sausage with the Xq28 as a little band on the sausage.
One of the difficulties with all of these studies - which the
cross-examiner failed to bring out - is that none of them prove
conclusively that sexual orientation is genetically immutable.
Moreover, the studies at the time of trial were limited in the popu-
lation they addressed, with virtually no research having been done
on women.
Despite these weaknesses, the scientific experts managed, over-
all, to convey their points strongly. The following excerpt from the
state's cross examination of Dean Hamer captures the challenges
faced by the cross-examination as well as the humor, perhaps unin-
tentional, that these examinations brought to the courtroom.
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In this excerpt, the cross-examining lawyer appeared to be at-
tempting to show that the scientific DNA research was not mean-
ingful and did not prove that being gay was an immutable
characteristic:
The cross examiner opened this line of questioning: "The per-
cent of DNA shared by human beings, in other words, the DNA
similarities between human beings, is how much?"
Dean Hamer's answer: "On average, each person shares about
99.9 percent of their DNA with other human beings, with each
other human being."
The cross-examiner: "So my DNA is almost exactly like your
DNA?"
Hamer responds: "Your DNA is on average about 0.1 percent
different from my DNA, and it is about 1 percent different from a
chimpanzee's DNA."
So the questioner asks: "All the difference between the two of
us is accounted for by 0.1 percent?"
Hamer: "All the inherited differences of DNA are accounted for
by that 0.1 percent, and all the inherited differences between you
and a chimpanzee are accounted for by 1 percent. The rest is
identical."
The questioner: "Knowing you and me, because I do not know
any chimpanzees -"
"- I am short, a short balding guy, and you are taller. That is
accounted for by 0.1 percent of the DNA?"
Hamer: "It would actually require much less than 0.1 percent of
the DNA. It is within 0.1 percent, that is right."
"You have hair, as you notice; I do not. That is accounted for by
that same 0.1 percent?"
Hamer: "Predominantly, and possibly some differences in our
age and other factors."
The questioner, a heavyset man, then asked "My bone structure
appears to be a little bigger in places than your bone structure; that
is accounted for by that difference?"
Hamer: "It is probably accounted for somewhere in the three
million differences that you and I have."
And it went on from there. Although entertaining, it was hard
to imagine how this discussion, even with Hamer's skillful re-
sponses, would assist the court in resolving the question of whether
sexual orientation was a suspect classification and it did not. After
many hours of testimony accompanied by a plethora of exhibits,
the trial court simply concluded that "the preponderance of credi-
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ble evidence suggests that there is a biologic or genetic 'compo-
nent' of sexual orientation, but even Dr. Hamer, the witness who
testified that he is 99.5% sure that there is some genetic influence
in forming sexual orientation admits that sexual orientation is not
completely genetic. The ultimate decision on 'nature' versus 'nur-
ture' is a decision for another court, not this court, and the court
makes no determination on this issue.""4 7
Not all that surprising, but that is in hindsight. On appeal,
neither the Colorado Supreme Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court
ever mentioned any of this testimony.
I am going to turn this over to Dan now to talk about all the
science that I have just glossed over. I wanted to leave you with
one last quote that I think offers another important perspective on
these issues - both as they arise in litigation and more broadly in
the social debate.
In 1984, Ginny Apuzzo, who at the time, headed up what was
then the National Gay Task Force, was asked to comment on the
significance of a finding that a biological marker for homosexuality
had been reported in gay men. Addressing the broader discussion
about the roots of sexual orientation, she said: "I do not think it is
an argument worthy of our energy. The problem is not what we
are; it is what they are. If people stopped asking why we are homo-
sexual and would ask why they are homophobic, that would be a
step forward."
With that, I will turn it over to Dan.
DR. BROOK: Thanks, Suzanne. It is interesting that I was
planning to get into less scientific detail than Suzanne, because
from my perception, as a physician and scientist, much of the stuff
that was discussed in this trial does not sound like it had very much
relevance to the question of immutability, and there are other
things that may actually be more relevant.
As Suzanne said, the debate between nature and nurture in the
etiology of homosexuality is unresolved. Most scientists and clini-
cians agree that sexual orientation is fixed at an early age, certainly
before age five or six, and that probably combinations of biological
(or genetic) and environmental factors are at work.
One type of study has been designed to attempt to separate ge-
netic factors from environmental factors and involves comparing
pairs of identical twins and comparing them with pairs of fraternal
twins. Identical twins have identical genetics. Fraternal twins are
47. Id. at *11.
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genetically no more similar than any two siblings in a family, simi-
lar but not the same, but do share very similar environments in
their upbringing. Therefore, when identical twins share a trait to a
greater degree than fraternal twins, it is assumed that that trait is
more likely to have been influences on a genetic basis.
In men, if one twin in a set of twins is homosexual, between fifty
percent and one hundred percent of the other in the pair of identi-
cal twins (depending on the study) will also be homosexual. By
comparison, only fifteen to twenty percent of male (or female) fra-
ternal twins will be concordant for homosexuality. In female identi-
cal twins, studies show about a fifty percent concordance rate for
homosexuality. The greater concordance rate in identical twins
compared to fraternal twins is thought to be attributable to a ge-
netic influence on the trait of homosexuality.
Suzanne mentioned the Levay study. In his neuroanatomical
study, Dr. Levay examined anatomical structure in the hypothala-
mus, a very important structure in the brain that is known to be
involved with functions such as hunger and thirst, and, at least as
demonstrated in animals, with sexual arousal and sexual behavior.
When he looked at the structure in women, versus heterosexual
men, the hypothalamic structure in heterosexual men was consist-
ently larger, whereas the same hypothalamic nodule in homosexual
men was about the same size as that found in the women. How-
ever, even though this finding sounds very provocative and sugges-
tive that sexuality may be determined by this hypothalamic
structure, in fact, the correlation does not prove a cause and effect
relationship between the size of the hypothalamic structure and the
sexuality of the individual. For all we know, it could be that the
correlation demonstrates a "use it or lose it" effect.
Another type of study in the etiology of homosexuality has been
gene studies, exemplified by Dean Hamer's work. Hamer selected
families in which there were at least two brothers who were both
gay. By doing that, he was looking for an unusual phenomenon,
that is, a grouping of homosexuals within a family, suggesting that
there might be some kind of genetic relationship. When he com-
pared the DNA from the two gay brothers and the DNA in another
brother in that family who was not gay, he found that in ninety-
nine percent of these cases, the gay brothers shared the same gene
or specific gene region, a very, very tiny part of the DNA, whereas
the gay brothers and non-gay brother did not share that gene. If
one is able to repeat that finding in enough people and find that it
is consistent, realizing that ordinarily there is a fifty-fifty chance
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that any sibling is going to share the particular gene, that is statisti-
cally good evidence that the gene correlated with the trait. In fact,
there is only one out of 100,000 chances that these kinds of results
would be attained by chance alone. Thus, this is relatively convinc-
ing evidence of correlation between sexuality and the gene. How-
ever, it is important to note that this finding does not suggest that
all homosexuality is related to that or any other single gene. Nor
does it explain how the gene might actually be involved in the eti-
ology of homosexuality.
Having said all that, while the evidence of biological etiologies as
the cause of homosexuality may be important, and inborn or ge-
netic characteristics probably tend to be less easy to change, in fact,
inborn behavior may still be changeable. For example, consider
left-handedness. If one takes a person born genetically left-
handed, one can train her to write with her right hand. Further-
more, learned behavior is not necessarily changeable. So even if it
turned out that homosexuality is caused by an early environmental
influence rather than an inborn genetic influence, it would not nec-
essarily mean that it was mutable.
So how does one determine immutability scientifically? If ethi-
cally feasible, the best approach scientifically may actually be stud-
ies that seek to determine if, and how easily, sexuality can be
changed. One of the stumbling blocks and sources of confusion
has been the concept of the definition of "homosexuality," and
what it is that one is trying to change if one is to try to change
sexuality.
One way to define homosexuality is purely on behavioral terms.
A person is homosexual if he is a male who has sex with other
males, or she is a female who has sex with other females. Any time
one can demonstrate in a study that one can prevent or alter that
activity, if you define homosexuality by that activity, theoretically
you would be demonstrating that that activity may be chosen or
avoided, and in that sense it could be argued that it is mutable.
There are quite a number of techniques intending as a goal to
change homosexuals to heterosexuals. Some of the more famous
ones are those used by psychoanalysts and psychotherapists, partic-
ularly those - some of whom still are very active - who believe
that homosexuality is a disease, in spite of the removal of homosex-
uality from the list of psychiatric disorders by the American Psychi-
atric Association over twenty-five years ago.
One large study, performed by Bieber et al. in 1962, examined
100 homosexually-behaving patients. All of the homosexually-be-
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having subjects in the study were voluntarily participating in psy-
choanalysis with the purpose of having their homosexuality altered.
All of the participating psychiatrists were attempting to do the
same. Twenty-seven percent of these people were "successfully
changed" from engaging in homosexual behavior to not participat-
ing in homosexual behavior and, in many cases, engaging in hetero-
sexual behavior. Notably, many of these men had in the past had
some heterosexual experience.
This conversion was only measured at the end of the study, and
in many cases there was no follow-up at all. No effort was made to
determine whether these individuals were having any homosexual
fantasies or had any feelings of unexpressed homosexual attraction,
but they were considered "cured." Seventy-three percent of these
highly motivated individuals undergoing 150-350 hours of intense
therapy had not been changed. Do these findings prove mutability
or immutability?
Similar sorts of outcomes have been seen with a type of behav-
ioral therapy, aversion therapy. This is therapy where the experi-
menter will show the subject a picture of a nude male or female
and determine physiological response by measuring either a penile
or a vaginal wall. When the subject has the "wrong" response (i.e.
a physiological response to someone of the same gender), the ex-
perimenter gives the subject an electric shock, or gives the subject
an injection of a drug that makes him severely nauseated. The goal
of this therapy was to change homosexual behavior, and sometimes
replace it with heterosexual behavior, and in some studies the ther-
apy was reported to be effective.
Using this physiological arousal as a definition, another psycho-
therapist, Dr. Freunds, after "curing" (changing the sexual behav-
ior from homosexual to heterosexual) a number of his patients,
decided that he wanted to see if he had really converted these ho-
mosexual patients to heterosexuality. He tested them using penile
and vaginal physiological measuring devices and found that just
about all of his supposedly heterosexual male patients were still
responding to male photographs, and not to the female photo-
graphs. Some of these patients remained convinced that they had
been converted to heterosexuality, and continued to behave heter-
osexually, even though they continued to have this homosexual
physiological response. Mutable of immutable?
Another way of defining homosexuality takes into account fan-
tasy and attraction as well as behavior. Kinsey took fantasy and
attraction, and not just overt behavior, into account when he per-
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formed his famous studies in which he developed his sexuality
scale, the Kinsey scale, which defines individuals as being any-
where from one end of the scale (zero), in which the individual has
no homosexual fantasy, behavior, or attraction, to the other end
(six), where the individual is homosexual in his/her attractions, be-
haviors and fantasies.
In some studies, experimenters using Kinsey's definition were
able to interview some of the subjects who had been studied and
"cured" of their homosexuality in some of the psychotherapeutic
and behavioral studies. Consistently, they found that these people
had fantasies and attractions for people of the same sex and in
many cases were actually having some behavior with the same sex,
as well, having followed them out over time. Thus, if one defines
homosexuality to include fantasy and attraction as well as behav-
ior, even if there is no overt homosexual behavior, the bulk of the
evidence suggests that homosexuality is immutable.
Which of, and how, these different definitions are used and how
homosexuality is understood will have a crucial effect on how one
frames the question of immutability. Ultimately, it is how the
question is framed that may be determinative as to the adjudica-
tion of immutability.
It is now my pleasure to introduce Kate Diaz. Kate is a gay
rights activist for over twelve years. She was a national organizer
of the 1997 civil disobedience action on the steps of the U.S.
Supreme Court. She was previously on the Board of Directors for
the Gay Community News in Boston, and she is currently on the
Board of Directors of the Center for Lesbian and Gay Studies in
New York. She has been an attorney in practice both in the public
and the private sectors and is currently associated with Walker,
Morgan & Finnegan. She is a freelance writer who has done a
great deal of thinking and writing on the issue of immutability and
sexual orientation for gay and progressive publications.
Let's welcome Kate Diaz.
MS. DIAZ: I am missing part of Suzanne's comments. I think
that my sense, Suzanne, is that to some extent the issue was left
unresolved - and I think this is what Dan spoke to - but I be-
lieve the issue has been resolved in the sense of the dominant
ideology.
Justice is supposedly derived from rationality, and rational jus-
tice depends primarily on the properties and types of liberty. But
"liberty for having," the pie being only so big, which invokes dis-
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tributive justice, and "liberty for being," or dignity, are not neces-
sarily the same thing.
As Professor Klome has noted, protection against core existen-
tial "unfreedoms" is necessary for the very existence of persons as
social agents, and thus a condition for justice rather than one of its
solutions. It, therefore, has to have priority. In classical liberal
theory, there should be no rivalry in basic needs. The basic exis-
tential liberties are conditions of dignity, not just the means of
achieving dignity.
Still, economic justice is critical to a larger. justice in society.
When we fight for the right not to be discriminated against in hous-
ing, not to be fired for being gay, to have access to services, to have
access to the political process, to have political asylum, to have pri-
vacy, we are fighting for our wants, the allocation of which is a
topic of economics converging with politics and ideology, ethics,
philosophy, psychology and, I suppose, science, too. What better
example than the right wing's twisting of equal rights into special
rights and feeding on the economic insecurities of straight voters?
But the subtopic I want to discuss today for this panel is the
political economy of theories of homosexuality. Whose wants and
needs are met? Well, this is the political currency of the meaning
of homosexuality. To address these issues I want to describe and
use three examples: the political economy and ideology of science,
of the media and of gay activism in defining what it means to be
gay and what it does not mean.
These three areas converge in the law. As lawyers - and I
know some of you are lawyers in training - our only tools are
words, and in litigating every case there is one essential strategy:
tell a story. Developing the story is a key bonding experience be-
tween the lawyer and the client. The lawyer is giving words, a
voice to the client who has been silenced, wronged or shut out.
The story empowers the client. The story develops as you compare
the case, but you better have the story together when you go to
trial and present your court papers. You better have the issues
framed in such a way that the story makes the answers to the issues
self-evident so that the judge or jury murmurs, "Of course, justice
requires X."
But what do you do when your story lacks a unified theme in one
area? What would you do if you were trying a class action with the
most unruly of classes, like trying to herd kittens scurrying every
which way and their theories, wants and desires? What do you do
when you as a lawyer are to some extent dis-empowered by legal
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precedents, the prejudices of the day, the exigencies of trying to
win, while crafting the story? What if you must present a story you
are not so sure of yourself? Are you compromising the ideal of the
very justice you seek? What if the story was already written for
you before you have a chance to use those words as weapons?
How have scientists, the media and activists written the story with
their own agendas in mind?
Science. Science has written a story that heterosexuality is the
norm and homosexuality the problem, the puzzling deviation, the
defect in the genes and/or the hormonal makeup that it is located
in the body. This is not new. The innocent quest of a Simon Levay
and his hypothalamus studies or a Dean Hamer and his gene stud-
ies, really self-quests of why they turned out gay and hence lost
some of the privileges attendant to white men in society that they
expected to enjoy, have their roots in the late nineteenth century.
The great German sex researcher, Magnus Hirshfeld, set out to
show scientifically that homosexuals were essentially different, with
the hope that social and legal benevolence would follow. In 1908,
Hirshfeld and the Scientific Humanitarian Committee developed a
questionnaire to investigate homosexuality to determine how, not
if, homosexuals were different in their minds or bodies. Thousands
of people answered, because they wanted to decriminalize homo-
sexuality. They thought that if homosexuality was biological they
would not be morally culpable for their desires. When the Nazis
came to power, they burned Hirshfeld's institute, but they picked
up on his theories of biological difference, how the Jewish body, in
addition to the homosexual body, was different and degenerate.
So the latest studies provide a back-to-the-future glimpse of the
culture and politics that make theorizing homosexuality based on
biological causation attractive at particular moments in history. In
pre-war Germany, homosexuals were becoming more visible. So
too now we are becoming more visible. While homosexuality has
repulsed or revoked curiosity in many straight people, scientists en-
chant and allure.
Science has become our secular religion. Scientist gods unlock
the mysteries of our very being, but despite over one hundred
years of trying to unlock the biological basis of homosexuality, the
results are inconclusive. Turning to science for an unassailable an-
swer to social questions, questions about homosexuality, what so-
cial rights, what freedoms we are entitled to.
Moreover, a key to understanding in the scientific study of
human sexuality is elided, that human sexual behaviors are com-
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plex expressions of the interactions of genes, environment, oppor-
tunity and culture, factors that cannot be isolated. The desire for
definitive answers about the cause of homosexuality will persist,
but the impossibility of achieving certainty means that the subject
will remain a marker of our cultural anxieties about sexuality in
general, the most meaning attempts of human activities, as Profes-
sor Sedgwick has noted.
Science gets bracketed with a status of purity and detachment
that advocacy never does, although judging does. Richard Piller,
author of many twin studies, is preoccupied with the fact that his
daughter is a lesbian, his sister is a lesbian, he and his brother are
gay, and he has reason to think that his father was gay. Could it be
something about his family other than genetics?
Nor is there purity or detachment in the money associated with
scientific research. Scientists need to promote their own work.
They need research money. They need to make a name for them-
selves to enhance the control of their own work and research inter-
ests. The Human Genome Project is a multibillion-dollar endeavor
to map and sequence all the DNA of the human prototype. The
mapping and sequencing are valuable intellectual property. The
sequence will define what it is to be human. In the 1990s, homo-
sexual and heterosexual alike turned to science as the final arbiter
of the most natural sexuality of all human beings.
Let's look at the media. In the media, homosexuality sells. You
remember the headlines from 1991 when Simon Levay's study of a
region in the hypothalamus of allegedly homosexual men was re-
leased. New York Times: "Zone of Brain Linked to Men's Sexual
Orientation"; 41 Washington Times: "Scientist Link Brain Anomaly
Homosexuality. '' 49 The New York Times, in particular, has had a
steady drumbeat on this issue, the biology of what it means to be
gay. In an interesting confusion of gender roles with sexual prefer-
ence, The Times did a tie-in article to the Levay study entitled, "In
Fish, Social Status Goes Right to the Brain. '50
Lesbians have generally been absent from these studies and me-
dia coverage, although last year we were treated to headlines, in-
cluding this one from the Washington Post: "Lesbians' Hearing
48. Natalie Angier, Zone of Brain Linked to Men's Sexual Orientation, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1991, at A2.
49. Joyce Price, Scientist Link Brain Anomaly, Homosexuality, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 1991, at A3.
50. Natalie Angier, In Fish, Social Status Goes Right to the Brain, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1991, at C5.
1999]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
Resembles Males, A New Study Suggests."51 You know that was
straight males, as opposed to female. Lesbians are somehow not
"real" women.
So the political economy at play here is whose voices crowd out
others in the media. Science journalism is very much boosterism.
Science journals often have a "you scratch my back I will scratch
your back" relationship with their subjects. Of course, this exists
with political journalism and punditry, but I suggest that journalists
tend to be less skeptical of the scientists they cover than other pub-
lic figures. They often take studies at face value and credit them
without even presenting critiques of such studies; or, worse, de-
riding those who do critique such studies as people who want to
rain on the parade or have an ax to grind.
I do think that scientists and the media aid and abet each other
to sensationalize and trivialize the complexities of human sexuality.
Journalists are on deadlines and can be lazy, so they do not do the
legwork of historical analysis of past studies, contextualizing the
studies, or noting their inconsistencies. Sometimes they seem just
like scribes rewriting press releases.
But ideology is also at play, as I alluded to before, on the anxie-
ties of the people who control media outlets, outlets that are be-
coming increasingly integrated - "synergy" in the marketers'
words. So despite an increase in channels, as it were, there appears
to be a decrease in viewpoints, which brings me to my final exam-
ple: gay activists.
As our movement grows, our voices have become somewhat uni-
fied over the ragtag group of gay liberationists of the late 1960s and
1970s. Interestingly, it was these early liberationists, many of
whom, I am sure, always felt this way, who argued for choice, that
challenged heterosexuals to examine their own bisexual or homo-
sexual potentials that might be realized in a more liberated world.
Today, discussions of whether homosexuality is biologically de-
termined are chockfull of emotion and tension. It is the subject of
fractious debate. If nothing else, the controversy proves that dispa-
rate experiences, whether conscious or unconscious, cannot be con-
flated into scattered cells in one region of the hypothalamus or a
genetic sequence.
I do not think you build a movement on "I cannot help myself; I
was born this way." It is not particularly empowering. While
many gay people who feel they had no choice in their sexuality are
51. Lesbians' Hearing Resembles Males, New Study Suggests, ARIZ. REP., Mar. 3,
1998, at A4 (taken from the Washington Post News Service).
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threatened by those who are bisexual or believe they have some
choice in the matter, even suggesting that the latter group is more
privileged and accepted by straights, I do not think one can deny
which side has had greater exposure and social currency as of late.
Whose story is winning out? I say this despite the right wing's em-
phasis on choice as a moral failing, but this is where we come back
to protection against core existential unfreedoms, what I began my
talk with.
It is an irony, is not it, that the story of those who feel that their
empowerment as social agents is to act on their wants, desires and
needs as a matter of dignity and agency, our supposed liberal foun-
dation in the United States, like freedom of religion, are elided to a
degree. As Nan Hunter has noted, expressing that you are gay is
what makes you gay. Is the status conduct distinction a compro-
mise to one's duty of candor to the court, to one's duty to all gays?
You never really had a choice in your religion of birth, did you?
On that note, I will close with a topic you might think I should
have started with, but it goes to the power of language and whose
voice is heard, the currency of speech by activists. Recently, I at-
tended a media training workshop led by the Gay and Lesbian Al-
liance Against Defamation, and in their kit they instruct you that
you are to use the phrase "sexual orientation"; you are not to use
the phrase "sexual preference." So I thought I would close with
reading definitions from the Webster's Third Edition, just some of
them.
"Orientation: the act of determining one's bearings or setting
one's sense of direction. ' 52 An allusion to the birds and the bees:
witness the bee's momentary pause for orientation before it
headed back to the hive.
"The settling of a sense of direction or relationship in moral or
social concerns or in thought or art; choice or adjustment of as-
sociations, connections, or dispositions. '53 One that I think is par-
ticularly apropos is definition five: "the change of position
exhibited by some protoplasmic bodies within the cell in relation to
external influences and the relative positions of atoms or groups in
a chemical compound. 54
Now, "Preference": "The act of preferring or the state of being
preferred, choice or estimation about another, a high evaluation or
52. WEBSTER'S DICrIONARY 1591 (3d ed. 1986).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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desirability; the power or opportunity of choosing"55 - and this is
what I think we are talking about, to have the opportunity to act on
your different desires, whatever origin you think they may have -
"someone or something that is preferred, an object of choice, a
favorite "56 - which is your favorite ice-cream.
In the precise language that is necessitated by the law, "prefer-
ence" seems more accurate, but the prevailing gay ideology has ex-
punged it.
Thank you.
55. Id. at 1787.
56. Id.
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GENDER THEORY AND LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDERED EMPOWERMENT
MS. KERN: I am Cynthia R. Kern, not to be confused with the
eminent Cynthia S. Kern, who is also here. I am a third-year stu-
dent at CUNY Law School, and I am going to be moderating the
panel today, which has the very short title of "How Does the Strug-
gle for Transgender Liberation Inform the Legal Strategy of the
Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights Movement?"
To my immediate left is Paisley Currah, Professor at Brooklyn
College, teaching political science, and Dana Turner is right beside
her; Dana is a Director on the Board of the International Confer-
ence on Transgender Law and Employment Policy (ICTLEP).
Then we have Professor Katherine Franke, who teaches here at
Fordham. Everyone is going to give their own personal spin on this
very important issue.
MS. TURNER: Let me introduce myself. I am a 1991 graduate
of Georgetown University Law Center, and, after 39 years of life as
David Turner, I re-constructed myself as only a critical legal theo-
rist could do, and, since 1993, I have changed my gender and have
been living as a person of the transsexual persuasion. Now, for the
first time in my life I feel "normal." Well, as normal as a Jesuit-
educated, self avowed socialist/feminist/anarchist, African Ameri-
can transsexual could ever hope to feel. Therefore, that makes me
what the literature describes as a "normative transsexual." Since
1997, I have served on the International Conference on Trans-
gender Law and Employment Policy, and I have been a civil rights
activist for more than thirty years. I feel honored to have been
selected for this panel today and to be here representing the view-
point of a practicing transsexual.
So with that introduction, I would point out that, here, on the
eve of the twenty-first century, people of a transgender experience
- like lesbians, gay males, bisexuals, people living with AIDS and
HIV disease, bisexuals, individuals who identify as queer, and all
sexual minorities generally, have become an integral part of our
society at every imaginable level of human activity and interaction.
Whereas a half-century ago, or even a couple of decades ago,
transsexuals were not a commonly recognized entity. Now, more
and more, we see them everywhere, and our growth in numbers
gives no indication of subsiding.
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I have a few news items, and I will read them as quickly as I can.
I think it will give you an overview of the landscape of the law and
societal conditions faced by transgender people.
January 26, 1999; Louisville, Kentucky: By a vote of seven-to-
five, the Louisville Board of Aldermen passed the first city ordi-
nance in Kentucky protecting citizens against employment or
workplace discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation or
gender identity. Several amendments ultimately affecting trans-
genders had been made to the original bill. The passed bill nar-
rowed the definition of gender identity to include only those who
have completed a sex-change operation. Cross-dressers and pre-
operative transsexuals undergoing hormonal sexual reassignment
therapy are not protected by this bill.
Employers, gender-specific dress codes, public restrooms, chang-
ing facilities and religious institutions are also exempted from the
bill.
February 23; Annapolis, Maryland: A state transgender rights
group, called "It's Time, Maryland," announced its opposition to
the Maryland Antidiscrimination Act of 1998,17 prohibiting dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. Even though the Mary-
land gay rights bill came within one vote of being passed the year
before, the "It's Time, America" transgender group refused to en-
dorse this year's bill.
The Maryland General Assembly members sponsoring the bill
refused to amend it with language expanding the definition of sex-
ual orientation to encompass those having or being perceived as
having an identity expression or physical characteristics not tradi-
tionally associated with one's physical sex or one's biological sex at
birth. Due to this political slight, the chairperson of "It's Time,
Maryland" abruptly resigned from the board of directors of the
Free State Justice Campaign, a statewide coalition of gay groups
that drafted the original bill.
Similarly, a group called the Gulf Gender Alliance in New Orle-
ans picketed the premiere fund-raising event of the Human Rights
Commission ("HRC") in 1994. They picketed HRC tables and
Gay Pride booths across the country during the summer of 1995
because HRC refused to endorse an employment nondiscrimina-
tion act that would include transgendered people. HRC had ex-
pressed, as has the major sponsor of the group, Representative
57. H.R. 315, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1999).
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Barney Frank, the idea that any amendment that included trans-
gendered people was doomed to failure.
These examples really illustrate part of the debate that goes on
in the transgender community today. Many people, as I said, feel
that a bill or law that protect people on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, meaning lesbians and gays, but do not protect transgendered
people should be struck down completely. Other organizations,
like the International Foundation for Gender Identity, say that any
bill is better than no bill.
November 26; Bronx, NY: The mother, brothers, cousin and
neighbor of a twenty-seven-year-old transgendered Puerto Rican
woman named Jalea Lamont were assaulted by New York City po-
lice officers, verbally abused, maced, arrested and charged with
sundry misdemeanors and felony offenses after Nancy Lamont,
Jalea's mother, called 911 when she could not awaken her child
from a cold-and-flu-medicine-induced sleep. Paramedics that re-
sponded to the call found that Jalea was not in need of medical
assistance, but when police officers unknowingly passed Jalea La-
mont in the hallway, they held the door for her and referred to her
as "ma'am." When they discovered that Jalea Lamont was trans-
gender, one police officer followed her into the bathroom of her
family's apartment where she was attempting to hide after he be-
gan verbally abusing her. He beat her with his fists and a night-
stick, even as she begged him to stop because she had recently
undergone silicon implant surgery.
He called her a "he/she," an "it," and a "fucking trans-testicle."
When relatives and neighbors tried to intervene, the officers alleg-
edly beat and maced them, too, including two young children, and
claimed that the family had attacked them. Jalea was treated at
Bronx Lebanon Hospital, and the officers also reported injuries.
December 31, 1993; Falls City, Nebraska: A lesbian, a gay man
and a female-to-male non-operative transsexual were murdered ex-
ecution-style with gunshots to the head on New Year's Eve. Bran-
don Tina, the female-to-male transsexual, was twenty-one years old
and had lived as a man for three years before being beaten and
raped at a Christmas party the week before by the same two men
who killed him. Lisa Lambert was twenty-four and Philip Devy
was twenty-two.
Police in Falls City, Nebraska, did not charge the pair when the
original crime was reported, and, in fact, publicly identified the
trans-man as a female-male impersonator. The harassment contin-
ued, culminating in the triple slaying, while an eight-year-old child
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cried in a nearby crib. The shooter in the case was sentenced to
death for the three murders.
August 25; Greenwich Village, New York City: Police reported a
dispute between two groups of men believed to include transsexu-
als and transvestites all involved in prostitution in the Lower West
Side meat packing district, led to the fatal shooting of an eighteen-
year-old Patterson, New Jersey man on the corner of Sixth Avenue
and 14th Street in Manhattan. Four men, two of whom wore wo-
men's attire, attacked Rivera with a baseball bat, knives and a 45-
caliber handgun, shooting him once through the chest. They fled in
a dark Lincoln Town Car and were arrested later in the day in
Jersey City. Rivera was pronounced dead at St. Vincent's Hospital.
Exactly one week before, thirty-six-year-old Fitzroy Green, a
well-known transvestite prostitute, hustler, S&M dungeon master
and freelance process server, was murdered in his apartment near
Greenwich and Charles Streets in the West Village, allegedly by a
twenty-one-year-old Bronx man who told the police that he killed
Green, known affectionately as Jamaica, because after accompany-
ing him to his apartment for a sexual encounter, he discovered the
victim to be a male instead of female. He stabbed Jamaica eight-
een times, once in the chest and seventeen in the back. The suspect
met the victim in front of a popular bar on Christopher Street,
called Two Potato, which features performances by female imper-
sonators. He is using the famous homosexual panic defense.
January 8; Austin, TX: In a case eerily reminiscent of Matthew
Shepard's murder,58 the body of a gay gender-questioning eight-
een-year-old teen-ager was found. His name was Donald Scott
Fuller. He was also known as Lauren Page. He was found in a
wooded area along South Congress Avenue of Houston with a
nine-inch gash across the throat and several stab wounds to the
head and torso.
Five days later, a twenty-eight-year-old, Gamalio Korea, was ar-
rested for the murder. He and his brother-in-law both admitted to
having met Lauren and another transgendered kid on the notori-
ous "Austin whore stroll" and paid to have sex with them.
Although Austin City Police said they were leaning toward not
classifying the murder as a bias crime, Travis County, Texas district
attorneys have announced their intention to process the case as a
hate crime. The suspect faces a very real possibility of execution by
lethal injection, considering the liberal voting record of Travis
58. See supra note 4.
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County, Texas residents, who elected an openly lesbian county
sheriff last November.
November 29; Quedlindorf, Germany: Residents of that tiny
East German village of 1048 persons voted to dismiss their mayor,
Norbert Lindner, age forty, after he began wearing women's cloth-
ing and calling himself Michaela. The divorced father of two chil-
dren and member of the former East German Reformed
Communist Party said that if she lost the vote of confidence from
the villagers she would leave Germany for her sex reassignment
surgery. Although Michaela's mayoral term was not to end until
2003, she herself called for the referendum while appealing for tol-
erance and understanding from the townspeople of Quedlindorf,
who were shocked when hundreds of transsexuals from across Ger-
many, France and Western Europe converged on the hamlet to
demonstrate their support for Mayor Lindner.
In Trinidad, Colorado, a small town twenty miles over the New
Mexico border, in a clinic that was once originally operated by the
United Mine Workers of America union, a seventy-five-year-old
general practitioner, Dr. Stanley Biber, has performed 3800 sex re-
assignment surgeries there in his seventy-bed hospital since his first
penectomy (penis removal) in 1969. Where once, as one of only a
few American doctors willing to perform this surgery, he per-
formed three sex change operations a week, now he does only one,
while other doctors have developed specialty practices in the field.
Dr. Biber also reports that he now does - where at the beginning
he did almost entirely sex reassignment surgeries for males to fe-
males, he says about half of his clients are female to male. That is
from the New York Times of Sunday, November 8.19
These vignettes represent the legal situation that transgenders,
transsexuals, transvestites, cross-dressers and gender-benders of
every persuasion find themselves in, and to varying degrees they
find that they are compelled to express themselves and manifest
their personhood in the clothing, attire or visage of the gender op-
posite their biological sex.
People who transcend the established norms and boundaries of
sexual identity are born both male and female, as well as inter-sex
and as hermaphrodites. Although most of my examples given here
involve male-to-female transgender pioneers, as I stated, the per-
centage tends to be about equal between male-to-female and fe-
male-to-male sex reassignment surgeries.
59. See James Brooke, Sex-Change Industry a Boon to Small City, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1998, at Al.
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A cursory examination of a simple area of personal identification
documentation illustrates the obstacles that transgender and gen-
der-variant individuals must navigate. Whereas medical technol-
ogy has made surgery possible for more and more persons than
ever before in history, the legal predicament that transgender peo-
ple find themselves in is very precarious and unsettled.
Under the present legal system, even postoperative transsexuals
are enjoined from any number of official societal institutions and
social activities, such as marriage, just as lesbians and gays are,
although interestingly, with transsexuals - and there are many
postoperative transsexuals in the country today who, having been
in legal heterosexual marriages before their sex reassignment sur-
gery, are now in legal same-sex marriages. So some same-sex mar-
riages do indeed exist in this country.
Whereas common law name change is widely recognized as
something that anyone could do, through usage and by order of a
court, having one's birth registration materials changed is some-
thing entirely different. New York will change the sex designation
on one's driver's license, although most window counter clerks in
the DMV offices know nothing of the policy. It is called Procedure
435, and it was just a letter ruling by the Commissioner of the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles.60
The Social Security Administration readily reissues Social Secur-
ity cards with a new name, although not a new Social Security
number, to facilitate the full employment of people who use pro-
fessional pseudonyms, like actors and authors. Therefore,
transsexual people, preoperative or postoperative, are able to take
advantage of the name being able to change there.
Some states do allow a court order to change the actual birth
certificate, while other states do not. Roberta Achtenberg's Sexual
Orientation in the Law6 1 gives a list of those states. The State De-
partment will also issue a passport with a sex designation change
upon presentation of a letter from a medical professional.
For transsexuals the prospects are not entirely bleak, although
they find themselves in about the same position that lesbians and
gays find themselves in.
Last, I would say that I like the title. I think that it should proba-
bly be the other way around.. I think that it is probably the lesbian
and gay civil rights movement, that informs the struggle for trans-
60. Commissioner of Dep't of Motor Vehicles, Ltr. Rul. Proc. 435.
61. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL RIGHTS COMM., NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (Roberta Achtenberg & Karen B. Moulding eds., 1998).
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gender liberation, as the transgender movement has in a lot of
ways - the organized political transgender movement has
modeled itself after the lesbian and gay civil rights movement.
Although we recognize that transsexuals have been leaders in the
gay civil rights movement since before Stonewall, and particularly
at the 1969 Stonewall rebellion, their role in leading the movement
toward expanded sexual liberty is changing and growing every day.
MS. KERN: Thank you, Dana.
MS. TURNER: I will end with one saying of Confucius: "One
of the great pleasures in life is in doing the things that people say
cannot be done."
MS. KERN: Thank you. I think it is very important to realize
what is going on out there in the world right now and that much of
the violence that we hear about and much of the problems that
transgender people deal with every day are problems we are deal-
ing with, too, but they are problems that transgender people have
always been dealing with, and in a very, very violent and very im-
mediate way.
Would you like to go next, Paisley?
PROFESSOR CURRAH: Before I get started, I also want to
get a plug in for my other affiliation, and Dana Turner's too. There
is a new group in New York State called the New York Association
for Gender Rights Advocacy ("NYAGRA"), and Dana and I are
members. NYAGRA is a membership organization that advocates
at the state and local level for self-determination in gender expres-
sion and identity, which means that it is a transgender political
rights group. I also have to handout a publication that I co-au-
thored with Shannon Minter, an activist handbook on how to get a
transsexual/transgender civil rights bill passed based on what has
happened in other places.62
My talk today is actually going to be a series of stories, four sto-
ries with a few larger points, "grandiloquent points" that I will in-
tersperse between the stories.
The first story - and this will hopefully speak to the larger goals
of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered ("L/G/B/T")
movements - is about Katherine McIntyre's name change and the
Catch-22 situation that this transsexual woman found herself in
when she tried to negotiate her life as a woman.63 Katherine McIn-
62. PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, SECURING CIVIL RIGHTS PROTEC-
TIONS FOR TRANSGENDERED AND TRANSSEXUAL PEOPLE: AN OVERVIEW OF Ex-
ISTING STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES (1998).
63. See In re McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1998).
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tyre works for the city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. She represents
herself as a woman in every area of her life - her bank informa-
tion, credit cards, voluntary participation in organizations - but
she has to go to work as a man, as Henry McIntyre. The reason she
has to go to work as a man is because she has not had a legal name
change, and her employer says if you do not change your name,
you cannot go to work as a woman.
When she went to the court to ask for a legal name change, the
court said, "No, you have not passed the real-life test, which means
living for at least a year in all aspects of your new gender." The
catch, of course, is that her employer will not recognize "him" as a
female and allow her to come to work as a woman until she has her
name legally changed, but she cannot get her name legally changed
until she passes the real-life test. It took three years of litigation
for her to be able to go to work as a woman, as Katherine Marie
McIntyre. This story demonstrates how different authorities rely
on different proofs of gender: For the psychiatric establishment,
one's gender identity is proved by passing the real-life test, for the
male-to-female transsexual, is really a "high fem" test. Can you be
Betty Davis for a year? For her employer, it is the legal name
change that is necessary to change her gender identity at work. Fi-
nally, the state-sanctioned legal name change relies on the real-life
test. This Catch-22 situation reveals the arbitrariness of gender
definition but the state's authority to police these definitions re-
mains in place.
The first grandiloquent idea I want to put out here today is this:
In the United States, we do not have an established church, so the
state obviously does not support - wink wink - any one particu-
lar religion or denomination, but we still have a country which is
one of the most religious in the world. There are hundreds of
thousands of religious communities who think everybody else is
completely wacko and they are the true believers. What we have,
though, in this country officially is religious pluralism, and it is the
separation of church and state that guarantees this pluralism. My
point today is that the most fundamental goal of the transgender
and of L/G/B/T politics needs to be the dis-establishment of the
current gender regime. If sexual minorities, including transsexuals,
transpeoples, queers, gays, lesbians and bisexuals, can agree on
nothing else, we should agree on that. So regardless of our own
personal views about the truth of gender, we need to work to dises-
tablish the state's ability to define and regulate the relations be-
tween biological birth sex, which if you investigate you realize is a
QUEER LAW 1999
completely messy concept; gender identity, one's sense of being
male or female; gender expression; and sexual orientation. So far,
a lot of the L/G/B/T movement is working only on sexual orienta-
tion - for example, preventing openly gay men and lesbians from
being fired. But the movement thus far has not really focused on
what goes into the construction of sexual orientation: sexual orien-
tation, defined in terms of same or opposite sex or gender object
choice, is coherent as a concept only if sex and gender remain un-
contested categories.64
Once we take away the state's authority to define sex and gen-
der, we can spend all our time working on building our own dispa-
rate gender communities, getting into shouting matches with
people whose views we do not like, working on them to convince
them how wrong they are, converting them to our view. You know
how that is, right? For example, I am exaggerating here a little, the
butch/fem lesbians think the androgynous lesbians are weirdoes,
and the androgynous lesbians think the butch/fem people are patri-
archal throwbacks, and the butches think that FTMs are com-
pletely out of line in changing their bodies. Everybody just thinks
the other person is wrong. That is what gender pluralism within
the longer L/G/B/T movement is.
So in a gender pluralistic society, one that respects the official
doctrine of separation of gender and state, the stakes in terms of
the distribution of resources would not be so high. No one would
lose custody of a child, be denied medical treatment, be denied
access to education, public accommodations, et cetera, be left espe-
cially vulnerable to hate crimes, because something about their
gender was a little or a lot nonconforming to an official gender
regime.
Obviously, I am preaching to the converted here, and obviously
this thought experiment is not exactly right around the corner. No
one is going to just discover a lost amendment - you know, part of
the Bill of Rights - "Oh, we just found it in a trunk." I wanted to
lay out this vision of the separation of state and gender in order to
emphasize one fundamental principle, and that is that we, as mem-
bers of diverse and endlessly proliferating communities of L/G/B/T
people, do not have to agree on any one truth or any one narrative
about gender before we start working together to dismantle the
state's gender regime. We do not have to come to any agreement
on which gender theorist will be our standard bearer, whether it be
64. See Paisley Currah, Queer Theory, Lesbian and Gay Rights, and Transsexual
Marriages, in IDENTrTY/SPACE/POWER (forthcoming) (discussing the point further).
1999]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
Judith Butler or Harry Benjamin, or even, God forbid, Janice Ray-
mond. So that is my whole take on gender theory.
Story two is about a bathroom. Utah officials chose to designate
the women's room of the county courthouse of Tooele County as a
unisex/single sex toilet.65 That is breaking news obviously. But
what was going on here was that there was a transsexual woman
who was working in the courthouse, and the county officials were
trying to accommodate this woman because her co-workers ob-
jected to using the same restroom as someone they perceived as
male. They had a woman and a men's room. So officials then de-
cided to designate the restroom as a "unisex" restroom. It was the
kind of bathroom where you go in, lock the door, and no one else
can come in. But the result of this whole situation was that the
genetic women in the workplace claimed that this restroom ar-
rangement created a hostile work environment and decided to sue.
I like this particular story because it is a very American story. If
you have any doubts about gender, just sue.
Now, for time reasons, I will spare you the next grandiloquent
point I was going to make, except to point out that the bathroom
issue actually stands in for transsexual and transgender employ-
ment issues more generally. When it is the case of a current em-
ployee who decides to transition, most of the anxieties about
gender boundaries get articulated as bathroom issues. There is a
lot more going on there but all these anxieties are condensed into
the bathroom question - issues of privacy, and labor issues more
generally.
The third story is about a transsexual marriage. There are lots of
stories these days about transsexual marriages, but what I really
like about this particular one is the right-wing response to it. I will
just read you a little bit of the news story. This is Utah again.
"A transsexual midway through operations to become female
was granted a marriage license in Salt Lake County last month and
married fiancde Marlene Smith." Nicole Cline, formerly Neal
Cline, married Smith on January 17 at the - which church? - the
Metropolitan Community Church, of course. Now a spokesman
for Focus on the Family in Colorado Springs - remember, that city
was ground zero of Colorado's anti-gay Amendment 2 - said he
was skeptical about this marriage. Quote: "I do not know that I
would even think of it as a marriage. The design of marriage is the
coming together of differences, not sameness. It escapes me what
65. See Michael Vigh, Women Ban Transsexual From Restroom, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Aug. 22, 1998, at B1.
QUEER LAW 1999
makes this arrangement so great." Here we see a problem in the
homophobic and transphobic logic of the right wing. They do not
like transsexuality; they do not like same-sex marriage. This
spokesman could just see it as an opposite-sex marriage, the way
the state does, but he decided to come down against same-sex mar-
riage instead. The consequence of seeing this marriage as a same-
sex marriage is that he is forced to recognize the phenomenon of
transsexuality.
Cline was listed as a male on the application form. According to
the clerk, "We had him sign an affidavit that he swore under oath
that he was the person he represented himself to be. There were
no court papers that said he changed his sex, only that he changed
his name." Cline was named the groom on the marriage license.
after being told that "somebody needed to be."'66
The funny thing about this story is that Nicole Cline is the same
woman who had the bathroom problem in the Tooele County
courthouse. So she has had quite a legal year. She is just trying to
live her life, but she had quite a year, coming up against legal gen-
der barriers more than once.
The ontological chaos hiding just underneath the surface of the
state's laws on marriage, sex and gender identity, is revealed by the
Christian Right's response to these kinds of marriages. Here is an-
other similar marriage, exact same situation. Someone had not
transitioned, so was recognized by the state (Oregon) as a male,
and was marrying someone the state recognized as female. So the
leader of the Oregon Citizens Alliance, Lon Mabon, when he
heard about this transsexual marriage, announced he would imme-
diately begin organizing a voter referendum that would define mar-
riage as a strictly heterosexual institution and gender as something
determined at conception - "It stops this playing around with
Mother Nature," according to Mabon.67
The Christian Right's attempt to defend traditional notions
about the relation between chromosomes - because it has to be at
conception that would be the only way to find out - and gender
identity by possibly resorting to a statewide referendum exposes
the futility of such a senseless gesture. I mean, when you have to
66. Michael Vigh, Transsexual Woman Weds Woman in Legally Recognized Union,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 5, 1999, at C1.
67. See Paissly Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and Gender Non-conformity in the
Civil Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1363 (1997) (discussing
these cases in detail).
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put this supposedly natural thing up to a vote, there is a problem
going on here.
Finally, this last story gets us more directly back to the idea of
disestablishing gender. On March 19, 1998, Bill Maher, the host of
"Politically Incorrect," delivered an extended riff on a transgender
man, and here is some of what he said throughout the show.
There is a person I am going to say "person," because I am not
so sure what this person is. It is a woman, a person with female
genitalia born Alice Myers. She is at Harvard, declared herself a
man. Now, she has not gone through any operation, any hormone,
anything when people - you know, there are such things as
transsexuals, transvestites. She looks like Yentl. She just has a
short haircut and wears men's clothing and glasses, and you know,
in a crowd you might not say, "Oh, that is a woman," but this is a
woman dressed - but she says "I am a man," because she just
wants to be a man. The question is, can you just declare yourself to
be something that nature did not make you?
It says, he says, "I am a man. Everything I do in life I do as a
man." Say this person is on the Titanic, hits an iceberg, women and
children first; do not you think they would be the first one to get
into an evening dress, pumps, and a matching handbag? '68 So that
is the punch line to the joke.
Now, at this point in the show, Sally Jesse Raphael, one of the
guests, jumps in and says - and you know it is not good when
Sally Jesse is your champion - "You are unfair to these trans-
gendered." Bill Maher interrupts, saying, "What do you mean
'these?' There is one. This is it."69
Obviously this is an example of rabid nasty transphobia, but let's
try to be a little more specific about what is going on here. Does it
represent some kind of fear on Bill Maher's part about gender flu-
idity where the relation between sex and gender is very much un-
moored, that one can simply change their gender by starting to
look like Yentl? Well, yes, obviously it is about this fear. Is it
about the fear that non-genetic men will usurp genetic male privi-
lege? (I have a friend who calls genetic men "accidental men," but
I will use the politically correct though still not completely scientifi-
cally sound term "genetic men.")
According to Maher, Alex has a girlfriend and Maher seems
both concerned and jealous about this whole girlfriend idea. So it
68. Politically Incorrect with Bill Maher (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 19,
1998).
69. Id.
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is clearly a little bit about that. But the kicker to his extended riff
on Alex Myers, one that he saves until the end of the segment, is
that this guy would change back to being a woman, a high-fem wo-
man no less, in a second, to get a space on a lifeboat on the Titanic.
This brings me to my last "grandiloquent point." This
transphobic story transitions into a slightly different kind of story.
It is questioning the permeability of the boundaries of the sex/gen-
der classification system. And those boundaries are so contested
because this gender system that we have now is one of the key
mechanisms through which scarce resources - boats, in the case of
the Titanic, Social Security and other state benefits in the case of
legal marriage - are distributed or not distributed. A regime that
does not adhere to the doctrine of the separation of gender and
state is going to produce a lot of anxieties and clashes about its
rules of gender classification. Conversely, if one's beliefs and prac-
tices about gender played as little a role in determining one's posi-
tion vis-A-vis the legal opportunity structures as the way one's
religious beliefs and practices now do, the myriad of conflicts about
gender - from gays in the military to transsexuality - would con-
tinue no doubt, but would be emptied of the considerable force of
state sanction.
Thank you.
MS. KERN: Thank you very much.
Professor Franke?
PROFESSOR FRANKE: I hope you do not mind if I come
over here. I teach torts in this room. So on behalf of both my torts
class and Fordham Law School, I want to welcome you all here.
It is exciting to me to have so many lesbian and gay people and
friends here at Fordham, which is not to say that we do not have
friends here the rest of the week.
There has been sort of a nice thread where we have each picked
up where the other one left off. I want to try to do that, as well,
and ask a question that I think is lurking where Paisley ended,
which is: What is transgender-based discrimination a question of?
Why should we, as lesbian and gay, bisexual or heterosexual peo-
ple, care about transgender-based discrimination? We tend to bun-
dle groups of identity-based concepts into civil rights categories.
Why do we add transgendered people and issues affecting trans-
gendered into the lesbian, gay and bisexual movement as opposed
to say, the women's movement? I do not profess to have a com-
plete answer to this question, but I am going to begin by making
the question more complex and then suggest some answers.
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Just as any adequate account of the nature of discrimination
against black people, for instance, must go beyond the mere status
of a person's race to questions of white supremacy in order to pro-
vide an adequate account of race discrimination, or any adequate
account of discrimination against women must go beyond biologi-
cal facts of people to an adequate account of patriarchy, I think
that in order to provide an adequate description of discrimination
against transgendered people, we have to include the cultural
norms that compel in subtle and, as we have heard from these sto-
ries, not so subtle ways a set of compulsory gender identities and
norms.
In the short time that I have today, I am going to cut through the
niceties and suggest what I think are two fundamental strategic er-
rors that have been made - not by everyone but by some - in
advocating on behalf of the rights of transgendered people, and
then elaborate a little bit on why I think those are mistakes. Then
if you are interested, we can talk about them a little more during
the questions.
First, is that I think it is a significant mistake for us to advocate
to add transgendered people to the laundry list of protected sta-
tuses that appear in most antidiscrimination laws: sex; race; na-
tional origin; religion; and, if you are lucky, sexual orientation. I
do not think we should add another semicolon and add trans-
gendered people.
Second, explaining in part, why I hold the just expressed view, I
think it is an even graver mistake to see the discrimination faced by
transgendered people as to be problems in which only trans-
gendered people have a stake. All of us have a stake, whether we
are transgendered or not, in the kinds of discrimination that people
who are believed to be transgendered experience.
Now let me, as my two prior panelists have done, begin by giving
you some examples, and I think there is a particular importance to
our telling stories and giving examples in this area, because these
are parts of life that so often are ignored and silenced. It is ex-
tremely important for us to work from real-life experiences and the
types of problems and violence that people experience day-to-day
who are transgendered.
First, Big Boy restaurant refused to hire a preoperative trans-
gendered woman as a hostess because she was transgender. When
she brought an action for sex discrimination, the court dismissed
the complaint and held that the law does not protect males dressed
or acting as females, or vice versa. According to the court, that is
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not what sex discrimination laws were intended to or should be
interpreted to apply to - not surprising, for any of you who have
looked at this area at all.
Secondly, a preoperative transgendered woman who worked at
Boeing, the big airplane manufacturer out in Washington, was told
by her employer that they had a policy regarding the employment
of transgendered persons; apparently, in Washington there are a
number of transgendered employees that had worked there - and
that as long as she was pre-op, she could not use the women's bath-
room and could only wear either male or unisex clothing. Curi-
ously, though, unisex clothing was defined by Boeing to include
blouses, sweaters, slacks, flat shoes, and - then this is the great
part - nylon stockings, earrings, lipstick, foundation, and clear
nail polish, no colors.
She was, however, instructed in addition not to wear clothing
that was excessively feminine, such as dresses, skirts and frilly
blouses. Blouses are okay; frilly blouses are not.
Now, remember, as a preoperative transsexual she has to live in
the gender role that she is choosing to officially occupy. So she has
to thread a needle between unisex on the one hand and overly fem-
inine on the other, and in order to do so, this poor woman's super-
visor was instructed to tell her each day whether or not her attire
was acceptable. The test that the supervisor was instructed to ap-
ply was whether her dress would be likely to cause a complaint
were she to use a men's room at the Boeing facility. This is the
"transgendered woman in the men's room at Boeing" test.
One day she comes to work wearing an outfit that had been pre-
viously approved by her supervisor but decided that day to acces-
sorize it with pink pearls and was fired immediately for wearing
clothing that was excessively feminine. She brings an action in
state court in Washington and ultimately loses in the Washington
Supreme Court.70
Finally, a masculine woman worked as a teacher in a juvenile
detention center where her supervisor, a female judge, described
the unwritten dress code as that which was "appropriately femi-
nine" - because, after all, they were role models for the young
girls in their charge - and this woman was ultimately fired for
wearing the "Brooks Brothers look," the look that all of you who
are either lawyers working in firms or will be some day know well.
70. Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993).
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She would not wear skirts; she wore pants and was fired for that
reason, that she was a bad female role model.
Now only the first two examples here involve transgendered
people, but the principle at stake in all three, I believe, is the same.
This is about coerced enforcement of gender orthodoxies through
workplace rules, and we could come up with other examples in
other parts of life. This orthodoxy reflects a collapsing of gender,
which is a set of cultural norms and biological sex in such a way
that femininity is understood as the natural and authentic expres-
sion of female agency, and masculinity is understood as the natural
and authentic expression of male agency. So just as you cannot
mix and match sex and gender, masculinity and maleness, feminin-
ity and femaleness, so too you cannot switch sides. Men do not
become women. Males do not become females.
These qualities, sex and gender, are regarded as being norma-
tively immutable. In that sense, it is naturally impossible to
change, and we should not want to in the first place. So it is wrong
of us to want to pull something off that is not possible to do
anyway.
There is a Supreme Court case from 1989 which I am sure many
of you are familiar with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,7' that should
have resolved all of these cases. There, Ann Hopkins, who had
been a very well-performing woman at one of the top accounting
firms, applied for partnership. She was denied partnership because
- and if you are a litigator, this is just the greatest thing that they
actually put this in writing - she was "too macho." She should
enroll in a course at charm school to learn how to walk more femi-
ninely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup,
have her hair styled, wear jewelry and learn how to accessorize like
the poor woman at Boeing did.
So Ann Hopkins did not wear the pearls and lost the job. Now
she won her sex discrimination suit in the U.S. Supreme Court, be-
cause the Court interpreted the sex discrimination provisions in Ti-
tle VII to include the imposition of gender-based norms on men
and women.72 To punish a woman because she acts aggressively or
to hold a view that women should not act aggressively or cannot is
gender-based discrimination, according to the Supreme Court in
1989.73 An incredibly important decision, an incredibly important
victory. We were all excited. I was very excited when this case was
71. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
72. See id. at 229.
73. See id.
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decided, and we thought, "Well, this is really going to change the
landscape of Title VII sex-based discrimination to include gender
norms."
Well, sad to say, it has not. You would have thought that this
ruling would have invalidated the three examples of the types of
workplace rules that I gave you before, but it just has not been the
case. You continue to see courts uphold the idea of clothing rules
that enforce the idea that certain clothes belong to men and other
clothes belong to women and that you cannot switch sides. So peo-
ple who are born male wear women's clothes as part of a transsex-
ual process continue to be discriminated against in the workplace,
on the theory that Title VII or workplace antidiscrimination laws
do not reach transgendered people, without understanding that this
is not about some hybrid special situation; this is about gender
norms.
To my mind, both our legislative and litigation strategies on be-
half of transgendered people should not be to add transgendered
people or transgenderism - or whatever the word is in your juris-
diction - into the laundry list of identity groups or statuses that
are protected by human rights laws, but instead to robustly inter-
pret what our sex- and gender-based discrimination laws prohibit,
which includes the idea that real men do not sleep with men, real
women are not masculine, real men do not want to be women.
They all stem from a central similar notion about who men and
women are and how we should behave in the world to perform our
gender identities.
MS. KERN: Thank you, Katherine.
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STICKS AND STONES: THE NEXUS BETWEEN HATE SPEECH
AND VIOLENCE
MR. CHEN: Welcome. My name is Jack Chen. I am a member
of Fordham Law School's class of 1996. I first approached James
about organizing this panel, partially because of the media's re-
sponse to the Matthew Shepard incident,74 and also because of
Reverend Phelps's "www.godhatesfags.com" Web site that serves
as a very clear example of hate speech.
What I was hoping to do today was try to put our arms around
the bigger issues, some of the grayer aspects of what really consti-
tutes hate speech and how it may be related to bias crimes and
what we can do to begin thinking about trying to address this in
society.
To my immediate left is Laura Edidin, managing attorney of the
New York City Gay and Lesbian Antiviolence Project; then we
have Professor Brian Levin, director of the Center on Hate and
Extremism and a Criminal Justice Professor at California State
University, San Bernardino; and lastly, Professor Jack Battaglia
from Touro Law School.
First, we will start with Laura, who will give us some examples of
hate speech that are experienced by people of lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, transgendered and HIV status ("L/G/B/T/H").
MS. EDIDIN: The Anti-Violence Project serves L/G/B/T/H
crime victims. The areas of crime in which we do counseling, advo-
cacy and legal services include domestic violence, bias crime, rape
and sexual assault, pickup crimes and police misconduct, and I will
also add HIV-related violence, because that is also a program that
I coordinate. We define HIV-related violence as anytime someone
is victimized because of their actual or perceived HIV status.
Part of the work that we do is bearing witness to the pain and
trauma that are suffered by L/G/B/T/H crime victims, and it is in
that role that I am here today. I want to talk about violence in the
nexus with hate speech. I am studiously avoiding defining hate
speech at this point because I want to just have all of us hear what
it sounds like, give you a sense of what it feels like, and what it
looks like. When I initially sat down to think about it, my first
instinct was to intellectualize what hate speech is. I wanted to back
off a step and talk about what we probably all agree is hate speech
just by listening to it, and then draw some examples in the end of
74. See supra note 4 (describing the Shepard hate crime).
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speech that I would like to see what people's opinion is on whether
it is what your visceral reaction would categorize as hate speech.
I am just going to start by giving some examples of narratives
about victims of crime, and then wrap up with some thoughts and
some ideas.
I am going to start in the area of domestic violence and tell you
some stories. The first one is about a woman. She and her partner
lived together with their two children, and this woman's mother
had mental illness and substance abuse issues. She wanted to come
live with this couple, and they said, "We do not really think this is a
good idea for our kids to have you in the home."
She was not happy with that, so one of the ways in which she
dealt with that was by standing on the corner near their apartment,
yelling all day long, "See that woman over there? She is a pussy-
eating dyke. She is a fucking lesbian."
It escalated from there to her moving across the street to the
stoop and telling the kids, "You want to know what your mom is
doing? I will tell you what she is doing. She is eating that woman's
pussy."
Then it escalated from there into her approaching their front
door and pounding on it until she broke in, insisting on sleeping
there for the night.
Another example is of a woman who resides in this country ille-
gally. She was dating a man for a long time, and he said, "Why
don't we just get married? It would make things easier with immi-
gration, and we have been together a long time and have generally
been thinking about it." She says, "Okay, let's do it."
About a month after they were married, she tested positive for
HIV, and when she sat down to tell her husband, he was initially
very supportive and said, "Well, let's go get another test and
double-check, and I will get one, too." When the test confirmed
that she was positive and that he was negative, he turned very abu-
sive, told her that she was dirty, that she was a carrier, that no one
else would have her now that she was soiled by having HIV,
threatened to reveal her HIV status in order to jeopardize her im-
migration proceedings and used it as an excuse to have sex outside
their marriage.
The impact of this kind of language is really complicated, but
what these examples bring out is the shame that is involved on the
part of the victim when they are on the receiving end of abuse like
that. For example, in the instance of the woman whose mother was
harassing her, she started to pull away from her partner. There
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started to be tension in their relationship. A lot of it came out of
internalized homophobia and the shame around the fact that she
was in love with a woman.
As for the woman who has HIV, she started to see an effect in
her health. I think that is true generally of people who are victims
of crime, but when someone already has a compromised immune
system, they feel that physical impact of the abuse even stronger.
To give you another example of domestic violence, a transgender
woman entered into a traditional marriage. At the time, he lived
his life as a man and his wife knew that his gender identity was as a
woman, but at the time he did not present as a woman to the
world. They married, had two children, and at a certain point he
decided that he wanted to live his life as a woman and started
dressing as a woman.
His wife became very abusive. She would sit at the breakfast
table and tell this transgender woman that she was ugly, that she
was disgusting, that she repulsed her, and it escalated to the point
where she threw a skillet full of eggs in the woman's face.
Moving into the area of bias crime, a very recent example that
we encountered was a case where two African American women
were driving a car in Manhattan and the light turned yellow, and
they decided to stop for the light. The taxicab driver who was be-
hind them was not happy about that and started honking his horn,
stuck his head out the window to see what they looked like, and
noticed a rainbow bumper sticker on their car. He started calling
them "black bitches," "nigger dikes" and other sundry names.
When that did not get the response he was looking for or did not
satisfy him, he started ramming his taxi into their car in the hopes
of pushing it into the oncoming traffic in the intersection. I will tell
you that, thanks to the work of one of our victim advocates, Momie
Moran, the taxi driver's license was revoked and there was a fine.
Another example of HIV-related bias crime is a composite of a
couple of different stories that we have heard - there was a gay
man who lived with his adopted son in an apartment building
where one of the neighbors started to harass him on the basis of his
sexual orientation and HIV status, and that ranged everything
from yelling "Die, AIDS faggot," to putting burning garbage on his
doorstep, to scrawling on food delivery menus that were stuck on
the door, "these men are gay, they are spreading AIDS, they are
child molesters." It escalated to the point where an order of pro-
tection was issued on behalf of the father and his adopted son,
thanks to the good work of another legal intern.
QUEER LAW 1999
I want to talk about the impact of those crimes. Victims of
crimes where hate language is used, where it is motivated by bias,
may try to change their behavior as a way of avoiding being victims
of another crime. For example, the women may have wanted to
take the rainbow sticker off their car. Victims may avoid gay-iden-
tified establishments; for example, victims of crimes outside of a
gay bar or a gay bookstore or an AIDS service organization may
avoid those places.
There was an instance in Brooklyn recently where a woman with
short hair was walking down the street and a man approached her
and said, "You want to know what it is like to be a man? I will
show you what it is like to be a man." He took her, pulled her by
the hair and pulled her head down and beat her head until she was
incapacitated. The impulse may be for her to grow her hair out,
since that is what seemed to be what made her a target.
Another impact on victims of crime, particularly crime where
hate speech is used, is the tendency to blame themselves for what
happened - "I should not have been out so late; I should not have
gone home with someone I did not know." That has a lot of conse-
quences, not the least of which is failure to seek medical attention,
for example.
I spoke with one man who was the victim of a bias attack, and I
said, "Are you injured?" He said, "No, no, just a couple of little
things." I said, "Okay, well, what is bothering you?" He said,
"Well, you know, my ear." I said, "Why don't you tell me more
about that?" He said, "I don't have any hearing in one of my
ears."
To him, that was not a serious injury, and I think part of that
dynamic is not only a bit of self-denial; it is easier to believe that
you are not injured, because it is easier to believe that what hap-
pened to you was not so serious. But part of that dynamic is also
self-blame - "Well, it is my own fault. What was I doing on the
subway that late at night where no one else was?"
Giving some examples from rape and sexual assault, a trans-
gender woman was volunteering for a while at a nursing home.
She knew a lot of people there very well. When a rumor got started
that she was not really a woman, she ignored it. She thought,
"These are people I know, they are my friends, and if they have a
question, they are going to come and ask me."
What ended up happening was she was lured into a storage
room. Her supervisor said, "There is something here I want to
show you; come on in." When she got there, there was a gang of
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employees who sexually assaulted her, pulling at her clothes, grab-
bing at her crotch, grabbing her breasts, and yelling things like,
"What do you have down there? What are you? Are you a man?
Are you a woman?" - calling her "an anti-man, a faggot, a cock-
sucker, a she-man."
There was another recent example of a man who went to a bar,
met someone he found attractive and invited him back to his apart-
ment, hoping to have a drink. The two of them had a conversation.
The other man apparently had slipped some knockout drugs in his
drink, and he awoke to find that he had been raped, and the perpe-
trator was taking his wallet off the table as he was awaking, calling
him a "stupid faggot."
For victims of crimes like these, in addition to other crimes, there
are often flashbacks to the incident. It may also trigger flashbacks
to other incidents of violence that they have experienced. It makes
very spotty memories. They may actually physically recall the vio-
lence that was perpetrated against them. They can feel the hands
of their coworker grabbing at their crotch or clawing at their
breasts.
Moving to an example of police misconduct, another area that
we do work in, a transgender woman lives at home with the family,
and her mother was concerned that she was not well and called
EMS. They showed up and determined that the woman was fine.
She had apparently taken some cold medicine. She left the apart-
ment, and after EMS left, some housing police showed up. The po-
lice said, "We are looking for John Doe." In this transgender
woman's family, they still referred to her by her male name, which
is John Doe. Her family replied, "Oh, John Doe went out, every-
thing is fine, we are sorry, it was a mistake."
As the police were leaving, they walked by a very attractive wo-
man, and they acknowledged her - perhaps held the door for her
- and she went over and knocked on the door of the apartment
from where they just left. When the door opened, the person who
answered the door said, "Oh," and called to the police and said,
"This is the person you were looking for." They came back and
said, "We were looking for John Doe. This is clearly not a John
Doe. Look at her, she is gorgeous."
Allegedly - and I say allegedly as a good lawyer would, because
there is a civil suit in the works - the police forced their way into
the apartment, started calling her names like "trans-testicle, he-she,
what-is-it." One officer allegedly followed her into a bathroom in
the apartment and started assaulting her. She said, "Please do not
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hit me in my chest and face; I had silicone implants and I have had
plastic surgery." Of course, that is exactly what they went for.
People who have been victims of crimes like that may see
changes in their sleeping and eating patterns. They may have
nightmares. I know of people who are on dream suppressants to
help them sleep through the night. Some are unable to function at
work or focus on anything in particular.
I hope that gives you some sense of what these crimes look,
sound and feel like. What I want to do now is throw out some
ideas about the relationship between speech and violence, how
they are linked, how they work together to oppress people, and
then at the very end return to hate speech.
What do we mean in terms of hate speech? First, hate speech
and violence are alike in the sense that they both hurt, and there is
evidence that the aftereffects of hate speech are, in fact, more dra-
matic and traumatic than the physical violence of a victim of a non-
bias crime. For example, people who are victims of a bias crime
may take more than twice as long to recover psychologically than
victims of similar crimes not motivated by bias. It is such a clich6,
but we hear clients say all the time that the bruises heal, but the
psychological scar from the words remains. Every time they hear
the same hateful words, it reopens that scar.
The other way in which I think they are similar is that what we
see in a lot of crimes motivated by bias is the idea of overkill. They
are not stabbed once, twice or three times, but rather stabbed ten,
fifteen or twenty times. It is this idea of overkill, doing more than is
necessary to mortally wound a person.
There is some sense that the phenomenon of overkill comes
from this idea that the perpetrator is literally trying to rub out the
very existence of that person, and in some way, hate speech has
that same dynamic. It is not enough to say "Is that a he-she, what is
that?" The perpetrator will say, "You are a fucking trans-testicle.
What is that?" They may repeat over and over the same language:
"faggot, fucking faggot." Most of this stuff is not very original.
You hear it over and over again. "Die, AIDS faggot." That kind
of repetitive and overkill quality serves the same kind of purpose.
It refuses to allow that person autonomy in how they identify.
Now I want to talk about how speech and violence work to-
gether. The way in which language and violence work together is if
someone kicks you in the head and calls you a faggot, the next time
someone calls you a faggot, you know what that means. You do
not need someone to tell you that you are going to get kicked in
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the head or if that person wanted to they could kick you in the
head. The word alone carries the threat.
They work together in the sense that when speech is used and
the perpetrator is very clear that they have targeted this person
because of their identity, whether sexual orientation, gender iden-
tity or their HIV status.
When a perpetrator uses speech and makes it very clear why he
or she is committing the crime, he or she are making it clear not
only to that individual, but to the community. To give you an ex-
ample, if I am mugged at the J Street subway station in Brooklyn, I
am going to take a different train and get off at Clark Street in-
stead. I am attacked and told that it is because I am an AIDS-
infected loser, what am I going to do to avoid that happening
again? What is any person who has HIV or AIDS going to do?
That sense of security and control over your life, that you are able
to change your behavior or something about yourself to make sure
you are not victimized again, is a loss because, in a sense, it is a
whole community that is being targeted.
Finally, I want to talk a little bit about another way in which
violence and speech work together. The use of hate speech during
a crime, particularly L/G/B/T/H hate speech, may alienate people
from access service. For example, if I am mugged, I will go to the
police station and say, "I was mugged. Here is what happened: I
was walking down the street, the guy pulled a handbag off my
shoulder, and I want to report it. In the process, I broke a finger,
and I am going to see a doctor."
If I go to a gay bar and I meet someone and I bring them home
and the minute they get in the door, they turn on me and they pull
out a knife and they say, "you stupid bitch, or you dumb faggot, I
am not here because I am interested in you; I am here because I
want your wallet," and then they cut me on the way out the door, I
am going to have to go to the police station and explain what this
person was doing in my apartment. What am I going to say?
"Well, officer, I am a gay man and I went to a gay bar, I picked
someone up and brought him home." The officer will say, "Why
did you bring them home?" I will have to reply, "I was interested
in having sex with him."
If you are not out, that is not something that you are going to do.
You would probably think that the police are not interested in
serving you as a member of that community.
For a clearer example, let's say you are coming out of a gay bar
by yourself. Suppose someone follows you and attacks you. The
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fact that the speech was used may prevent you from reporting what
happened.
For people of transgender experience, who are already alienated
from services, particularly medical services, it is not very likely that
they are going to seek medical attention. If they do not have ac-
cess to regular health care and a doctor who knows them and their
story, they are going to have to walk into an emergency room and
explain to someone they have never met before why they appear to
be a woman but anatomically are a male. Similarly, if the police
generally target people of transgender experience and harass them,
they are not likely to report such incidents.
Finally, I want to talk about the definition of hate speech, and I
will give you a couple of examples, rather than cite a definition
myself. Focusing on the transgender woman again whose wife be-
came abusive when she decided to start acting on feelings of being
a woman by dressing and living as a woman. When she decided to
start living her life as a woman, she went to her employer and
asked a couple of things. She said, "I would like to wear the wo-
man's uniform rather than the man's uniform, and rather than you
calling me John Doe, I would like you to call me Jane Doe."
Her employer started the conversation by saying, "I do not un-
derstand what you mean. Do you have a penis?"
The client said, "Yes, I do."
"Well, do you want the penis?"
The client said, "Well, I am considering sex reassignment
surgery."
"Well, when you have the operation, how does it work? What
do they do to your penis? Are you going to have breasts? How
does that work?"
Then the client said, "Now that you asked me all those questions,
how do you feel about my requests?"
The employer, much to my amazement, said, "Well, you can
wear the woman's uniform. We cannot call you Jane Doe because
your union card says John Doe, and in order to get your union card
changed, you have to change a whole bunch of other identification
- which, by the by, is not very easy to do. So we are not going to
call you Jane Doe. We are going to call you John Doe." And they
continued to do that.
This same woman shopped regularly at a grocery store in her
neighborhood, and after she started dressing as a woman and living
as a woman, the bag boy at the grocery store continued to call her
"sir." As many times as she corrected him and said, "I am a wo-
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man, please call me ma'am," he continued to call her "sir." Those
examples of calling someone "John Doe" instead of "Jane Doe,"
asking questions or making statements like "I have never heard of
someone who has a penis who is a woman," or "do you have a
penis," or "are you going to get rid of your penis," calling her "sir"
instead of "ma'am" - I think those things push the edge of the
envelope and may have sharpened our focus of what hate speech
is, even though we know it when we feel it, to try to put it into
words, in the same way that the experience of transgender people
in general inform the work that we do every day, making connec-
tions between discrimination based upon sex, on sexual orienta-
tion, on gender and parsing those things out and thinking carefully,
thoughtfully and thoroughly about all those different areas.
Finally, the other thing I want to throw out there is the fact that a
lot of times speech involves multiple forms of behavior. One of the
things I would encourage us to talk about today is making connec-
tions. When someone calls you a "homo-ass nigger," what did that
get them? How is that different than if they just called you "a
homo" or "a nigger," and why layer those things? Why pile them
up? What implications does that have for us as service providers,
for us as theorists, for us as litigators, in terms of thinking about the
ways in which different forms of oppression work together, the way
in which language can tell us something about those connections?
MR. CHEN: Thank you, Laura. Brian Levin has worked on a
number of cases that have touched on hate speech and bias crimes
and has also testified in front of Congress once or twice.
I have asked him here to give us a broader view of the legislative
scenery and discuss what is happening for different states, how hate
crime legislation works, and also talk a little bit about the current
bill that is in front of Congress that would include sexual
orientation.
MR. LEVIN: Thank you. What I am going to try to do is actu-
ally frame that discussion in the last part of my talk. What I want
to do first, though, is get to the nexus issue, the title of this conver-
sation. I think that hate crime is a vitally important issue for our
society and one that really warrants a national conversation.
As someone who has been very involved in public policy, and
particularly with hate crimes, since 1986, I can really sense how our
discussion of this issue has significantly degenerated. I have a pal-
pable sense that we are no longer talking to each other; but rather
at each other, and in some ways I think the media and the general
level of discourse has oftentimes succumbed to incivility and sensa-
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tionalism. That is something I am not going to dwell on here, but I
do think it is important to discuss because homophobia is some-
thing that takes place not only in discreet singular events, but also
in a larger context where many take advantage of using hurtful and
negative stereotypes to achieve a particular political agenda.
Table 1. Hate Crime Incidents in the United States by Year7 5
% OF TOTAL POLICE DEPTS.
YEAR INCIDENTS SUBMITTING REPORTS
1991 4558 17%
1992 6623 39%
1993 7587 41%
1994 5932 46%
1995 7947 60%
1996 8759 71%
1997 8049 70%
TOTAL ANTI GAY, LESBIAN OR
INCIDENTS BISEXUAL (NUMBER/%)
1995 7947 1002/12.6%
1996 8759 1001/11.4%
1997 8049 1090/13.5%
I will talk specifically, though, about the intersection of hate
speech and hate crime. One of the things I have always felt is that
you can evaluate a society in part by how it treats two different
things. The first is the level of tolerance that society has for dis-
course, including the kind of uncivil discourse that I just railed
against. Secondly - and in no particular order of importance - is
how a society reacts to diversity and to those who, by virtue of
those differences, are sometimes cast in a position of being the
most vulnerable in that society. At times, those interests conflict.
What we have in our discussion today, I think, is the intersection of
these important values.
Let me try to wear two hats here. On the one hand, I am an
attorney. On the other hand, I am a professor and criminologist. I
recognize that many of you will leave here saying, "Jack, why did
you invite that guy," because the world is not divided up into these
artificial boundaries that lawyers make, nor is it divided up into the
artificial boundaries that criminologists make. With that small dis-
75. See FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Hate Crime Statistics Annual Report. The
majority of agencies submit reports counting zero hate crime in their jurisdiction.
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claimer, let me go into what I think are two of the many issues that
exist with regard to this nexus.
The first thing is how far should criminal laws go to punish big-
oted or discriminatory behaviors, if they should at all? Let me say
in the beginning that I think there can be a non-bigoted and non-
prejudiced argument that laws should not cover so-called hate
crimes, and I will try to define them in a bit. I happen to be on the
opposite end of that debate, but I do think one can make a princi-
pled argument on the opposite side.
Unfortunately, the last several times I have taken part in any
public discourse on the topic, I did not have the benefit of princi-
pled discussion. A lot of it just devolved into a presentation of
stereotypes, homophobia and a substantive misstatement as to the
purposes of the criminal law.
We do punish discrimination in our society, both on the civil and
criminal side of the law.76 Now, the definition of discrimination
sometimes does not get you very far. Discrimination is treating
similarly situated people differently without a legal or sufficient ba-
sis. Now, if you do not think there are loopholes in that definition,
there certainly are.
In addition, there are many immoral things in this society, many
hurtful things, many horrible things, that we simply do not punish
by the force of law. That does not mean that we as a society neces-
sarily condone those things. The law is a very strong instrument,
and I think we must be selective as to what it addresses.
The second issue, which has caused me considerable distress for
a very long time is if you embrace civil and criminal anti-discrimi-
nation laws, what kind of classifications do you protect? On what
basis in law? Is there any kind of fixed or definitional reason that
we include race, religion or national origin in some states, but not
sexual orientation, disability or gender in others? Forty-one states
have hate crime laws, but only twenty-two cover sexual orientation.
Those are important issues, as well, that we are going to try to get
to.
76. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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Table 2. 1999: Jurisdictions With Criminal Hate Crime Statutes
Covering Sexual Orientation - 22 States77
AZ LA OR
CA ME RI
CT MA TX
DC MN VT
DE MO WA
FL NE WI
IA NH
IL NJ
The next issue regards speech: what constitutes speech, and how
far should we allow speech to go? As a general rule, speech or
communicative expression that does not fall into certain unpro-
tected categories is, in fact, insulated from punishment based on its
content. In fact, since R.A. V. v. St. Paul,78 even unprotected areas
of speech have a minimal level of protection based on content.
The crux of this issue is that mere offensiveness of speech alone
is not a basis for a proscription.79 Interestingly, in many other parts
of the world - Canada, the U.K. and Germany for instance -
incitement to racial hatred or so-called group defamation laws are
on the books. They are very rarely used in part because it is so
hard to prosecute them. In England, for example, very few cases
come up under that law.
In fact, we had laws like this in the United States during the first
half of the 20th Century. At that time, laws punishing group defa-
mation were on the books. In fact, a challenge went up to the
Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois.0 The Supreme Court
validated the law. Since then, however, the primary legal founda-
tions upon which the Beauharnais decision was based upon have
been cut down, although technically Beauharnais has never been
overruled. Since then, though, it is important to recognize that of-
fensiveness is not a basis for punishing or preventing speech by
force of law.
77. See National Gay & Lesbian Task Force: Hate Crime Laws in the United
States, Center on Hate & Extremism <http:\\www.ngltf.org>. Texas hate crime law
covers bias or prejudice against groups without identifying the actual groups
protected.
78. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
79. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
80. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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Nevertheless, there are certain communications that are crimes
in and of themselves. Conspiracy - an agreement with another
person to commit a crime, is not insulated by the First Amendment
from criminal prosecution.8" Threats are certainly punishable -
nasty letters to the President about his policies are protected, but
do not threaten him.82 That is, I think, an important area of de-
lineation. Criminal solicitation where someone requests or encour-
ages another person to commit a crime is another example of a
form of communication.83
In addition, speech can be used as evidence to prove intent or
motive in a crime. Now, intent is the "what" of the crime, the de-
sired purpose or the knowledge in committing the crime. Motive
generally is not an element of a crime, although it certainly can be.
For instance, why you break into a house can determine whether or
not you get convicted of criminal trespass or burglary. If you enter
the home to commit a crime inside and that is your motive, if you
will, that is the heightened offense of burglary, and motive actually
becomes an element to the offense.84 So in order to make it more
confusing, sometimes motive becomes a material element of an of-
fense, depending upon how the elements of the crime are written.
In any event, even if it is not an element of the crime, motive can
certainly be used to determine upon conviction the severity of
one's sentence.
Well, that being said, what do you do about hurtful offenses be-
ing targeted at group members, the kind that Laura spoke so elo-
quently about, that do not fit into these existing niches? The first
thing I will admit to you is that hate speech has consequences.
Hate speech, particularly about historically oppressed minorities,
has an effect. It changes people's behavior. It harms them in ways
that they relate to others, something particularly harmful to a dem-
ocratic and pluralistic society.85 However, the majority view on the
First Amendment says we must tolerate a certain amount of bad
discourse in a free society and the way to beat bigoted speech is
with enlightened discourse, which leads us next to hate crime laws.
The Supreme Court decided two cases involving hate crime laws,
including one that involved a cross burning by a teenaged
81. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03.
82. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); see also 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994).
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02.
84. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1-2.
85. See, e.g., Charles Lawrence, Is There Ever a Good Reason to Restrict Free
Speech on a College Campus? Yes., THE STAN. LAW. (Fall 1990).
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skinhead, the R.A.V. v. St. Paul.86 In that case, theocross burning
law at issue punished only certain types of cross burning that were
used to express certain views. It did not punish all cross burnings
that were used to terrorize people, but only those cross burnings
that communicated certain types of bigotry deemed unacceptable
by the city. The Supreme Court in essence said, "You cannot do
that. If you burn a cross on a black family's lawn to express racial
hatred, that would be a crime, but if you are burning a cross at a
home for mentally ill people, a category of the law left out, that
would not be punished. No, we are not going to allow that, be-
cause the criminality hinges on the bigotry, hinges on the prejudice,
rather than the underlying terrorist act and we do not want to pun-
ish people for their prejudice."
The next year, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on a differ-
ent type of law that was better drafted. The law at issue in Wiscon-
sin v. Mitchell87 punished the intentional selection of a crime victim
based on a particular group category, such as race or sexual orien-
tation. This kind of discriminatory selection resulted in an en-
hanced penalty to be added on to the punishment for an underlying
crime.
Well, the first difference between R.A. V. and Mitchell is that you
had to commit a crime first with Wisconsin's law in order to be
punished. So that was one thing. The second thing is the prejudice
was not the primary target of the Wisconsin law; but rather the
discriminatory selection of a crime victim. Interestingly, if there
was a gay offender that went around beating up gay people, wore a
mask, and said homophobic things to promote gay solidarity in the
city, he would be a hate offender, and his actions would be punish-
able, irrespective of the fact that he did not have the kind of ani-
mus that we usually think of with violent homophobes.
Therefore, discrimination is an act that can be punished.88 It is
treating someone differently. While the prejudice that leads to it
cannot be punished, the act of discrimination itself can be.
Well, let's look at the kind of laws we have on the books, so I can
close with that. There is no one type of hate crime law. However,
the most broadly applicable laws fall into two categories.
The first type is the intentional selection style statute I just spoke
of, where intentionally selecting a crime victim based on their
group status is punished. That is one type.
86. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
87. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
88. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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Another type is the stand alone civil rights type statute, which
punish the interference with someone's civil rights through force or
threat. Some also add protected group categories such as race, reli-
gion, sexual orientation - that is another of the most broadly ap-
plicable kind.8 9 This type of law does not require the charging of
an additional offense.
But there are many other types of state laws, which unfortu-
nately time does not give me the ability to go over right now.
Unfortunately, there is no broadly applicable federal hate crime
law. There is the Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994 of the Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,90 which
does cover sexual orientation, but you have to commit an underly-
ing federal offense first, of which there are a limited number. So if
you "gaybash" in a post office or a maritime vessel, the crime is
covered. But not on a military base, apparently, since the Uniform
Code of Military Justice does not have a hate crime provision.
There are also separate federal criminal civil rights laws that
cover various things, such as conspiracies9' and housing.92 There is
a thirty-one year-old law that covers race in certain civil rights dep-
rivations.93 It covers religion and national origin with a smaller
number of violent deprivations. These protected rights are criss-
crossed to certain protected groups. So if you attack someone be-
cause of their race because they want to vote, or because they were
going to serve on a jury or something like that it would be covered,
but not if you were gay. It is very convoluted and quite stark as to
what gets covered and what does not.
The latest bill, the Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1999, 94 changes
existing deficiencies by amending section 245 of title 18 of the
United States Code 245 to protect on the basis of gender, sexual
orientation and disability. It also includes a requirement involving
a nexus to interstate commerce in order to fully establish federal
jurisdiction over criminal civil rights offenses involving those added
categories.95 The Supreme Court consistently relied upon a show-
ing of Congress' constitutional authority in upholding antidis-
crimination laws and it is usually hooked into the Thirteenth
89. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 422.6 (West 1999).
90. Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 280003 (1994).
91. See 18 U.S.C. 241 (1994).
92. See 42 U.S.C. 3631 (1994).
93. See 18 U.S.C. 245 (1994).
94. S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999).
95. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Bronkala v. Virginia Polytech-
nic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996).
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Amendment and the Commerce Clause. So presumably the Com-
merce Clause can be construed to empower Congressional action
because if you beat up a gay person, that would stop that gay per-
son from coming to that state or that city to engage in commerce.
This proposal was a just defeated on Capitol Hill.
New York State does not have an adequate hate crime law. 96 It
has a provision called aggravated harassment, which is, again,
probably the most ineffective hate crime law in the United States,
if you call it a hate crime law at all.
New York State does not have a hate crime law that covers sex-
ual orientation. About twenty states do. Interestingly enough, this
year Colorado, 97 Wyoming,9 s Idaho99 and Utah,100 have all failed to
enact new hate crime laws or amend existing laws to cover gays.
The debate has been degraded by, I think, two things: homophobia
on the one hand and, on the other hand, a misrepresentation of the
actual severity of hate crime.
Hate crimes are more likely to involve assault; these assaults are
more likely to involve injury; they are more likely to involve copy-
cat offenses, retaliatory crimes; they are more likely to involve
strangers, imprecise weapons of opportunity, multiple assailants -
all objective measures of severity.101 When you inject the
homophobia into things, however, it becomes a debate or a refer-
endum on the theology of how it relates to gay rights.
In closing, I think it is important to recognize that this is not
simply a gay, lesbian or transgendered issue. It is a human rights
and civil rights issue. This is an issue that I have been working on
for more than fourteen years to try to get these important laws
passed, and to show how these crimes are more severe. But, again,
I think we are losing something if we say we merely want these
laws because they involve more assailants and because they involve
imprecise dangerous weapons of opportunity. I think it is also an
attack of moral violence on a pluralistic democracy, because if
there is one thing that the United States, and hopefully the Four-
teenth Amendment, should stand for is the notion that no matter
96. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30-31.
97. See H.R. 1074, 62nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1999).
98. See S. 84, 55th Leg.; H.R. 117, 55th Leg. (Wyo. 1999).
99. See H.R. 36, 55th Leg; 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1999).
100. See S. 34, 54th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 1999).
101. See J. LEVIN, J. McDEvrrr, THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED:
HATE CRIMES (1993); B. Levin, Hate Crimes: Worse by Definition, 15 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST., Feb. 6, 1999.
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what group you are in, you are entitled to the basic dignity and
civility of life in a free society.
That is why a hate crime is different. In the same way, as when a
witness is attacked in a mob criminal trial, it is not just an attack on
that particular individual, or when a police officer is attacked or
when the President is assassinated. There is a symbolic significance
to these crimes which makes these crimes acts of terrorism, and in
that way, even if they were no more serious from a criminological
standpoint, I think that heightened punishment would be war-
ranted, because I believe that it shakes the very basis and founda-
tions of a pluralistic society.
I want to give you a Web site, www.hatemonitor.org, and thank
you so much for giving me the privilege to come here and hope-
fully rekindle the kind of national conversation that we need so
that people of goodwill can make sure that these kinds of statutes
are passed and enforced to protect all those who reside within our
society. Thank you.
MR. CHEN: Thank you, Brian. Lastly, I have asked Jack Bat-
taglia to come and speak, because one of the things I noticed after
the Matthew Shepard incident °2 was the discussion in the media
about the types of hate speech that happens on college campuses,
as well as in high schools. We have the infamous "scarecrow inci-
dent" on the float of the college fraternity, just to name one of the
more highly publicized incidents. 0 3 I have asked Jack to come talk
about what is going on right now in the legal field with respect to
students who face hate speech, who suffer such incidents in schools,
and who is responsible and what are the remedies.
MR. BATTAGLIA: When I realized I was going to be the last
speaker on the last panel for the day, two things occurred to me:
the first, that I had better not speak too long and, secondly, that
maybe this was a special responsibility. Then I realized that my
topic, which is antigay harassment in schools, provides a very con-
venient opportunity to close the circle on some of the things that
were talked about during the plenary session this morning.
The answer that Matt Coles, for example, gave to the question
that was put to him about his priorities for our movement - of the
three he mentioned, one was schools. As the discussion
progressed, there was a focus on the relation between law and cul-
ture and, in particular, the limitations of law to make changes in
102. See supra note 4 (discussing the incident).
103. See CSU Students Protest Anti-Gay Incident on Campus, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 19, 1999.
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culture; how, instead, sometimes the changes in culture have to
come first; If there is any institution in our country in which cul-
tural battles take place, it is the schools.
In fact, certainly at the lower educational levels (elementary
school through high school) the educational mission includes trans-
mitting values to students - cultural values - that represent civic
virtue. There is always significant vying among people in the com-
munity about just what those values will be and how they will be
transmitted.
Another theme of the plenary session was how, as lawyers, we
have to follow our community in terms of the needs and interests
that we pursue in what we do, whether it is in litigation or legisla-
tion, or other arenas of advocacy. It is quite clear that in the area
of antigay harassment, there is a reluctance to litigate on the part
of parents of students who have been harassed. There are a
number of reasons for this reluctance, most of which I bet you can
suspect and would understand.
So a possibility for reaching the result a different way, perhaps, is
something that should be at least part of the goal, and part of that
is a recognition that what we are trying to do, what advocates are
trying to do, is not only to provide compensation or other remedies
for the particular individual in the particular circumstance, but to
make the offensive behavior stop, and to make it stop not only at
the institution at which this particular individual has been harassed,
but to make it stop throughout the system.
With that, my focus is going to be on a couple of avenues of
available redress that are directed to school districts and schools as
opposed to the individuals who are the actors in antigay harass-
ment. For example, I am not going to talk about generally applica-
ble criminal laws or hate crime laws that might be available to
punish the particular offender; nor will I talk about state tort reme-
dies that may be available to provide some redress.
Instead, I am going to talk briefly about two federal remedies:
the possibility of action under Section 1983 of the federal civil
rights laws10 4 , and under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.105 Then, I am going to talk a little bit about how the First
Amendment might limit the ability of schools and school districts
to restrict the harassment that we would like to see eliminated
from the school system.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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There was extensive discussion during that session about the Na-
bozny106 case, which was a Seventh Circuit decision rendered
under Section 1983, in which a young man who had been subject to
years of harassment through both middle school and high school
was able, after a jury verdict of liability, to negotiate a settlement
of slightly under $1 million, for the harm that was done to him
when the school authorities literally ignored his and his parents'
complaints about the harassment.
Very briefly, that case was based on Section 1983 for the depriva-
tion of constitutional rights under the color of state law. Only pub-
lic schools are subject to suit under Section 1983 to the extent that
the basis for the violation is a federal constitutional right, because,
as you know, only governmental actors can violate the
Constitution.
The claims that were asserted in Nabozny were of two types,
based on two separate provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment:
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. I will
deal with the due process claims quickly because they have not
been successful, not only in this context but generally. The due
process argument is essentially that there is a liberty interest in be-
ing free from harm, which is deprived without due process of law
when an educational institution does not act to protect students
from harm, particularly after being put on notice that harm is
occurring.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence generally under the Due
Process Clause makes it very difficult to establish a duty on the
part of an educational institution to protect a student from third-
party harm, and in fact, those claims were unsuccessful in Nabozny.
I mention the clause, however, because there is always the possibil-
ity, given other factual circumstances, that a due process violation
could be established. So it is something you should look at.
The Nabozny case was ultimately decided in Nabozny's favor
under the Equal Protection Clause, and the nature of the denial of
equal protection was twofold. The court found that Jamie Nabozny
was deprived of equal protection because of his sex in that the
school district treated claims of harassment from male students dif-
ferently than they treated claims of harassment from female stu-
dents.1 °7 So there was intentional discrimination, based on sex,
that was redressable under the Equal Protection Clause through
Section 1983.
106. Nabozny v. Poalesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
107. See id. at 454-55.
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Perhaps more significant in the long term, Nabozny was also able
to establish a deprivation of equal protection based upon his sexual
orientation. The court relied on Romer v. Evans'0 8 as establishing
a new paradigm in federal constitutional law in the area of sexual
orientation, soon to overshadow Bowers v. Hardwick.10 9 The basis
for the claim that the school district acted intentionally to discrimi-
nate against Jamie Nabozny based on his sexual orientation was
statements that were made by the school authorities when he com-
plained - statements like, "well, what do you expect? If you are
out, if you act gay, you can expect that you will be harmed." The
court found that the statements established that the school authori-
ties acted with a discriminatory motive with respect to Nabozny's
sexual orientation. 110
Before I go any further, one of the important reasons why I high-
light these federal causes of action is that, unlike most remedies
under state law, you can obtain attorneys fees if you are successful
with a 1983 claim or a Title IX claim, and that is quite significant.
Moving onto Title IX, the statute prohibits discrimination be-
cause of sex in educational programs that receive federal fund-
ing."' Since virtually all schools and school districts, public and
private, receive federal funds, there is a possibility of an action
under Title IX; but here the argument gets a little bit more attenu-
ated. The argument is that antigay harassment, at least of certain
kinds, is in the nature of sexual harassment, and that sexual harass-
ment constituting discrimination because of sex, is redressable and
subject to remedy under Title IX.
The Supreme Court of the United States is currently considering
whether, in fact, Title IX provides a remedy for what is called stu-
dent-on-student or peer harassment, as opposed to teacher-on-stu-
dent harassment, and that ruling may preclude the possibility of an
action for damages." 2 However - and this may be even more im-
portant than the attorneys' fees point - Title IX is enforced by the
Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education, and there is
an administrative proceeding, an administrative remedy, that can
result in the loss of funding to a school district if the school district
does not take action to remedy a situation that involves sexual har-
108. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
109. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
110. See Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 460.
111. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1999).
112. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999) (holding that
a private cause of action for damages is available).
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assment. Moreover, the Department of Education has been willing
to recognize that antigay harassment can be sexual harassment that
is covered by Title IX.
However, the guidelines make a very strange distinction between
general antigay harassment and harassment of a sexual nature. If
the harassment is of a sexual nature, even though it is antigay har-
assment, it is sexual harassment covered by the statute. But, if the
antigay harassment does not have a sexual component - that is, if
it is harassment just with a sexual orientation cast - then it is not
covered. The reason it is not covered is because the statute does
not prohibit or provide a basis for redress of sexual orientation dis-
crimination. Only sex discrimination is covered by the law, so
there is a little bit of sleight of hand going on there.
Moving onto the First Amendment question, the R.A.V. case 113
that Brian talked about is often used by those who would resist
attempts to take action against harassment based on group mem-
bership as standing for the proposition that this kind of harmful
speech/behavior is protected First Amendment activity. The con-
text of R.A.V., as Brian told you, was a cross burning, and the case
is sometimes characterized as holding that cross burning is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.
But R.A.V. did not hold that cross burning is protected by the
First Amendment; R.A.V. only held that a particular statute,
drafted so as to cover cross burning only, when it is used to effect a
certain response because of race, was unconstitutional on its face.
Justice Scalia went out of his way in the very first paragraph of the
majority opinion to point out that there were all sorts of other stat-
utes that legitimately could prohibit and penalize and criminalize
the cross burning that took place in that case; in fact, he pointed
out that there was another charge, which was not being challenged,
on which these individuals were convicted because of the cross
burning." 4
Another point about the R.A. V. case is that Justice Scalia distin-
guished the criminal statute in that case from action taken to rem-
edy Title VII, i.e., employment discrimination actions, including
those based on sexual harassment. Justice Scalia carved out from
the thrust or the effect of the opinion conduct, i.e., discriminatory
harassment, even when comprised of speech, that would be
redressable under antidiscrimination laws - which would also
113. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
114. See id. at 370-80.
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cover Title IX or any other law that prohibits discrimination, in-
cluding discrimination based on sexual orientation.115
Another important point on the First Amendment is that the
Supreme Court has developed a somewhat separate jurisprudence
for the application of the First Amendment in schools. Beginning
with a case most of you are probably familiar with that goes back
to the Vietnam protest era, the Tinker case," 6 the Court has held
that high school authorities may censor or sanction student speech
when it substantially interferes with order or discipline or with the
rights of other students.
Subsequently, in Hazelwood,'17 the Court relaxed even that stan-
dard for school-sponsored speech, or speech which takes place in a
context that somebody could think constituted endorsement by the
school, such as in the classroom or in programs that are part of the
curriculum. In those cases, the Court said that the school can take
action that is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.
Well, it seems to me that there is an extraordinary amount of
room there, both under the Tinker formulation, which is a little bit
more stringent, and the Hazelwood formulation, for penalizing an-
tigay harassment in schools.
A qualification on that conclusion is that, above the high school
level, with respect to colleges and universities, the Supreme Court
- and courts generally - have shown a greater reluctance to au-
thorize restrictions on speech. The notion of the university as a
place where people come in order to exchange ideas, in order to
find truth and develop truth, is the countervailing consideration.
Another aspect, of course, is the age of the students. It is consid-
ered more likely, as we would expect, that the role of the school
would be more protective, and legitimately more protective, at the
lower levels than on the university level.
Again, what is important about the Tinker/Hazelwood formula-
tion in the lower grades is that it explicitly recognizes that schools
have a role in teaching civic virtue and teaching the values of our
dominant society, which includes teaching tolerance and the right
of students to be free from harassment.
115. See id. at 389.
116. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
117. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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NAME REPORTING AND PARTNER NOTIFICATION LEGISLATION
MS. COOPER: I am Liz Cooper. I teach here at Fordham. The
panelists we have this afternoon are absolutely wonderful people.
I will introduce them in the order that they are going to be speak-
ing in. Catherine Hanssens is the director of the AIDS Project at
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. Matthew Carmody is
an attorney with Brooklyn Legal Services. Haley Gorenberg is
with The Legal Support Unit of Legal Services for New York City.
Mildred Pinot is an attorney with the Legal Aid Society, herself
with the Volunteer Law Office.
MS. HANSSENS: Thank you, Liz.
The issues of names-based HIV reporting and partner notifica-
tion have been debated for some time, but the debate picked up
heat over the last year. A focal point of that debate has occurred
in New York, which adopted in 1998 a law mandating names re-
porting and partner notification. 118
Although the law was scheduled to go into effect in January,
1999, final regulations implementing the law have not been issued.
The law is vague or ambiguous in a number of important respects,
and until we see the interpretation from the health department, we
do not know exactly what the law will mean for people in New
York with HIV who are contemplating getting testing.
The panelists here today thought it might be helpful to say some-
thing about why names reporting has become the debate that it
has; why the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC")
has been pushing so hard for this, and how we think you should
assess whether this kind of a program makes sense, focusing also
on what the pros and the cons are. We also will address specifically
how name reporting and partner notification are treated under
New York law. Finally, we will discuss how those of you who might
either be contemplating getting tested or who work with clients
that might deal with the new law.
For the last several years, the CDC has been waging an aggres-
sive campaign in states around the country to institute a national
system of HIV test reporting. The CDC takes the position that
names-based reporting is essential to get a more accurate picture of
the epidemic. The CDC also contends that names reporting will be
used to facilitate individual follow-up, so that health departments
can track people supportively and get them into services.
118. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2130 (McKinney 1999).
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The CDC suggests that this names reporting initiative reflects
broad community input and consensus. Contrary to what the CDC
says there has not been substantial, meaningful community input
into the CDC's recommendations for HIV surveillance, and in fact,
it was very difficult for advocates - and impossible for people on
the streets - to get copies of the CDC's proposed guidelines until
they published it in December, 1998.
Basically, the CDC is proposing that states adopt a system that
reports positive test results; they suggest this system should mirror
the way AIDS reporting is done, which in all fifty states at this
point is by name, as it has been for some time. While they do allow
states the option of adopting what is called a "unique identifier
system," which means that instead of using names, you can use
some kind of a code, the proposed guidelines question the effec-
tiveness of a unique identifier system and indicate that funding will
hinge on a high rate of accuracy for reported data. In several
states, unique identifiers for HIV reporting are a combination of
initials, birth date and a portion of the individual's Social Security
number. But there certainly is no universal, single definition of
unique identifiers. Consider, for example, that anybody here who
uses the internet also has a unique identifier for that purpose. Ob-
viously, it is relatively easy to create a unique identifier system and
that allows assignment of accurate, individualized codes while mil-
lions of people use a system at one time.
The CDC, nonetheless, is really actively discouraging any alter-
native to names-based HIV reporting. The CDC is making it clear
that they may hinge the availability of federal money for HIV sur-
veillance on a state's adoption of the CDC's preferred system. At
the same time, however, while they explicitly recognize that the
option of anonymous testing is essential to ensure that the maxi-
mum number of people are willing to get tested, the CDC refuses
to withhold federal dollars from states that adopt laws to make
anonymous testing unavailable. So far, eleven states that have
names reporting also have banned the option of anonymous
testing.
I, along with most advocates of people with HIV, believe that
the CDC's proposal for names reporting is ill-advised and that it
does not advance the public health goals that it is intended to
serve. A primary objection to names reporting is that it threatens
people's confidentiality, or more importantly, that there is a strong
perception among people at risk of HIV that it will discourage
many people from getting tested altogether.
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While a number of the studies of the impact of names reporting
on willingness to test are somewhat flawed, the clear majority of
studies that have attempted to assess this indicate that a significant
number of people will be deterred from getting tested if they have
to give their name or if they feel the result could be tracked back to
them. Most importantly, those who object to or who worry about
names reporting are disproportionately people in already marginal-
ized communities: people who are gay, people of color, IV drug
users and at-risk youth. The primary goal of any health official in
this epidemic has to be to increase testing, treatment and preven-
tion. A reporting system that undermines this essential goal is sim-
ply bad public health policy.
The current estimates are that up to 900,000 people in this coun-
try are living with HIV, with at least 40,000 new infections every
year; CDC reports make it pretty clear that these new infections
occur disproportionately among younger people, particularly
among young gay men, women with substance-abusing partners,
people of color and those who use drugs intravenously.
When we are trying to assess the efficiency of a public health
program, we need to get a sense of where the new infections are
occurring and whether the public health measure that is supposed
to deal with this is going to be more productive than destructive in
accomplishing the goal.
HIV testing and counseling is described as central to the CDC
prevention efforts, and yet the current estimates are that roughly
forty to fifty percent of 900,000 people with HIV in this country
have not been tested.
HIV, like many other frightening and expensive diseases, has al-
ways involved significant social risk as well as medical and public
health risk, and historically people with stigmatized diseases - in
the past, it was TB, STDs, syphilis - have been marginalized and
demonized. What is happening with people with HIV is nothing
new.
That type of social risk can and does deter people from getting
diagnosed and treated. There is social science data that supports
this premise, so there is a historical and current reason to be
concerned.
In order to understand the impact of reportable HIV testing and
whether the good outweighs the bad, we have to have the sense of
the actual prevalence of harmful attitudes towards people with
HIV, actual harmful policies aimed at people with HIV and some
understanding of the subjective perception of individuals who are
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at risk of the harm to them if they are identified as having HIV.
We can look at the laws that are in existence, we can look at the
available evidence of stigma and attitudes, and we can try to get a
sense from that.
A recent study published in 1998 by research psychologist Greg-
ory Herek showed that by comparing a 1998 survey of peoples'
attitudes about HIV with an identical survey conducted eight years
earlier, the level of stigma and misunderstanding that people have
has remained relatively constant, and actually in some areas has
increased. A substantial number of people across all sorts of eco-
nomic and educational backgrounds and experiences are uncom-
fortable working with people with HIV, using a glass that
somebody with HIV has used, even if it has been sterilized, wear-
ing a sweater of somebody with HIV even if it has been dry-cle-
aned and believe that they are at risk by driving in the same car
with people with HIV. The risk is real.
One of the primary problems in looking at what this will accom-
plish will actually give a better picture: if about fifty percent of
those people who are infected are not voluntarily testing, and we
have reason to believe that stigma and suspicion, political and med-
ical system are still high, will we get accurate data?
I think we have very good reason to believe that names reporting
will yield faulty data and, if anything, give us a very skewed and
dangerously skewed, picture of who is infected, because if we rely
on voluntary testing - people voluntarily going forward - and we
have a fear of stigma and a fear of punishment, then we are going
to disproportionately leave out those populations I mentioned
before that have been traditionally marginalized. In fact, the CDC
has produced no data to suggest that names reporting will accom-
plish the goal of getting a better picture of the epidemic.
In addition, names reporting is not necessary to allow follow-up
with individual patients. Even with a unique identifier system, it is
possible to do a backward track through reporting physicians to
reach individual people. The truth is that the CDC has rarely used
names-reporting data to accomplish such tracking, and in a well-
constructed system where you get the needed epidemiological in-
formation up-front, you rarely need to backtrack. The likelihood
that there are going to be extraordinary and new means of trans-
mission that we need to track is only going to become increasingly
unlikely.
I have tried to identify some of the issues raised by names re-
porting. I laid out for you some of the issues you should be think-
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ing about as the next panelists talk about what is planned here in
New York.
MR. CARMODY: I am going to talk to you about partner noti-
fication. First I will give you some historical and theoretical back-
ground to partner notification, and then discuss how partner
notification has been applied to HIV and what some of the
problems that result are.
Partner notification is a public health measure, which are actions
the state imposes upon society to protect it from public health risks
like communicable diseases. There are many public health meas-
ures in existence today, such as receiving a simple flu vaccine to
being quarantined for tuberculosis. However, most public health
measures impose to some degree a restriction in a persons consti-
tutional right to liberty under the Fourteenth amendment.
The legal authority for states to exercise their public health
measures was set forth in the 1905 Supreme Court case Jacobson v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.119 This case was about a chal-
lenge to Massachusetts's mandatory small pox vaccine, citing that it
was a violation of the plaintiff's personal liberty. The court de-
scribes in dicta how states have reserved for themselves a "police
power" through which state public health measure are imple-
mented. This " police power" was indirectly reserved by the states
during the Constitutional Convention, as they did not delegate this
power directly to the federal government. This "police power" al-
lows the states to protect and preserve their populations apart from
the protection provided by the federal government. Partner notifi-
cation is just another example of the State exercising its police
power to protect its populations from communicable diseases.
Partner notification originally started back in the 1930s by the
then-Surgeon General Thomas Parran. Originally called "contact
tracing," partner notification was envisioned after antibiotics were
discovered as a cure for syphilis so that the state could more di-
rectly bring the cure to infected people, rather than waiting for the
infected people to discover their infection and seek treatment.
Surgeon General Parran wanted every case of venereal disease to
be located, reported, its source ascertained and all contacts then
informed about the possibility of infection, provided a Wasserman
test (a test for venereal disease), and, if infected, treated. In seek-
ing out infected people this way, the state could prevent transmis-
sion of Syphilis before people developed symptoms and thus
119. 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
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realized their infection. There is a very good book by Gabriel
Rotello called Sexual Ecology,20 which examines more closely how
diseases such as HIV spread through communities, and how com-
munities can either foster or deter disease transmission.
Although partner notification's primary purpose is to stop the
spread of communicable diseases, primarily venereal disease, it
also has the secondary purpose of treating infected people.
Although this was not really stressed with other sexually transmit-
ted diseases in which partner notification was used, such as syphilis,
gonorrhea, chlamydia, etc., because you could always cure a person
with antibiotics when he or she discovered his or her infection.
You will see with HIV how this secondary purpose becomes more
and more important, especially as scientific theories are increas-
ingly suggesting that early treatment of HIV is essential to a longer
life after infection.
Applying partner notification programs to HIV infection and
transmission is different from other diseases in several respects.
One, there is no cure for HIV. Therefore, even if they notify some-
one of their infection, the State cannot prevent further transmission
by this individual with a shot of penicillin. The only way the State
can prevent is by encouraging a behavioral change in the individ-
ual: meaning counseling and educating the person how to prevent
him or her from transmitting the virus to other people, and hoping
that this person they have spent so much time and money on will
listen and obey. Unfortunately, since HIV is primarily transmitted
by sex and intravenous drug use, it is hard for people to simply
listen and obey, because sex and drug uses involves a whole host of
physiological and psychological pressures and variables that the
state is not really able to or prepared to deal with for effective be-
havior modification. Therefore, after a person is contacted through
a partner notification program, whether that person further trans-
mits HIV to others really depends on the person and their situa-
tion. This is a lot less effective than a shot of penicillin for a
syphilis infection.
The second variable is that HIV has a really long incubation pe-
riod. It takes three to six months after infection before a person
even starts producing antibodies, and it takes up to 10 years and
more before someone might develop symptoms. It is very difficult
for people to remember who they have exposed to HIV for such a
long duration of time. Most partner notification programs limit the
120. GABRIEL ROTELLO, SEXUAL ECOLOGY: AIDS AND ThE DESTINY OF GAY
MEN (1997).
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partners they are willing to contact to people who have been ex-
posed only a year or two ago. But even here, it may be very diffi-
cult for people to remember all their sex and needle sharing
partners in the previous two years, much less to provide a state
with identifying information about these people. This is very dif-
ferent than diseases like syphilis and gonorrhea where symptoms
usually manifest within a week to ten days, as it is much easier for
people to remember who they had sex with last Wednesday, for
instance, and the probable whereabouts of that person now.
Economically, this long incubation period has real ramifications.
It has been estimated that it takes upward of $5000 to perform one
partner notification on average. 121 This is primarily due to the
amount of work it takes to track a person down whose identifying
information is either very sketchy or is outdated. People who per-
form HIV partner notification must do things like comb shooting
galleries and homeless shelters looking for the named contacts.
This takes a lot of time and money. As endorsers of HIV partner
notification have pointed out, this is still a lot less money than it
takes to treat a person with HIV over the duration of their lifetime,
so there is still a cost benefit to running partner notification pro-
grams. However, I think it is important to question how existing
prevention efforts would be affected if all that money was poured
into education, counseling and testing programs, rather than into
partner notification.
HIV is also different in the social treatment of those infected.
Possible discrimination, violence and de-racization await those who
are infected. There is also an inherent distrust of the state to pro-
tect infected individuals from these harms. Partner notification
programs generally rely on the cooperation of the participants to
provide information in which the program can function. It may be
very hard for people to give up this information, thinking that the
contact may figure out the informant's identity and seek some sort
of revenge.
This leads to the question of whether mandatory HIV partner
notification could be considered an invasion of privacy. The type
of privacy which frames this issue is really that of informational
privacy, because we are talking about controlling the use of a per-
son's HIV related information - whether this HIV related informa-
tion can and should be disclosed in a limited form to a person's
contact via the State. It is different than the privacy issue at issue
121. See Cheryl Ellenberg, HIV Partner Notification Activities in New York State: A
Comparative Analysis - Executive Summary, AIDS Institute 4 (1996).
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in Jacobson because the State action involved in that case involved
the person's bodily integrity, not what happens to the information
of the person's status as being or not being vaccinated.
One of the primary cases involving informational privacy is
Whalen v. Roe.122 This U.S. Supreme Court case challenged a New
York statute mandating the reporting of all prescriptions for con-
trolled substances, along with the name of the prescribing doctor,
dispensing pharmacy and patient receiving the drug to the N.Y.
Department of Health. The challenge was based on the assump-
tion that people would not go to their doctors to get necessary
health care if they thought their name was going to be on some list
in the Department of Health as someone who receives a prescrip-
tion for controlled substances. The Supreme Court said that there
were two interests involved: an interest of avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and an interest in independence of making cer-
tain kinds of important decisions. The Court held that these two
interests were adequately safeguarded by the Department of
Health, and therefore there was not privacy infringement. How-
ever, you might imagine some argument in which these interests
are not adequately protected by the Department of Health when
applying this standard to mandatory HIV partner notification.
Another important case dealing with informational privacy is
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.123 This case was
brought by Nixon to prevent the government from going through
his private tapes, stating that there were personal conversations re-
corded on them and therefore mandatory disclosure should be con-
sidered an invasion of privacy. The Court applied a balancing test,
weighing the expected privacy against the public interest in such an
intrusion. Since the overwhelming majority of the content of the
tapes was not personal, and the personal information would not be
widely disclosed, the Court held that his privacy interests were not
Constitutionally violated. This standard would be less useful in a
facial challenge to a mandatory HIV partner notification law be-
cause even though the expected privacy of a person's HIV status is
high, the public interest in this information would probably be con-
sidered even higher, particularly when the name of the HIV in-
fected person would presumably be kept confidential.
I see I am out of time. I just want to emphasize the dis-empow-
ering nature of mandatory HIV partner notification law. HIV af-
fects mainly people who are in traditionally marginalized
122. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
123. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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populations, namely people of color, gay men and substance abus-
ers. Mandatory HIV partner notification further disadvantages
these populations by subjecting them to liberty infringements and
consequently possible discrimination, harassment and violence. It
is hard to believe that states are subjecting their citizens to such
effects when partner notification is marginally effective when ap-
plied to HIV and other HIV prevention programs that are not dis-
empowering in nature could be just as or more effective as partner
notification with a comparable increase in funding.
MS. GORENBERG: I would like to spend some time talking
about the actual law that is to be implemented in New York.
As has already been said, we are waiting for the regulations that
will give us some detail about how this law is actually going to go
into effect. They are overdue. We have been told that we will have
an opportunity for comments, that they will not be instituted as
emergency regulations. In fact, we had thought as panelists that we
might have them some time this week and be able to discuss what
we saw in the regulations that were proposed.
Since there will be a comment period and we have an opportu-
nity to participate in that, what I would like to do is go over some
sections of the law and identify what I consider to be some hot
spots to watch for implementation and regulatory effect.
The law that we are talking about here that combines these two
elements, names reporting and contact tracing, is a new Title 3 of
Article 21 of the Public Health Law, Sections 2130 and about ten
sections following. It was enacted on July 7, 1998, to take effect in
180 days, which have now elapsed.
The law has two parts. One of them is the so-called "names re-
porting" - and I will tell you why I am saying "so-called" in a
moment - and the other piece is the contact tracing or partner
notification piece.12 4
Starting with names reporting, the first thing that is interesting to
note about this statute is that the law itself does not say that names
must be reported. When it talks about the index patient, the HIV-
positive person, it says that information identifying the index pa-
tient is to be reported, as well as the names of the contacts. 25
Well, clearly the legislature knows how to use the word "names."
They used it to talk about the contacts. But in the phrase preced-
ing, they talked about "information identifying the case."'1 26 This
124. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1230-1239 (McKinney 1998).
125. See id. § 2130.3.
126. See id.
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brings to mind - it certainly brought to mind for a lot of us who
wanted to comment on this law - the possibility that a unique
identifier system would be possible and that there was nothing in
the law that prohibited its use. We said that in our comments, and
we hear that it probably is not going to be well-received and that
actually some of the people who were pushing the law up in the
state government were not too pleased to see that possible
interpretation.
So, in a political world I would say that we do not have high
hopes of seeing a unique identifier system coming out of this par-
ticular law, but we certainly made the argument, the argument is
there to be made, and maybe we will be pleasantly surprised.
The other thing I would like to say about the names reporting
issue is to highlight the fact that this law preserves anonymous test-
ing. It very clearly preserves anonymous testing,'27 which makes a
lot of sense in a public health context, if this is really going to be at
all taken seriously as a public health law, since we know that some
people will not get tested unless they have an anonymous option.
We consider that to be a very important thing for people to know,
for advocates to know, and anybody working with a population
that is taking the possibility of testing seriously to know: anony-
mous testing does still exist in the State of New York and is specifi-
cally preserved.
The duty to report under this law is a duty on behalf of physi-
cians, anybody else who is authorized to diagnose HIV or related
illnesses and laboratories.128 What those entities have the duty to
report, according to this law, is an initial determination or diagno-
sis of HIV, HIV-related illness or AIDS.1 29 Now the duty to report
AIDS already existed in other law, but I want to call attention to
this issue of the initial determination, or diagnosis, and also talk
about the fact that we have read that together with the preserva-
tion of anonymous testing.
One of the arguments that advocates have made --and it re-
mains to be seen whether the regulations will reflect - is that if we
know that the preservation of anonymous testing is very important
to the public health, because some people will be deterred from
testing and getting diagnosed early if they are not given the oppor-
tunity for anonymous testing, and we have a law that says very
clearly in three places that the duty to report applies to initial test-
127. See id. § 2138.
128. See id. § 2130.1.
129. See id. § 2130.1(a)-(c).
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ing and initial determinations and initial diagnoses,13 ° then I would
certainly argue that somebody who enters the health system
through anonymous testing for an initial diagnosis or determina-
tion and at that point goes for follow-up treatment or confirmatory
testing could logically be excluded from the reporting require-
ments. That would be an extremely valid public health decision to
make, especially when you see that the law recognizes the preser-
vation of anonymous testing as an important public health mea-
sure. Again, a hot spot to watch for in the regulations.
I want to put all of these points that we are making about report-
ing and names and lists in a little bit of context here.
People have already mentioned stigmatizing diseases and stigma-
tizing infections and the effects on populations that are already un-
deserved in many ways. We have already noted that it seems that
people who are deterred from testing are also disproportionately
the people who are very often at greatest risk for HIV infection,
and that that is a very dangerous intersection.
There are two more points that I want to mention as far as con-
text when we talk about names reporting, lists and what it means to
our clients or to patients or to any of us to be on these lists and
reported and in databases.
My first call that I got for advice as the HIV Advocacy Coordi-
nator at Legal Services was from somebody who said that he had
just found out that his confidentiality had been breached, because
he had met a guy at a bar the week before, and it turned out that
this person worked at the Division of AIDS Services and Income
Support, the public assistance source for people with HIV in New
York City. They went out on a date, and a couple of days later he
got a letter from this government employee revealing that this per-
son had used his position to look him up in the database, saw he
was receiving services associated with his HIV, and wrote on the
outside of the envelope that the caller was HIV-positive, and how
terrible it was that he had not disclosed this on the date.
Lists and databases can be used in scary ways. There are real-life
examples. It is not just that we are saying that there is a theoretical
potential. I mean, the questions of who has access, whether they
are qualified people, people who understand confidentiality or
might be inclined to use information for their own reasons, are
very serious. I have seen it put into play in the real world.
130. See id.
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The other thing that I wanted to mention as far as context is that
last legislative session we had names reporting and partner notifi-
cation passed. This session we have seen proposed, and sometimes
re-proposed, laws that would criminalize all kinds of behavior, in-
cluding having sex with somebody if you are HIV-positive or hav-
ing sex with somebody if you are HIV-positive and do not disclose
to them. Following right on the heels of the law creating a
database is the suggestion of creating laws that will make it a crime
for people who know their HIV status to be doing various things.
This is pretty scary.
I want to move from the names reporting hot spots into contact
tracing and partner notification. One of the things that this law
does is modify who is considered to be a contact. There was al-
ready a legal provision talking about what is considered to be a
contact for an HIV-positive person and that provision was limited
to a sexual contact or needle-sharing partner.
The new law amends this section of the public health law, adding
a phrase saying that a contact will also now be a person who is at
risk of transmission as determined by the Health Commissioner,
and we do not know what that is going to be. We do not know how
it is going to be interpreted or broadened, whether that is going to
mean somebody who received a needle stick. It is a big question,
and it is a big question especially when people start talking about
whether it is going to be limited to reasonable risk of transmission,
or whether it is going to be anybody who is worried, with no medi-
cal support, that perhaps somehow their contact with someone
could have led to transmission.
When we see recent studies that show that knowledge of actual
risk of HIV transmission is, if not plateauing, maybe even decreas-
ing, then we have to be concerned about what it means to say that
some unelaborated "risk of transmission" could justify application
of this law.
Another issue for us to watch out for in the regulations is how a
contact will be identified. On one end of the spectrum is a sugges-
tion that identifying the contact of an HIV-positive person should
mean using information that comes out of a conversation that that
person has with his or her physician, which is protected by a ver-
sion of informed consent, where the physician would say, "This is
the result of your test, and now we are going to have a conversa-
tion about contact tracing or partner notification, and what con-
tacts you have, and what we will be reporting," and that physician
would explain what the partner notification law requires.
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Actually, we could say that we might hope that this information
would be given ahead of time, when the person is tested, but the
bottom line is that in the context of creating this list of contacts to
be reported to the State, there should be a conversation with the
physician where the physician explains what information is to be
taken and what will be done with it. Then people could disclose as
they see fit. That is one much more protected option that many
advocates have supported.
At the other end of the spectrum is the possibility of some kind
of sleuthing through the person's file - I mean, perhaps when they
entered care with this physician they had a relationship with some-
body whom they mentioned, somewhere deep in the file, maybe a
couple years back or whatever - that they might go looking in the
background and using various old parts of the medical file in re-
ports to the State, perhaps without any particular discussion about
that with the patient.
Obviously, one of the big concerns is what that means for physi-
cian/patient relationships in the future and whether people will be
greatly deterred from sharing important aspects of their life and
their sexual health and maybe drug use with their physician if we
have a law in effect that means that anything is fair game for re-
porting should you develop an illness in the future.
A couple of other points. The law as it is written right now says
that when the health departments come to do this actual contact
tracing, it will strive for in-person notification unless circumstances
reasonably prevent doing so.
Well, what does that mean? I am excused because my car broke
down when I was supposed to go notify you? Does it mean I tried
twice and you were not home and now I am going to stick notifica-
tion on the door in a sealed envelope? I mean, that is allowed in
certain other cases for service of a notice. I think we would argue
that it is not reasonable in this context, but there is no real explana-
tion of what it means to say personal notification unless reasonably
prevented from doing so.
There is a major question about the potential retroactive applica-
tion of this law, and that could be a real hot spot for litigation. If
you have gone for an HIV test that was anonymous, then you know
that you are given information - or you should be given informa-
tion - on the current state of confidentiality law and how your
testing information and results will be kept private. If we do not
see regulations that make it clear that application of this law is pro-
spective only, then we see a real conflict with what people have
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signed in the past that they thought protected them, that they
thought gave them certain rights to confidentiality, and what this
law now requires.
I think it is important to note that there are provisions in the
laws regarding criminal and civil liability that not only protect
somebody who is acting in good faith trying to comply with this law
but also protect someone who might fail to cooperate with the law
from criminal or civil liability.
There is a real question about what the section of the law that
deals with domestic violence screening will look like when regula-
tions are finally handed down. There is a section of the law that
talks about recognition of domestic violence risk and says that
there will be identification and screening of both index patients
and contacts for domestic violence risk.' But there is nothing that
says what will be done once these people are supposedly screened,
and all kinds of questions about how you would do that screening.
For instance, if I have a brief relationship with somebody or went
on a date and had sex with somebody two days ago and do not
know them very well, how would I contribute to an assessment of
their risk for domestic violence?
I have asked some advocates for victims of domestic violence
about this, saying, "Well, I understand the sensitivity of doing a
domestic violence assessment of a person sitting with you - that is
difficult enough. Now, what if I come in and say, 'Well, you know,
I just met this person.' Do you think that you can assess through
me whether they are at risk for domestic violence?" Nobody has
really given me an answer for how on earth that could be effec-
tively done.
In any case, one would assume that coming out of this idea of
recognizing domestic violence risk should be some sort of exclu-
sion, at least a limited exclusion - that partner notification would
not happen if it were likely to exacerbate domestic violence. But
right now what we have is a law that says "there shall be screening"
and provides no real direction about what might then be done with
it.
So that is going to be a very interesting section to see come down
in regulations, and I believe, from some of what I have heard, that
it may be a section that has been delaying the regulations.
All right, the last thing that I will say is that a demand that has
been made by advocates across the board has been that there
131. See id. § 2137.
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should be some kind of study of the effect of these measures some
reasonable time after they have been put into place, especially
since we are talking about the possibility of driving people from
testing and treatment.
When we see that possibility in something called a public health
law, the effect must be examined, especially when we have studies
and indications from clients and patients that we may see severe
adverse effects, and especially when we see in the Governor's new
budget that millions of dollars are now proposed to be diverted
from proven methods of HIV prevention to this extremely expen-
sive system of names reporting and partner notification.
We really have to demand not only a study on rates of infection
and deterrence linked to names reporting and partner notification,
but also a look at what programs are suffering to fund these
measures.
MS PINOT: I was asked to talk about some potential scenarios
as a result of the new partner notification, contact tracing law.
I guess I should identify who I am. I am Mildred Pinot from the
Community Law Offices of the Legal Aid Society. I am a supervis-
ing attorney of the HIV/AIDS Representation Project. I know
some of the folks in the audience who I have had the pleasure of
working with during the course of my ten years at Legal Aid.
So I am, in fact, going to talk about a couple of scenarios that
have come up during the course of some community outreach and
education that I have done, in Upper Manhattan primarily, and in
the Bronx, because I think it is really important, exceedingly im-
portant, not just for us to educate ourselves but to educate the
community at large. And, as a service provider, I think it is really
important to educate my clients and to have them, in turn, educate
their families, their friends and their acquaintances. And that goes
for all of you as well.
There are many issues that attach to this legislation. I know, as
an advocate that was opposed to it, that traveled to Albany on
more than one occasion and spoke to many legislators, it was a
difficult and disappointing process, because never in my wildest
dreams did I really think this was going to pass. This is
retrogressive.
The complexion of the epidemic has changed. Have people no-
ticed that? Interesting how now we have legislative efforts not only
to mandate names reporting and contact tracing, but also criminal-
ization of behavior by individuals who happen to be HIV positive.
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I am disgusted. I think it is horrific, and there should be a public
outcry about this.
Who is affected primarily? Women and men of color and poor
people. It was just announced recently - surprise surprise - that
HIV/AIDS is an emergency in the African American community.
Really? No! $156 million has been earmarked for prevention.
Now there is tons of controversy about how that money is going to
be used. Lovely. Let's just go out and educate the folks that are
getting infected the most. Who are they? Primarily adolescents. I
heard a statistic the other day that totally blew me away. It was
like two people under the age of twenty-five are infected per hour,
on a daily basis. That is amazing. We are doing something wrong.
We better start doing it right because if we do not, you think this is
an epidemic now? This is going to start killing us off like we cannot
imagine.
What is involved? Access to early testing. I talk to teenagers
during the course of my work. I am not supposed to, because I am
supposed to represent the adults, but I talk to their children, and I
have kids who are thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, some of
whom are parents, telling me "I am not getting a test, I am not
having my name going on some list, and then, you know, what if
rumor has it that I am HIV-positive and somebody tries to come
and kick my butt or kill me?" That is the reality of potential do-
mestic violence. That is the reality of the situation that people do
not talk about. I am not talking about, "Oh, I am going to curse
you out because I am really enraged that you could have possibility
infected me." I am talking real fear of imminent danger.
So this is the stuff that comes up at community forums.
Back to my initial statement, the reason I think it is so important
to engage the communities that we serve is because most people do
not ever see a copy of legislation. People have never seen this.
People do not have an opportunity to read through the law. I take
two-and-a-half hours with a community group or other audiences,
and I spend an hour and fifteen minutes, and I read the law at
community forums, and I have the audience tell me what they find
problematic with it. So issues such as the one that Hayley brought
up, which I guess are part of my scenarios, are some of the things
that come up.
For example, I go to a doctor's office, my first time there. What
do you all get when you go to a doctor's office? You get forms,
right? You get that little clipboard and a pen. They tell you "could
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you please fill this out, could I see your insurance card" - you
know, the whole works.
On .that form there is all kinds of information that you are listing.
When I went for my first ob-gyn examination, I was a nervous
wreck. I filled out all the stuff. I got inside, and my doctor said,
"Oh, your husband's name is Eric."
I said, "How did you know he was my husband?"
She said, "Oh, I just assumed." You should never assume, be-
cause I do not share his last name. He is my husband, but she
made an assumption, okay?
Assumptions are made. She asked me about my sexual history,
and I shared that information, because, of course, I wanted to do
everything I could possibly do to ensure that I had a healthy and
good pregnancy. Okay, I am thinking now all that information I
gave this provider, who I had never met before - this was a cold
call that Eric, my husband, made to a hospital in Westchester
County; he figured we will go to Westchester - "small hospitals,
we can get a private room when you finally give birth, not a big
deal" - I do not know who this woman is, never met her before.
I am developing a relationship with her. She now has all kinds of
information about me. She knows how many times I have had mis-
carriages. She knows all about my gynecological history. She has
asked me questions about sexual partners. During the course of
your conversation with a medical provider, you share information.
She did not tell me anything about informed consent. She asked
me if I wanted to be tested for HIV, if there was any reason why I
thought I might be at risk. No, I did not. She asked me if I had
ever done IV drugs. No. Anybody I had ever dated? I do not
know. But these are just general questions that come up during the
course of a regular visit with a physician.
I did not think anything of it then, just like I did not think any-
thing of it when they asked me, "Is it okay to test your baby for
HIV?" My initial response was I broke out into a sweat. I swear
to God, I broke out into a sweat. I was like, "they are going to test
the baby for HIV." Well, that means they are going to test me for
HIV. I do not know if I can agree to this. The law had not even
passed at the time.
They said, "Well, we really encourage it."
I said, "Okay, test the baby."
When did I get my results? My child is two years old. Had I not
called a year later - a year later! - I would not have received the
results of my child's HIV test, because no one volunteered that,
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and my provider did not volunteer it. I did not say anything be-
cause I wanted to see how long it would take. Now mind you, I
think, had she been HIV-positive they would have told me, espe-
cially because they know I am a lawyer.
It is telling, however, that these are problems. These are glitches
within the law. I am at least savvy about this stuff. Most people
are not.
So back to accessing care. Here I am at the doctor's office. I fill
out a form, talk to my doctor, the doctor writes notes. Mind you,
most doctors are not going to want to be in the practice of engaging
in partner notification. I do not know that people talk about that,
either. I talk to medical providers, and they are asking me, "'How
the hell can I get around this? I mean, I do not want to do this.
Can't I just refer it to the Department of Health?"
I answer, "No, it is your patient's option whether they want to
ask you to do it or someone from the Department of Health."
They reply, "So then what do I do if my patient says that I should
do it?"
Well, what do you think doctors are going to do? Do you think a
doctor is going to go out and try to personally contact someone
that is a known contact? No, they are going to delegate that re-
sponsibility to someone on their staff. Do you think their nurses,
physician assistants, anybody else that they work with is really go-
ing to want to engage in partner notification? No. This is a real
problem. I do not know how they are going to do all of this.
It is a very expensive law. It is problematic. How is it going to
go into effect?
Yesterday was Friday. I spoke to someone from the Department
of Health at a legislative session we had up in Harlem:
"So, know anything about the amendments?"
"Amendment? No, do not know a thing. We are having a little
trouble getting them together."
We have heard this for months. What is happening here?
First of all, I can tell you what is happening. No money was allo-
cated to this legislation, and it is bad law. It was not properly
thought out. It is going to be very, very hard to implement.
Let us talk about the database. My ten-year-old stepson can get
into almost any database that exists. How are they going to ensure
confidentiality? There is a lot of transmission of information here.
You are going from a doctor or a lab or someone else who is au-
thorized to give an initial diagnosis of a positive HIV result, an
initial HIV-related illness diagnosis, or a diagnosis of AIDS. That
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goes from that whatever you want to call them - entity, individual
- to the State Department of Health. Then from the State De-
partment of Health it goes back to the local Department of Health.
Gee, that is a lot of transmission of information going around.
Problems with potential breaches of confidentiality obviously exist.
Who will have access to this information if it is not encoded, it is
not encrypted, if they are actually transmitting information in
terms of names?
I heard the story of all stories yesterday from a client. The client
could not get some benefit, so he hooked up with somebody at the
agency, and benefits got in place the next day. I say, "No, you need
to stop." The client said, "Oh yeah? It is the truth, and I have no
reason to lie to you." The client goes on to say "Now I am having
another problem with the same agency, but I do not feel like hook-
ing up with anyone, and I need you to help me. I mean, the first
time around, it was fine. But not again." Look, call me naive. I
did not think this stuff went down, all right? It goes down. I did
not know about it. Now I know.
What if that agency person gets upset and divulges information?
Obviously there was a breach in the instance that Hayley men-
tioned. Obviously these things happen more than I realized. This
is the first I ever heard of the stuff. It is outrageous, and it is prob-
lematic, and we need to address it. That is why the commentary
period is so important.
The other thing that I was told yesterday is there will be no pub-
lic hearings but only written comments. Do you know what that
means? Written comments mean no one is going to read them.
Okay? We better make some major hoopla about this, either for
public hearings or to ensure that our comments are, in fact, read,
and that it is documented who read them and what recommenda-
tion was made upon reading the comments, because otherwise it is
an exercise in futility.
MS. GORENBERG: When my o.b. asked me if I wanted to be
tested, I had the same sweat reaction. I said "Okay, let's do it, I
gotta see," and the lab lost the test. Leads to fantastic confidence
in the system, I must say.
MS. PINOT: Unbelievable. People seem to think that we make
this stuff up. It is not made up. Now, we are pretty mellow about
it. Most people are not that mellow about it. It freaks them out. It
is a major decision to be tested. It is not something to be taken
lightly. Your entire life changes, or could potentially change, but it
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is being treated as a one-shot deal, especially in light of partner
notification/contact tracing, and that is problematic.
Do people think that folks in the neighborhood do not know
who works for the Department of Health? They know. Just like
when you have an STD, people know. Word gets out. If they think
you are HIV positive, word is going to get out. People start seeing
the same kind of envelopes, same people knocking on doors, word
is going to get out. We talk about stigma.
MS. PINOT: If your baby gets tested, derivatively you get
tested. Your partner is going to be informed if the child is positive.
Your partner is going to be informed, if they know who he or she
is.
MS. GORENBERG: I filled out the form when I walked into
the doctor's office.
MS. PINOT: They know who it is. It is a problem. It is a real
problem. And this is stuff that my clients were telling me: "If I
have a baby, you know they test the baby."
"Yes, I know they test the baby. Well, if I list who helped me
conceive this child, they are going to tell whoever it is."
"Yes, that is a distinct possibility."
"Well, then, what am I supposed to do? I just gave birth. How
am I supposed to deal with that?"
Okay, psychosocial issues. How are they going to deal with this?
Is there follow-up counseling for any of this? Have you seen any-
thing apropos? Are people qualified to do it? Anyone funded to
do it? I think it is a problem.
Okay, I am sixteen, I am sexually active, I have experimented
with IV drugs. Friends suggest I get tested because rumor has it
that Jack, who I hung out with last week, has been ill - I mean, in
and out of the hospital. People do not know what the deal is with
him. I should get tested. I go to an anonymous testing site. Test
positive. Not only do I freak out, but after I test positive, I am told
- counseled - that I should access care - prophylactic measures,
I should talk to somebody. "There are ways to avoid becoming ill,
so you should see a doctor."
Who do I go to? Are they going to tell me that if I go to a
doctor, who is probably my family doctor, because who else do I
know, that he will have to do a confirmatory test and if positive
report my name and the names of my known contacts? I guess I
could to Planned Parenthood; I guess I could go to GMHC; I guess
I could go to a CBO; but when I go I am going to have a confirma-
tory test. My argument, in this context, has consistently been a
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confirmatory test of my HIV status is not an initial diagnosis and,
therefore, it should not be reported and my name should not be
reported.
Providers are not looking at it that way because they are nervous
about being sanctioned. I mean, I do hospital-based legal services.
They are telling us, "We are not sure that this is what it says. We
want to comply with the law. We would probably err on the side of
reporting rather than not." We need to educate, educate, educate,
educate.
Okay, so I go. I now have an appointment with my doctor. I am
nervous and scared. The doctor says to me, "You want to tell me
who you have been with?" It is important, because you should en-
gage in partner notification, and you should not be engaging in at-
risk behavior. You need to take care of yourself. It is real, real
important. And you, because you are feeling vulnerable at the age
of sixteen and freaking out because you tested positive, share some
information. They, in turn, have to engage in contact tracing, and
they may.
Now, it could be a problem and it could not be a problem. On
the other hand, whoever you have been with may have already
identified you as a partner. So you may already be on a list. Say
you get a letter at home. You are sixteen, get a letter at home from
the Department of Health, because of course their attempts to
reach you personally failed, and they were good-faith efforts.
They knock on your door. Maybe you are not home. Parents
are home. They say, "Have your child get in touch with the De-
partment of Health." Then they send the letter. You think Mom
and Dad are not going to ask you why you are getting letters from
the Department of Health? Then they may even read the letter.
And then what happens? I have situations where I have sixteen-
and seventeen-year-olds who call my office and say, "My Mom just
found out that I am positive and kicked me out of the house. My
father found out I am positive and said that I cannot touch any-
thing in the house, I cannot touch my brother and sister, I have to
get a job. I mean, I gotta take care of business. How can you help
me?"
Do we all know about the changes in the welfare laws? What do
sixteen-year-olds do if they are not hooked up with another adult,
unless they are emancipated? Remember, New York is not an
emancipation state. You cannot go to court and get emancipated.
These are real problems, and they have far-reaching repercus-
sions, and people do not think about it.
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Say you are in a battering situation. Get tested. So you have
been in counseling with a particular community-based agency that
can provide comprehensive services. People know who the bat-
terer is. They know who you are hooked up with. It may be a
series of batterers that you have been with. I mean, it happens. It
could be a historical situation. Is this agency now required to en-
gage in contact tracing, and how much risk are you at this point?
So what is the point of getting tested? I would not. I would do
the same things my clients tell me: "No. I would go to an anony-
mous site, and when I am really, really sick then I will get care."
Is that what this law was designed to accomplish? No. Alleg-
edly, it was to do exactly the opposite, to encourage folks to access
care early on, to alert people to the possibility that they may have
been exposed to HIV and stem the tide of the epidemic. Well, I
think it is going to do exactly the contrary, and I have real issues
about informed consent.
What about a false/positive? Do you ever think about that?
There are false/positives. I have a couple. People come in, tested
positive, two years later come back and tell me, "No. You know
what? They made a mistake. Thank you for helping me, and I am
very happy."
Okay, the name is on a list now. How do you get it off? What
do you do with contact tracing? People may have been contacted.
Your life may be completely changed as a result of this. We
thought about it enough. The folks who passed the law -did not
think about it enough.
I am trying to think if there are any other little scenarios that I
have not talked about. Interesting questions.
I had a representative from one of those companies that does the
HIV tests by mail - they are not New York-based. I forgot where
they are. Is it Texas? There is one in Texas, and there is another
one, because this gentleman was not from Texas - but anyway, say
Texas. Okay, I do an HIV test by mail. This is supposed to be
anonymous, except I do not understand, if they are so anonymous
- I mean, you call in and you give them a number, but if there is
some problem with the blood sample, then you are supposed to
send another one, and they send you another kit, but by sending
you another kit, they already know who you are.
AUDIENCE: But they do not have to link it to the - they
could give you another kit with a new number.
MS. PINOT: Yes, but they send it to your home. Sure, you
could send it to a Post Office box, assuming you have a Post Office
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* box. You could send it to your place of employment. You can send
it to a friend's house.
You could send it anywhere. All I am saying is that there is no
guarantee of confidentiality - what is confidentiality? Let's be
real, okay?
So, anyway, can we use these tests to avoid the law? My prob-
lem with it is, say, there is a problem with the blood sample and
you then have to do it again and instead of going out and purchas-
ing another one, you call in. They tell you that there was a prob-
lem with xyz2000 and "if you give us your address or an address
where we can send this, we will send you another one." All right,
that is okay. Give somebody else's. I will give my mother's ad-
dress, okay? Fine. What then? What happens then? Say you are
positive. What do you do? What do you do?
Do you access care? How do you document that you are posi-
tive? You have this thing with a number on it. How do you know
it is you? You know, I can see doctors going "No, no, no. This will
not do. You have to take an initial HIV test here in the State of
New York." And that is a problem because then there is disclo-
sure; you know, you have to report.
Okay, I am trying to be creative. I am trying to think of as many
scenarios as possible. You want to help me out?
AUDIENCE: Well, who has access to the lists legally?
MS. PINOT: The Department of Health.
AUDIENCE: Does anybody else? I mean, insurance compa-
nies, criminal justice?
MS. PINOT: Well, at the moment -
MS. HANSSENS: Illinois adopted a measure authorizing use of
the state AIDS registry to crosscheck with names of licensed heath
care workers, although it has not been implemented. So, in theory,
laws can be adopted allowing access or use outside the state health
department. The CDC currently is advancing the adoption of a
model state privacy law that would allow health officials across the
country - local, state and federal - to all share identifiable infor-
mation of persons with HIV. Such use would not be considered a
disclosure requiring affected individuals' informed consent. Once
names-based registries of those with HIV have been created, the
list of agencies and individuals who have access to this information
can be changed with the stroke of a legislative pen.
AUDIENCE: Could you file a Freedom of Information Act re-
quest, if you are in litigation or anything like that?
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AUDIENCE: Well, the law as it is written says that, confidential-
ity will be maintained and will only be disclosed "as necessary to
further the provisions of this Title.' 1 32 But then, we have questions
about what that really means, what is going to be necessary - es-
pecially when you see amendments that are pulling out things like
a doctor before could make certain kinds of disclosures if the doc-
tor reasonably believed there was the risk of transmission. Well,
they struck the word "reasonably."
MS. HANSSENS: Well, there are two words which illustrate
how officials might define "necessary": Nushawn Williams. Local
officials responded by taking his picture into schools, and his mug
shot broadcast on national television. While health department of-
ficials may not have intended that broad a result, the incident dem-
onstrates that health officials, both state and federal, either are
unwilling or unable to control those kinds of disclosures, particu-
larly in changed situations.
AUDIENCE: And who is doing data entry? I mean, if we do
not think that the Commissioner of Health is going to do this in a
wrongful way - in the call that I got in my office - I mean, who
was this person? I do not believe - although I do not know who it
was - I do not believe that it was a high-ranking official at the
local Department of Health or at the Division of AIDS Services,
but it was a data entry person or it was a caseworker or it was
somebody who had access to a computer screen.
AUDIENCE: In Florida last year there was this guy who
worked for the Florida Department of Health, took the records
and threatened to publish them in two newspapers.
AUDIENCE: Well, he sent them to the newspapers.
AUDIENCE: But the newspapers refused to publish it.
MS. HANSSENS: They prosecuted him and he got probation.
AUDIENCE: I am still confused on when you said the law
presumes anonymous testing and yet you have to have names re-
porting. That does not seem to go.
MS. PINOT: You can go to an anonymous testing site and be
tested. That is your option.
AUDIENCE: But once your doctor or someone else -
MS. PINOT: The big issue, or the big question, is if you go to a
doctor to access care and the doctor suggests - because you tell
the doctor "I am HIV, having a confirmatory test done" - the
question is, is that test confirming your HIV diagnosis an initial test
132. See id. § 2139.
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or not? Our argument is that it is not and, therefore, your name
should not be reported.
We do not know what the regulations are going to say, but they
hear us talking, so in all likelihood it is going to say if you get
tested anonymously, upon accessing care a confirmatory test will
be deemed an initial test subject to the requirements of the new
law.
AUDIENCE: We should say as a baseline, though, - and
maybe this goes to your question - that before this law, we had
anonymous testing and we had confidential testing. There were
specially licensed sites to do anonymous testing, and then there was
your confidential document if you go to your doctor, or something.
So what they are saying, we think, is that those anonymous sites,
specially funded to give anonymous testing rather than confidential
testing, will -
AUDIENCE: Well, it is just that with the partner notification I
am wondering - I do not mean this to sound funny, given the
political climate today, but where they say they have to contact
your sexual partners, what is their definition of a "sexual partner?"
What kind of sex are they talking about? What if you refuse to
give names, or what if you honestly do not know the name of the
person you had sex with?
AUDIENCE: There are, in fact, no criminal penalties, and I
would suggest that you identify Assemblyperson Nettie
Meyersohn.
MS. PINOT: She is the one that is pushing the "unblinding" of
- she wants to make these lists of names available to other
entities.
MS. HANSSENS: This happened with the newborn testing here
in New York and this is something that Liz Cooper worked on a
lot. We had blinded seroprevalence surveys among newborns, and
once that information was there, Assemblyperson Meyersch was
one of these people that pushed to say babies are going home and
dying. So, with a stroke of the legislative pen, an anonymous sur-
vey turned into mandatory names reporting.
The bottom line is that once a list is there, then there will be this
desire - this uninformed, usually politically driven desire - to use
the data for other purposes. History supports us on this.
For folks that have money, these things are much less of a prob-
lem. There have always been doctors, certainly in the gay commu-
nity, that will allow you to test as Donald Duck and you could still
test as Donald Duck in a names reporting system. The problem is
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that, for individuals who rely on publicly-funded benefits to sur-
vive, there may be some problems with continuing through the sys-
tem as Donald Duck.
But there are certainly doctors - there always have been doc-
tors - who will not report and who will do everything they can to
protect their patients. So part of what you do is for your own pro-
tection is identify those doctors, and you also try to work with
clients.
Ultimately, a lot of these policies are driven by politics and fund-
ing, funding, funding.
The CDC wants these names and numbers for a variety of rea-
sons unrelated to the ones that they are offering. Politician want
names; government agencies want numbers to show that they de-
serve funding. There has been incredible pressure on the states,
and it was clear even from members of the New York State HIV
Advisory Council that they believed if they did not adopt a names-
based reporting system, that we would lose funding. So a lot of the
rhetoric supporting HIV reporting strikes me as an "emperor with
no clothes" situation. There are mainstream health officials and
even some directors of aids service organizations in the receiving
line for this naked king that are saying, "You look fabulous, you
look fabulous." And then there are the rest of us in the crowd that
are saying, "Excuse me, I think you are naked."
AUDIENCE: There is an interesting and very painful historical
twist in all this, which is that there was sort of a concession early
on, or an understanding early on in the epidemic, that with AIDS
when people got sick, they really died very close to the time of
diagnosis. And now, ironically enough, we have all these reasons
to give people incentives to go ahead and get tested early so that
they can go ahead and get treatment - the direct opposite of what
a lot of Millie's clients talk about - and yet, we now are putting in
a roadblock at exactly the time that we want to encourage people
to go in to get tested, and possibly to get care. The irony of those
things happening at the same time, quite frankly, on the backs of
poor people and largely people of color, is just too painful in this
epidemic.
AUDIENCE: And for data that is largely useless for the pur-
poses that they are saying that they are collecting it.
AUDIENCE: A question and a comment. On unique identifi-
ers, I mean, I realize that that has been thrown out as a way of
trying to back off on names reporting. On the other hand, given all
the risks to what happens to a database once it exists, and the fact
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that for unique identifiers to work somebody has to have a match
of the name and the unique identifier somewhere - I mean, that
exists physically somewhere in the world.
AUDIENCE: It does not have to, actually. Anna Forbes of
Philadelphia is the most brilliant person who could explain why
you do not actually have to have a master list.
AUDIENCE: My concern is that even using unique identifiers,
(1) there is a reality of a risk of confidentiality being breached, and
(2) perhaps more important, is that there is probably going to be
the same perception by people who are going to be deterred from
taking the test.
AUDIENCE: And that has been shown.
AUDIENCE: It just struck me through the whole debate that
while there was sort of a political tactic to raising unique identifi-
ers, does it really accomplish anything? Does it really accomplish
what we want it to accomplish with respect to the problems with
names reporting?
The second question is, has there been any enforcement of the
provisions of Article 27-F, the confidentially provisions that have
been in effect now for a number of years in New York State? I
think there actually are criminal penalties attached, right? Has
anyone anywhere in New York State been prosecuted? Is it
enough for institutions to think that if they err on the wrong side of
reporting - for example, if they decide something is initial and it is
not - they could be running afoul of that law?
MS. PINOT: Not if they are acting in good faith. There are
some handouts here, but one of the ones that I brought says "dis-
claimers." If you are acting in good faith in carrying out the provi-
sions of the law, no criminal or civil liabilities attach -
AUDIENCE: So then the 27-F pressures just do not exist in that
whole, so there is no incentive to err on that side.
The other thing I just wanted to mention is on the domestic vio-
lence point. The domestic violence provisions that are passed with
respect to welfare are an abomination. The supposed domestic vio-
lence community was part of creating that abomination; they were
part of creating the abomination as to the regulations, enforcing it.
I would not trust either the administration, obviously, or people
who call themselves domestic violence advocates to inform you on
those provisions, and I would certainly - (1) they did not consult
any poor people advocates, and certainly did not want consult poor
people's advocates, because we are seen as pariah and likely to
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turn off the Governor because we actually care about the lives of
poor people.
I would suggest - I am saying this very strongly, since it is abso-
lutely true, and it has been a nightmare - that when it comes to
domestic violence provisions, expect the worse. And certainly do
not limit your consultations to people who call themselves domes-
tic violence advocates, because they are dangerous.
MS. HANSSENS: Can I just answer your first question? I think
what you are suggesting about unique identifiers is absolutely true.
I think that the problems, the basic problems, with names reporting
as surveillance - those are different things - are the same for
unique identifiers as they are there. That is one of the reasons
Lambda has never actively supported unique identifiers - we do
not support HIV test reporting in any form as a way of getting a
reliable picture of the epidemic.
In fact, the Latino Commission on AIDS did a phone survey
with graduate students calling people with Hispanic surnames, and
found that there was not a substantial difference between unique
identifiers and names reporting in deterring people from willing-
ness to get tested.
This fear is not unfounded. If I had a choice of a name and I
could say, use either "Donald Duck," or a unique identifier that
includes the last four digits of my Social Security number - well,
all I have to do is put those four numbers into a phone call to Visa
and they say "Hi, Catherine Hanssens, how are you?" I mean, it is
particularly easy to track people down with a social security
number, and then of course there are immigrants at risk who do
not have a number at all.
I think that people supported unique identifiers because people
believe we need a better picture of the epidemic and it is a prefera-
ble alternative to names reporting. Fine, we do need a better pic-
ture - but none of the information we have about IV drug use has
ever produced broad-based government support for needle
exchanges.
In fact, in New Jersey when people involved in needle exchange
programs are being chased down, prosecuted, arrested and pro-
grams are being shut down, and the information we know about
youth is rejected for abstinence-only-based prevention education,
what reason do we have to believe that more data will produce
better programs?
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AUDIENCE: Universal health coverage with confidentiality
would do a lot more for giving a good picture of what is happening
in the epidemic.
It also would be interesting to see - you know, there are unique
identifiers in Massachusetts, starting in Massachusetts, and they
have it in Maryland. It will be interesting if they are going to do a
follow-up study, also to see negative impact, if any, and then do
some sort of comparison in those states that have gone to name
reporting and those that have gone to unique identifiers.
The problem with those systems, though, is that the systems -
the Maryland system sucks. Excuse me, but it does. It is dumb. It
is also based on using a portion of the Social Security number,
which leaves out - oh, who are we forgetting? - oh, immigrants.
There are those folks, of course, but they do not get HIV, so we are
not really losing anything.
MS. PINOT: And if they do, we do not care, right?
AUDIENCE: We do not care because we are not going to give
them health care.
And the system in Massachusetts is actually sort of scary, too, I
think.
Plus, any unique identifier system you did manage to put to-
gether would do nothing for the contacts. If you are named as a
contact, you are on the list. I mean, you are there. There is no way
you can manipulate that any other way.
MS. PINOT: I mean, think of the potential for being on a con-
tact list. I mean, I could be ticked off at all of you and put you all
on my contact list.
AUDIENCE: But the track-back thing, again, there is this
whole sort of suggestion that we need to be able to indefinitely - I
mean, because if you are HIV-positive, it will be, as far as we
know, it will be a pretty long time, somebody checking in on you.
When you take a test, you do not, I think, envision that somebody
from the Health Department is going to have the ability to track
you and show up at your door - which, frankly, is not much better
than a letter, and in fact most of the data that we have -
On the off chance that New York did end up adopting a unique
identifier system, what additional obstacles would you see, consid-
ering the fact that New York has such a higher seroprevalence
compared to Maryland and Massachusetts?
You mean in terms of that it is more difficult to do it?
I mean, in terms of if you are having the last four digits of the
Social Security code.
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MS. HANSSENS: Well, I never totally understood, first of all,
why numbers are viewed as inherently more difficult than letters. I
mean, just conceptually I do not understand that. My name is rou-
tinely misspelled. It is misspelled here in the program. It is always
wrong. There is this sort of notion that it has to be a Social Secur-
ity number. How many people here have AOL or use the
Internet?
And you made up your own name, right, and you fed it in, and in
nanoseconds they told you if that name was taken. So if you
wanted to be reddog69, and damn, it was taken, you could become
reddog70.
And that is your identifier. You have made up that name. The
odds are - even if you are drunk or forgetful - that you will
remember your identifier because it is your own special name
named after your first love or your dog or whoever. So the likeli-
hood that people will remember that and give that and that can be
keyed to that test and subsequent tests is pretty decent. We have
the technology.
Health officials, they talk about traditional health methods as if
traditional forms of medical treatment - you know, like attaching
leeches to your body - somehow have this kind of permanent
value. And, in fact, as Matthew explained, this epidemic is differ-
ent than the ones that we adopted these methods for in the 1920s
and 1930s, where you slept with a few folks, you were tested, you
were treated, you were rendered noninfectious. If they found out
who you were with, they could treat you and render you noninfec-
tious and that was the end of it.
This is very different, but there is no reason why, with the tech-
nology that we have, that we need or should rely on a names-based
system to track people with HIV, but this is the way it has always
been done. They would have to change some things, and bureau-
crats hate change.
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SECTION 60.41 OF THE NEW YORK CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW: THE SEXUAL ASSAULT
REFORM ACT OF 1999 CHALLENGES
MOLINEUX AND DUE PROCESS
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Governor George Pataki recently submitted a crime bill to the
New York State Legislature entitled the Sexual Assault Reform
Act of 1999 (the "Act").' The Act proposes the addition of section
60.41 to Article 60 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law
("CPL").' CPL section 60.41 would allow prosecutors in sexual as-
sault prosecutions to introduce evidence of a defendant's previous
commission of any "offense or offenses of sexual assault.., on any
matter to which it is relevant, including the defendant's propensity
to commit an offense of sexual assault or the credibility of the al-
leged victim of the sexual assault . . . .
CPL section 60.41 is based upon Federal Rules of Evidence
("FRE") 413 and 414,4 which Congress enacted in 1994, 5 and
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Voss, Raymond Holland, Carolyn Wilson, Michael Coleman and everyone else at
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1. See S. 1592, 222d Leg. (N.Y. 1999), A. 3062, 222d Leg. (N.Y. 1999). The Sen-
ate passed the Act on February 8, 1999. At the time of this Article, the Act remains
in the Assembly Committee on Codes, as amended A. 3062-B, 222d Leg. (N.Y. 1999).
The Assembly will resume consideration of the Act upon reconvening for the January,
2000, legislative session.
2. See S. 1592, 222d Leg. § 10 (N.Y. 1999); A. 3062-B, 222d Leg. § 10 (N.Y. 1999).
The Act also would repeal and redraft section 130 of New York Criminal Penal Law,
change several evidence provisions in the CPL, enhance sentencing for sex offenses,
modify aspects of the Sex Offender Registration Act and grant the prosecution the
right to appeal bail and sentencing decisions.
3. Id. (emphasis added).
4. See Sponsor's Memorandum in Support of Bill 3062 (Jan. 28, 1999) (on file
with the author).
5. FRE 413(a) provides: "In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of
an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another of-
fense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing
on any matter to which it is relevant." FED. R. EvID. 413(a). FRE 414 uses similar
language, focusing upon child molestation cases. See FED. R. EVID. 414; see also FED.
R. EvID. 415 (civil cases). Although FRE 413 and 414 do not refer explicitly to pro-
pensity, as does the proposed CPL section 60.41, the legislative history makes clear
that Congress intended for FRE 413 and 414 to allow criminal propensity evidence.
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would upset almost a century of jurisprudence that exists in New
York State under the Molineux rule.6 This rule, which "forms part
of the law of evidence throughout the nation,"7 holds that the pros-
ecution may not introduce evidence of prior crimes solely to
demonstrate a defendant's propensity to commit crime,8 or to bol-
ster the credibility of a witness.9 This article considers a question
that surely will arise if the New York Legislature passes the Act:
whether the Molineux rule, precluding criminal propensity evi-
dence, finds its roots in the Due Process Clause of either the
United States or New York State Constitution. 10
Part I of this article recites the basic principles of the Molineux
rule. Part II reviews the U.S. Supreme Court and New York State
Court of Appeals authorities that suggest a constitutional basis to
See United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1491 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600,
604 (2d Cir. 1997). See also Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, Are You Going
to Arraign His Whole Life?: How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process
Clause, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 5-9 (1996) (reviewing the legislative history of FRE
413-415); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 413-415: Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence
Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment off on the Right Foot, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285 (1995) (analyzing policy issues underlying FRE 413-415).
6. See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
7. RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 4-501, at 175
(11th ed. 1995).
8. See Molineux, 61 N.E. at 293-94; People v. Till, 661 N.E.2d 153, 154 (N.Y.
1995); People v. Alvino, 519 N.E.2d 812, 812-13 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Ventimiglia,
420 N.E.2d 59, 62 (N.Y. 1981); People v. Santarelli, 401 N.E.2d 199, 203 (N.Y. 1980);
People v. Allweiss, 396 N.E.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. 1979); People v. Fiore, 312 N.E.2d 174,
176 (N.Y. 1974); People v. Bagarozy, 522 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (App. Div. 1987).
9. See People v. Vargas, 666 N.E.2d 1357, 1358 (N.Y. 1996); People v. Hudy, 535
N.E.2d 250, 258-59 (N.Y. 1998); People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915, 917-19 (N.Y. 1987);
People v. McKinney, 247 N.E.2d 244, 246 (N.Y. 1969); People v. Ortiz, 554 N.Y.S.2d
107, 109 (App. Div. 1990); People v. Harris, 541 N.Y.S.2d 593, 595 (App. Div. 1989).
10. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1998). CPL sec-
tion 60.41 may raise other constitutional issues that this article will not address. For
example, this provision may raise Equal Protection claims for its disparate treatment
of sex offense defendants over all other classes of defendants. But see United States v.
Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427,
1433-34 (10th Cir. 1998). The Act further would permit the introduction of criminal
propensity evidence, without regard to whether the defendant was actually convicted
for this conduct. This provision indicates that criminal propensity evidence would
remain admissible despite a disposition favorable to the defendant, such as a dismissal
on the merits or an acquittal. Although such a provision would not violate federal
constitutional law, it may not survive scrutiny under the New York State Constitution.
See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 347-55 (1990). Cf. People v. Acevedo, 508
N.E.2d 665, 669-70 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Santiago, 204 N.E.2d 197, 198 (N.Y. 1964);
People v. Correal, 559 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007-08 (App. Div. 1990); cf. also People v.
Bouton, 405 N.E.2d 699, 704 (1980); People v. Colas, 619 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706-08 (App.
Div. 1994).
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the ban on criminal propensity evidence. Part III addresses two
recent opinions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, uphold-
ing FRE 413 and 414 as facially constitutional. Part IV considers
intermediate appellate court opinions from the State of California,
upholding section 1108 of the California Evidence Code ("CEC"),
which California modeled upon FRE 413 and 414. Part V suggests
several questions that nonetheless remain regarding the constitu-
tionality of CPL section 60.41, particularly under New York State
precedents, focusing upon: (1) the ambiguous historical practice of
admitting propensity-type evidence in sexual assault prosecutions;
(2) the impact of criminal propensity evidence upon the presump-
tion of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof, despite its
argued probative value; (3) the evidentiary disparity that may exist
between application of the proposed CPL section 60.41 and the
Rape Shield Act; and (4) the questionable ability of courts to "bal-
ance" the prejudice of true criminal propensity evidence. The arti-
cle concludes with strong reservations about the constitutionality
of the proposed CPL section 60.41, especially under the traditions
and laws of New York State.
I. THE MOLINEUX RULE AND CRIMINAL
PROPENSITY EVIDENCE
The Molineux rule assumed its title in 1901 from the seminal case
of People v. Molineux,"a in which the New York State Court of Ap-
peals articulated this well-known rule of evidence: "The general
rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is that the state cannot
prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment
.. as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged."'
2
The Molineux rule acknowledges that evidence of a defendant's
prior crimes has the unfair potential of suggesting his or her crimi-
nal propensity to commit the charged crime.' 3 Prior crimes evi-
dence further implicates the more general rule of evidence that a
defendant's character never constitutes an issue, unless the defend-
ant "opens the door" to such evidence.' 4 The Molineux rule thus
precludes prior crimes evidence, unless the evidence tends to prove
a material fact other than criminal propensity, such as identity, in-
11. 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
12. Id. at 293.
13. See id. at 294-95, 302.
14. See People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930); cf. People v. Kuss, 299
N.E.2d 249, 252 (N.Y. 1973).
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tent, motive, 'or common scheme or plan. 5 The trial court also
must determine that the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its potential for prejudice. 16
New York state courts consistently have reaffirmed this rule of
evidence. 17 Federal courts also follow this rule,'8 along with virtu-
ally every other United States jurisdiction. Congress codified the
rule at the federal level under FRE 40419 and 403.20
II. DUE PROCESS AND THE BAN ON CRIMINAL
PROPENSITY EVIDENCE
The admission of prior crimes evidence solely to demonstrate a
defendant's criminal propensity, and for no other evidentiary pur-
pose, undoubtedly prejudices a defendant. Nevertheless, "[n]ot all
admissions of [prejudicial] evidence are errors of constitutional di-
mension. The introduction of improper evidence against a defend-
ant does not amount to a violation of due process unless the
evidence 'is o extremely unfair that its admission violates funda-
15. See Molineux, 61 N.E. at 294. See generally FARRELL, supra note 7, § 4-503 to
4-516, at 179-94.
16. See People v. Alvino, 519 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Ely, 503
N.E.2d 88, 94 (N.Y. 1986); FARRELL, supra note 7, § 4-502, at 177-78.
17. See People v. Cook, 710 N.E.2d 654, 654-55 (N.Y. 1999); People v. Blair, 688
N.E.2d 503, 503-4 (N.Y. 1997); People v. Till, 661 N.E.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. 1995); People
v. Ingram, 522 N.E.2d 439, 441 (N.Y. 1988); Alvino, 519 N.E.2d at 812-13; Ely, 503
N.E.2d at 93-94; People v. Ventimiglia, 420 N.E.2d 59, 62 (N.Y. 1981); People v.
Allweiss, 396 N.E.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. 1979); People v. Underwood, 680 N.Y.S.2d 555,
556 (App. Div. 1998); People v. Steinberg, 573 N.Y.S.2d 965, 979 (App. Div. 1991);
People v. Correal, 559 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009-10 (App. Div. 1990).
18. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68-75 (1991); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554, 562-69 (1967); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227-28 & n.9 (1941); United
States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Lovely v. United States,
169 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1948) (quoting from "the leading opinion in the celebrated
Molineux case").
19. FRE 404 reads in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EvID. 404.
20. FRE 403 reads in pertinent part: "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID.
403.
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mental conceptions of justice.' ,,21 The state "is free to regulate the
procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of
policy and fairness, unless in so doing it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental."'22
"The primary guide in determining whether the principle in
question is fundamental is... historical practice. '23 Moreover, axi-
omatically, any constitutional right that a criminal defendant pos-
sesses by application of the Fourteenth Amendment ranks as
"fundamental."'24 Thus, any state rule of evidence or trial proce-
dure that unduly infringes upon an established constitutional right
violates due process because "'substantive due process' prevents
the government from engaging in conduct that... interferes with
rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' ,25
21. Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)); accord Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72-73; Spencer,
385 U.S. at 564.
22. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
23. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996). See also Medina v. California,
505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (noting that "[h]istorical practice is probative of whether a
procedural rule can be characterized as fundamental"); Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 528 (1884) (commenting that "however exceptional it may be as tested by
definitions and principles of ordinary procedure, nevertheless, this, in substance, has
been immemorially the actual law of the land, and therefore, is due process of law").
24. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (finding that the protections
of the Bill of Rights apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as part
of due process, when "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty").
25. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at
325). Cf. also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1995) (finding that "the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of 'due process of law' ... include[s] a substan-
tive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' lib-
erty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest"). See e.g., Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985) (holding that evidentiary presumption violates due process if
it relieves the prosecution of its burden of proof on any essential element); Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (finding that for a prosecutor to comment upon a
defendant's post-Miranda silence is "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due
process"); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (noting that a trial of an incom-
petent defendant violates due process because an incompetent defendant cannot as-
sist in his or her own defense); Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 707-14 (2d Cir.
1997) (determining that the prosecutor's "generic" commentary on the defendant's
advantageous presence in courtroom before testifying violates due process by infring-
ing upon the defendant's rights of confrontation and to testify); People v. Shapiro, 409
N.E.2d 897, 904-06 (N.Y. 1980) (finding that a prosecutor violates due process by
granting immunity to state's witnesses but withholding immunity from a defendant's
exculpatory witnesses and intimidating them from testifying for fear of perjury
charges); People v. Conyers, 400 N.E.2d 342, 346-49 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that a pros-
ecutor violates due process by commenting on a defendant's post-arrest silence, even
without Miranda warnings, because it undermines the right against self-incrimina-
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Some circumstances certainly exist where the admission of crimi-
nal propensity evidence could prejudice a defendant so grossly as
to violate due process, as applied under the facts of a particular
case. If, however, "no set of circumstances exist under which the
Act would be valid, '26 the law in question violates due process on
its face.27 The question thus arises as to whether a statute, such as
CPL section 60.41, would violate a defendant's due process rights
by permitting criminal propensity evidence.
A. The U.S. Supreme Court and Criminal Propensity Evidence
The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether
criminal propensity evidence proves so fundamentally unfair as to
violate due process.21 In addressing the general policy of preclud-
ing prior crimes evidence, however, Supreme Court Justices have
written of criminal propensity evidence in extremely strong and, on
occasion, constitutional terms. These discussions do not just reveal
a long-standing tradition of criminal propensity evidence preclu-
sion, but also a concern that this evidence undermines the constitu-
tionally-mandated presumption of innocence 29 and requirement
that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.30
For example, as long ago as 1892 in Boyd v. United States,31 the
Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction because the trial
court admitted evidence of uncharged robberies that the defend-
ants allegedly committed prior to the charged murder.32 While the
Court noted the relevance of prior crimes evidence in some cases,33
the Court concluded:
Those robberies may have been committed by the defendants in
March, and yet they may have been innocent of the murder of
Dansby in April. Proof of them only tended to prejudice the
defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from the
real issue, and to produce the impression that they were
wretches whose lives were of no value to the community, and
tion); People v. Roman, 324 N.E.2d 885, 886 (N.Y. 1975) (commenting on how a trial
court violates due process by forcing a defendant unnecessarily to appear at trial in
prison garb, because such a presentation undermines the presumption of innocence).
26. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
27. See id.
28. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991).
29. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
30. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also People v. Kohl, 527 N.E.2d
1182, 1185 (N.Y. 1988).
31. 142 U.S. 450 (1892).
32. See id. at 454.
33. See id.
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who were not entitled to the full benefit of the rules -prescribed
by law for the trial of human beings charged with crime ...
However depraved in character, and however full of crime their
past lives may have been, the defendants were entitled to be tried
upon competent evidence, and only for the offense charged.34
In 1948, the Supreme Court again discussed the policy of pre-
cluding prior crimes and bad character evidence to prove a defend-
ant's propensity to commit a charged crime. Specifically, in
Michelson v. United States,35 the Court noted:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unani-
mously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any
kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a
probability of his guilt .... The state may not show defendant's
prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name
among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be
persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the
crime.... [I]t is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge.36
One year after Michelson, the Supreme Court in Brinegar v.
United States37 explained why relevant evidence of prior crimes by
a defendant, admissible at a pre-trial probable cause hearing, nev-
ertheless may prove inadmissible on the question of guilt at trial.
This discussion by the Supreme Court explicitly incorporates fun-
damental concepts of due process:
Much evidence of real and substantial probative value goes out
on considerations irrelevant to its probative weight but relevant
to possible misunderstanding or misuse by the jury.... Guilt in
a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and
by evidence confined to that which long experience in the com-
mon-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution,
has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that stan-
dard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system,
developed to safeguard [people] from dubious and unjust con-
victions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
38
34. Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
35. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
36. Id. at 475-76 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also id. at 472-75 nn.3-
6 (citing theories on the admission of character evidence of prior bad acts).
37. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
38. Id. at 173-74.
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In the 1967 decision in Spencer v. Texas,39 then-Chief Justice Earl
Warren, with Justice Abe Fortas, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, placed the policy of precluding criminal propensity evi-
dence squarely in constitutional terms:
[O]ur decisions.., as well as decisions by courts of appeals and
of state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes introduced
for no purpose other than to show criminal disposition would vi-
olate the Due Process Clause. Evidence of prior convictions has
been forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of inno-
cence of the crime currently charged. A jury might punish an
accused for being guilty of a previous offense, or feel that incar-
ceration is justified because the accused is a "bad man," without
regard to his guilt of the crime currently charged .... Recogni-
tion of the prejudicial effect of prior-convictions evidence has tra-
ditionally been related to the requirement of our criminal law that
the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a
specific criminal act.... Because of the possibility that the gen-
erality of the jury's verdict might mask a finding of guilt based
on an accused's past crimes or unsavory reputation, state and
federal courts have consistently refused to admit evidence of
past crimes except in circumstances where it tends to prove
something other than general criminal disposition.4"
In the 1991 opinion of Estelle v. McGuire,4' two current Supreme
Court Justices, Sandra Day O'Connor, with John Paul Stevens con-
curring in part and dissenting in part, reiterated the concerns
presented in Spencer by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas.42
In Estelle, the Ninth Circuit concluded that admission of evidence
of prior child abuse as criminal propensity evidence in the defend-
ant's trial for murdering his daughter, violated due process.43 Con-
trary to the Ninth Circuit, however, the Supreme Court believed
that the prior abuse evidence demonstrated intent and that the trial
39. 385 U.S. 554 (1967) (upholding convictions under Texas "recidivist" statute,
under which the indictment charged and the trial court admitted the defendants' prior
convictions, though the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider the convictions
on the question of guilt).
40. Id. at 573-75 (Warren, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (empha-
sis added) (citations omitted).
41. 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
42. See id. at 75-80.
43. See McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
The Ninth Circuit has adhered to its position in McGuire that criminal propensity
evidence violates the Due Process Clause. See Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.
1994), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995); McKin-
ney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1993).
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court did not give the jury a propensity instruction.4"4 The majority
of the Supreme Court thus declined to rule "on whether a state law
would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of
'prior crimes' evidence to show propensity to commit a charged
crime."4 5
Justices O'Connor and Stevens agreed with the majority that the
prior abuse evidence demonstrated intent. But these Justices sided
with the Ninth Circuit in its view that the trial court's instructions
allowed the jury to consider the evidence for propensity purposes
in deciding whether the defendant inflicted the fatal injuries.46 Jus-
tices O'Connor and Stevens framed this erroneous use of the prior
abuse evidence in constitutional terms, focusing upon the principle
that "prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a
jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden
of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential ele-
ment of a crime. '47 These two Justices thus analogized criminal
propensity evidence to a mandatory evidentiary presumption,
which "may have relieved the State of its burden of proving the
identity of [the] murderer beyond a reasonable doubt[.]"48
The Supreme Court addressed the impropriety of criminal pro-
pensity evidence as recently as 1997, in Old Chief v. United States.49
In Old Chief, the Court discussed the concept of "unfair prejudice"
under FRE 403.50 The Court opined that "[s]uch improper
grounds certainly include... generalizing a defendant's earlier bad
act into bad character and taking that as raising the odds that he
did the later bad act now charged (or, worse, as calling for preven-
tive conviction even if he should happen to be innocent momenta-
rily)."'5 1 The Court quoted extensively from Michelson v. United
States52 in support of this proposition,53 and noted that "Rule of
Evidence 404(b) reflects this common-law tradition by addressing
44. See McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68-75.
45. Id. at 75 n.5.
46. See id. at 76-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 78 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985)) (citing Sand-
strom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-24 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
210, 215 (1977)).
48. Id. at 76.
49. 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (holding that a district court abuses its discretion under
FRE 403 if it spurns a defendant's offer to concede prior conviction and instead ad-
mits full record of prior conviction).
50. See id. at 180.
51. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180-81.
52. 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
53. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181.
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propensity reasoning directly.... There is, accordingly, no question
that propensity evidence would be an 'improper basis' for
conviction[.] 54
From this lead by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts simi-
larly have written on the preclusion of criminal propensity evi-
dence in strong, tradition-laden terms. For example, in the oft-
cited 1948 opinion in Lovely v. United States,5" the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted:
The rule which.., forbids the introduction of evidence of other
offenses having no reasonable tendency to prove the crime
charged, except in so far as they may establish a criminal ten-
dency on the part of the accused, is not a mere technical rule of
law. It arises out of the fundamental demand for justice and fair-
ness which lies at the basis of our jurisprudence.56
Other federal courts have concluded that "[a] concomitant of the
presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what
he did, not for who he is."'57
This body of federal jurisprudence consequently establishes a
long-standing "common law tradition,"58 by the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts, precluding the use of prior crimes
evidence solely to demonstrate a defendant's criminal propensity.
This common law tradition reflects, if not explicitly relies upon, the
established constitutional principles that the prosecution must
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that a defendant is pre-
sumed innocent.
54. Id. at 181-82 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. EvID. 404(b)).
55. 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948) (holding that in a prosecution of a rape case where
the defendant admitted intercourse, evidence of prior rape by defendant was not ad-
missible on question of identity).
56. Id. at 389 (emphasis added); cf United States v. Simon, 842 F.2d 552, 556 (1st
Cir. 1988) (Torruella, J., concurring) (referring to "the prohibition against the intro-
duction of 'evidence of other crimes ... to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith,' mandated by FED. R. EVID. 404(b), as well as
due process" (emphasis added) (quoting Lovely, 169 F.2d at 389)).
57. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added);
cf. Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995); McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1993).
58. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181-82; cf Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 41-44
(1996); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 528 (1884).
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B. The New York Court of Appeals and the Molineux Rule
The New York State Court of Appeals similarly has rooted the
prohibition of criminal propensity evidence in a long-standing com-
mon law tradition that conjures the same constitutional guarantees
of due process. In 1901, the court of appeals explained the ration-
ale for this rule in unambiguous constitutional terms in People v.
Molineux:59
This rule, so universally recognized and so firmly established in
all English-speaking lands, is rooted in that jealous regard for
the liberty of the individual which has distinguished our juris-
prudence from all others, at least from the birth of Magna Carta.
It is the product of the same humane and enlightened public
spirit which, speaking through our common law, has decreed
that every person charged with the commission of a crime shall
be protected by the presumption of innocence until he has been
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.6"
The court thus foreshadowed Justices O'Connor and Stevens' con-
cerns in Estelle, that "'[i]t is not proper to raise a presumption of
guilt on the ground that having committed one crime, the depravity
it exhibits makes it likely he would commit another.'"61
In 1930, the court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge Benjamin
Cardozo, further acknowledged the significance and tradition of
the rule precluding criminal propensity evidence in New York
jurisprudence:
If a murderous propensity may be proved against a defendant as
one of the tokens of his guilt, a rule of criminal evidence, long
believed to be of fundamental importance for the protection of
the innocent, must be first declared away. Fundamental hitherto
has been the rule that character is never an issue in a criminal
prosecution unless the defendant chooses to make it one.62
Since Molineux, the court of appeals has repeated its concern
that criminal propensity evidence, by generating presumptions of
guilt, will prompt a conviction when a jury otherwise might enter-
tain a reasonable doubt of a defendant's actual guilt. For instance,
59. 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901) (reversing the defendant's first degree murder convic-
tion because the admission of evidence at trial that the defendant committed a previ-
ous murder by poisoning was not relevant to prove that the defendant committed the
present crime).
60. Id. at 293-94 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 294 (emphasis added) (quoting Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. 60, 65
(1872)).
62. People v. Zackowitz, 174 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930) (emphasis added).
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in 1981 in People v. Ventimiglia,63 the court explained that "[t]he
rule excluding evidence of uncharged crimes . . .is intended to
eliminate the danger that a jury may convict to punish the person
portrayed by the evidence before them even though not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the crime of which he is
charged. "64
The lower New York courts have expressed the same concerns as
the court of appeals about the impact of criminal propensity evi-
dence upon the prosecution's burden of proof and the defendant's
presumption of innocence. In 1994, for example, the First Depart-
ment noted in People v. Colas65 that "[E]vidence of uncharged
crimes is excluded because jurors will tend to 'believe in the guilt
of an accused person when it is known or suspected that he has
previously committed a similar crime' . . . and so tend to convict
upon lesser proof than required.'66
In People v. Celestino,67 the First Department, again in 1994, re-
ferred to the "fundamental principal [sic] that evidence of un-
charged crimes should not be admitted for the sole purpose of
demonstrating that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime charged. "68 The court explained the rationale for this princi-
63. 420 N.E.2d 59 (N.Y. 1981) (weighing the probative value of defendants' state-
ments as to pre-meditation of murder and plan of conspiracy, against prejudice result-
ing from implication that defendants committed prior murders).
64. Id. at 62 (emphasis added); see also People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y.
1987) (holding that prior crime evidence "is usually excluded because it may (1) re-
quire defendant to meet a charge of which he had no notice; (2) raise collateral issues
and direct the attention of the jury away from the crime charged; or (3) result in the
proof of the prior offenses being taken by the jury as justifying a condemnation of the
defendant irrespective of his guilt of the offenses charged"); People v. Ely, 503 N.E.2d
88, 94 (N.Y. 1986) (quoting Ventimiglia, 420 N.E.2d at 62); People v. Robinson, 503
N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1986) (finding that "[t]he Molineux rule excludes evidence of
uncharged crimes when the danger that the jury may, on the basis of such testimony,
convict, even though not convinced of defendant's guilt of the crime charged beyond
a reasonable doubt, is not overcome by the probative value of the prior crime evi-
dence in relation to the crime now charged"); People v. Allweiss, 396 N.E.2d 735, 738
(N.Y. 1998) (commenting that "[tihe rule.., is meant to eliminate the risk that a jury,
not fully convinced of the defendant's guilt of the crime charged may, nevertheless,
find against him because his conduct generally merits punishment"); cf. People v. Fi-
ore, 312 N.E.2d 174, 176-77 (N.Y. 1974); People v. Condon, 257 N.E. 2d 615 at 616-
17(1970).
65. 619 N.Y.S.2d 702 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that cumulative effect of improper
evidence along with weakness of the identification required a new trial).
66. Id. at 705 (emphasis added) (quoting Molineux, 61 N.E. at 302).
67. 615 N.Y.S.2d 346 (App. Div. 1994) (finding that the trial court should not have
admitted evidence of uncharged crimes without weighing probative value against po-
tential for prejudice).
68. Id. at 349.
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pie, stating that the "risk is that a jury, not convinced of defend-
ant's guilt, may nevertheless find against him because his conduct
generally merits punishment or because of his bad character. 69
Over virtually the same century of jurisprudence, therefore, the
New York Court of Appeals and lower courts have developed a
common law tradition precluding the use of prior crimes evidence
to demonstrate criminal propensity. This tradition echoes, if not
exceeds, the U.S. Supreme Court's concerns about the effect that
criminal propensity evidence has upon the prosecution's constitu-
tionally-mandated burden of proof and the defendant's constitu-
tional entitlement to a presumption of innocence.
HI. FEDERAL COURTS UPHOLD FRE 413 AND 414
After the passage of FRE 41370 and 41471 in 1994, the lower fed-
eral courts began to consider and admit criminal propensity evi-
dence in sexual assault prosecutions. So far, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, which includes New York State in its jurisdic-
tion, has not ruled upon the constitutionality of FRE 413 or 414 in
sexual assault prosecutions. In 1998, however, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals adjudged the facial constitutionality of both FRE
413 and 414, in the cases of United States v. Enjady7z and United
States v. Castillo.73
A. United States v. Enjady and FRE 413
In United States v. Enjady, the Tenth Circuit considered, inter
alia, a facial due process challenge to FRE 413. In Enjady, the
defendant and the complainant spent the late morning and after-
noon drinking with other people at the complainant's house. 4
When the complainant passed out or fell asleep, everyone left.75
The defendant returned, however, and the complainant alleged
that she awoke to find the defendant raping her.76 The defendant
initially denied having sex with the complainant to the arresting
69. Id.
70. See supra note 5.
71. See id.
72. 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998).
73. 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998).
74. See Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1429.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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detective.77 After DNA testing linked the defendant to rape kit
evidence, however, the defendant asserted a consent defense.78
During the trial, pursuant to FRE 413, the court permitted an-
other woman to testify that the defendant raped her two years ear-
lier, "to show propensity and to rebut defendant's statement to [the
arresting detective]" that he "'wouldn't ever do something like this
to anyone.' "7 As a result, the jury convicted the defendant of ag-
gravated sexual abuse.8°
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "Rule 413 raises a serious
constitutional due process issue, ' 81 and identified three due pro-
cess arguments against criminal propensity evidence: (1) that the
prohibition of propensity evidence has existed for so long that it
enjoys "settled usage" ;82 (2) that propensity evidence undermines
the prosecution's burden of proof by creating a presumption of
guilt;83 and (3) that propensity evidence erodes the presumption of
innocence by licensing the fact-finder to punish a defendant's past
acts.84 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit upheld FRE 413 as
constitutional.
In upholding FRE 413, the Tenth Circuit relied on two main fac-
tors. First, the court discussed that when passing FRE 413 Con-
gress intended to minimize the "'unresolvable swearing
matches' ' '85 that occur in many sexual assault cases, particularly
when the defendant proceeds with a consent defense. 6 Indeed, by
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1429 (10th Cir. 1998).
81. Id. at 1430.
82. Id. at 1432 (citing Hurtado v. United States, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884). See also
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 41-44 (1996) (plurality opinion) (using historical
practice as the primary factor in determining whether due process guarantees require
admission of certain evidence).
83. See id. at 1432 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 78 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
84. See id. (citing M. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Fron-
tier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 77-82 (1995)).
85. Id. at 1431 (quoting 140 CONG. REC. S129901-01, S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20,
1994) (statement of Sen. Dole); 140 CONG. REC. H8968-01, H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21,
1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)); see also Paul G. Cassell & Evan S. Strassberg,
Evidence of Repeated Acts of Rape and Child Molestation: Reforming Utah Law to
Permit the Propensity Inference, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 145, 165-167 (1998); David J.
Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases,
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 20-21 (1994).
86. Cf Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence:
Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 275-
77 (1995) (describing the "intrusive and embarrassing" ordeal a complainant may ex-
perience when a defendant presents a consent defense).
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analogizing criminal propensity evidence to, the use of prior crimes
evidence to impeach a defendant's testimony, the court wrote that
"[lt is no great stretch" to suggest that use of the evidence to "bol-
ster[ ] the credibility of the victim" amounts to "a purpose for the
evidence other than propensity. "87 The court thus deferred to
Congress' judgment in identifying the unique probative value of
sexual assault propensity evidence, and the fact that "Congress has
the ultimate power over enactment of [evidentiary] rules."88 Sec-
ond, the court relied upon the safeguards that FRE 403 provides in
the application of FRE 413, without which "we would hold the rule
unconstitutional,' '8 9 along with the notice requirement under FRE
413(b), which "protects against surprise and allows the defendant
to investigate and prepare cross-examination." 9°
B. United States v. Castillo and FRE 414
Shortly after Enjady, the Tenth Circuit found FRE 414 facially
constitutional in United States v. Castillo.91 In Castillo, the defend-
ant faced four counts of sexual abuse concerning two of his five
daughters. 92 At trial, under FRE 414, the court permitted one
daughter to testify to one uncharged act of sexual abuse, and the
other daughter to testify to two uncharged acts of sexual abuse.93
The jury convicted the defendant of four counts of sexual abuse
and four counts of sexual abuse of a minor.94
The court in Castillo acknowledged that Supreme Court and
even Tenth Circuit precedent suggest a constitutional dimension to
87. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433.
88. Id. at 1432.
89. Id. at 1433. The Tenth Circuit noted that:
Rule 403 balancing in the sexual assault context requires the court to con-
sider: "1) how clearly the prior act has been proved; 2) how probative the
evidence is of the material fact it is admitted to prove; 3) how seriously dis-
puted the material fact is; and 4) whether the government can avail itself of
any less prejudicial evidence. When analyzing the probative dangers, a court
considers: 1) how likely is it such evidence will contribute to an improperly-
based jury verdict; 2) the extent to which such evidence will distract the jury
from the central issues of the trial; and 3) how time consuming it will be to
prove the prior conduct."
Id. (quoting Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Fron-
tier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 57, 59 n.16 (1995)).
90. Id.
91. 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998).
92. See id. at 878.
93. See id. at 878-79.
94. See id. at 878.
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the ban on criminal propensity evidence. 95 The court also noted
that "[t]he ban on propensity evidence dates back to English cases
of the 17th century," and "courts in the United States have en-
forced the ban throughout our nation's history. ' 96 The court thus
"assume[d] for purposes of this case, without deciding the matter,
that because of the ban's lineage and significance in our jurispru-
dence, it is a protection that the Due Process Clause guarantees." 97
The Castillo court, however, noted that "the historical record re-
garding evidence of one's sexual character is much more ambigu-
ous."98 Specifically, the court discussed the historical acceptance of
sexual propensity-type evidence under the "lustful disposition"
rule. 99 The "lustful disposition" rule allows evidence of prior sex-
ual misconduct by the defendant in certain sexual assault prosecu-
tions to demonstrate the defendant's sexual "disposition."'' a°
"Many of the cases in this area of the law concern sexual offenses
against children,"'10 1 the court noted, the subject of FRE 414.
The court further opined that the prejudice accompanying the
admission of this criminal propensity evidence is no worse than
that prejudice accompanying prior crimes evidence under its tradi-
tional use, with both chancing that the jury may convict because of
the defendant's past conduct. 0 Finally, as in Enjady, the court
relied upon the procedural protections that exist under FRE 403,
which "should always result in the exclusion of evidence that has
such a prejudicial effect" as to prove fundamentally unfair to a
defendant. 10 3
95. See id. at 880 (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 571 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
173-74 (1949); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); Tucker v.
Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that the improper admission of
evidence of prior crimes "raises a due process issue"); United States v. Biswell, 700
F.2d 1310, 1319 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that the "[i]mproper admission of a prior
crime or conviction, even in the face of other evidence amply supporting the verdict,
constitutes plain error impinging upon the fundamental fairness of the trial itself");
United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 205 (10th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (noting that
"the exclusion of evidence of prior acts 'is not a simple evidentiary [issue], but rather
goes to the fundamental fairness and justice of the trial itself'").
96. Castillo, 140 F.3d at 881.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. For a detailed review of the "lustful disposition" exception, see infra notes
160-210 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 882.
103. See id. at 883.
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Enjady and Castillo thus reserve any constitutional limitations
upon FRE 413 and 414 to a case-by-case analysis because some
"set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid.' 10 4
At least two other federal appellate courts have relied upon the
Tenth Circuit's reasoning to find FRE 413 and 414 constitutional. 10 5
IV. CALIFORNIA COURTS UPHOLD EVIDENCE CEC
SECTION 1108
In 1995, California passed CEC section 1108, which the Califor-
nia Legislature modeled upon FRE 413 and 414.106 CEC section
1108 exempts evidence of prior sexual assaults from the preclusion
of character evidence that exists in California under CEC section
1101, so long as the evidence meets the prejudice-balancing test of
CEC section 352, California's analogue to FRE 403.107 Two of Cal-
ifornia's intermediate courts of appeals have upheld CEC section
1108 against facial due process challenges, in People v. Fitch08 and
People v. Falsetta.10 9
A. People v. Fitch
In People v. Fitch, the defendant and the complainant, who met
at their apartment complex in Sacramento, spent an evening to-
gether, planning to go to a local carnival." 0 After meeting with
one of the complainant's friends, buying and smoking some mari-
juana and buying food at a Taco Bell, the defendant and the com-
plainant stopped their car at a park for the defendant to use the
restroom.1" At the stop, the defendant allegedly became aggres-
104. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1991). See also United States v.
McHorse, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11269, at *9-11 (10th Cir. June 3, 1999); United
States v. Charley, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8711, at *15-19 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 1999).
105. See United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing United
States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Wright, 48
M.J. 896, 899-901 (U.S.A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (addressing MIL. R. EvID. 413);
United States v. Mann, 145 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion), reported
in No. 96-2283, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7459 (10th Cir. Apr. 13, 1998).
106. See People v. Soto, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 605, 613 (Cal. App. 1998).
107. CEC section 1108(a) provides in pertinent part: "In a criminal action in which
the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission
of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the
evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a)
(West 1999).
108. 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753 (Cal. App. 1997).
109. 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 (Cal. App. 1998).
110. 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 755.
111. See id.
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sive with the complainant and raped her.112 Afterwards, the de-
fendant took the complainant home, and "invited her and her
daughter to brunch the next morning.
111
Upon arriving at home, the complainant reported the rape to her
friend, and the complainant's sister called the police. 1 4 DNA test-
ing of semen samples taken from the complainant revealed a high
likelihood of the defendant as the source. 1 5 The defendant origi-
nally told the police, after his arrest, that he did not have sex with
the complainant. 116 At trial, however, the defendant presented a
consent defense. 1 7 Witnesses at trial described the complainant as
looking "happy and not scared" that night." 8 "One witness testi-
fied [the complainant] told her 'I'm going to get mine tonight,'
which she interpreted as meaning [the complainant] intended to
have sex with defendant." 19
The trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence
regarding the defendant's prior conviction for raping another wo-
man in 1990 pursuant to CEC section 1108.120 The jury convicted
the defendant of forcible rape. 2 '
In addressing the defendant's due process challenge to CEC sec-
tion 1108 in Fitch, the California Court of Appeals, like the Tenth
Circuit in Castillo, first asserted that historically, the "ambivalence
about prohibiting character evidence is greatest in sex offense
cases."122 The Fitch court noted further: "Courts have liberally in-
terpreted evidence rules to permit the admission of uncharged sex-
ual misconduct under the rubric of motive, identity and common
plan, or more directly admitted it under an exception known as the
'lustful disposition' rule.' '1 23
The Fitch court thus rejected the defendant's reliance upon the
1993 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in McKinney v.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id.; see also Robert W. Schumacher II, Note, Expanding New York's DNA
Database: The Future of Law Enforcement, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1635 (1999) (dis-
cussing the discriminatory power of DNA evidence).
116. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 755.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 758.
123. Id.
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Rees,124 which tied due process considerations to the historical ban
on character evidence.'25 Instead, the court quoted extensively
from the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Marshall v. Lonberger,12 6
concluding: "'In short, the common law ... implicitly recognized
that any unfairness resulting from admitting prior convictions was
more often than not balanced by its probative value and permitted
the prosecution to introduce such evidence without demanding any
particularly strong justification.' "127
The court thus deferred to "the change in policy" by the
legislature:
Our elected Legislature has determined that the policy consider-
ations favoring the exclusion of evidence of uncharged sexual
offenses are outweighed in criminal sexual offense cases by the
policy considerations favoring the admission of such evidence.
The Legislature has determined the need for this evidence is
"critical" given the serious and secretive nature of sex crimes
and the often resulting credibility contest at trial.12 8
The Fitch court did recognize that "[t]he Due Process Clause re-
quires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the charged crime."'1 29 But, the court concluded:
While the admission of evidence of the uncharged sex offense
may have added to the evidence the jury could consider as to
defendant's guilt, it did not lessen the prosecution's burden to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "The courts specifi-
cally addressing the question of Winship's application to un-
charged misconduct uniformly hold that the admission of
uncharged misconduct does not undermine Winship."' 3 °
Further, just as the Tenth Circuit relied upon FRE 403, the court in
Fitch relied upon CEC section 352's prejudice-balancing provision
to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial in individual cases.
"With this check upon the admission of evidence of uncharged sex
124. 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that admission of other acts evidence,
only probative of defendant's character, deprived defendant of a fair trial and violated
his right to due process).
125. See id. at 1385-86; see also Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758.
126. 459 U.S. 422 (1983) (upholding trial court's limiting instruction regarding the
jury's consideration of defendant's prior conviction).
127. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758 (quoting Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 438 n.6).
128. Id. at 759 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Cf United States v. Enjady,
134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (characterizing the contests as "unresolvable
swearing matches").
129. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
130. Id. at 759-60 (quoting EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, UNCHARGED MISCONDUcT
EVIDENCE § 10.11, at 21 (1986) (citation omitted)).
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offenses in prosecutions for sex crimes, we find that CEC section
1108 does not violate the Due Process Clause.' '1 31
B. People v. Falsetta
In People v. Falsetta,132 the defendant allegedly picked up the six-
teen year-old complainant in his car. 33 The defendant then alleg-
edly drove with the complainant, proclaiming, "We're going on a
date."'13 4 The defendant eventually pulled into a darkened parking
lot and attacked the complainant in his car. 13 5 At one point, the
defendant allegedly placed his penis near the complainant's mouth,
ordering her to "Suck it."'1 36 The complainant instead bit the pe-
nis.137 The complainant next used a ruse to convince the defendant
to drive her to a gas station, where the complainant told a cus-
tomer, "some guy tried to rape me.' '1 38
At the police station later that night, the complainant identified
someone other than the defendant from photographs.139 The po-
lice exonerated that person, however, in part because he had no
injury to his penis.'40 Several weeks later, the defendant was ar-
rested for a parole violation.14 The police placed the defendant in
a lineup because his residence and car matched information that
the complainant provided, and because he had what appeared to
constitute a small injury on his penis. 142 The complainant identi-
fied the defendant in the lineup, and also identified his car.143
At trial, the defendant called the gas station attendant, who testi-
fied that he overheard the complainant say to the customer, "'my
boyfriend beat me up, it's the third time it's happened."" '  The
prosecution presented rebuttal testimony, 4 and the trial court also
permitted the prosecution to introduce in its direct case the de-
fendant's two prior convictions for rapes of strangers, under CEC
131. Id. at 760.
132. 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
133. See id. at 235.
134. Id. at 236.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 237.
145. See id.
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section 1108.146 The jury convicted the defendant of several
counts, including forcible oral copulation. 147
The Falsetta court similarly rejected the defendant's argument
that "section 1108 violates due process because the admission of
prior bad acts evidence to show propensity offends a fundamental,
historical principle of justice."'14 8 The court noted that in Fitch,
"[t]he Third Appellate District ... examined this very argument
and disagreed."'14 9 Rather, the Court found, "[a]t least 29 states
and the District of Columbia 'use a special exception to the charac-
ter evidence rule just for sex offenders called the 'lustful disposi-
tion' rule.' "150
The Falsetta court thus also rejected the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' analysis in McKinney, because McKinney "failed to rec-
ognize that most states now permit the admission of uncharged
sexual misconduct evidence in sex crime prosecutions in order to
prove 'lustful disposition.' "51 Accordingly, the court found "un-
persuasive [the defendant's] historical argument that courts have
traditionally barred evidence of prior acts of sexual misconduct in a
sex offense case to show disposition.' '15 2
Moreover, the Falsetta court noted, "[n]either the Supreme
Court nor any California court has held that this policy of exclud-
ing criminal propensity evidence is based upon the due process
clause. . . . We presume that the Legislature was aware of prior
judicial decisions holding that propensity evidence was inadmissi-
ble, and enacted section 1108 intending to change the law.' '1 53
Consequently, the Court refused "to examine the correctness of
the Legislature's policy decisions underlying section 1108 and its
effect on the section 352 balancing test. '1 54
146. See id. at 237-38.
147. See id. at 235.
148. Id. at 238.
149. Id. (citing People v. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753 (1997)).
150. Falsetta, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 238 (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 238 n.4 (analyzing McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993)).
152. Id. at 238.
153. Id. at 239 & n.5 (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 240. Subsequent to the completion of this article, the California
Supreme Court filed its opinion in Falsetta, upholding CEC section 1108 as facially
constitutional. See People v. Falsetta, No. S071521, 1999 WL 983921 (Nov. 1, 1999).
In upholding CEC section 1108, the California Supreme Court found it "unclear
whether the rule against 'propensity' evidence in sex offense cases should be deemed a
fundamental historical principle of justice." Id. at *11 (emphasis in original). The
court nevertheless concluded that "even if the rule were deemed fundamental from a
historical perspective, we would nonetheless uphold section 1108 if it did not unduly
'offend' those fundamental due process principles." Id. The court noted the circum-
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Several California courts of appeals have cited to Fitch and Fal-
setta to uphold CEC section 1108 against facial due process chal-
lenges. 55 California courts of appeals also have relied upon the
reasoning in Fitch and Falsetta to uphold CEC section 1109, which
permits criminal propensity evidence in domestic violence prosecu-
tions.156 Fitch and Falsetta, therefore, similarly to Enjady and Cas-
tillo, leave any due process questions under CEC section 1108 to a
case-by-case, as-applied analysis. 57
V. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS REMAIN FOR CPL
SECTION 60.41
While not binding in New York State, Enjady, Castillo, Fitch and
Falsetta do offer persuasive authority on the facial constitutionality
stantial relevance of prior convictions for sex offenses in sex offense prosecutions, and
opined that CEC section 1108 does not create an unfair burden to defend against
uncharged offences, does not interfere unduly with judicial efficiency and, under CEC
section 352, "guards against undue prejudice arising from the admission of the de-
fendant's other offenses." Id. at *8. The court also found that CEC section 1108 does
not lessen the prosecution's burden of proof or undermine the defendant's presump-
tion of innocence. Rather, the court adopted the view expressed in Fitch that "[w]hile
the admission of evidence of the uncharged sex offense may have added to the evi-
dence the jury could consider as to the defendant's guilt, it did not lessen the prosecu-
tion's burden to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at *11 (quoting Fitch,
63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753). Therefore, the court resolved, "in light of the substantial
protections afforded to defendants in all cases to which section 1108 applies, we see
no undue fairness in its limited exception to the historical rule against propensity
evidence." Id. at *7.
Justice Mosk, however, concurred "[w]ith reluctance." Id. at *17 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring). Justice Mosk did find that "[a]lthough evidence of prior sexual offenses has
traditionally been excluded under California law to show propensity, there appears to
be no constitutional barrier to its admission." Id. at *16. But, Justice Mosk
continued,
I write separately because I am concerned that the majority leave open
troubling questions .... I am concerned that, under the majority's analysis,
the "careful weighing process" under Evidence Code section 352 would ap-
pear to exclude, in every case, the long-standing principle that use of prior
offenses to show "propensity" may itself be prejudicial.
Id. Justice Mosk thus concurred solely "under the present limited circumstances," for
"there are too many unanswered questions for me to concur with the reasoning of the
majority opinion." Id. at *17.
155. See People v. Van Winkle, No. F030661, 1999 WL 744028 (Cal. App. Sept. 24,
1999); People v. Davis, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (Ct. App. 1999); People v. Ritson, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 698, 707 (Ct. App. 1998).
156. See People v. Acosta, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370 (Ct. App. 1999); People v. Hoover,
75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 866-9 (Ct. App. 1998).
157. See, e.g., Davis, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632; People v. Soto, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 605,
613 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing the relationship between CEC section 1108 and FRE
413 and 414, and the proper application of CEC section 352 to cases under CEC
section 1108).
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of the proposed CPL section 60.41. The Tenth Circuit and the Cali-
fornia state courts' opinions on this subject nevertheless fail to an-
swer or even address many questions regarding the constitutional
propriety of criminal propensity evidence in sexual assault prosecu-
tions, particularly under New York State court of appeals and
lower court precedents. And, "where there is a conflict between
the decisional law of the Court of Appeals and that of an interme-
diate Federal appellate court on a constitutional issue, the ruling of
the state Court of Appeals should be followed.'
'1 58
A. Historical Practice and the "Lustful Disposition" Exception
Castillo and the California opinions attempt to differentiate sex-
ual assault propensity evidence from the common law preclusion of
criminal propensity evidence by focusing on the distinct historical
status that sexual assault propensity evidence has occupied, partic-
ularly under the "lustful disposition" rule. 15
9
The "lustful disposition" rule, which many United States jurisdic-
tions recognize under various titles, 160 generally provides "that in
prosecutions for adultery, seduction, statutory rape upon one
under the age of consent and incest, acts of sexual intercourse be-
tween the parties prior to the offense charged in the indictment
may be given in evidence."'' This exception permits such other-
wise inadmissible prior crimes evidence "to show a lewd or adulter-
ous disposition between the parties.'
' 62
In recognizing the "lustful disposition" exception, some courts
have applied it in broad fashion to demonstrate a defendant's gen-
eral sexual "disposition." For example, in Caldwell v. State,63 the
Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the defendant's conviction for
murder, rape and child molestation. Relying upon the lustful dis-
158. People v. Lugo, 650 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103 (App. Div. 1996); People v. Joseph, 445
N.Y.S.2d 2, 2 (App. Div. 1981) (stating that "the Court did fairly recognize that a
difference existed between the decisional law of the highest Court of this state and
that of an intermediate federal appellate court.... In the absence of a ruling from the
United States Supreme Court on the same issue, the Court below should have ad-
hered to the rulings of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York"); see also
People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1337-38 (1992).
159. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881; Falsetta, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
238; People v. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 757-60 (Ct. App. 1997).
160. See United States v. Wright, 48 M.J. 896, 900 (U.S.A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998)
(referring to "lustful disposition," "sexual proclivity" and "depraved sexual instinct"
exceptions).
161. People v. Thompson, 106 N.E. 78, 78 (1914).
162. Id. at 79.
163. 436 S.E.2d 488 (Ga. 1993).
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position" exception, the court upheld the admission of four adult
movies that the police recovered, depicting "women dressed as
young girls having sex with various men."'16 The court held:
This evidence was admissible to show appellant's bent of mind
toward the sexual activity with which he was charged and his
lustful disposition. That this evidence may have incidentally put
appellant's character into evidence does not render inadmissible
what is otherwise relevant and material to the issues in this crim-
inal case. 165
Georgia courts continue to follow this broad use of the "lustful
disposition" exception. In a very recent opinion, the Georgia
Court of Appeals in Condra v. State,"6 upheld the admission of
evidence that the defendant, as a youth, engaged in oral sex with
his sister, some twenty years prior to the defendant's trial for child
molestation and aggravated sexual battery of his niece. The court
explained:
In crimes involving sexual offenses, evidence of similar previous
transactions is admissible to show the lustful disposition of the
defendant and to corroborate the victim's testimony. There
need only be evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of
both crimes and sufficient similarity or connection between the
independent crime and the offenses charged. 167
The court found that this exception permitted the twenty year-
old evidence in the defendant's case, as "'[t]he rules regarding the
use of similar transaction evidence are construed most liberally in
cases involving sexual offenses.' "168
Other jurisdictions have mirrored Georgia's liberal application
of the "lustful disposition" exception.169 These applications of this
164. Id. at 492.
165. Id. at 492-93 (citation omitted).
166. No. A99A0134, 1999 WL 314746 (Ga. App. May 20, 1999).
167. Id. at *1 (quoting Gibbins v. State, 495 S.E.2d 46, 50 (Ga. App. 1997)); see also
Ryan v. State, 486 S.E.2d 397, 398 (Ga. App. 1997) (holding that "[fi]n crimes involv-
ing sexual offenses, evidence of similar previous transactions is admissible to show the
lustful disposition of the defendant and to corroborate the victim's testimony").
168. Condra, 1999 WL 314746, at *2 (quoting Nichols v. State, 473 S.E.2d 491, 493
(Ga. App. 1996)).
169. See, e.g., State v. Morey, 722 A.2d 1185, 1189 (R.I. 1999) (citing to "an 'almost
universally recognized' exception to [Rhode Island] Rule 404(b) for the admission of
evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct to show 'lustful disposition or sexual pro-
pensity"'); State v. Tabor, 529 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming that
"[i]t is the law in Wisconsin that 'a greater latitude of proof is to be allowed in the
admission of other-acts evidence in sex crimes cases, particularly in those involving
incest and indecent liberties with a minor child."'); State v. Phillips, 845 P.2d 1211,
1214 (Idaho 1993) (affirming "lustful disposition" exception to demonstrate a defend-
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exception do suggest a special evidentiary place for prior crimes
evidence in prosecutions for many sexual assault offenses. Indeed,
these opinions seem to endorse the admission of criminal propen-
sity evidence in sexual assault prosecutions, just simply by another
name.
Many courts, however, have not applied the "lustful disposition"
exception so as to evince a defendant's general propensity to com-
mit sexual assaults, particularly in cases not involving incest and
statutory rape-type offenses or the same parties as the prior crime
evidence. As the court in Lovely v. United States7 ' noted in 1948,
"While evidence of other similar offenses.., is admissible in prose-
cutions for crime involving a depraved sexual instinct.., the over-
whelming weight of authority is that such evidence is not
admissible in prosecutions for rape. "171 The Lovely court
explained:
The reason for the difference in the rule applicable is obvious
.... Acts showing a perverted sexual instinct are circumstances
which with other circumstances may have a tendency to connect
an accused with a crime of that character. The fact that one
woman was raped, however, has no tendency to show that an-
other woman did not consent. 172
State jurisprudence generally follows Lovely's more restricted
view of the "lustful disposition" exception. For example, in State v.
McArthur,173 the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the trial
court "erred in applying the 'lustful disposition' exception' 1 74 in
the defendant's trial for rape. The McArthur court rejected the ap-
plicability of this exception, either to demonstrate that the defend-
ant "'lure[d] acquaintances into situations where he could force
them with brute force into nonconsensual sex acts"' or because the
ant's "general plan" to "exploit and sexually abuse" young women, and to corrobo-
rate the complainant's credibility, because the-defendant's not guilty plea "places the
credibility of the victim squarely in issue for the jury to decide"); State v. Edward
Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 133 (W.Va. 1990) (holding that "[c]ollateral acts or crimes
may be introduced in cases involving child sexual assault or sexual abuse victims to
show the perpetrator had a lustful disposition towards the victim, a lustful disposition
to children generally, or a lustful disposition to specific other children .. .
170. 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948).
171. Id. at 390 (citation omitted).
172. Id.
173. 719 So.2d 1037, 1039 (La. 1998) (excluding evidence of defendant's past sex
crimes because the current case did not involve child sex abuse).
174. Id. at 1040.
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asserted defense of consent "plac[ed] her credibility at issue.' 1 75
Other state courts similarly have limited the application of the
"lustful disposition" exception, even in cases involving child-
complainants. 176
Furthermore, many states do not recognize any evidentiary ex-
ception analogous to the "lustful disposition" exception. For ex-
ample, in Lannan v. State, 7 7 the Supreme Court of Indiana
extensively reviewed that state's "depraved sexual instinct" excep-
tion, and its own and other states' authorities regarding the "recidi-
vism" and "bolstering" purposes for admitting such evidence. The
court concluded that "any justification for maintaining the excep-
tion in its current form is outweighed by the mischief created by
the open-ended application of the rule.'1 78 The court thus aban-
doned Indiana's "depraved sexual instinct" exception in sexual as-
sault prosecutions "to show action in conformity with a particular
character trait. "179
175. Id. at 1039. But see State v. Phillips, 845 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Idaho 1993) (af-
firming the use of "lustful disposition" evidence in part because a defendant's not
guilty plea "places the credibility of the victim squarely in issue for the jury to
decide").
176. See, e.g., Lambert v. State, 724 So.2d 392, 394 (Miss. 1998) (holding that Mis-
sissippi's "lustful disposition" authorities "specifically limited evidence of other sexual
relations to those between the defendant and the particular victim" (citations omit-
ted)); Commonwealth v. Barrett, 641 N.E.2d 1302, 1307 (Mass. 1994). The court in
Barrett stated that:
"When a defendant is charged with any form of illicit sexual intercourse,
evidence of the commission of similar crimes by the same parties though
committed in another place, if not too remote in time, is competent to prove
an inclination to commit the [acts] charged in the indictment.., and is rele-
vant to show the probable existence of the same passion or emotion at the
time in issue" . . . When a court is presented with evidence of uncharged
conduct by the defendant toward a child other than the complainant, the
conduct in issue, to be admissible, must be closely related in time, place, and
form of acts to show a common course of conduct by the defendant toward
the two children so as to be logically probative .... The conduct toward the
children must form a "temporal and schematic nexus" which renders the evi-
dence admissible to show a common course of conduct regarding the children.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moore, 278
S.E.2d 822, 825 (Va. 1981). The Moore court asserted that:
[I]n a prosecution for incest, evidence of acts of incestuous intercourse be-
tween the parties other than those charged in the indictment or information
... is, if not too remote in point of time, admissible for the purpose of throw-
ing light upon the relations of the parties and the incestuous disposition of
the defendant toward the other party, and to corroborate the proof of the
act relied upon for conviction.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
177. 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992).
178. Id. at 1338.
179. Id. at 1339.
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In 1997, in State v. Osier, s° the Supreme Court of North Dakota
"cautioned about the dangers underlying the trend of allowing
prior crime evidence in sexual assault cases."'' The court thus re-
fused to affirm the use of prior sexual assault evidence during the
defendant's trial for sexual contact with a minor, either under the
offered "lustful disposition" authorities,8 2 or by adopting FRE 414
as a state rule of evidence. 3 The court concluded, "[tihe sole pur-
pose served by [the prior crimes] testimony was to demonstrate
Osier's criminal sexual character to show he probably acted in con-
formity with that character in committing the acts charged.... It is
fundamentally unfair to tempt a jury to convict a defendant circum-
stantially on the basis of prior misconduct or character propensity
rather than upon evidence of the criminal acts charged."'8 4
In 1998, in State v. Nelson,8 5 the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina reversed the defendant's conviction for multiple counts of sex-
ual contact and lewd acts with a minor, reasoning that the trial
court admitted evidence that the police recovered portraying the
defendant as a pedophile. 8 6 In response to the prosecution's argu-
ments for the admissibility of this evidence, the court noted:
In spite of the ban on character or propensity evidence, some
states have nonetheless admitted evidence of collateral sexual
crimes or sexual bad acts in sex offense cases, carving out spe-
cific exceptions they variously term 'lustful disposition,' 'de-
praved sexual instinct,' or the like .... South Carolina has not
recognized such an exception, nor are we inclined to do S.187
The court took this stance because, in its view, "'the fairness and
due process concerns underlying [South Carolina] FRE 404(b) are
no less pertinent in sexual assault cases. ' "18 8 Indeed, the court
180. 569 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1997) (addressing the admissibility of evidence that the
defendant engaged in prior sexual misconduct with his 15-year old niece when she was
eight or nine years old).
181. Id. at 444.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 442 n.1.
184. Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
185. 501 S.E.2d 716 (S.C. 1998) (addressing whether children's toys, videos and
photographs of young girls, which the police seized from the defendant's bedroom,
were admissible in a trial for criminal sexual conduct).
186. See id. at 724.
187. Id. at 723 n.16.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
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noted, "'a corollary to the presumption of innocence is that a de-
fendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he is."189
Other jurisdictions similarly have abandoned their version of the
"lustful disposition" exception, or refused to adopt such an excep-
tion.190 The "lustful disposition" authorities upon which Castillo
and the California opinions rely, therefore, demonstrate no uni-
formly distinct historical status for criminal propensity evidence in
sexual assault prosecutions. 191 Rather, as Castillo itself acknowl-
edges, "the historical record regarding evidence of one's sexual
character is ... ambiguous."'1 92
189. Id. at 723 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Melcher, 678 A.2d 146, 151
(N.H. 1996)).
190. See, e.g., State v. Winter, 648 A.2d 624, 626-27 (Vt. 1994). The court in Winter
stated that:
[N]either before the adoption of the Vermont Rules of Evidence, nor since,
have we allowed the admission of acts of sexual misconduct to show a lustful
disposition. . . .Just as we have no special exception to [Vermont] Rule
404(b) for sexual misconduct cases, neither have we adopted special, more
liberal, interpretations of Rule 404(b) to allow the admission of prior bad act
evidence in such cases, especially when we would not admit similar evidence
in other cases.
Id.; see also State v. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d 824, 825, 828-29 (Tenn. 1994). The Rickman
court opined that:
Tennessee should not recognize a "sex crimes" exception to the general
rule.... [E]vidence admitted under a general sex crimes exception is said to
be for the purposes of corroboration, or to show the intimate relations be-
tween the parties, or to show that the defendant had a lustful disposition....
Our re-examination of the authorities convinces us that the general rule,
which excludes evidence of other crimes or bad acts as irrelevant and preju-
dicial when defendant is on trial for a crime or act of the same character,
remains sound.
Id.; cf. Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Ky. 1985). The Pendleton
court held that:
[N]o evidence is admissible to show "lustful inclination." This Court is un-
certain as to what is meant by the broad and subjective phrase "lustful incli-
nation." The better standard requires evidence to be the type that shows a
common plan or pattern of activity .... Kentucky, like many other jurisdic-
tions, has consistently followed the general rule that evidence of other crimi-
nal acts of the accused is inadmissible unless it comes within certain well-
defined exceptions which must be strictly construed.
191. See generally, L. Renee Lieux, Note, The Michigan Pig Farm Perception: The
Michigan Supreme Court Continues to Ignore the Opportunity to Create a Lustful Dis-
position Exception to Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b), 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv.
127, 151, 155-56 (1998) (reviewing the wide-ranging approach of various states to the
"lustful disposition" exception, and concluding that "[t]he implementation of the ex-
ception varies in scope. Sometimes it is construed narrowly, allowing only admission
of prior sexual acts against the complainant, and sometimes broadly, allowing the
admission of any prior sexual acts").
192. 140 F.3d at 881.
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This ambiguous exception to the tradition of criminal propensity
evidence preclusion provides a questionable basis upon which to
eliminate that tradition in toto.1 9 3 The Tenth Circuit and California
state courts nonetheless use this narrow historical evidentiary ex-
ception to obviate the whole rule.
In suggesting otherwise, the California courts misplace their reli-
ance upon Marshall v. Lonberger's acknowledgement that "the
common law was far more ambivalent."' 94 In Lonberger, as with
the "vaguely defined [common law] exceptions" to which
Lonberger cited, 95 the prosecution introduced the defendant's
prior conviction to demonstrate a relevant evidentiary fact other
than criminal propensity. Indeed, Lonberger relied upon the fact
that "as in Spencer, the trial judge gave a careful and sound instruc-
tion requiring the jury to consider respondent's prior conviction
only for purposes of the specification.... And, of course, if the jury
considers a defendant's prior conviction only for purposes of sen-
tence enhancement no questions of fairness arise. "196
This view of prior crimes evidence instead reveals a common law
tradition of not allowing such evidence to prove criminal propen-
sity. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in 1997 in Old Chief v.
United States, "Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) reflects this com-
mon law tradition by addressing propensity reasoning directly.' '1 97
Moreover, regardless of the historical pedigree of the "lustful
disposition" rule in other jurisdictions, the New York State Court
of Appeals significantly has limited, if not abandoned, New York
State's version of the "lustful disposition" rule - the "amorous
design" exception. In 1914, the court of appeals affirmed the "am-
orous design" exception to the rule precluding criminal propensity
evidence, "in prosecutions for adultery, seduction, statutory rape
... and incest."' 98 The court wrote approvingly of the "amorous
design" exception as recently as 1980.199
193. Cf. id. at 889 (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concur-
ring with Court's judgment upholding FRE 414 as constitutional, but avoiding "the
extended analysis ... discussing ... the 'lustful disposition' rule in state jurisprudence
194. 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983); see also People v. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 758
(Cal. App. 1997).
195. 459 U.S. at 438 n.6.
196. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)).
197. 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (emphasis added).
198. People v. Thompson, 106 N.E. 78, 78 (1914).
199. See People v. Fuller, 409 N.E.2d 834, 838-39 (N.Y. 1980); see also People v.
Bouton, 405 N.E.2d 699, 704 (N.Y. 1980).
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But in 1987, in People v. Lewis,2" the court of appeals rejected
the defendant's use of prior incest evidence under the "amorous
design" exception. The Lewis court directly questioned the viabil-
ity of the "amorous design" doctrine, even under its own prece-
dent.20 1 The court held that the general rule precluding prior
crimes evidence remains, even in sexual assault prosecutions, with
the exception existing solely to establish "mutual disposition" and
requisite corroboration.2 °2
The primary duty of the fact finder in this case was to determine
whether the victim's statements describing the incestuous act
charged in the indictment were credible ... [the complainant's]
allegations concerning defendant's prior actions did not render
her testimony pertaining to the charged crime more
trustworthy.2 °3
The prosecution, the court decreed, may not use such prior sexual
assault evidence to prove "the defendant's attitude toward his
victim. "2"
In 1988, the court of appeals reiterated its disapproval of propen-
sity-type evidence under this doctrine in People v. Hudy.2 °5 Hudy
involved a teacher's alleged molestation of eight young male stu-
dents. The trial court permitted evidence regarding the defend-
ant's prior molestation of another young student.2° In rejecting
this evidence to bolster the complainants' credibility,20 7 the court
discussed the impropriety of propensity evidence under doctrines
such as the "amorous design" exception. The court concluded,
"[e]vidence of prior sexual contact with the same 'victim,' tradi-
tionally admitted under the rubric of 'amorous design,' [is] really
no more than a form of propensity evidence hiding behind an as-
sumed name and should no longer be permitted. 20 8 .
Lewis and Hudy, therefore, reveal no inclination by the New
York State Court of Appeals to permit "amorous design" evidence
beyond this very narrow exception, if at all.20 9 The lower New
200. 506 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987).
201. See id. at 917 (citing Thompson, 106 N.E. at 78; Fuller, 409 N.E.2d at 834).
202. See Lewis, 506 N.E.2d at 917-18 (citing Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Ball, 6
Crim. App. 31 (1908-1910)).
203. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d at 918 (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. 535 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1988).
206. See id. at 253.
207. See id. at 258; see infra notes 254-260.
208. Hudy, 535 N.E.2d at 259.
209. See FARRELL, supra note 7, § 4-515, at 191.
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York courts have followed suit, holding that "such evidence of the
defendant's predisposition is precisely the sort of evidence which
ordinarily has no place in the prosecution's case."210
B. Probative Value, Legislative Judgment and Burden of Proof
Enjady, Castillo and the California opinions also defer to the leg-
islative judgment that evidence of prior sexual assaults presents
unique probative value to subsequently charged sexual assaults,
particularly in resolving "unresolvable swearing matches."21' True,
intuitively, many people do attribute great significance to evidence
of a person's history of committing sexual assaults in considering a
subsequently charged sexual assault. The Molineux rule, however,
does not depend upon criminal propensity evidence having no pro-
bative value.
On the contrary, the law always has recognized that "such facts
might logically be persuasive that [the defendant] is by propensity
a probable perpetrator of the crime. ' 212 For this very reason, "this
inquiry.., is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so over-
persuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and
deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge. ' 21 3 Accordingly, "[t]he rule is based on policy and not on
logic, '214 "rooted in the principle that a man may not be convicted
210. People v. Gautier, 544 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (App. Div. 1989). See also People v.
Jackson, 524 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847-48 (App. Div. 1988); cf People v. Bagarozy, 522
N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that evidence concerning the defendant's sex-
ual tendencies was not admissible under the "amorous design" exception); People v.
Seaman, 657 N.Y.S.2d 242, 243-44 (App. Div. 1997) (rejecting evidence of "sexual
climate" in the defendant's household because it was "aimed at convincing the jury of
the defendant's sexual proclivity"); but cf. People v. Fitzgerald, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 2,
1999, at 33 (proclaiming that "prior similar sex acts are admissible when the evidence
of the prior similar sex acts is (1) reliable and (2) is being offered to corroborate the
testimony of a young child when he or she is to identify the defendant as the person
who had committed a particular sex act").
211. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431-33 (10th Cir. 1998); see also
United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881-83 (10th Cir. 1998); People v. Fitch, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 753, 758 (Ct. App. 1997).
212. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); see also People v. Moli-
neux, 61 N.E. 286, 302 (N.Y. 1901).
213. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76; accord Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386,
388-90 (1948); People v. Alvino, 519 N.E.2d 808, 812 (1987); People v. Robinson, 503
N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1984); People v. Ventimiglia, 420 N.E.2d 59, 62 (N.Y. 1981);
People v. Allweiss, 396 N.E.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. 1979).
214. Allweiss, 396 N.E.2d at 738.
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of one crime simply because he may be shown guilty of another
when there is no connection between the two." '215
The unique probative value that people attach to prior sexual
assault evidence consequently implicates exactly the sort of preju-
dice that the Molineux rule seeks to prevent: that the evidence will
prompt the jury to presume the defendant's guilt and convict in the
absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The argued proba-
tive value of sexual assault propensity evidence only increases the
danger of such a constitutionally impermissible result.
Neither Enjady nor Castillo addresses this constitutional paradox
that their reasoning creates. Indeed, neither opinion even ad-
dresses the relationship between criminal propensity evidence and
the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of
proof, despite the U.S. Supreme Court and other authorities - in-
cluding the Tenth Circuit's own - that highlight this improper
nexus. The court instead ignores the fact, which some proponents
of this evidence candidly seek, that "[c]ombining direct evidence of
guilt with evidence of the defendant's past crimes may thus elimi-
nate reasonable doubt in a case that would otherwise be inconclu-
sive," '16 or that "re-setting [jurors] regret levels can give them a
more appropriate attitude toward reasonable doubt ... [and] may
therefore push jurors closer to the right standard of proof.2 17
California courts do recognize that "[t]he Due Process Clause
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the charged crime. "218 Fitch even acknowledged that
"[o]ur Supreme Court has recognized the possibility that propen-
sity evidence may reduce the burden of proof. 2 1 9 Fitch nonethe-
less offered the following rationale to uphold CEC section 1108:
While the admission of evidence of the uncharged sex offense
may have added to the evidence the jury could consider as to
defendant's guilt, it did not lessen the prosecution's burden to
215. People v. Katz, 103 N.E. 305, 311 (N.Y. 1913); cf. McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d
1378, 1386 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming that "[i]t is part of our community's sense of fair
play that people are convicted because of what they have done, not who they are");
United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that "[a] concomi-
tant of the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what he
did, not for who he is").
216. Cassell & Strassberg, supra note 85, at 167 (emphasis added).
217. Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence:
Congress Was Right about Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 274-75
(1995) (emphasis added).
218. People v. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 759 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
219. Id. at 760 (citing People v. Garceau, 862 P.2d 664 (Cal. 1993)).
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prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "The courts specifi-
cally addressing the question of Winship's application to un-
charged misconduct uniformly hold that admission of uncharged
misconduct does not undermine Winship."2 '
This reasoning misconstrues the actual constitutional question
that criminal propensity evidence raises. Arguing that such evi-
dence merely "add[s] to the evidence the jury could consider as to
defendant's guilt,"2 21 ignores whether evidence of a defendant's
past, similar misconduct may be so considered by a jury consistent
with our established constitutional principles.
On the contrary, if such collateral evidence leads a jury to con-
vict "in a case that would otherwise be inconclusive ' 222 on its own
evidence, that collateral evidence lessens the prosecution's burden
of proving that the charged crime in fact occurred. "[R]e-setting
[jurors] regret levels [to] give them a more appropriate attitude to-
ward reasonable doubt '223 simply raises the bar of reasonable
doubt in sexual assault prosecutions, and may shift the burden to
the defense entirely of demonstrating actual innocence to over-
come the "regret levels" that the jurors otherwise will experience
over acquitting. The courts' noted historical acceptance of prior
crimes evidence in accordance with the mandate of Winship merely
reflects the admission of such evidence for some valid purpose
other than to demonstrate criminal propensity.224
To remedy this problem, the California courts, similar to the
Tenth Circuit, simply revert to application of the prejudice-balanc-
ing provision under CEC section 352. Limiting criminal propensity
evidence to an as-applied, prejudice-versus-probative value analy-
sis, however, again fails to answer the more fundamental question
of whether admitting prior crimes evidence to demonstrate crimi-
nal propensity, at its core, unduly infringes upon the presumption
of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof.22 5
220. Id. at 759-60 (citation omitted); see also, People v. Van Winkle, No. F030661,
1999 WL 744028, at *4 (Cal. App. Sept. 24, 1999) (holding that "evidence of un-
charged sexual offenses increasing the evidence of defendant's guilt does not reduce
the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; prior sexual
misconduct is simply an additional circumstance to be considered along with all the
other circumstances of the case").
221. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759-60.
222. Cassell & Strassberg, supra note 85, at 167.
223. Park, supra note 217, at 274-75.
224. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (noting that "if
the jury considers a defendant's prior conviction only for purposes of sentence en-
hancement no questions of fairness arise" (emphasis added)).
225. See also infra Part IV.D.
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A comparison to the Sex Offender Registration Act
("SORA")226 highlights the distinction between the probative
value of a sex offender's recidivist behavior, and the significance of
using that evidence to overcome a defendant's presumption of in-
nocence and to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. SORA
addresses parallel sociological concerns to CPL section 60.41:
The seriousness of the harm that sex offenders' actions cause to
society and the perception, supported by some data, that such
offenders have a greater probability of recidivism than other of-
fenders have recently combined to prompt the enactment of nu-
merous laws across the country directed specifically toward
persons convicted of crimes involving sexual conduct.2 27
SORA requires convicted "sex offenders '228 to register with the
state, and in some cases authorizes the dissemination of personal
information regarding a sex offender and his criminal history.229
Recently, in People v. David W., an Appellate Term of the Sec-
ond Department upheld SORA as facially constitutional.230 But as
David W. and lower New York courts have noted in analyzing
SORA, the "post-trial, post-conviction hearing [to determine risk-
level under SORA] is not for adjudicating guilt but rather for su-
pervising released offenders. "231 "The hearing is part of a criminal
proceeding but not part of a criminal action, ' 232 and "does not liti-
gate guilt or nonguilt. ' 233 Rather, a SORA adjudication deter-
mines how strictly the state should regulate an already-convicted
individual whose background demonstrates a particular risk of
recidivism.
Thus, an adjudication under SORA "is more analogous to the
due process requirements for sentencing, '234 or for a violation of
probation.235 Such a proceeding "is a summary, informal proce-
226. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (Consol. 1999).
227. Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1266 (2d Cir. 1997).
228. SORA defines what convictions render a person a "sex offender." See N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW § 168(a)(1)-(3). Interestingly, SORA exempts certain "sex offenses"
under section 130 of New York Penal Law from its definitions of a "sex offense" or
"sexually violent offense," such as Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Abuse in the Third
Degree. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.20(1)-(3), 130.55, respectively.
229. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168(f), (h), (j), (p) & (q).
230. See People v. David W., N.Y. L.J., Sept. 9, 1999, at 28.
231. People v. Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
232. People v. Brasier, 646 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
233. Id. at 444; see also People v. Salaam, 666 N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (Sup. Ct. 1997)
("The risk assessment hearing is not intended to be used as a means to re-litigate the
guilt or innocence of the convicted sex offender.").
234. People v. Roe, 677 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
235. See Brasier, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 443-44.
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dure which does not require strict adherence to the rules of evi-
dence; statutory and due process requirements are met so long as
defendant is given formal notice of the charges and an opportunity
to be heard and to confront the witnesses against him through cross
examination. '236 The state need not overcome a presumption of
innocence with proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the
state's need to regulate in relation to the evidence of recidivist
behavior. 237
Therefore, the classification procedure under SORA does not in-
voke the "full panoply of constitutional rights '231 that the United
States and New York State Constitutions extend to defendants liti-
gating guilt or lack of guilt. SORA only must relate rationally to a
legitimate governmental interest,239 and not prove "arbitrary and
capricious" in its application.2 40 The court in David W. found "rea-
sonable and necessary" both the classification procedure, as well as
the "government's interest in ensuring that the defendant be desig-
nated at the appropriate risk level ... to protect the public from
the danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and to assist the
criminal justice system to identify, investigate, apprehend and pros-
ecute sex offenders." 24 1
236. People v. Minard, 555 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting People v.
Tyrrell, 475 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939 (App. Div. 1984)). See also People v. Recor, 619
N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (App. Div. 1994); People v. Mitchell, 587 N.Y.S.2d 187 (App. Div.
1992); Salaam, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85. Cf Darvin M. v. Jacobs, 509 N.E.2d 336, 337
(N.Y. 1987) (holding that a probation revocation hearing is a proceeding to determine
whether a defendant's subsequent acts violate the original sentence, not whether the
acts constitute a crime); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
237. The exact standard of proof that SORA requires has generated some uncer-
tainty amongst lower courts. One court has suggested placing the burden of proof
upon the person challenging the state's classification findings. See People v. Ross, 646
N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1996). Other courts have required the state to meet a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. See e.g., Roe, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 900; Recor,
619 N.Y.S.2d at 187; Mitchell, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 187; Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 250. But see
Salaam, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 885 (requiring a "clear and convincing evidence" standard).
The New York Legislature, however, recently clarified this issue by amending SORA
to require the state to prove risk classification factors by clear and convincing evi-
dence. See L. 1999, ch. 453, §§ 6, 11, 16, 18. Irrespective of the applicable standard of
proof, a SORA adjudication remains a "summary," post-conviction proceeding. Sa-
laam, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85.
238. Roe, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
239. See David W., N.Y. L.J. Sept. 9, 1999 at 28; cf Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (discussing the "rational relationship" test applied to non-funda-
mental right); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1995) (same); Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 824-25 (1991) (same); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (same).
240. Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 251-52.
241. See supra note 230.
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Criminal propensity evidence, by contrast, asks a jury to forgive
any inadequacies in the prosecution's proof of guilt at trial because
of the defendant's history of similar criminal conduct. 242 While ar-
guably relevant, and certainly persuasive, 43 evidence that so un-
dermines fundamental constitutional guarantees cannot be justified
merely because it rationally relates to the government's interest in
convicting guilty sex offenders. On the contrary, far from proving
narrowly tailored to this governmental interest, 244 such evidence
creates an overbroad net that will ensure the conviction of a high
percentage of the guilty, but at the expense of the innocent whom
the presumption of innocence and requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt were designed to protect.
Such a catch-all approach to criminal law would require a signifi-
cant reevaluation of our social priorities and the constitutional val-
ues that preserve them. As the U.S. Supreme Court expressed in
In re Winship:
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the Ameri-
can scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for
reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The
standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of in-
nocence - that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle
whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration
of our criminal law.... It is critical that the moral force of crimi-
nal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. 45
Indeed, as Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in concurrence, "In
a criminal case.., we do not view the social disutility of convicting
an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting some-
one who is guilty. '246 Thus, Justice Harlan "view[ed] the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases as
bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that
242. See Cassell & Strassberg, supra note 85, at 167; see also Park, supra note 217,
at 274-75.
243. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76; see also People v. Moli-
neux, 61 N.E. 286, 302 (1901).
244. Cf. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (discussing strict scrutiny test applied to funda-
mental rights); Reno, 507 U.S. at 301-02 (same); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (discussing overbreadth doctrine in upholding anti-noise ordi-
nance as sufficiently narrowly tailored, and not "an impermissibly broad prophylactic
ordinance").
245. 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
246. Id. at 372.
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it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man
go free.
24 7
In this vein, the New York State Court of Appeals historically
has proven unreceptive to allowing criminal propensity evidence to
"tip the scales" in the prosecution's favor in cases involving credi-
bility contests or challenges. In People v. McKinney,248 for exam-
ple, the defendant faced domestic assault charges concerning his
baby's mother. Competing testimony of the complainant and the
defendant constituted the primary evidence. 249 The trial court ad-
mitted evidence of the defendant's prior domestic assaults upon
the complainant, ostensibly to prove the defendant's intent.25 °
The court of appeals, however, rejected this basis for admitting
the prior crimes evidence, finding that the defendant's "intention
to inflict physical injury may be inferred from the act itself. '251 The
court consequently concluded:
The resolution of defendant's guilt.., hinged upon whether Be-
linda's or defendant's version of the events on the night in ques-
tion be believed. The impact of the erroneously received
evidence of uncharged assaults was to demonstrate defendant's
violent nature and propensity to commit assaults.... The admis-
sion of the evidence of uncharged assaults was certainly prejudi-
cial to defendant ....252
Many would equate the probative value of a defendant's history of
domestic assaults in establishing a domestic assault offense to the
probative value of prior sexual assaults in establishing a sexual as-
sault offense.253 Yet, unlike the Tenth Circuit and the California
247. Id.; cf Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1949) (noting that
"[m]uch evidence of real and substantial probative value goes out on considerations
irrelevant to its probative weight but relevant to possible misunderstanding or misuse
by the jury"); People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 292 (1901) (holding that "[a] person
cannot be convicted of one offense upon proof that he committed another, however
persuasive in a moral point of view such evidence may be." (emphasis added)).
248. 247 N.E.2d 244 (N.Y. 1969).
249. See id. at 245-46.
250. See id. at 246.
251. Id. at 247.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Lisa Marie DeSanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evi-
dence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359
(1996); Benjamin Z. Rice, A Voice from People v. Simpson: Reconsidering the Pro-
pensity Rule in Spousal Homicide Cases, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 939 (1996); Lisa A.
Linsky, Use of Domestic Violence History Evidence in the Criminal Prosecution: A
Common Sense Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 73 (1995); Franklin W. Dunford, The
Measurement of Recidivism in Cases of Spousal Assault, 83 CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
120 (1992).
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state courts, the New York Court of Appeals discerned no proper
basis for criminal propensity evidence to resolve the "swearing
contest" in McKinney.
In People v. Hudy,254 the court of appeals extended to sexual
assault cases its unwillingness to allow criminal propensity evi-
dence to resolve difficult credibility contests against a defendant.
In Hudy, the defendant argued that the complainants falsely ac-
cused him when following the suggestions of the police and the
initial complainant, who assertedly adhered to his false story to
avoid punishment for lying.255 In response, the trial court allowed
evidence concerning another former student who accused the de-
fendant of similar conduct more than a year before the investiga-
tion of the charged offenses began.256 The trial court admitted this
evidence on the theory that "since [the prior alleged victim] had
made his accusations against the defendant long before the
[charged] story surfaced, his accusations had the ring of truth and
lent credibility to the other boys' charges. 257
The court of appeals flatly rejected this use of the prior sexual
assault evidence, holding that "defendant's misconduct toward [the
prior alleged victim] in the past has no legitimate, legally cogniza-
ble bearing on the truthfulness of the other children's allega-
tions. '258 The court noted further:
[T]here is a serious danger that the jury used [the prior sexual
assault evidence] to draw the impermissible inference ("he did it
before, so he probably did it this time too") and to resolve any
doubts it might otherwise have had about the other boys' stories
in the People's favor. Again, it is precisely this type of result that
the Molineux rule was adopted to prevent.259
The court thus reversed, finding that this and other evidentiary er-
rors "tainted the fairness of [the defendant's] trial. '260
The court of appeals in 1996 adhered to this philosophy in People
v. Vargas,26 1 a rape case involving exactly the sort of credibility is-
sues to which the Tenth Circuit and California state courts re-
254. See 535 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1988); see also supra notes 100-101.
255. See id. at 252-53.
256. See id. at 253.
257. Id. at 259.
258. Id.
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 252.
261. See Vargas, 666 N.E.2d 1357 (N.Y. 1996).
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ferred.262 In Vargas, the complainant accused the defendant of
forcible rape on an apartment rooftop.263 The complainant, how-
ever, admitted to giving the defendant her telephone number after
the alleged rape and to meeting him at his residence for consensual
sex the next day.264
In response to the defendant's proffered defense of consent, the
trial court granted the prosecution's application to present "the tes-
timony of several women that defendant had accosted them and
demanded sex, fondled them or engaged in other sexually deviant
behavior. '265 The trial court admitted the evidence as necessary to
demonstrate the defendant's "intent," because of the "'extraordi-
nary' fact" that the complainant engaged in consensual sex with the
defendant the day after the alleged rape.266 The defendant conse-
quently abandoned his consent defense.267
The court of appeals concluded that this threatened prior sexual
assault evidence "denied [the defendant] a fair trial. '268 The court
noted the swearing contest nature of the case, and the resultant
prejudice that the threatened propensity evidence effected:
Here, two starkly contrasting scenarios were presented, with
only credibility in issue. If the trier of fact believed the defend-
ant's version of events, complainant consented to a sexual en-
counter with him.... If the trier of fact found complainant more
credible, defendant used force and threats to rape her, with in-
tent readily inferable from the acts alleged. As in Hudy ... the
prior misconduct evidence was relevant only to lend credibility to
complainant by suggesting that, because defendant had engaged
in sexual misconduct with others, he was likely to have committed
the acts charged.269
Vargas thus reaffirms Hudy and the court's other holdings pre-
cluding the use of sexual assault propensity evidence, even in "con-
sent" cases, to resolve credibility contests against a defendant.27 °
262. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (referring to
"unresolvable swearing matches"); People v. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 759 (Ct. App.
1997) (referring to "credibility contests").
263. See Vargas, 666 N.E.2d at 1357.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 1358.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1357 (emphasis added).
270. See also People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915, 918-19 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Liner,
229 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1967); People v. Ortiz, 554 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 1990); Peo-
ple v. Harris, 541 N.Y.S.2d 593 (App. Div. 1989); People v. Bagarozy, 522 N.Y.S.2d
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The court consistently has required that prior crimes evidence in
sexual assault prosecutions relate to some material issue beyond
merely bolstering witness credibility by highlighting the defend-
ant's criminal propensity.2 7'
Significantly, in Vargas, Hudy and the court's related holdings,
the court reversed on a finding that the criminal propensity evi-
dence deprived the defendant of a "fair trial," by resolving
"doubts" that jurors otherwise might possess of the defendant's ac-
tual guilt. This language recalls the court of appeals' strong, consti-
tutional language in Molineux.272 Indeed, in Hudy, the court
emphasized that "it is precisely this type of result that the Molineux
rule was adopted to prevent. '273
C. Criminal Propensity Evidence and the Rape Shield Act
Allowing evidence of a defendant's propensity to commit sexual
assaults to resolve credibility contests also creates a questionable
evidentiary disparity between criminal defendants and complain-
ants under the Rape Shield Acts that exist in New York State,274 in
most other states and at the federal level.275 This disparity high-
848, 854 (App. Div. 1987) ("As a review of this record makes clear, the court and the
prosecutor mistakenly equated 'intent' with 'inclination' or proclivity,' subjects ex-
pressly proscribed by Molineux."); People v. Dowdell, 695 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Div.
1999); People v. Hardy, 695 N.Y.S.2d 103 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that the defend-
ant's previous drug convictions "did not refute the defendant's claim that he had been
framed by the police, but merely tended to show his criminal propensity").
271. See, e.g., People v. Tas, 415 N.E.2d 967, 968 (N.Y. 1980) (admitting the com-
plainant's "[t]estimony concerning the prior assault on another prisoner in the vic-
tim's presence which occurred just minutes before the attack on the victim and was
participated in by both defendants, ... [because] it was highly relevant in establishing
the victim's fear and, thus, force as an element of the crime charged" in jail-house
sodomy prosecution (emphasis added)); People v. Cook, 710 N.E.2d 654, 655 (N.Y.
1999) (allowing prior crimes evidence to prove "forcible compulsion" element of rape
charge); see also People v. Gutkaiss, 614 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (App. Div. 1994); People
v. George, 602 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645 (App. Div. 1993); People v. Steinberg, 573 N.Y.S.2d
965, 979 (App. Div. 1991); People v. DeLeon, 521 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div. 1987);
People v. Young, 472 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803 (App. Div. 1984); cf. also People v.
Dauphinee, 658 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Div. 1997); People v. Williams, 637 N.Y.S.2d 379
(App. Div. 1996).
272. 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901); cf. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,
180-81 (1997); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75-80 (1991) (O'Conner, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 572-76 (1967) (Warren,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 475-76 (1948).
273. People v. Hudy, 535 N.E.2d 250, 259 (N.Y. 1988).
274. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1998).
275. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
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lights the impropriety of the evidence that CPL section 60.41 would
permit.276
Rape Shield Acts, such as New York's, preclude a defendant
from admitting evidence of a complainant's past sexual conduct as
evidence of her propensity to consent, except in very limited situa-
tions.277 This evidence is not precluded because juries attach little
probative value to it. On the contrary, the evidence is precluded
because juries usually attribute too much weight to this evidence,
prompting juries to decide a case upon the complainant's sexual
propensities rather than the evidence against the defendant, thus
confusing the issues and unfairly prejudicing the complainant.278
Accordingly, as a matter of policy, the Rape Shield Act deems
this evidence irrelevant and prejudicial,279 unless it bears upon a
material issue other than a complainant's sexual propensities. The
Rape Shield Act thus logically parallels the Molineux rule in its
protection of similar interests of complainants. Neither the Tenth
Circuit nor the California state courts, however, elucidate why evi-
dence of past sexual propensities, so irrelevant and prejudicial to a
complainant as to override a defendant's Sixth Amendment con-
frontation rights,28 ° suddenly becomes so probative and fair when
admitted against a defendant.
One commentator, David Karp, an official with the Department
of Justice who argued in support of FRE 413-415 prior to their
276. This disparity also may raise Equal Protection claims.
277. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(1)-(5).
278. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-53 (1991); Agard v. Portuondo, 117
F.3d 696, 703 (2d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that the Rape Shield Act "reinforces the
trial judge's traditional power to keep inflammatory and distracting evidence from the
jury"); People v. Williams, 614 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1993); People v. Crawford, 531
N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (App. Div. 1988) (stating that "the court's decision to preclude such
an inquiry was consistent with the legislative purpose of barring harassment of victims
of sexual crimes concerning irrelevant issues and of shielding the jury from confusing
and prejudicial matters which have no bearing on the issue of the guilt or innocence of
the accused"). Compare Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). Ap-
parently, a complainant's sexual history proves irrelevant and prejudicial only insofar
as the defense seeks to offer it. The prosecution, by contrast, may introduce evidence
of a complainant's chastity on "the issue of why complainant failed to immediately
inform her husband of the rape, as well as to defendant's contention that the sexual
encounter was consensual in exchange for employment." People v. Wigfall, 690
N.Y.S.2d 2, 3-4 (App. Div. 1999).
279. See People v. Swain, 567 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (App. Div. 1991); cf. People v.
Allweiss, 396 N.E.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. 1979) (explaining that the Molineux rule "is based
on policy and not on logic").
280. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149-53; Williams, 614 N.E.2d at 735; People v. Smith,
391 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (App. Div. 1977). See also People v. Dixon, 604 N.Y.S.2d 604
(App. Div. 1993); Agard, 117 F.3d at 696.
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adoption by Congress, characterized this objection as "superfi-
cial."28' Mr. Karp explained:
Inquiry into [the complainant's] sexual history will normally dis-
close nothing that particularly distinguishes her from the general
population, and typically has little probative value on the ques-
tion whether she consented to sex in the charged incident and
fabricated a false accusation. In contrast, evidence showing that
the defendant has committed sexual assaults on other occasions
places him in a small class of depraved criminals, and is likely to
be highly probative in relation to the pending charge. The dif-
ference in typical probative value alone is sufficient to refute
facile equations between evidence of other sexual behavior by
the victim and evidence of other violent sex crimes by the
defendant.282
Significantly, however, Mr. Karp cites as the probative value of a
defendant's sexual assault propensities only the fact that it "places
him in a small class of depraved criminals." The argued relevance
of this evidentiary fact contravenes centuries of jurisprudence
under our system of adjudicating guilt or lack of guilt.
Mr. Karp also seems to ignore the fact that the Rape Shield Act
does preclude evidence that, at least in the minds of some jurors,
arguably "distinguishes [a complainant] from the general popula-
tion. ' 283 These same jurors, so easily misled and confused by this
evidence of a complainant's sexual propensities, Mr. Karp readily
trusts to weigh evidence that "places [a defendant] in a small class
of depraved criminals." Such equally facile distinctions between
the nature and purposes of the Rape Shield Act and laws such as
281. Karp, supra note 85, at 23.
282. Id. at 24.
283. See e.g., Mark Hamblett, In the Courts: Shield Law, Consent Issues Arise in
"Cybersex" Appeal, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 1999, at 3 (discussing appellate issues from the
well-publicized "cybersex" sadomasochism-kidnapping trial of People v. Oliver Jova-
novic, in which the trial court precluded, under Rape Shield Act, several e-mails from
complainant concerning her sadomasochistic experiences, despite defendant's defense
of consent to such conduct and complainant's assertedly misleading testimony about
her experiences); People v. Jovanovic, 676 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 n.3 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.,
1997) (denying disclosure of subpoenaed e-mails between complainant and third par-
ties containing "information regarding the complainant's sexual history and/or
proclivities"); Williams, 614 N.E.2d at 735 (precluding evidence that white complain-
ant previously engaged in group sex with black males, which defendants offered to
support consent defense in case charging several black males with forcible rape, as
illustrating complainant's motive to fabricate and propensity to consent to this type of
sexual encounter, and to rebut prosecution's summation characterization of defend-
ants' group-consent theory as "a little peculiar"); Dixon, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 605 (pre-
cluding evidence of a complainant's arrests for prostitution, offered to support
consent).
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CPL section 60.41 cannot obviate the troublesome self-contradic-
tion that their co-existence would create.
Another commentator, Professor Roger Park, offers a slightly
different take on the significance of propensity evidence regarding
a defendant rather than a complainant:
[E]vidence about a victim's sexual history is less probative than
evidence about the defendant's prior sex offenses because the
victim evidence cuts both ways. If the victim frequently con-
sented to casual sex, that fact tends to show, however slightly,
that she is more likely to have consented to casual sex on a par-
ticular occasion than another woman who never consents. It
also tends, however, to show that she does not readily make ac-
cusations of rape .... The defendant's history of rapes does not
cut both ways. It simply tends to show that the defendant is a
rapist who is more likely to be guilty in this case than he would
be without the evidence. 2 4
Professor Park's analysis, however appealing, merely returns the
analysis to questions of the relative weight of this competing evi-
dence - generally a factor for the jury to decide - not its admissi-
bility. The rule precluding criminal propensity evidence "is based
on policy and not on logic. '2 85 As Professor Park notes, "rape
shield laws [similarly] are not only designed to protect against jury
misdecision. They are also aimed at goals outside the courtroom,"
such as "to protect victims from embarrassment in order to en-
courage them to report rape," and because "victims have a legiti-
mate privacy interest in keeping facts about their (noncriminal)
sexual history secret. ' 286 Professor Park, however, does not iden-
tify why the policies underlying the general preclusion of a com-
plainant's sexual character in a criminal trial merit more protection
than the policies underlying the preclusion of a defendant's sexual
character during the very same trial.
D. Due Process and Prejudice-Balancing
The Tenth Circuit and the California State courts ultimately up-
hold FRE 413 and 414 and CEC section 1108 under a case-by-case,
as-applied analysis, relying upon FRE 403 and CEC section 352's
prejudice-balancing test. CPL section 60.41 would incorporate this
balancing test. This familiar prejudice-versus-probative value anal-
284. Park, supra note 217, at 277-78 (internal citations omitted).
285. People v. Aliweiss, 396 N.E.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. 1979).
286. Park, supra note 217, at 277.
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ysis, however, provides an odd sort of protection against the preju-
dice of true propensity evidence.
Under a traditional Molineux analysis, as with FRE 403 and
CEC section 352, the court, in deciding whether to admit prior
crimes evidence, weighs the potential prejudice of prior crimes evi-
dence - consideration of the defendant's criminal propensity -
against its probative value at proving some other material issue.287
With the admission of prior crimes evidence specifically to demon-
strate criminal propensity, by contrast, the proffered probative
value of the prior crimes evidence is the prejudice against which
the court must weigh the evidence: that the fact-finder will pre-
sume guilt because of the defendant's past conduct, even in the
absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Logic dictates that
the greater the probative value of the criminal propensity evidence,
the more acute its prejudice necessarily becomes.
Indeed, Castillo turns traditional Molineux analysis on its head
by suggesting that criminal propensity evidence generates little or
no prejudice beyond what already exists with traditional Molineux
evidence, because in either case the jury may convict due to the
defendant's past conduct.288 This reasoning ignores the delicate
factual balancing and jury instructions that decades of decisional
and statutory law has developed to prevent exactly this result when
a trial court does admit prior crimes evidence.289
Quite contrary to the court's view in Castillo, criminal propensity
evidence asks the jury to reach precisely the conclusion that the
law so painstakingly has sought to avoid. Traditional Molineux bal-
ancing, therefore, as with much of the reasoning of the Tenth Cir-
cuit and the California state courts, fails to answer the due process
concerns that criminal propensity evidence raises, perhaps most
acutely in sexual assault prosecutions.
287. See People v. Alvino, 519 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Ventimiglia,
420 N.E.2d 59, 62 (N.Y. 1981); FARRELL, supra note 7, § 4-501, at 176.
288. United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1998).
289. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 409 N.E.2d 949, 950 (N.Y. 1980); People v. Celes-
tino, 615 N.Y.S.2d 346, 349 (App. Div. 1994) (reversing conviction, because trial court
"utterly failed to consider the [prior narcotics sale] evidence to be proffered or to
weigh its probative value against its potential for prejudice," and "failed to instruct
the jury, both at the time of its introduction and in its charge, on the limited purpose
for which it may consider evidence of the uncharged crime"); People v. Matthews, 544
N.Y.S.2d 398, 402-3 (App. Div. 1989).
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CONCLUSION
The proposed CPL section 60.41 reflects a legislative judgment
that, for alleged sex offenders, a different set of evidentiary rules
should apply regarding the admissibility of similar past criminal
conduct. The question becomes whether the law in New York
State will reject this legislative judgment, or whether "that jealous
regard for the liberty of the individual" and "humane and enlight-
ened public spirit '290 underpinning the Molineux rule no longer ap-
ply to those persons whom the State charges with sexual assaults.
"His [will] not [be] the trial by peers promised by the Constitution
of the United States, conducted in accordance with centuries-old
fundamental conceptions of justice." 291
If the Legislature passes the Act, for proponents of this change,
persuasive authority exists under federal and California law that
the proposed CPL section 60.41, on its face, does not violate due
process. 292 Until the Supreme Court or New York appellate courts
rule upon this issue, however, defense counsel will possess mean-
ingful arguments that CPL section 60.41 violates a common law
tradition that preserves the presumption of innocence and holds
the prosecution to its proper burden of proof. These arguments
may prove strongest under New York State law.293 For before New
York Courts could accept CPL section 60.41, "a rule of criminal
evidence, long believed to be of fundamental importance for the
protection of the innocent, must be first declared away. 2
94
290. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293 (N.Y. 1901).
291. McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir. 1993).
292. Notwithstanding, these opinions make clear that a trial court's failure to con-
duct a patient, searching inquiry into proffered sexual assault propensity evidence, or
the prosecution's failure to give adequate pre-trial notice of this evidence, may render
the evidence unconstitutional as applied under both the New York and United States
Due Process Clauses. Cf United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 896 (10th Cir.
1999); United States v. Charley, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8711, at *15-19 (10th Cir.
Aug. 27, 1999); People v. Soto, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 605, 615-21 (Ct. App. 1998).
293. See People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338 (N.Y. 1992); People v. Lugo, 650
N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (App. Div. 1996); People v. Joseph, 445 N.Y.S.2d 2 (App. Div.
1981).
294. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
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SHEDDING SOME LIGHT ON LENDING: THE
EFFECT OF EXPANDED DISCLOSURE LAWS
ON HOME MORTGAGE MARKETING,
LENDING AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
Richard D. Marsico*
ITrRODUCTION
In 1991, conventional home mortgage lenders disclosed vastly
expanded information about their lending for the first time. The
newly amended Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (the "HMDA")1
required lenders to disclose information regarding the number of
applications received, the race and income of applicants, the loca-
tion of the property for which the loan was sought and the disposi-
tion of each application.2 The federal government intended the
disclosure of this information to impact the private allocation of
credit - that is, to have an impact on to whom, where and on what
terms private lenders make loans - without directly allocating
credit through lending quotas or specific lending mandates.3
The HMDA is a federal home mortgage lending disclosure law
that provides a significant amount of the data the federal banking
regulatory agencies (collectively the "federal banking agencies")
that enforce the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA")4 use to
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I thank New York Law School for
its generous support of this research. I thank Lenni Benson, Jean Marie Brescia, Jim
Brook, Carol Buckler, David Chang, Steve Ellmann, Larry Grosberg, Mariana Ho-
gan, Faith Kahn, Carlin Meyer, Michael Perlin, Robert Schwemm, Gregory Squires
and Warren TYaiger for their helpful comments on and questions about earlier drafts,
and the organizers and attendees of New York Law School's Informal Tuesday
Faculty Lunch series, where I presented this article. I also thank several representa-
tives of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for reviewing a previous draft and
meeting with me to discuss their agreements and disagreements with the article's
analysis and conclusions: Jim Hodgetts, Brian Early, Peter Antunovich and Robert
Riggs. I also thank my research assistants, Alon Karpman, Meena Mariwalla and
David Resnick. Finally, I wish to thank my administrative assistant, Cathy Jenkins,
for all her hard work.
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1999).
2. See id.
3. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
4. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1999). The CRA states that banks have an affirmative
obligation to meet the credit needs of their local communities, including low- and
moderate neighborhoods. See id. §§ 2901(a), 2903(1), 2906(a)(1). The CRA does not
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evaluate a bank's lending record in its local community.5 The
HMDA is broader in its coverage than the CRA, covering banks,
bank affiliates and subsidiaries, mortgage lenders that are not
banks or related to banks, credit unions, mortgage companies and
finance companies that make home mortgage loans.6 The HMDA
contains no lending mandate; in fact it explicitly states that Con-
gress did not intend that the HMDA allocate credit.7 Nevertheless,
the HMDA's Congressional sponsors did intend that disclosure of
cover lenders other than banks, thus exempting bank subsidiaries or affiliates or non-
bank lenders from scrutiny, although the lending record of a bank's subsidiaries or
affiliates may be considered as part of the bank's CRA record. See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 25.22(c), 25.23(c) (1999). Four federal banking agencies share regulatory jurisdic-
tion over the CRA, and they have promulgated virtually identical CRA regulations.
The agencies, the banks they regulate and their CRA regulations are:
Agency Jurisdiction Regulations
Office of the Comp- National banks 12 C.F.R. pt. 25 (1999)
troller of the Currency
("oCC")
Board of Governors of State-chartered banks 12 C.F.R. pt. 228
the Federal Reserve that are members of (1999)
System ("Federal the Federal Reserve
Reserve") System
Federal Deposit Insur- State-chartered banks 12 C.F.R. pt. 345
ance Corporation that are not members (1999)
("FDIC") of the Federal Reserve
System
Office of Thrift Super- Savings and loans 12 C.F.R. pt. 563e
vision ("OTS") (1999)
The four federal banking agencies enforce the CRA through conducting periodic
examinations of banks' CRA records, issuing public written evaluation reports that
include performance ratings, and taking a bank's CRA record into account when the
bank seeks permission from the agency to merge or otherwise expand. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2903, 2906. Although the CRA requires banks to meet the credit needs of their
local communities, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, the legisla-
tive history of the CRA indicates that Congress did not intend the CRA to allocate
credit. Because the federal banking agencies fear that quantitative standards for eval-
uating bank lending under the CRA would allocate credit, they have not established
such standards. For example, although the federal banking agencies evaluate bank
lending using numerical indicia such as loan-to-deposit ratios and dollar amount of
loans outstanding, they rely on subjective criteria such as "excellent," "good" or
"poor" to evaluate those numbers. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 25, app. A (1999) (stating
the OCC's standards for evaluating a bank's lending, investments and services).
5. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1).
6. See infra note 17.
7. See 12 U.S.C. § 2801(c) (1999). See also S. REP. No. 94-187, at 11 (1975); 121
Cong. Rec. 25,161, 26,162 (1975).
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lending data would goad lenders into lending more money in low-
income and inner-city areas.8
As originally enacted, the HMDA covered only banks, and it re-
quired banks to disclose the location, by state, county and census
tract, of each residential real estate-related loan they made. 9 In
1989, Congress amended the HMDA to cover lenders other than
banks and to expand the HMDA's disclosure requirements signifi-
cantly.10 Starting with loans made in 1990, the HMDA would re-
quire banks to disclose additional information about their
residential real estate-related loans, including the number of appli-
cations they received, the race, income and gender of each appli-
cant, the census tract in which the property that was the subject of
the loan application was located, and the disposition of each appli-
cation.1 The goal of these amendments was to spur lenders to do
more to meet the credit needs of certain individuals and communi-
ties, including African Americans, Latinos, low- and moderate-in-
come ("LMI") persons, predominantly minority neighborhoods
and LMI neighborhoods (collectively, the "subject communi-
8. See H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 14, 20-21 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-187, at 1, 2, 9
(1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 25,154 to 25,161, 25,162, 34,455 (1975). The disclosure provi-
sions of the federal securities laws and regulations are another example of govern-
mental efforts to influence the behavior of private actors via disclosure rather than
establishing specific behavioral rules or mandates. See James A. Fanto, Investor Edu-
cation, Securities Disclosure, and the Creation and Enforcement of Corporate Govern-
ance and Firm Norms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 15 (1998); Cynthia Williams, The
Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1197 (1999). For example, disclosure of the countries in which a company
does business, the background of directors and the salaries of top management may
induce corporations to behave in a certain way, even though their underlying behav-
ior is not necessarily subject to specific rules of conduct. See Fanto, supra, at 24-25.
See also Williams, supra, at 1227, 1297. Disclosure rules such as the HMDA and the
SEC's rules thus may be seen as an effort to create and enforce norms of behavior
beyond those required by law. See Fanto, supra, at 23-25; Williams, supra, at 1227.
9. The HMDA was originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 94-200, §§ 301-310, 89 Stat.
1125-1128 (1975). The disclosure provisions were at § 304, 89 Stat. 1125-26. A census
tract is a small geographic unit within a larger jurisdiction that is designated by the
Bureau of the Census for purposes of compiling census data. See <http://www.cen-
sus.gov/dmd/www/glossary.html#T>.
10. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 744.
11. Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 1211(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2)(a)-(c), (f), (i), (j), 103 Stat.
524-526 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4)). See also 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)
(1999). Depository institutions with assets of $30 million or less are not required to
report information about the race, gender and income of applicants. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2803(i) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(b)(2)(ii) (1999). Other lenders did not begin to
disclose their lending until 1993. See infra note 17.
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ties").'" Despite the HMDA's proviso that Congress did not intend
it to allocate credit,' 3 lending to the subject communities nationally
surged beginning in 1992, following the disclosure in 1991 of the
first set of expanded HMDA data.'4
This article is a study of the expanded HMDA's impact on con-
ventional home mortgage lending in the New York City metropoli-
tan area from 1991, when the expanded data was first released,
until 1998, the last year for which the lending data is available.
This study grows out of the author's broader examination into the
various ways that the federal government allocates credit and influ-
ences its allocation. 15 The goal of this larger investigation is to de-
velop quantitative standards without establishing quotas, for
evaluating the sufficiency of bank lending under the CRA.'
6
Part I of this study examines several ways to determine whether
the disclosure of expanded HMDA data in 1991 influenced private
lenders 1 7 allocation of credit in the New York City metropolitan
12. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), at 497-99 (1989). For purposes of the HMDA
data collection and analysis, a predominantly minority neighborhood has a minority
population of 80 percent or higher. See, e.g., Financial and Business Statistics, 85 FED.
RES. BULL. A65, tbl. 4.37 (Sept. 1999). A predominantly minority neighborhood may
include, in its minority population, Native Americans, Asians/Pacific Islanders, Afri-
can Americans and/or Latinos. See id. An LMI neighborhood has a median family
income of less than 80 percent of the area median income ("AMI"). See id. at n.3.
An LMI individual has an income less than 80 percent of the AMI. See id.
13. See 12 U.S.C. § 2801(c); 12 C.F.R. § 203.1(b)(2) (1999).
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
15. The working title of this investigation is "A Law in Search of Standards: The
Evolution of Community Reinvestment Act Enforcement Policy and a Proposal for
Change."
16. Besides the HMDA, some other governmental attempts to allocate credit or
influence its allocation of credit include bank safety and soundness regulations, lend-
ing targets for the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation and loan-to-deposit ratio requirements for interstate
banks.
17. The HMDA covers depository institutions, which include banks, savings as-
sociations and credit unions. See 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2) (1999). Depository institutions
with assets of $10 million or less are exempt from the HMDA's disclosure require-
ments as are institutions that do not have a home or branch office in an MSA. See id.
§§ 2808, 2803(a)(1). In 1996, Congress created an annual inflation-adjusted asset-
based exemption. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2225(a), 110 Stat. 3009-415-16 (1996)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2808(b) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a) (1999). The 1999 thresh-
old is $28 million. Federal Reserve System, Press Release, December 18, 1998, at 1-3.
In 1989, Congress also amended the HMDA to extend its coverage to "other lend-
ing institutions," which it defined as "any person engaged for profit in the business of
mortgage lending." Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1211(d), (e)(4), 103 Stat. 525-26 (1989)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2)(B), (4) (1999)). In 1992, the Federal Reserve issued
regulations requiring such "other lending institutions" that had total assets combined
with any parent corporation of more than $10 million or made 100 loans the previous
calendar year to start reporting their 1993 lending under the HMDA. See 57 Fed.
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area.18 First, it measures the annual change in the overall market
share of applications for conventional home mortgage loans 19 from
each subject community from 1991 to 1997. Second, this Part ana-
lyzes lenders' actual lending performance by measuring the annual
change in conventional home mortgage loan market share each
subject community held from 1991 to 1997. Third, Part I examines
lenders' treatment of applicants from the subject communities
compared to their treatment of applications from control commu-
nities. It does this by deriving a "denial rate ratio" for each subject
community. 20
Part II then evaluates the results from Part I to determine the
actual effect of expanded HMDA disclosure. It begins by explor-
ing the strong growth in the market share of applications from and
Reg. 56,965 (1992) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a)(2) (1999)). The inflation-adjusted
asset threshold does not apply to these other lending institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 2808(a)
(1999).
18. More precisely, this study examines conventional home mortgage lending in
Metropolitan Statistical Area 5600 ("MSA 5600"), which includes New York City and
Putnam, Rockland and Westchester Counties. An MSA is a central city of at least
50,000 people and its surrounding suburbs. See U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Man-
agement Division Glossary (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/
glossary.html#M>.
19. The HMDA requires lenders to disclose information about four different types
of applications for home mortgage loans: 1) conventional home mortgage loans; 2)
federally-insured home mortgage loans; 3) home mortgage refinancing loans; and 4)
home improvement loans. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)
(1999); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app. A, §§ V.A.3-4. (1999). The HMDA also requires lend-
ers to report whether the property that is the subject of the application has four or
fewer residential units, or more than four residential units. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app.
A, §§ V.A. 4-5. (1999). If the property has four or fewer residential units, the HMDA
requires the lender to report whether the property is owner-occupied. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2803(b)(2) (1999); 12 C.F.R. 203.4(a)(3) (1999).
This study examines only one type of loan covered by the HMDA: conventional
home purchase loans on residential dwellings with one to four units ("conventional
home mortgage loans"). Such loans represent a high percentage of all the HMDA-
covered loans in MSA 5600. Of the 516,346 loans reported under the HMDA from
1992 to 1997 in MSA 5600, 42.9 percent were conventional home mortgage loans. See
infra note 30 (containing the source of this data). A conventional home mortgage
loan also represents a significant financial stake for both the lender and the borrower
and serves as a strong indicator of the lender's and borrower's willingness to invest in
a community.
20. This study calculates the denial rate ratio by dividing the denial rate on appli-
cations from a subject community by the denial rate on applications from a control
community. The control communities are white applicants for African American and
Latino applicants, predominantly white neighborhoods (white population greater
than 80 percent) for predominantly minority neighborhoods, upper-income ("UL")
applicants (income greater than "120 percent of AMI) for LMI applicants, and Ul
neighborhoods (median income greater than 120 percent of AMI) for LMI neighbor-
hoods. See Financial and Business Statistics, supra note 12.
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loans to four of the five subject communities in the New York met-
ropolitan area from 1992 to 1995, followed by its general decline
from 1996 to 1997.21 This study does not analyze enough data to
conclude definitively that the disclosure of expanded data caused
these increases. However, the release of expanded HMDA data in
1991 focused attention on lending in the subject communities,
which lead to changes in the regulatory environment, sparked com-
munity activism and changed lenders' attitudes, thus suggesting
that the expanded HMDA disclosure had a powerful impact.
While this study cannot prove that the disclosure of expanded data
began a chain reaction that resulted in the increase in the market
share of applications from and loans to the subject communities,
the increases are certainly consistent with this conclusion.
Part II then turns to the increase in the denial rate ratio for three
of the subject communities between 1991 and 1997, and the high
levels for all five subject communities.2 This Part examines
whether the high denial rate ratios for three of the subject commu-
nities in particular - African Americans, Latinos and predomi-
nantly minority neighborhoods - indicate that lenders in the New
York metropolitan area discriminate against these communities.23
Although high denial rate ratios based on HMDA data are consis-
tent with discrimination, they are not sufficient to prove discrimi-
nation. The HMDA does not control enough information to reach
a definite conclusion about discrimination. The denial rates are
high enough, however, to merit further analysis by the federal and
state governmental agencies that have enforcement jurisdiction
over home mortgage lenders and access to the data.
Finally, Part III of this study examines the apparent inconsis-
tency in the conclusions of Parts I and II that, while the disclosure
21. This means that these subject communities' share of the conventional home
mortgage loan "pie" increased from 1992 to 1997 and decreased from 1996 to 1997,
although the 1997 share remained higher than the 1991 share. The change in share
does not indicate whether the total number of loans they received increased or
decreased.
22. This means that from 1991 to 1997, the ratio of the denial rate in three subject
communities to the denial rate in their respective control groups increased. This, in
turn, means that lenders rejected members of these subject communities more fre-
quently than members of the control groups. It is important to note that these are
ratios only; actual denial rates might have increased or decreased.
23. "Discrimination" against members of the subject communities may take many
forms at different stages of the lending process, including discouraging them from
applying for loans, failing to provide them with equal levels of information and assist-
ance in applying for loans, utilizing race-neutral criteria for evaluating creditworthi-
ness that have a disparate impact based on race, and intentionally denying them loans.
For a discussion of these forms of discrimination, see infra notes 73, 74, 151, 153.
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of expanded HMDA data influenced lenders to allocate more
credit to four of five of the subject communities, lenders may be
discriminating based on race. Lenders' allocation of more credit to
the subject communities is not inconsistent with discrimination
against them, however, because changes in lending were more di-
rectly correlated with marketing than differential treatment.
I. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF THE DISCLOSURE OF
EXPANDED HMDA DATA
This part examines three ways that the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data in late 1991 may have influenced private lenders' allo-
cation of credit in the New York metropolitan area. It begins by
examining lenders' efforts to market loans in the subject communi-
ties following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data in 1991.24
The study uses changes in the market share of conventional home
mortgage loan applications filed by members of the subject com-
munities from 1991 to 1997 as a proxy for marketing efforts.25 The
theory behind examining marketing is that if lenders desired to in-
crease lending to the subject communities following the disclosure
of expanded HMDA data in 1991, one way they could have done
so was by increasing their marketing to the subject communities. E6
This part then examines lenders' actual lending performance by
examining changes in the market share of conventional home
mortgage loans each subject community held from 1991 to 1997.
24. In this context, marketing includes anything a bank does to sell its loans, from
television advertising to conducting first-time homebuyer seminars.
25. This study uses 1991 as a baseline for measuring change because the first set of
expanded HMDA data - covering 1990 - was disclosed in late 1991; therefore, the
first year that the disclosure of the actual expanded HMDA data itself could have had
an impact on lenders' behavior was 1992. The study uses the market share of applica-
tions and loans instead of total applications and loans because the total number of
applications and loans fluctuates from year to year, distorting the relative changes in
lending to each subject community. Relying on relative market share controls for
these fluctuations.
26. For studies that use the market share of applications to examine the lending
record of individual banks, see KARL FLAMING & RICHARD ANDERSON, MORTGAGE
PRACTICES IN COLORADO (1993); SAMUEL L. MYERS, JR. & BILL MILCZARSKI, AP-
PROPRIATE USES OF THE HMDA DATA IN MEASURING AND DETERMINING DISCRIM-
INATION IN LOCAL MARKETS: THE CASE OF' CHICAGO (1997); NATIONAL
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, AMERICA'S BEST AND WORST LENDERS
(1998); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, WHO'S FINANCING THE
AMERICAN DREAM (1998); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION,
AMERICA'S WORST LENDERS!: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF MORTGAGE LEND-
ING IN THE NATION'S Top 20 CITIES (1995); WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMM. FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS, RANKING THE LENDERS: INVESTIGATING FOR
PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAKING OF HOME LOANS (1994).
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An increase in the market share of loans from the subject commu-
nities is consistent with the hypothesis that lenders responded to
the disclosure of expanded data by making relatively more loans to
members of the subject communities.27
Finally, this part examines the relative treatment lenders gave to
applicants from the subject communities compared to applicants
from control groups by comparing annual changes in the denial
rate ratio for each subject community, which is the rate lenders
denied applications from a subject community divided by the rate
they denied applications from a control community. The reason
for examining denial rate ratios is that if lenders wanted to increase
lending in the subject communities following the disclosure of ex-
panded HMDA data, one way they could have done so was by
treating applicants from the subject communities more favorably -
or at least less unfavorably - than previously, and a good measure
of this is the change in lenders' treatment of applicants from each
subject community relative to their treatment of applicants from a
control community.28
27. For a discussion of this methodology and examples of studies that use the mar-
ket share of loans to evaluate overall lending in a community and the lending record
of individual lenders, see JONATHAN BROWN & CHARLES BENNINGTON, RACIAL
REDLINING: A STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION BY BANKS AND MORTGAGE COMPANIES
IN THE UNITED STATES (1993); JIM CAMPEN, CHANGING PATTERNS IV: MORTGAGE
LENDING TO TRADITIONALLY UNDERSERVED BORROWERS & NEIGHBORHOODS IN
BOSTON, 1990-1996 (1997); MYERS & MILCZARSKI, supra note 26; FAIR LENDING
ANALYSIS: A COMPENDIUM OF ESSAYS ON THE USE OF STATISTICS (Anthony M.
Yezer ed. 1995); AMERICA'S BEST AND WORST LENDERS, supra note 26; WHO's FI-
NANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 26; PETER SKILLERN & MAGRIT
BERGHOLZ, AN ANALYSIS OF 1992 MORTGAGE LENDING ACTIVITY TO AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA
(1994); Robert B. Avery et al., Trends in Home Purchase Lending: Consolidation and
the Community Reinvestment Act, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 81, 93 (1999); Katharine L.
Bradbury et al., Geographic Patterns of Mortgage Lending in Boston, 1982-1987, NEW
ENG. ECON. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 3; Glenn B. Canner, Redlining: Research and
Federal Legislative Response, FED. RES. BULL. (Oct. 1982); Bill Dedman, The Color
of Money, ATL. J.-CoNsT. (May 1-4, 1989) (reprint of four part series).
28. For example, if the denial rate for African American applicants in a given year
is 50 percent, and the denial rate for white applicants in the same year is 25 percent,
the denial rate ratio is 2 (50/25=2). If the denial rate ratio in the next year is 2.5, this
means the denial rate ratio increased by 25 percent, indicating that lenders treated
African Americans less favorably than whites in the second year than in the first year.
Thus, in contrast to changes in the market share of applications and loans, where
increases in the subject communities indicate more favorable treatment, increases in
the denial rate ratio indicate less favorable treatment. For studies that use the denial
rate ratio, see MYERS & MILCZARSKI, supra note 26; AMERICA'S BEST AND WORST
LENDERS, supra note 26; WHO'S FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 26.
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A. Marketing and Applications
Table One depicts the market share of conventional home loan
mortgage applications each subject community submitted from
1991 to 1997, the percentage change each year and the overall per-
centage change in share from 1991, when expanded HMDA data
was first disclosed, to 1997.29
TABLE ONE
3 0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1991-1997
Share Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Change
African
Americans 10.9 10.7 (1.8) 12.1 13.1 14.3 18.2 16.0 11.9 14.2 (11.3) 12.3 (13.4) 12.8
Latinos 6.2 6.4 3.2 6.4 0.0 7.7 20.3 8.6 11.7 8.3 (3.5) 8.2 (1.2) 32.3
LMI
Applicants 6.9 6.8 (1.4) 8.1 19.1 6.7 (17.3) 4.7 (29.9) 4.7 0.0 9.3 97.9 34.8
Minority
Neighborhoods 8.9 11.3 26.9 11.2 (0.9) 12.5 11.6 13.5 8.0 12.6 (6.7) 13.3 5.6 49.4
LMI
Neighborhoods 11.9 8.8 (26.1) 8.4 (4.5) 8.9 5.9 9.5 6.7 8.9 (6.3) 9.9 11.2 (16.8)
Table One shows that the market share of applications for con-
ventional home mortgage loans increased overall from 1991 to
1997 in four of the five subject communities. The subject communi-
ties experienced the strongest growth in market share of applica-
tions from 1992 to 1995. During these four years, for all subject
communities, the market share of applications grew in twelve of
twenty observations, decreased in seven and remained the same in
one.31 By 1995, the market share of applications from three subject
29. This study is not attempting to determine whether lenders are meeting the
demand for loans in the subject communities, and therefore does not rely on proxies
for demand such as the percentage of the population a subject community constitutes.
Instead, this study analyzes what happened to lending in the subject communities fol-
lowing the disclosure of expanded the HMDA data in late 1991. This study does this
by using relative changes in the market share of applications and loans and denial rate
ratios in the subject communities to evaluate whether lenders are improving their
lending records.
30. Unless otherwise indicated, the source of the HMDA data in this study is the
Center for Community Change, which publishes "the HMDA Works," a software
program for analyzing the HMDA data, and the website of the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, <www.ffiec.gov>. All numbers are rounded to the
nearest tenth, except where that would result in a change of the integer. In this and
subsequent tables, "share" represents the percentage market share, "change"
represents the percentage change in market share from the previous year, and a
number in parentheses indicates a decrease in the relevant share or ratio.
31. This means that during this three-year period, there were twenty opportunities
for the market share of applications to change ("observations"): one observation in
each of the five subject communities each year, for a total of five observations per
year for four years, or twenty observations. This terminology will be used in the rest
of this study.
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communities - African Americans, Latinos and predominantly mi-
nority neighborhoods - had reached post-1991 highs. These gains
slowed or eroded in 1996 and 1997, however. In those two years,
for all subject communities, the market share of applications
dropped in six of ten observations, increased in three and remained
the same in one.
The largest increase in the market share of conventional home
mortgage loan applications was in predominantly minority neigh-
borhoods, for which the share grew 49.4 percent from 1991 to 1997,
from 8.9 to 13.3 percent. The market share of applications also
increased significantly for LMI applicants - 34.8 percent, from 6.9
percent in 1991 to 9.3 percent in 1997. Similarly, Latinos' market
share of applications increased 32.3 percent, from 6.2 percent in
1991 to 8.2 percent in 1997. African Americans' market share of
applications increased 12.8 percent, from 10.9 percent in 1991 to
12.3 percent in 1997. In contrast to these increases, LMI neighbor-
hoods' market share of applications declined 16.8 percent, from
11.9 percent in 1991 to 9.9 percent in 1997.
B. Lending
Table Two depicts the market share of loans held by each subject
community from 1991 to 1997, the percentage change in share for
each year and the overall change in share from 1991, when ex-
panded HMDA was first disclosed, to 1997.
TABLE Two 32
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1991-1997
Share Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Change
African
Americans 9.3 9.2 (1.1) 11.1 20.7 13.4 20.7 14.8 10.4 12.2 (17.6) 10.3 (15.6) 10.8
Latinos 5.5 6.2 12.7 5.9 (4.8) 7.6 28.8 8.1 6.6 7.8 (3.7) 7.6 (2.6) 38.2
LMI Persons 6.3 5.7 (9.5) 6.8 19.3 5.5 (19.1) 3.8 (30.9) 3.5 (7.9) 7.4 111.4 17.4
Minority
Neighborhoods 7.4 9.8 32.4 9.9 1.0 11.2 13.1 12.1 8.0 10.1 (16.5) 10.2 0.9 37.8
LMI
Neighborhoods 10.2 7.9 (22.5) 7.6 (3.8) 8.1 6.6 8.6 6.2 7.3 (15.1) 7.9 8.2 (22.5)
Table Two shows that the market share of conventional home
mortgage loans increased in four of the five subject communities
from 1991 to 1997. Lending grew strongly from 1992 to 1995, the
first four years after the disclosure of expanded HMDA data. In
these four years, in all subject communities, the market share of
loans increased in thirteen of twenty observations and decreased in
32. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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seven. The strongest gains came from 1993 to 1995. In these three
years, the market share of loans increased in eleven of fifteen ob-
servations. By 1995, the market share for all subject communities,
except LMI persons, had reached their post-1991 highs. These
gains nearly reversed themselves for African Americans from 1996
to 1997, however, and the market share of loans held by all the
subject communities decreased in seven of ten observations in
these two years.
The largest increases in the market share of loans were for
predominantly minority neighborhoods and Latinos. The market
share of loans held by predominantly minority neighborhoods grew
from 7.4 percent in 1991 to 10.2 percent in 1997, an increase of'37.8
percent. The market share of loans held by Latinos increased 38.2
percent from 1991 to 1997, from 5.5 percent to 7.6 percent. The
market share of loans held by African Americans and LMI persons
grew at smaller rates, 10.8 and 17.4 percent, respectively. In con-
trast to these increases, the market share of loans held by LMI
neighborhoods declined from 10.2 percent in 1991 to 7.9 percent in
1997, a decrease of 22.5 percent.
C. Relative Treatment of Applicants
Table Three shows the denial rate ratios33 on conventional home
mortgage loan applications for the five subject communities and
their corresponding control groups from 1991 to 1997. It also
shows the percentage change in denial rate ratios in each year
starting in 1992, and the overall percentage change from 1991 to
1997.
33. As a reminder, the denial rate ratio is the conventional home mortgage loan
application denial rate for applicants from one of the subject communities divided by
the denial rate for applicants from its control community. For example, if the denial
rate for Latino conventional home loan mortgage applicants is 40 percent, and the
denial rate for white conventional home loan mortgage applicants is 20 percent, the
denial rate ratio is 2. (40/20=2)
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TABLE THREE
3 4
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1991-1997
Ratio Ratio Change Ratio Change Ratio Change Ratio Change Ratio Change Ratio Change Change
African American/
White Applicants 1.9 1.9 0.0 1.7 (10.5) 1.9 11.8 1.8 (5.3) 2.1 16.7 2.2 4.8 15.8
Latino/White
Applicants 1.9 1.5 (21.1) 1.6 6.7 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.7 6.3 1.7 0.0 (10.5)
LMII.lI
Applicants 1.5 1.9 26.7 2.1 10.5 2.5 19.0 2.8 12.0 2.5 (10.7) 2.3 (8.0) 53.3
Minority/White
Neighborhoods 1.9 1.9 0.0 1.7 (10.5) 1.9 11.8 1.7 (10.5) 2.0 17.6 2.0 0.0 5.3
LMI/UI
Neighborhoods 1.8 1.7 (5.6) 1.6 (5.9) 1.8 12.5 1.5 (16.7) 1.9 26.7 1.8 (5.3) 0.0
Table Three shows that denial rate ratios were higher in 1997
than in 1991 for three of the five subject communities, lower for
one, and unchanged for the remaining community. The denial rate
ratio increased most significantly for LMI applicants, increasing
from 1.5 percent in 1991 to 2.3 percent in 1997, an increase of 53.3
percent. The denial rate ratio increased modestly for African
Americans and predominantly minority neighborhoods: 15.8 per-
cent for African Americans, from 1.9 in 1991 to 2.2 in 1997; and 5.3
percent for predominantly minority neighborhoods, from 1.9 in
1991 to 2.0 in 1997. The denial rate ratio decreased 10.5 percent
for Latinos, from 1.9 in 1991 to 1.7 in 1997. The denial rate ratio
did not change for LMI neighborhoods, starting at 1.8 in 1991 and
ending at 1.8 in 1997.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE DISCLOSURE OF EXPANDED THE
HMDA DATA
This part explores the effect of expanded HMDA disclosure. It
examines the overall growth in the market share of applications
from and loans to four of the five subject communities following
the disclosure and the factors that suggest that these increases cor-
relate directly to the expanded HMDA disclosure. While this
study cannot definitively conclude that the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data alone resulted in these increases, the extent, timing
and context of the increases and changes in the activist and regula-
tory environment following the disclosure point to a direct
correlation.
This part then examines the connection between continually high
denial ratios and the. existence of discrimination in the lending
market. This part concludes that strong evidence of discrimination
34. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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exists that merits further analysis. The data, however, required for
the confirmation or refutation of the existence of discrimination is
not commonly available. The evidence of discrimination is strong
enough that the federal and state governmental agencies with en-
forcement jurisdiction over home mortgage lenders should gather
the necessary date to conduct a comprehensive study of
jurisdiction.
A. The Allocative Effects of the Disclosure of Expanded the
HMDA Data
As the above data shows,35 the market share of applications
from and loans to four of the five subject communities increased
significantly from 1991 to 1997. This study does not analyze suffi-
cient data to conclude definitively that the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data in 1991 caused these increases. Many other factors
could have had a role in these increases, particularly the economic
expansion in the United States and New York City. The extent and
timing of the changes in market share, both locally and nationally,
however, strongly suggest that the disclosure of expanded data in-
fluenced private lenders' decisions about allocating credit. In addi-
tion, direct evidence exists that the disclosure of expanded HMDA
data changed the regulatory and activist environment, and that
lenders attempted to increase lending to subject communities in ex-
plicit response to these changing circumstances.
1. Extent and Timing of the Increases in the Market Share of
Applications and Loans
By 1997, the market share of conventional home mortgage loan
applications from and loans to four of the five subject communities
had increased from their 1991 levels. These increases are depicted
graphically as follows:
35. See supra Parts L.A-B.
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GRAPH ONE
OVERALL INCREASES IN MARKET SHARE OF
APPLICATIONS, 1991-1997
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GRAPH Two
OVERALL INCREASES IN MARKET SHARE OF LOANS, 1991-1997
African-Ameries * w Latinos LMI Persons a s * Minority Neighborhoods
17
Is
13
I1
Market Share
(0 )
9.
7.
5.
3
1991 1997
Year
The increases were concentrated most strongly in the four years
following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data, from 1992 to
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1995, but they trailed off from 1996 to 1997. As Table Four shows,
during the period of the strongest increases, from 1992 to 1995, the
market share of applications increased in twelve instances, de-
creased in seven and remained the same in one, for all subject com-
munities in all years. The market share of loans increased in
thirteen of twenty observations.
TABLE FOUR
3 6
Increases Decreases No Change
Market Share of Applications 12 7 1
Market Share of Loans 13 7 0
These results are depicted graphically as follows:
GRAPH THREE
ANNUAL CHANGE IN MARKET SHARE OF
APPLICATIONS, 1992-1997
African-Americans U 0 Latinos LMI Persons m 2 m Minority Neighborhoods]
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year
36. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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I GRAPH FOUR
ANNUAL CHANGE IN MARKET SHARE OF
LOANS, 1992-1997
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As Graphs Three and Four show, the most significant growth in
the market share of applications and loans occurred from 1993 to
1995. In these three years, the market share of applications from
and loans to the subject communities increased in eleven of fifteen
observations. The timing of these increases provides further evi-
dence that the disclosure of expanded HMDA data influenced pri-
vate lenders' allocation of credit. The expanded HMDA was not
disclosed until late 1991, 37 so presumably it would have taken lend-
ers until well into 1992 to strengthen their efforts to lend more to
the subject communities. These efforts would have been partially
reflected in the 1992 HMDA data, but not fully until the 1993 data.
In the subject communities, two trends in the market share of
loans appear inconsistent with the conclusion that the disclosure of
expanded HMDA data had a strong influence on private lenders'
allocation of credit: the overall decline in the market share of ap-
plications from and loans to LMI neighborhoods from 1991 to
1997; and the general decline in the market share of applications
37. See infra text accompanying note 48.
1999] SHEDDING SOME LIGHT ON LENDING
from and loans to the subject communities from 1996 to 1997. De-
spite this apparent inconsistency, however, two hypotheses about
these trends, if correct, would indicate that the decreases are actu-
ally consistent with the conclusion that the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data in 1991 had an allocative impact.
As to the general decline from 1996 to 1997, the hypothesis is
that if lenders were under serving the credit needs of the subject
communities before 1991, there would have been significant unsat-
isfied demand for loans in these communities. Lenders may have
satisfied this accumulated demand between 1992 and 1995, after
which demand returned to a more normal level. Under this hy-
pothesis, the decline in lending from 1996 to 1997 was just a level-
ing after lenders satisfied this unfulfilled demand from 1992 to
1995. Consistent with this hypothesis, from 1990 to 1991, after the
legislation requiring disclosure of expanded HMDA data was
passed but before any data was released, the market share of loans
to all five subject communities declined significantly. 8 Following
the disclosure of the expanded data, lending increased. 9
The hypothesis regarding the decline in market share of applica-
tions from and loans to LMI neighborhoods is that the greater
availability of credit to members of the subject communities
opened previously unaffordable housing markets in higher income
neighborhoods for them, allowing them to move there. According
to this hypothesis, members of the subject communities who lived
in LMI neighborhoods and received loans would have moved in
disproportionate numbers to middle income ("MI") neighbor-
hoods, and members of the subject communities who received
loans and lived in MI neighborhoods, would have moved in dispro-
portionate numbers into UI neighborhoods. It may be possible,
through a combination of analyses of deed transfers, demographic
patterns, home value changes and surveys, to determine whether
this was the case. As for this study, the following data suggests that
this hypothesis is correct. The hypothesis would predict, for exam-
ple, that while loans grew in predominantly minority neighbor-
hoods overall from 1991 to 1997, the strongest growth would have
been in MI and UI predominantly minority neighborhoods. In
fact, this is what happened. From 1991 to 1997, the market share of
loans in all predominantly minority neighborhoods grew by 37.8
percent.40 The growth in LMI predominantly minority neighbor-
38. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
39. See supra Table Two.
40. See id.
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hoods was only twenty percent,"' while the increase in MI
predominantly minority neighborhoods was 167 percent42 and the
increase in UI predominantly minority neighborhoods was 222
percent.43
If these hypotheses prove correct, which seems likely from the
data, no inconsistency exists between these two trends in the mar-
ket share of loans in the subject communities and the conclusion
that expanded HMDA disclosure had a strong influence on private
lenders' allocation of credit.
2. Local Results in National Context
Examining the New York results in the context of national re-
sults also suggests that the increases in applications and loans re-
sulted directly from the HMDA disclosure, rather than other
anomalous local factors. Nationally, the market share of applica-
tions from and loans to all five subject communities increased;44 in
fact, the increases were greater than in the New York metropolitan
area.45 As Table Five shows, by 1997, the national market shares of
conventional home mortgage applications from all five subject
communities had increased significantly from their 1991 levels. 46
TABLE FIVE
Market Share of Applications
1991 1997 % Change
African Americans 4.2 8.8 109.5
Latinos 4.9 5.9 20.4
LMI persons 23.0 31.7 37.8
Predominantly minority neighborhoods 2.3 3.5 52.2
LMI neighborhoods 10.2 14.2 39.2
As Table Six shows, the market share of approved loans also in-
creased nationally in all five subject communities from 1991 to
1997. 47
41. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act:
Expanded HMDA Data on Residential Lending: One Year Later, 78 FED. REs. BULL.
801, 806, 808, 810 (1991); Financial and Business Statistics, supra note 12, at A65, A67.
45. See sources cited supra note 44.
46. See id.
47. See sources cited supra note 44. The "Market Share of Loan Approvals" de-
picted in Table Six includes both loans originated and applications the lender ap-
proved but that the borrower did not accept. This differs from Table Two, which
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TABLE SIX
Market Share of Loan Approvals
1991 1997 % Change
African Americans 3.1 5.6 80.6
Latinos 4.1 5.0 21.9
LMI persons 18.6 25.1 34.9
Predominantly minority
neighborhoods 1.9 2.6 36.8
LMI neighborhoods 9.2 11.6 26.1
Although the increases in the market share of applications and
loans were greater nationally than in the New York metropolitan
area, these national results show that the increases in New York
were part of a national trend, providing support for the hypothesis
that the increases were not the result of factors unique to New
York.
3. Efforts to Force Lenders to Increase Lending in Response to
the Disclosure of Expanded HMDA Data
In addition to the statistical increases in the market share of
loans in the subject communities following the disclosure of ex-
panded HMDA data, other evidence suggests that the disclosure of
expanded HMDA data had an allocative effect. There is direct evi-
dence - in the form of public outcry over the initial disclosure of
expanded HMDA data in late 1991, followed by increased commu-
nity activism and governmental efforts to strengthen enforcement
of the fair lending laws, followed in turn by lenders' efforts to in-
crease their lending in the subject communities in explicit response
to the disclosure of expanded HMDA data and changed environ-
ment - that the disclosure of expanded HMDA data had an alloca-
tive effect.
(a) The Public Response to the Disclosure of Expanded the
HMDA Data
In late 1991, the Federal Reserve released the first set of ex-
panded HMDA data.48 The data showed that in 1990, lenders
across the nation denied conventional home mortgage loan appli-
cations from African Americans more than twice as frequently and
shows changes in the market share of loans in the New York metropolitan area, which
included only loans originated.
48. For a description of the expanded data, see supra text accompanying note 11.
See also supra notes 17, 19 and text accompanying notes 6-12 (providing a more com-
plete description of the HMDA).
500 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
from Latinos nearly 1.5 times as frequently as from whites.49 Lend-
ers denied applications for conventional home mortgage loans
from predominantly minority neighborhoods more than twice as
frequently as from predominantly white neighborhoods.50
The disclosure of this data immediately created a tremendous
amount of negative publicity for lenders in New York and around
the country.5 ' Community leaders called on banks to investigate
the reasons for the rejection rate disparities and improve their
lending records.52 Community groups, activists and journalists
published numerous studies of bank lending records that generally
confirmed the national data at the local level.53
49. Denial rates were 33.9 percent for African Americans, 21.4 percent for Latinos
and 14.4 percent for whites. See Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act: Expanded Data on Residential Lending, 77 FED. RES. BULL. 859,
870 (1991). African Americans were denied 2.35 times as frequently as whites and
Latinos were denied 1.4 times as frequently. See id.
50. See id. (stating that the denial rate was 24.0 percent for predominantly minor-
ity neighborhoods and 11.5 percent for predominantly white neighborhoods).
51. See John I. Douglas, Banking Law, NAT. L.J., October 24, 1994, at B4 ("This
disparity created a tremendous amount of unfavorable publicity for banks and
thrifts."); Jaret Seiberg, Banks Making Good Progress in Their Fair-Lending Efforts,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 16, 1996, at 1 ("The first year's the HMDA data, which covered
1990, focused public attention on disparate rejection rates for whites and minorities.
The numbers were publicized on the front pages of newspapers across the country -
and inevitably drew charges of bias from activists.").
52. See Seiberg, supra note 51; see also Leslie Wayne, New Hope in Inner Cities:
Banks Offering Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, at Al.
53. See Seiberg, supra note 51. Examples of such studies include ACORN, TAKE
THE MONEY AND RUN: THE SIPHONING OF DEPOSITS FROM MINORITY NEIGHBOR-
HOODS IN 14 CITIES (1992); BROWN & BENNINGTON, supra note 27; FLAMING & AN-
DERSON, supra note 26; WHERE THE MONEY ISN'T FLOWING, A PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE CITY OF ROCHESTER, NEW YORK (1994);
JOHN E. LIND, EXPANDED METHOD FOR ANALYZING HOME MORTGAGE DISCLO-
SURE ACT DATA FOR THE EVALUATION OF A LENDER'S COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
(1993); AMERICA'S WORST LENDERS, supra note 26; CHARLES SCHUMER, HOME
MORTGAGE REDLINING DENIES AMERICAN DREAM TO MINORITES (1997); SKIL-
LERN & BERGHOLZ, supra note 27; WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMIrrEE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 26; Joel Glenn Brenner & Liz Spayd, A
Pattern of Bias in Mortgage Loans, WASH. POST, June 6, 1993, at Al; Ford Fessenden
et al., Race and Mortgages, NEWSDAY, Apr. 28-May 1, 1996 (four-part series);
Michelle A. Hill & Paul D'Ambrosio, Race Counts in Home Loans, ASBURY PARK
SUNDAY PRESS, May 22, 1994, at 1; David R. Sands, D.C. Banks Said to Favor White
Area Investment, WASH. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at Cl; Paulette Thomas, Minority-Area
Lenders Faulted in Acorn Study, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1992, at A2; Sean Webby, Mort-
gage Discrimination?, No Equal Treatment, and Unequal Lending, GANNETT SUBUR-
BAN NEWSPAPERS, Nov. 25-27 (1991).
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(b) Increased Community Activism
Community activism regarding lending to the subject communi-
ties increased substantially following the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data. The rallying point for CRA activists is the "CRA
challenge," which is a community group's attempt to block a bank's
expansion or merger plan on the grounds that the bank had not
satisfied its CRA obligations. 4 These challenges frequently end
with commitments by the bank to lend millions-if not billions-of
dollars, to the subject communities." The pace of these challenges
increased after 1991, and by the end of the 1990s, banks had com-
mitted several billion dollars of loans to subject communities
around the country.56
A CRA challenge operates as follows: When a bank seeks to
engage in several different types of expansion activities, it must file
an application for permission to do so with the federal banking
agency that has jurisdiction over it.57 The bank must give notice of
the application to members of the public, who can submit com-
ments to the federal banking agency on the application. 8 When a
bank files any one of six types of expansion applications, including
applications to merge with another bank or open a new branch, the
relevant federal banking agency must take the bank's CRA record
into account when deciding the application. 9 The federal banking
54. See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It
Works, But Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293,
294, 296 (1993); Robert C. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions: The
Community Reinvestment Act One Decade Later, 18 PAC. L.J. 1071, 1073-74 n.10
(1987).
55. See NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA COMMITMENTS
(1999).
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (opening a new branch - national
bank); 12 U.S.C. § 215a (1999) (merger and consolidation of national banks with
state banks or national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(i), (o), (p) (1999) (conversion of
federal savings association to state savings association or banks and vice versa); 12
U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(4) (1991) (business expansion plans of savings and loan holding
companies); 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1999) (bank holding company applications to form a
bank holding company, acquire a subsidiary bank, merge bank holding companies or
acquire bank assets); 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(e) (1999) (acquisition by savings and loan
holding companies); 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1994 & supp. 1999) (factors to consider in ap-
plication for deposit insurance); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1999); 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1999)
(activities of insured state banks).
58. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.4, 5.8, 5.10 (1999) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.14, 262.3 (1998)
(Federal Reserve); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 303 (1999) (FDIC).
59. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2903, 2902(3) (1999).
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agencies can deny an application on the grounds that the bank has
a poor CRA record.6"
From the earliest days of the CRA, this opportunity for the pub-
lic to comment on or challenge a bank's application on the ground
that it had not satisfied its CRA obligations has been a crucial part
of the CRA's enforcement.61 Frequently, after a community group
files a CRA challenge, the bank and the community group enter an
agreement in which the bank commits to increase its lending in the
group's community.62 After 1991, the number of CRA challenges
and the amount of money banks committed increased signifi-
cantly.63 The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (the
"NCRC") has published a catalogue of CRA agreements. 6' The
NCRC has counted 360 agreements totaling approximately $1 tril-
lion.65 The NCRC estimates that prior to 1992, banks had made
commitments in connection with actual or threatened CRA chal-
lenges, totaling approximately $8.8 billion.66 After 1991, the total
dollars committed was approximately $1.028 trillion.67 CRA chal-
lenge activity in New York City reflects this national trend. Be-
tween 1977 and 1992, the NCRC lists five commitments by banks
in New York City, totaling approximately $565 million.68 After
1991, the NCRC counts eleven commitments, totaling approxi-
mately $900 million.69
(c) Strengthened Enforcement of Fair Lending Laws
The disclosure of expanded HMDA data in late 1991 and the
subsequent calls for action were followed by strengthened govern-
mental enforcement of the laws prohibiting lending discrimination
and promoting lending in LMI communities.7" The laws the gov-
60. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.29 (1999) (OTS); 12 C.F.R. § 345.29(d) (1999) (FDIC); 12
C.F.R. §§ 5.13, 25.29(d) (1999) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 228.29 (1999) (Federal Reserve).
61. See Fishbein, supra note 54; Art, supra note 54.
62. See Avery et al., supra note 27, at 86; Fishbein, supra note 54, at 298-300.
63. See CRA COMMITMENTS, supra note 55.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1.
66. See id. at 3.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 10.
69. See id.
70. See Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Lending Analysis Must Include Discrimination Check,
A.B.A. BANKING J., Aug. 1, 1992, at 24; Steve Cocheo, ABA Takes Constructive Tack
on the HMDA Numbers, A.B.A. BANKING J., July 1, 1992, at 13; Mary Colby, Learn-
ing to be Colorblind, BANK MGMT., Jan. 1993, at 27; Scott B. Schreiber & Beth S.
DeSimone, Avoiding Liability for Alleged Discriminatory Lending Practices, BANK-
ING L. REV., Winter 1992, at 3; Saul Hansell, Shamed by Publicity, Banks Stress Mi-
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ernment began to enforce more strictly included the CRA, the Fair
Housing Act ("FHA"),71 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
("ECOA").72 These efforts included the first serious steps by the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") to enforce the FHA and ECOA
against banks and other mortgage lenders in connection with their
real estate-related lending, tightened enforcement of the fair lend-
ing laws and improved CRA regulations.
In 1992, the DOJ filed United States v. Decatur Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n,73 the first case ever filed accusing a bank of engaging
in a pattern and practice of home mortgage lending discrimination
in the twenty-four years since the FHA had given the DOJ the
authority to file such cases. Since then, the DOJ has filed twelve
cases against home mortgage lenders around the country alleging a
pattern of home mortgage lending discrimination.74 The cases have
nority Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at D1; Phil Roosevelt, Justice Dept. In
Probing Loan Bias At Banks, AM. BANKER, May 29, 1992, at 1; Warren R. Stern et
al., Meeting the Challenge of Loan Bias Scrutiny, AM. BANKER, Aug. 21, 1992, at 4;
John R. Wilke, Home Loans to Blacks, Hispanics Soared in '94, WALL ST. J., July 19,
1995, at A2.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3613 (1999). The FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status and national origin in residential
real estate-related transactions, including making loans in connection with such trans-
actions. See id. § 3605. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has the authority to insti-
tute a civil action in federal court to challenge a pattern or practice of behavior that
violates the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (1999). The Secretary of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") has the authority to file administrative
coinplaints on its own behalf with HUD alleging FHA violations and to investigate
and prosecute administrative complaints filed with HUD by individuals. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612. Individuals can also commence administrative or court pro-
ceedings under the FHA to challenge discriminatory lending practices. See id. § 3613.
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 to 1691f (1999). The ECOA prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status or age with respect to
any credit transaction. See id. § 1691(a). Various federal agencies have authority to
enforce compliance with the ECOA, including the federal banking agencies, the DOJ,
and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). See id. §§ 1691c, 1691e(g). Individuals
can also commence court proceedings to challenge ECOA violations. See id.
§ 1691e(f).
73. Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,377, No. 1-92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. filed
Sept. 17, 1992).
74. See United States v. Albank, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,401, No.
97-CV-1206 (N.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 8, 1997); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Dofia
Ana, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 1 19,395, No. CV97-96HB/JHG (D.N.M. filed
Jan. 29, 1997); United States v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., Fair Housing-Fair Lending
Rptr. 19,392, No. CV 96-6159 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 1996); United States v. Fleet
Mortgage Corp., Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,391, No. CV 96 2279
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 7, 1996); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Gordon, Fair Hous-
ing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,398, No. 96-5035 (W.D.S.D. filed Apr. 15, 1996); United
States v. Huntington Mortgage Co., Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,390, No.
1:9555-CV-2211 (N.D.O. filed Oct. 18, 1995); United States v. Security State Bank of
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covered all stages of the real estate-related lending process. The
DOJ accused lenders of establishing lending territories that ex-
cluded predominantly minority communities,75 failing to advertise
in minority communities, 6 discriminating against borrowers on the
basis of their race, 77 placing more onerous application burdens on
minority loan applicants than white applicants78 and charging
higher interest rates to minority borrowers. 79 The DOJ settled all
of these cases. The consent decrees, which the mortgage lending
industry and the DOJ have treated as informal legal precedent, 0
required the lenders to establish multi-million dollar loan pro-
Pecos, No. SA95CA0996 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 18, 1995); United States v. Northern
Trust Co., Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,388, No. 95-C3239 (N.D. Ill. filed
June 1, 1995); United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank, Fair Housing-Fair Lend-
ing Rptr. 19,385, No. 94-1824 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 22, 1994); United States v.
Blackpipe State Bank, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 1 8.10 No. 93-5115 (D.S.D.
filed Jan. 21, 1994); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg, Fair Housing-Fair
Lending Rptr. 19,384, No. 5:94CV6 (S.D. Miss. filed Jan. 21, 1994); United States v.
Shawmut Mortgage Co., Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,383, No. 3:93 CV-2453
(AVC) (D.Conn. filed Dec. 13, 1993).
75. See Decatur Compl. 14; Blackpipe Compl. 7-8, 13; Chevy Chase Compl.
11, 16; Albank Compl. 1$ 8, 14, 16-18.
76. See Decatur Compl. 10, 13; Chevy Chase Compl. 11 17, 18c; Blackpipe
Compl. 13.
77. See Decatur Compl. { 1; Blackpipe Compl. 1}; Shawmut Compl. { };
Northern Trust Compl. I { 1; Dofia Ana Compl. { }.
78. See Northern Trust Compl. 1$ 13-15; Decatur Compl. 17; Blackpipe Compl.
12.
79. See Huntington Compl. 11 6-9; Fleet Compl. 1 6-7, 9; Bank of Gordon
Compl. 7-8.
80. See Steve Cocheo, Fair Lending Won't Go Away, ABA BANKING J., Jan., 1995,
at 26; Barbara Ellis & Leonard Bernstein, DOJ to Mortgage Lenders: Monitor
Branches for Fair Lending, INSIDE FAIR LENDING, Nov. 1996, at 6; Justice Department
Explains Fair Lending Enforcement Program, 14 BANKING POL'Y REP., Mar. 20, 1995,
at 7; William J. Sweet, Jr., Fair Lending Pressures Spread to Regulations and Private
Litigation, 14 BANKING POL'Y REP., Feb. 6, 1995, at 2; Douglas, supra note 51; Robert
M. Garsson, Capital Account: Justice Dept. 's Firm Grip on Banking Industry Appears
to be Loosening, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1994, at 3; Saul Hansell, Stretching the Bor-
ders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1994, at D1; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Wider Attack on Loan
Bias Seen in Accord With S. & L., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1994, at D1; Robyn Meredith,
Bank and Thrift Groups Ask U.S. to Spell Out Fair-Lending Policy, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 16, 1994, at 3; Christopher Rhoads, Community Bankers Worried Over Justice
Dept. Bias Push, AM. BANKER, Oct. 31, 1994, at 1; Jaret Seiberg, Huntington's Loan
Bias Settlement With Justice Department Stirs Debate, AM. BANKER, Oct. 25, 1995, at
1; Jaret Seiberg, Chief Departs with a Legacy of Deterring Loan Bias, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 21, 1997, at 4; Jaret Seiberg, Settlement of Bias Case Against California Lender
Criticized for Vagueness, AM. BANKER, Sept. 16, 1996, at 3; Jaret Seiberg, California
Lender Paying $4M to Settle U.S. Bias Charges, AM. BANKER, Sept. 6, 1996, at 1; Jaret
Seiberg, When the Justice Dept. Eases Up, Look Out, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 1996, at 4;
Jaret Seiberg, Justice Department Says It Will Focus on Patterns of Bias, Not Single
Instances, AM. BANKER, Feb. 28, 1995, at 2; Jaret Seiberg, Industry Sees Dangerous
Extension of Basis for Discrimination Complaints, AM. BANKER, Aug. 23, 1994, at 4.
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grams 8 adopt new procedures to eliminate alleged discrimina-
tion8 2 and create compensation funds for alleged victims.
8 3
In addition to the DOJ's efforts, the federal banking agencies
tightened their enforcement of the CRA and the fair lending laws
against banks.' Upon releasing the expanded HMDA data in Oc-
tober 1991, Federal Reserve Governor John LaWare said the fed-
eral banking agencies would use the expanded HMDA data as an
additional tool to evaluate bank compliance with the CRA and the
fair lending laws. 5 Following. this, the OCC targeted 266 banks for
investigation whose HMDA data raised questions about their lend-
ing records.8 6 Soon after this, the OCC announced that it was be-
ginning to conduct matched-pair tests of the banks it regulated to
determine whether they were engaging in discriminatory lending
practices.8 7
For the first time, the federal banking agencies began to use their
authority to refer potential lending discrimination cases to the DOJ
and HUD, many of which became the DOJ complaints and consent
81. See Chevy Chase Cons. Dec. §§ I., V.; Dofia Ana Cons. Dec. §§ IV.8.b.d., V.13,
17; Vicksburg Cons. Dec. § VIII.
82. See, e.g., Decatur Cons. Dec. § II.E; Blackpipe Cons. Dec. § II.D.; Northern
Trust Cons. Dec. § C; Dofia Ana Cons. Dec. § 111.2-4, 6-8.
83. See, e.g., Decatur Cons. Dec. § IV; Blackpipe Cons. Dec. § IV.
84. See supra note 4. As stated earlier, the federal banking agencies regulate
banks only. A large number of conventional home mortgage loans are made by lend-
ers not subject to federal banking agency scrutiny.
85. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Release of 1990
HMDA Data 1 (1991).
86. See National Banks Need More Work on the HMDA, NAT'L MORTGAGE
NEWS, June 1, 1992, at 8; Schreiber & DeSimone, supra note 70; Paulette Thomas,
U.S., Some Bankers Sharply Boost Use of "Testers" to Find Racial Bias in Loans,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 1992, at B6; Paulette Thomas, U.S. Is Intensifying Inquiry Into
Bias In Lending Practices at Banks, Thrifts, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1992, at A3.
87. See Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 12.5 (June 1, 1993). In a matched-pair
test, the testing agency sends pairs of undercover "testers," posing as loan applicants,
to apply for a loan. Each member of the pair has identical characteristics except for
the characteristic that is the subject of the test. For example, if the test is investigating
whether a lender is discriminating against African American loan applicants, one tes-
ter would be African American and the other would be white. The testing agency
would supply each member of the pair with a profile that contained identical credit-
related characteristics. By eliminating all differences other than race, the test can
determine whether any subsequent differential treatment is the result of race
discrimination.
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decrees described earlier. 88 Prior to 1991, they rarely, if ever, used
this authority.89
The federal banking agencies also changed their procedures for
examining banks for fair lending compliance, and in doing so
adopted a theory of discrimination more likely to uncover viola-
tions. Previously, the agencies examined files of individual minor-
ity applicants to see if denials were based on credit-related
reasons.' By 1992, they changed their procedures so that they
compared the application files of minorities and whites to see if
lenders were treating them equally.91
The federal banking agencies also notified banks about their
concerns regarding HMDA data and urged them to review their
own data and lending practices for evidence of differential treat-
ment.92 In March 1992, the federal banking agencies issued a state-
ment suggesting ways that banks could reduce their rejection rate
disparities, including establishing second review procedures for de-
nied applicants, implementing matched-pair testing, offering credit
88. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REVISED EXAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR
FAIR HOUSING 5287 (Apr. 1993); OCC Report Lists Lending Discrimination Refer-
rals to HUD, DOJ, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. $ 3.7 (Mar. 1, 1996); Claudia
Cummins, Fed Using New Statistical Tool to Detect Bias, AM. BANKER, June 8, 1994, at
3.
89. See Discrimination in Home Mortgage Lending: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 1-119 (1989) (federal banking agencies reported finding
few violations of the FHA or ECOA by banks); Federal Financial Regulators Con-
ducting the HMDA Follow-up Study, BNA's BANKING REP., May 18, 1992, at 863, 864
(describing study by Rep. Joseph Kennedy finding one referral to the DOJ in the
previous ten years); HUD to Fund $1 Million Lending Testing Program, Fair Housing-
Fair Lending Rptr. T 1.2 (July 1, 1992).
90. BNA's BANKING REP., May 18, 1992, at 863-64 (including Federal Governor
Lawrence Lindsey explanations that credit history was the single most commonly
cited reason for credit denial of a mortgage loan).
91. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERIM PROCEDURES
FOR EXAMINING FOR RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN RESIDENTIAL LEND-
ING, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 5247 (1993); Stephen R. Steinbrick, Remarks
before the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council's Emerging Issues Con-
ference on New Procedures for Examining National Banks for Mortgage Loan Dis-
crimination, reprinted in 12-2 0CC Q.J. 23 (1993), 1993 OCC Q.J. Lexis 85. See also
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REVISED EXAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR FAIR
HOUSING 5287 (Apr. 1993).
92. See Statement of Susan F. Krause, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Super-
vision Policy, Before the House Banking Subcomm. on Housing and Community Dev.
and the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and Coinage, on Home Mortgage Lending by
National Banks, Washington, D.C., 11-3 0CC Q.J. 49, 54 (1992), 1992 OCC Q.J. Lexis
227.
506
SHEDDING SOME LIGHT ON LENDING
counseling and examining lending criteria that might have a dispa-
rate impact.93
In addition, the federal banking agencies toughened their en-
forcement of the CRA. From June 30, 1990 to July 1, 1992, they
awarded 89 percent of banks a CRA rating of satisfactory or
higher, down from 98 percent prior to June 30, 1990.94 They also
denied several bank expansion applications and commenced en-
forcement proceedings against banks based on CRA, HMDA and
fair lending concerns more frequently than they had prior to
1991.95
93. See Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Expanded the HMDA Data on Resi-
dential Lending: One Year Later, 78 FED. RES. BULL. 801, 813, 815 (1992).
94. HOUSING SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, 102D CONG., REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE COMMUNITY REIN-
VESTMENT Acr 33-35 (1992) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE CRA].
95. Prior to 1991, there are few reported instances of the federal banking agencies
denying bank expansion applications on CRA or fair lending grounds or commencing
administrative proceedings against banks for violating the fair lending laws. See Rich-
ard Marsico, Fighting Poverty Through Community Empowerment and Economic De-
velopment The Role of the Community Reinvestment and Home Mortgage Disclosure
Acts, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 281, 295-96 (1995) (observing that between 1977
and 1989, federal banking agencies denied less than 10 of 50,000 banking applications
on CRA grounds); Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvest-
ment Act, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 274 (1993) [hereinafter Marsico, Enforcing the
CRA] (observing that Federal Reserve denied only one bank expansion application
on CRA grounds between 1977 and 1991).
Starting in late 1991, the federal banking agencies denied bank expansion applica-
tions on CRA and fair lending grounds and commenced administrative proceedings
against banks to enforce the fair lending laws with greater frequency.
The Federal Reserve denied at least seven applications on CRA or fair lending
grounds. See Totalbank Corp., 81 FED. RES. BULL. 876 (1995); Johnson Int'l, Inc., 81
FED. RES. BULL. 507 (1995); Shawmut Nat'l Corp., 80 FED. RES. BULL. 47 (1994);
Farmers & Merchants Bank of Long Beach, Fed. Res. Press Release (Feb. 9, 1993);
First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 79 FED. RES. BULL. 706 (1993); Gore-Bronson
Bancorp, Inc., 78 FED. RES. BULL. 784 (1992); First Interstate BancSyst. of Montana,
Inc., 77 FED. RES. BULL. 1007 (1991). The Federal Reserve also reached consent
decrees in administrative proceedings with at least four banks requiring them to im-
prove their CRA and fair lending records. See Equitable Bank, Fed. Res. Sys., Doc.
No. 94-083-WA/RB-SM (1995); First Bank of Berne, Indiana, Fed. Res. Sys., Doc. No.
92-110-WA/RB-SM (1992); Columbus Junction State Bank, Fed. Res. Sys., Doc. No.
92-076-WA/RB-SM (1992); Farmers and Merchants Bank of Long Beach, Fed. Res.
Sys., Doc. No. 91-080-B-SM (1991).
The OCC denied at least three applications on CRA grounds. See Application to
establish a CBCT branch, Mayde Creek Bank, App. No. 93-SW-06-148, OCC, Dec.
(CRA) No. 66 (Dec. 9, 1993); Application to establish a domestic branch facility, Na-
tional Bank of Commerce, App. No. 92-SW-05-035, OCC, Dec. (CRA) No. 56 (Nov.
20, 1992); Application to merge First City National Bank into First Commercial Bank,
App. No. 92-SW-02-045, OCC, Dec. (CRA) No. 55 (Nov. 20, 1992). The OCC also
brought several enforcement proceedings. See First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg, OCC
EA No. 94-220, 1994 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 271 (Jan. 21, 1994); Davis Nat'l Bank of
Mullins, OCC EA No. 94-81, 1994 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 113 (Apr. 21, 1994); First
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In 1993, the federal banking agencies announced that they in-
tended to strengthen their CRA regulations to focus more on a
bank's lending record than its lending efforts.96 They issued pro-
posals in 1993 and 1994, and finally announced the amended CRA
Nat'l Bank of Bar Harbor, OCC EA No. 205, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 285 (Aug. 6,
1993); Lake Area Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 93-150, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 241
(June 21, 1993); Metrobank of Philadelphia, N.A., OCC EA No. 93-117, 1993 OCC
Enf. Dec. Lexis 169 (Mar. 18, 1993); Ka Wah Bank, Ltd., OCC EA No. 93-89, 1993
OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 141 (Apr. 29, 1993); Metrobank of Philadelphia, N.A., OCC EA
No. 93-68, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 120 (Mar. 18, 1993); First Nat'l Bank of Down-
sville, OCC EA No. 93-65, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 117 (Mar. 22, 1993); First Nat'l
Bank of Polk County, OCC EA No. 93-22, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 73 (Feb. 25,
1993); First United Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 93-8, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 11 (Jan.
19, 1993); Tupper Lake Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-848, terminated by OCC EA No.
93-319, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 569 (Apr. 29, 1992); Consumer Nat'l Bank, OCC
EA No. 92-760, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 492 (Oct. 28, 1992); Continental Nat'l
Bank of Miami, OCC EA No. 92-757, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 490 (Nov. 10, 1992);
City Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-745, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 480 (Nov. 18, 1992);
South Branch Valley Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-731, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 465
(Oct. 7, 1992); First Philson Bank, N.A., OCC EA No. 92-728, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec.
Lexis 464 (Oct. 13, 1992); Downingtown Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-532, 1992 OCC
Enf. Dec. Lexis 210 (May 6, 1992); Superior Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-708, 1992
OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 182 (Sept. 3, 1992); The Nat'l Republic Bank of Chicago, OCC
EA No. 92-710, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 180 (Sept. 22, 1992); Addison Nat'l Bank,
OCC EA No. 92-680, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 121 (Aug. 27, 1992); First Nat'l Bank
of Brooksville, OCC EA No. 92-674, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 115 (July 15, 1992);
First National Bank of Logan, OCC EA No. 673, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 114 (July
7, 1992); Palmer Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-488, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 38
(Mar. 11, 1992); Vinings Bank and Trust, OCC EA No. 435, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec.
Lexis 19 (Jan. 8, 1992).
The FDIC also brought several enforcement proceedings against banks with poor
CRA or fair lending records. See Louisiana Bank Ordered to Reimburse Minority
Borrowers, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 3.2 (Mar. 1, 1995); Sunniland Bank,
FDIC 95-13b, 1995 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 1 (Jan. 30, 1995); New England Savings
Bank, FDIC 95-156e, 1995 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 368 (July 14, 1995); Bank of Hol-
landale, FDIC 95-526, 1995 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 155 (May 11, 1995); Bank of Pull-
man, FDIC 94-146b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 399 (Nov. 7, 1994); Pine Banking
Corp., FDIC 94-146b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 371 (Nov. 18, 1994); First Scotland
Bank, FDIC 94-115b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 277 (Aug. 29, 1994); American State
Bank, FDIC 94-112b, 1994 Enf. Dec. Lexis 281 (Aug. 26, 1994); First State Bank,
FDIC 94-79b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 217 (July 12, 1994); Bank of Coffey, FDIC-
94-55b, 1994 Enf. Dec. Lexis 146 (May 27, 1994); Buckner State Bank, FDIC 94-38b,
1994 Enf. Dec. Lexis 127 (Apr. 6, 1994); Golden Security Thrift and Loan, FDIC 93-
187b, 1993 Enf. Dec. Lexis 688 (Sept. 7, 1993). The FDIC also penalized eight banks
for failing to file timely the HMDA reports. See Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr.
16.15 (Oct. 1, 1994).
96. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Regulators to
Hold Hearings in New York on Community Lending by Financial Institutions, Joint
Release, Aug. 23, 1993, at 2.
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regulations in 1995. 9' The amendments were fully effective as of
July 1, 1997.98 The new regulations are more demanding than the
previous ones, in that they evaluate a bank's CRA record accord-
ing to its record of lending, investing and providing banking serv-
ices in low-income communities.99 The old regulations placed a
greater emphasis than they should have on a bank's efforts to lend,
as opposed to its actual lending record. 1°°
Other federal agencies increased their efforts to enforce the fair
lending laws as well. In 1994, a federal interagency task force com-
prised of nine federal agencies with fair lending law enforcement
authority adopted a policy statement on lending discrimination. 10
The policy statement describes practices that the agencies believe
constitute lending discrimination and the enforcement actions the
agencies would take against lenders who violated the law. 10 2 The
policy statement indicates that both the ECOA and the FHA pro-
hibit lenders from engaging in several forms of discrimination, in-
cluding providing different information and services about credit,
discouraging or selectively encouraging credit applicants, refusing
to extend credit and using different standards in determining
whether to extend credit or varying the terms of credit offered.0 3
The policy statement also indicates that the various agencies would
take several actions to enforce the law, including commencing ad-
ministrative and court enforcement proceedings, seeking civil
97. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 51,232 (1994); 60 Fed. Reg.
22,156 (1995).
98. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995).
99. Under the new regulations, the CRA record of banks with more than $250
million in assets is evaluated according to three tests: the lending, investment and
service tests. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(a)(1) (1999) (citing only the OCC's CRA regula-
tions). The result of the lending test has twice the weight of the other tests in as-
signing a performance rating to a bank. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,168-70 (1995).
Banks with less than $250 million in assets are evaluated according to their loan-to-
deposit ratio, percentage of loans in assessment area, lending to borrowers at different
income levels, lending to small businesses and farms and geographic distribution of
loans. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.26(a)(1)-(5) (1999). Wholesale banks that do not serve re-
tail customers are evaluated according to their community development lending, in-
vestment and service record. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.25(c) (1999).
100. REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE CRA, supra note 94, at 61; 60 Fed. Reg.
22,156, 22,157 (1995); Marsico, Enforcing the CRA, supra note 95, at 200-11; Former
OCC Official: Some CRA Assessment Categories "More Equal than Others," Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 7.2 (Jan. 1, 1991).
101. See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266 (1994)
[hereinafter Policy Statement]. The task force was composed of representatives of the
DOJ, OCC, OTS, Federal Reserve, FDIC, Federal Housing Finance Board, FTC, Na-
tional Credit Union Administration and HUD.
102. See id. at 18,267.
103. See id. at 18,268.
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money penalties, damages and credit extensions for victims and re-
questing injunctive relief.104
The Secretary of HUD, who has the authority to enforce the
FHA on its own initiative by filing an administrative complaint
with HUD, 105 used this authority to enforce the FHA against non-
bank mortgage lenders more aggressively. In 1994, HUD signed a
"best practices" agreement with the Mortgage Bankers Associa-
tion, the trade organization that represents non-bank mortgage
lenders, outlining "best" lending practices for such lenders to un-
dertake to prevent or eliminate lending discrimination.0 6 By No-
vember 1997, HUD had signed individual "best practices"
agreements with 114 mortgage lenders.0 7 HUD also reached con-
sent decrees with several home mortgage lenders in cases involving
allegations of lending discrimination, including at least two agree-
ments to lend more than $1 billion to minority borrowers. 10 8
Several states and municipalities also began initiatives to create
or enforce their own versions of the CRA and the FHA more
strictly. 10 9 In New York, the New York City Banking Commission
tightened its rules for designating banks eligible to provide banking
services to the City by requiring them to achieve a higher level of
compliance with New York State's CRA and by assigning weights
to the various evaluative criteria, assigning the highest weight to
the bank's community lending programs."10 The New York State
104. See id. at 18,272-73.
105. See 24 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1999).
106. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am. and the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Dev., Fair Lending - Best Practices Master Agreement, Sept. 14, 1994; MBA, HUD
Reach New Agreement On New 'Best Practices' Pact, INSIDE FAIR LENDING, Nov.
1997, at 3; MBA, HUD Sign New Pact on Fair Lending, Best Practices, INSIDE FAIR
LENDING, Jan. 1998, at 13.
107. MBA, HUD Near Agreement on "Best Practices" Pact, INSIDE FAIR LENDING,
Nov. 1997, at 3.
108. See Michael Janofsky, Texas Lenders Pledge $1.4 Billion in Housing Case, N.Y.
TIMES, March 10, 1998, at A13; Snigdha Prakash, Accubanc in $2B Settlement of Fair
Lending Charges, AM. BANKER, April 6, 1998, at 2; Warren W. Traiger, New Fair
Lending Initiatives, REV. BANKING AND FIN. SERVICES, Mar. 4, 1998, at 51; Jaret
Seiberg, Lender Assails Implication it Broke Bias Law, AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 1999, at
1.
109. See Ellen Braitman, 6 N.Y Banks Pass City's Account As Burden, AM.
BANKER, June 1, 1992, at 6; Teresa Carson, California May Join States Mandating
Deep Disclosure, AM. BANKER, June 8, 1992, at 11; Teresa Carson, L.A. May Seek
Bias Data Before Placing City Deposits, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 1991, at 8; Jeffrey
Marshall, City Deposits - CRA Weapon, U. S. BANKER, Apr. 1991, at 18; Rick Del
Vecchio, Oakland Urges Banks to Invest, SAN FRAN. CHRON., May 19, 1992, at A12;
Phil Roosevelt, N.J. Prods Banks on Lending Bias, AM. BANKER, May 18, 1992, at 6.
110. THE CITY OF NEW YORK BANKING COMMISSION, AMENDMENT TO THE RULES
RELATING TO REOUIREMENTS FOR DESIGNATION OF DEPOSITORY RULES RFY THF
510
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Superintendent of Banks sent a letter to banks urging them to
adopt more flexible lending standards for low-income borrowers,
publicize their willingness to make loans in low-income and minor-
ity communities and provide credit counseling. 1 ' Subsequently,
the Superintendent proposed regulations that would have strength-
ened New York State's CRA law by requiring banks to devote at
least fifteen percent of their assets to lending, investments and
other services for low-income communities." 2 After New York
State issued its proposal, the federal banking agencies commenced
their CRA amendment process, and New York State held its pro-
posal in abeyance. Eventually, the State adopted CRA regulations
that essentially matched the federal CRA regulations." 3 In 1997,
the New York State Banking Department settled a lending discrim-
ination case against Roslyn Savings Bank for $3 million." 4
4. Lenders' Increased Efforts to Lend to LMI and Minority
Individuals and Neighborhoods Resulting from
Publicity, Activism and Enforcement
In response to the public controversy, increased activism and
strengthened law enforcement that followed the 1991 HMDA data
disclosures, lenders took several steps to increase their conven-
tional home mortgage lending to low-income and minority borrow-
ers and communities." 5  These steps included adopting new
BANKING COMMISSION (1992). See Braitman, supra note 109; Alan C. Emdin & War-
ren W. Traiger, New York City's Bank Regulations, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 1992, at 1.
111. See Andree Brooks, Removing Barriers to Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992,
§ 10, at 5; Paulette Thomas, Federal Data Detail Pervasive Racial Gap in Mortgage
Lending, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1992, at Al.
112. See NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEP'T, PROPOSED CRA REGULATIONS
(1993); Thomas J. Lueck, Banking Department Proposes Changes in Rating Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at B3; Warren W. Traiger, New York State's CRA Plan,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 21, 1992, at 1.
113. See Warren W. Traiger, New York Adopts Community Reinvestment Act Rules,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 1997, at 1. New York's CRA regulations are codified at Part 76 of
the General Regulations of the Banking Board.
114. See John T. McQuiston, Loan Rate Discrimination Case is Settled by Long Is-
land Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1998, at B7; Governor Pataki Announces Historic $3
Million Settlement With Roslyn Savings Bank on Fair Lending Laws (visited Oct. 15,
1999) <http://www.banking.state.ny.us/prfeb17.htm>.
115. See Canner & Smith, supra note 93, at 817-18; J. Linn Allen, Banks, Activists
Tailor Loans to Communities, CHIC. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1992, at 1; Bill Atkinson, ABA
Admits Bias by Home Lenders, AM. BANKER, May 22, 1992, at 1; Andree Brooks,
Mortgage Outreach Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, § 9, at 5; Brooks, supra note
111; Claudia Cummins, Riegle: Congress Will Crack Down On Loan Bias if Regulators
Don't, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29, 1992, at 1; Charles H. Grice, The Challenge of Lending
Disparities, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 1991, at 4; Cocheo, supra note 70; Timothy R.
Dougherty, Closing the Gap: Stung by Charges of Bias Against Minorities, Lenders
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lending programs designed to make loans to low-income per-
sons, 116 implementing new lending procedures such as a second re-
view of rejected loan applications, 117 examining and changing loan
underwriting criteria," 8 creating lending consortia with other
banks,"19 increasing outreach to minority and low-income commu-
nities 20 and working with community groups to design credit coun-
seling programs to assist low-income home buyers to qualify for
are Trying to do Right Thing, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1993, at 30; Joanne Johnson, Mort-
gage Lenders Re-Examining Their Methods, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 17, 1991, at
Cl; Albert R. Karr, Loan-Denial Rate is Still High for Blacks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21,
1993, at A2; Edward Kulkosky, Low-Income Lending Tips: Use Local Groups, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 22, 1995, at 11; Paulette Thomas, Persistent Gap, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30,
1992, at Al; U.S. Probes Bank Records for Race Bias, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1992, at
A2; Thomas, supra note 86; Heather Timmons, Improving Minority Lending a Hands-
On Proposition, AM. BANKER, Sept. 17, 1996, at 1; John R. Wilke, Home Loans to
Blacks, Hispanics Soared in '94, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1995, at A2.
Theorists who argue that disclosure rules such as the SEC's corporate disclosure
rules help to create and enforce norms suggest that publicity about the disclosed in-
formation is crucial because it alerts affected individuals that the norms exist and are
important and helps affected individuals identify actors who are not following the
norm, allowing affected individuals to take appropriate action. See Fanto, supra note
8, at 24. For a discussion of the role of publicity in norm creation and enforcement,
see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 362-64, 388, 399 (1997). In the case of the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data, theory about publicity would mean that banks responded to the nega-
tive publicity and expanded enforcement efforts following the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data in order to comply with the norm expressed by the 1989 amendments to
the HMDA - that they should lend to the subject communities - because they were
embarrassed and worried about the consequences of violating this norm following
disclosure that they were doing so.
116. See Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passman, Residential Lending to Low-Income
and Minority Families: Evidence from the 1992 the HMDA Data, 80 FED. RES. BULL.
79, 87 (1994); Allen, supra note 115; Keith Bradsher, Minority Home Loans Rise, But
Many Are Still Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1994, at Dl; Brooks, supra note 111;
Cummins, supra note 115; John R. Wilke, Giving Credit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1996, at
Al. For example, in 1990, only 70 lenders nationwide participated in Fannie Mae's
Community Homebuyer's Program, which provides loans with flexible terms to low-
income borrowers. By 1992, 700 lenders participated, and lending increased from
$130 million to $3.5 billion. See Dougherty, supra note 115.
117. See Karr, supra note 115; Jaret Seiberg, Greenspan Says Banks Reaching Out
To Minorities, AM. BANKER, July 20, 1995, at 1.
118. See Canner & Passman, supra note 116, at 88; Karr, supra note 115. For exam-
ple, some banks changed their underwriting criteria relating to employment and
credit history, the definition of family members and the percentage of a down pay-
ment that could be from gifts. See Brooks, supra note 111.
119. See Canner & Smith, supra note 93, at 817-18; New York Banks Form Mort-
gage Coalition, NEWS RELEASE, May 11, 1992.
120. See Canner & Smith, supra note 93, at 817-18; Dougherty, supra note 115;
Seiberg, supra note 117.
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loans.121 In New York, for example, Chemical Bank established a
$10 million home mortgage loan pool for borrowers who did not
satisfy traditional loan criteria.122 Several lenders combined to cre-
ate the New York Mortgage Coalition, a consortium that offered
loan counseling and a second review of rejected loan applications
by all banks in the consortium. 23 This coalition made 191 loans in
1993.124
Thus, the extent and timing of the increase in the subject com-
munities' market share of applications and loans, the consistency of
local results with national results and the widespread public outcry
over the first data disclosure, followed by increased activism, gov-
ernment enforcement and efforts by lenders to increase their lend-
ing in the subject communities, demonstrate the allocative impact
of the HMDA.
B. Discrimination in the Conventional Home Mortgage
Lending Market
As discussed above, denial rate ratios have been consistently
high in the subject communities. 25 This trend leads to an inquiry
about whether lenders have been discriminating in the conven-
tional home mortgage loan market in the New York metropolitan
area, even in spite of the allocated effort of the expanded HMDA
disclosure. While the high denial rate ratios are consistent with dis-
crimination, they alone cannot prove conclusively that there is dis-
crimination in the conventional home mortgage lending market.
Other data exists that evidence lending discrimination, including
lenders' failure to report the race of borrowers on a high percent-
age of loans, a relatively high percentage of minority applicants
whom lenders apparently discouraged from pursuing their loan ap-
plications and lenders' use of evaluative criteria that have a dispa-
rate impact based on race. 26 This data, along with the consistently
high denial rate ratios, suggest the need for a comprehensive study
121. See Canner & Smith, supra note 93, at 817-18; Brooks, supra note 111; Dough-
erty, supra note 115; Hansell, supra note 70; Karr, supra note 115; Timmons, supra
note 115.
122. See Dougherty, supra note 115.
123. See Christine Dugas, Lenders Organize to Right Wrong, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15,
1994, at 6.
124. See id.
125. See supra Part I.C.
126. As described more fully infra at note 153, use of a lending criterion that has a
disparate impact based on race is not illegal as long as it fulfills a business purpose
and there is not an alternative criterion that serves the same purpose but does not
have a disparate impact.
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of discrimination in the New York City metropolitan area conven-
tional home mortgage market by the federal and state governmen-
tal agencies with access to the data and authority over lenders.
1. Denial Rate Ratios in the New York Metropolitan Area
In 1997, denial rate ratios in the New York metropolitan area
were high for African Americans (2.2), Latinos (1.7) and predomi-
nantly minority neighborhoods (2.0).127 A Chi-Square test, 28
based on this HMDA data, indicates that the chance that any of
these denial rate ratios is explicable other than by race is less than
.1 percent. 129 The results of this Chi-Square test do not prove dis-
crimination because causality is not tested and because of the
127. Although denial rate ratios were also high for LMI applicants and LMI neigh-
borhoods, this study does not use this as evidence of discrimination against these com-
munities because differences in income may explain differences in denial rates, while
differences in race do not.
128. The Chi-Square test is a statistical method used where more than one variable
has been collected as part of a sample survey and the variables are in a categorical
form (when numbers are used as symbols to stand for individual characteristics of the
category chosen). The data is then put into a contingency table. The numbers in the
table are the actual numbers of individuals that fit the description. The test statistic
used is x2 = Y(O - E)2/E. "0" is the actual observed value in each case. "E" is the
expected value in that same cell. The expected value is the product of the total
number in its row times the total number in its column divided by the grand total of
the entire table. See JAMES BROOK, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO PROBABILITY AND STA-
TISTICS 199-206 (1990) (describing how to conduct the Chi-Square test).
129. The Chi-square test results are based on the following data for 1997:
African-Americans/Whites
Approvals Denials Total
African-Americans 5,923 2,249 8,172
Whites 33,944 4,615 38,559
Total 39,867 6,864 46,731
Latinos/Whites
Approvals Denials Total
Latinos 4,320 1,130 5,450
Whites 33,944 4,615 38,559
Total 38,264 5,745 44,007
Predominantly Minority/Predominantly White Neighborhoods
Approvals Denials Total
0-20% Minority 33,778 4,668 38,446
80-100% minority 6,268 2,292 8,560
Total 40,046 6,960 47,006
See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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HMDA's limitations, but the Chi-Square test results do show a
strong association between race and the outcome of a lending deci-
sion that merits further study.130
Denial rate ratios in the New York metropolitan area in 1997
were also high when controlling for the income of the applicant or
the neighborhood, as Table Seven shows.
TABLE SEVEN' 3 '
Denial Rate Ratio
LMI African American Appl./LMI White Appl. 1.9
MI African American Appl./MI White Appl. 1.8
UI African American Appl./Ut White Appl. 2.2
LMI Latino Appl.ILMI White Appl. 1.4
MI Latino Appl./MI White Appl. 1.3
UI Latino Appl./UI White Appl. 1.7
LMI Minority Neighborhood/LMl White Neighborhood 1.4
MI Minority Neighborhood/MI White Neighborhood 1.5
Ut Minority Neighborhood/UI White Neighborhood 2.2
In 1997, the denial rate ratios for African Americans to white
applicants at the LMI, MI and UI levels stood at 1.9, 1.8 and 2.2,
respectively. A Chi-Square test on these HMDA data indicates
that there is less than a .1 percent chance that no link existed be-
tween status as an African American person and the decision on a
lending application at each of these three income levels. 3 2 The
corresponding rates for Latinos were 1.4, 1.3 and 1.7. A Chi-
Square test indicates that the chance that race was not related to a
decision on LMI and MI Latino applicants is between one and five
percent, and less than .1 percent for UI Latino applicants. 133 By
130. See BROOK, supra note 128, at 199-200. For a discussion of the HMDA's limi-
tations, see text accompanying notes 135-137 infra.
131. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
132. The data that these results are based on are as follows for 1997 in MSA 5600:
Approvals Denials Total
LMI African-American 870 623 1,493
LMI White 1,955 532 2,487
Total 2,825 1,155 3,980
MI African-American 1,682 604 2,286
MI White 5,215 874 6,089
Total 6,897 1,478 8,375
UI African-American 2,920 880 3,800
UI White 24,539 2,787 27,326
Total 27,459 3,667 31,126
See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
133. The data that these results are based on are as follows for 1997 in MSA 5600:
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1997, the denial rate ratios for LMI, MI and UI predominantly mi-
nority neighborhoods to white neighborhoods at the same income
levels were 1.4, 1.5 and 2.2, respectively. A Chi-Square test on
these results indicates that the chance that the racial composition
of a neighborhood was not related to a lending decision is between
five and ten percent for LMI minority neighborhoods, between .1
percent and one percent for MI minority neighborhoods and less
than one percent for UI minority neighborhoods.3 As previously
stated, these Chi-Square tests do not prove discrimination, but they
do suggest a strong association between race and a decision on a
loan application that merits further study.
2. The Meaning of High Denial Rate Ratios
The persistently high denial rate ratios in the New York metro-
politan area are consistent with the existence of lending discrimina-
tion, although the high denial rate ratios alone do not conclusively
prove this discrimination. The HMDA does not require lenders to
provide sufficiently detailed information about applicants or the
property that is the subject of the loan application to justify a con-
clusion that a high denial rate ratio is the result of discrimina-
Approvals Denials Total
LMI Latino 546 236 782
LMI White 1,955 532 2,487
Total 2,501 768 3,269
MI Latino 1,191 291 1,482
MI White 5,215 874 6,089
Total 6,406 1,165 7,571
UI Latino 2,281 507 2,788
UI White 24,539 2,787 27,326
Total 26,820 3,294 30,114
See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
134. The data that these results are based on are as follows for 1997 in MSA 5600:
Approvals Denials Total
LMI Minority 2,887 1,123 4,010
LMI White 186 44 230
Total 3,073 1,167 4,240
MI Minority 2,218 744 2,962
MI White 4,038 780 4,818
Total 6,256 1,524 7,780
UI Minority 1,157 424 1,581
UI White 29,487 3,819 33,306
Total 30,644 4,243 34,887
See supra note 30 (containing the source of these data).
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tion.135 Further, the HMDA does not require lenders to provide
information about most of the factors that lenders consider when
deciding a loan application, including the applicant's credit and
employment history, housing expense-to-income ratio and overall
debt-to-income ratio.1 36 The HMDA also does not require lenders
to disclose crucial information about the property that is the sub-
ject of the loan application, including its appraised value and the
loan-to-property value ratio. 137
Despite the HMDA's limitations, a high denial rate ratio is con-
sistent with discrimination and merits further investigation.138
Even when considering complete data, including factors relating to
borrower creditworthiness and the value of the collateral, it is pos-
sible that differences will remain in denial rates. A good example
of this proposition - as well as an example of the sort of study that
would be necessary to reach a more definitive conclusion about
lending discrimination - is a study three economists from the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Boston published in .1992 (the "Boston Fed
Study"). 39 According to the Boston Fed Study, in 1990, lenders in
Boston denied conventional home mortgage loan applications from
African Americans and Latinos 2.7 times more frequently than
whites.1' ° The Boston Fed Study found that the average minority
applicant had weaker financial characteristics than the average
white applicant, including higher debt burdens and weaker credit
histories. 4' To control for these differences, the authors of the
Boston Fed Study conducted a multiple regression analysis using
twelve variables about borrower qualifications and the property
that were relevant to a bank's decision on a loan application. 142
135. See Cathy Cloud & George Galster, What do We Know about Racial Discrimi-
nation in Mortgage Markets?, June 1992, at 9; FAIR LENDING ANALYSIS, supra note
27.
136. See FAIR LENDING ANALYSIS, supra note 27, at 2, 16, 41.
137. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1999).
138. See Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,270 (noting that the HMDA data
can provide "red flags" that there is a problem at a particular institution); Clark H.
Nielsen, Regulators Looking for Racial Bias in Lending, MAG. BANK MGMT., July
1992, at 16 (discussing that the OCC examined lenders for potential discrimination if
they rejected minorities twice as frequently as whites); Thomas, supra note 86 (dis-
cussing that the OCC reviewed banks with denial rate ratios of two or higher).
139. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING
THE HMDA DATA, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 92-7 (1992)
[hereinafter "Boston Fed Study"].
140. See id. at 2.
141. See id. at 2, 25.
142. The Boston Fed Study identified several variables relevant to a lending deci-
sion, including: 1) housing expense-income ratio; 2) total debt payment-income ratio;
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
Controlling for these factors reduced the denial rate ratio between
minorities and whites to 1.6 to 1.143 Lenders rejected minority ap-
plicants with the same financial characteristics as whites seventeen
percent of the time but rejected whites only eleven percent of the
time. 44 The Boston Fed Study concluded that this was a statisti-
cally significant gap of greater than two standard deviations that
was associated with race.145 Put another way, even accounting for
differences in finances, employment and neighborhood characteris-
tics, minorities were sixty percent more likely to be rejected for
home mortgage loans than whites, with race serving as the only
explanation.14
6
3) net wealth; 4) consumer credit history; 5) mortgage credit history; 6) public record
of defaults; 7) probability of unemployment; 8) self-employment; 9) loan/appraised
property value ratio; 10) private mortgage insurance; 11) neighborhood rent/value
ratio; 12) personal characteristics of mortgage applicants; and 13) number of units in
the home. The study then assigned a weight to each variable based on its relative
importance to the lending decision. When applied to the characteristics of a particu-
lar applicant, these variables predict the result of the applicant's application. See id.
at 24.
143. See id. at 2.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. The Boston Fed Study was and is controversial and has many support-
ers and detractors. TWo critics found that errors in the Boston Fed Study's data
tainted the results, and that by using correct data there was no evidence of discrimina-
tion. See JAMES H. CARR & ISAAC F. MEGBOLUGBE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF BOSTON STUDY ON MORTGAGE LENDING REVISITED (1993) (reporting on the crit-
icisms of the Boston Fed Study). However, both the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation ("Fannie Mae") and the OCC conducted studies that corrected the data and
confirmed the Boston Fed Study's original results. See id. at 15-21; see also DENNIS
GLENNON & MITCHELL STENGEL, AN EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF BOSTON'S STUDY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING 1
(1994).
Economist Mark Zandi concluded that the Boston Fed Study was flawed because it
failed to account for the fact that housing prices in Boston declined in 1990 at higher
rates in minority neighborhoods than white neighborhoods; it should have included
several additional variables, including whether the applicant's credit history met the
lender's guidelines, whether the borrower submitted information that could not be
verified, the presence of a co-signor, and the loan amount; and it should have ana-
lyzed how much the denial rate for minorities would have decreased if lenders treated
minorities like whites rather than how the denial rate for whites would have changed
if lenders treated whites like minorities. See Mark Zandi, Boston Fed's Bias Study
Was Deeply Flawed, AM. BANKER, Aug. 19, 1993, at 13. Studies by Fannie Mae and
the OCC rebutted Zandi's conclusions. CARR & MEGBOLUGBE, supra, at 15; GLEN-
NON & STENGEL, supra, at 17-20. Several economists argued that the Boston Fed
Study was wrong to conclude there was discrimination in the Boston area because the
default rate in minority census tracts was equal to the default rate in white census
tracts, meaning that lenders were appropriately measuring the true default risks of
whites and minorities and were not discriminating against minorities. See Gary S.
Becker, The Evidence Against Banks Doesn't Prove Bias, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1993, at
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3. Other Data Consistent With Lending Discrimination
Other data exists that is consistent with the existence of lending
discrimination in the New York metropolitan area. First, lenders
did not report the race of the applicant on a large percentage of
applications. 4 7 One possible explanation for this is that they may
have been masking discriminatory intent by reporting that the race
of minority applicants whom they intended to deny was not avail-
able. 148 Table Eight shows that in 1997, lenders did not report the
race of the applicant on 9.9 percent of applications, and that they
failed to do so on 11.2 percent of applications from 1990 to 1997.49
TABLE EIGHT1 50
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1990-1997
Percent of Race
Not Available 14.4 14.5 9.6 9.8 10.5 10.5 11.1 9.9 11.2
Second, lenders appear to be discouraging a relatively high per-
centage of minority applicants and residents of predominantly mi-
nority neighborhoods from pursuing loan applications that they
18; Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The Hidden Clue, FORBES, Jan. 4, 1993, at 48.
One author of the Boston Fed Study responded to this criticism by stating that a
higher proportion of whites who were granted loans were at the higher end of
creditworthiness than minority applicants who were granted loans. See Lynn E.
Browne, Default Rates Aren't the Way to Determine Bias in Boston, Bus. WK., May 24,
1993, at 7. Therefore, whites and minorities had an equal default rate even though
minorities were subject to higher (discriminatory) loan standards. Both Fannie Mae
and the OCC conducted independent analyses of the Boston Fed's data, and after
employing several different studies using different variables, concluded that lenders in
Boston discriminated on the basis of race. See CARR & MEGBOLUGBE, supra, at 35;
GLENNON & STENGEL, supra, at 36-37.
147. The HMDA requires lenders to report the race of applicants, if known, but the
HMDA does not require applicants to report their race. If an applicant does not do
so, the HMDA requires the lender to report the race of the applicant to the extent
possible. If it is not possible for the lender to report the race of the applicant, the
HMDA permits the lender to report that the race of the applicant is not available.
See 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(b) (1999).
148. There may be many other reasons lenders fail to report the race of an appli-
cant that are not related to intent to discriminate. One possible reason is that a large
number of applicants who made applications telephonically or electronically declined
to report their race and the lender had no way to determine the race of those appli-
cants. Even if innocent, however, at the very best, lenders' failure to report the race
of applicants renders it more difficult to identify potentially discriminatory lending
patterns.
149. Tables Eight, Nine and Ten start from 1990, the first year expanded the
HMDA data was available. This is in contrast to the previous tables that start in 1991
because Tables Eight, Nine and Ten are not attempting to measure lender behavior
following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data.
150. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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have filed. 151 The HMDA requires lenders to report one of five
dispositions of an application: 1) loan originated; 2) loan denied; 3)
application withdrawn; 4) file closed for incompleteness; and 5) ap-
plication granted but not accepted by the borrower. 5 2 Any one of
the last three outcomes suggests the possibility that the lender,
either implicitly or explicitly, discouraged the applicant from pur-
suing a loan application. 53 For example, the lender might have
151. The FHA prohibits housing providers from discouraging individuals from pur-
suing housing without explicitly rejecting them. See ROBERT SCHWEMM, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION LAW § 13.2, at 13-3 (Release No. 1, 1991). Professor Schwemm's
treatise cites several cases in support of this proposition. See Trafficante v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 207-09 (1972); Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521,
1529 (7th Cir. 1990); Davis v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 343 (N.D. Ind. 1984);
United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See
also 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.65(b)(3), 100.70(d)(3) (1999). Although a search turned up no
cases that determined whether the FHA and ECOA prohibit lenders from discourag-
ing an applicant from pursuing a home mortgage loan, the Policy Statement states that
the FHA and ECOA prohibit lenders from discouraging an applicant from pursuing a
filed application by, for example, providing different information or services regard-
ing any aspect of the lending process. See Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,628.
HUD regulations reflect the Policy Statement. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.120(b),
100.130(b)(1) (1999).
152. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, App. A, § V.B.1 (1999).
153. These outcomes do not include another form of discouragement, known as
"pre-screening," by which a lender discourages a potential applicant from filing an
application in the first place. See Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,266 (stating
that the FHA and ECOA prohibit discouraging applicants with respect to inquiries
about credit). See also Krause Statement, supra note 92, at 51 (suggesting that the
fact that half of national banks received no applications from African Americans
might have been the result of pre-screening); Thomas, supra note 86 (observing that
OCC examined banks for pre-screening if they received at least 350 home mortgage
applications and less than one percent were from minorities). A lender is required to
report a "pre-screened" application as a denial under the HMDA. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.5(f) (1999); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Official Staff
Interpretation, Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(f), supp. 1, cmt. 2 (1999). This rule,
however, is subject to many exceptions, and the result is a rather murky requirement.
See FDIC, MORTGAGE LOAN PRE-QUALIFICATIONS: APPLICATION OR NOT? (1996).
In addition, the ECOA requires lenders to provide loan applicants with a statement of
reasons for an "adverse action," which includes a denial of credit or a refusal to grant
credit in substantially the terms or amount requested. See 15 U.S.C. §1691(d) (1999).
A search found no cases that concluded that pre-screening violated the ECOA or
FHA, but the Policy Statement takes the position that it is illegal. It states that lend-
ers are prohibited from failing to provide information or services about credit, provid-
ing different information or services regarding application procedures, or selectively
encouraging applicants with respect to inquiries about applications for credit. See
Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18, 628. HUD regulations are similar. See 24
C.F.R. §§ 100.120(b), 100.130(b)(1) (1994).
Matched-pair testing of lenders can be an effective way to determine whether they
are pre-screening. See Eugene Ludwig, Statement (1993), reprinted in OCC Q. REP.,
1st Qtr. 1994, at 119. For a more detailed description of matched-pair testing, see
supra, note 87.
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taken too long to make a decision, suggested to the applicant that
the loan would be denied or demanded unreasonably extensive
documentation. As a result, the borrower might have withdrawn
the application, abandoned it or applied elsewhere. While it is im-
possible to tell from the HMDA data alone whether the lender in
fact discouraged an applicant, if lenders disproportionately report
these three outcomes for the subject communities, this raises a con-
cern that they might be discriminating by discouraging members of
the subject communities from pursuing their loan applications.
Table Nine shows the percentage of applicants that lenders dis-
couraged from applying for loans.'54 It shows the combined per-
centage of applications that lenders approved but borrowers did
not accept, that borrowers withdrew and that lenders closed be-
cause incomplete, for African Americans, Latinos and predomi-
nantly minority neighborhoods, and their corresponding control
groups, and the percentage difference, from 1990 to 1997.
TABLE NINE
155
Community Percent Percent Differential
White 11.7 N/A
African American 13.7 +17.1
Latino 13.6 +16.2
Race Comp. <20% Min. 12.6 N/A
Race Comp. >80% Min. 17.7 +40.5
Lenders discouraged applicants from minority neighborhoods
40.5 percent more frequently than they discouraged residents of
white neighborhoods. There was also a pronounced difference in
the experiences of African Americans and white applicants, as
lenders discouraged African American applicants 17.1 percent
more frequently than whites. The difference in discouraged Latino
and white applicants was similar, at 16.2 percent. A Chi-Square
test indicates that there is less than a .1 percent chance that race
In one series of tests conducted in Kentucky, the testing agency found that lenders
discouraged applicants from applying by falsely stating that they did not take mort-
gage applications, by referring a minority applicant to get an insured loan at another
institution, and by informing minority testers of the rules but not the exceptions. See
HUD Enforcement Efforts Target Three New Areas, Mansfield Tells FHA Group, Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rptr., 5.1 (Nov. 1, 1990); Brenner & Spayd, supra note 53.
154. As described earlier, it is impossible to conclude whether any one of these
three results indicates that a lender, in fact, discouraged an applicant. It is only possi-
ble that the lender discouraged an applicant. As shorthand, however, this study refers
to applicants whose application resulted in one of these three results as "discour-
aged" applicants.
155. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
522 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
did not play a role in the results for African Americans and
predominantly minority neighborhoods and between a .1 and one
percent chance that race did not play a role in the results for Lati-
nos; these results are qualified by the limits of the HMDA data and
Chi-Square testing as described earlier.156
Finally, lenders appear to be using several criteria for evaluating
loan applications that have a disparate impact on Latinos, African
Americans or both.'57 The HMDA permits, but does not require,
156. These Chi-Square test results are based on the following data:
Predominantly Minority Neighborhoods
Discouraged Processed Total
>80% Minority 8,791 40,852 49,643
<20% Minority 28,576 198,855 227,431
Total 37,367 239,707 277,074
African-American Applicants
Discouraged Processed Total
African-American 7,136 45,097 52,233
White 26,022 196,842 222,864
Total 33,158 241,939 275,097
Latino Applicants
Discouraged Processed Total
Latino 4,062 25,897 29,959
White 26,022 196,842 222,864
Total 30,084 222,739 252,823
See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
157. Under the disparate impact theory of discrimination, if a lender uses criteria
that have a significant disproportionately negative effect on minorities, this would vio-
late the FHA unless the lender could justify the use of that criterion as serving a
legitimate business purpose and not replaceable by an alternative criterion that served
the same purpose but did not have the same effect. See Peter E. Mahoney, The
End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending
Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J., 409, 458-95 (1998). The
U.S. Supreme Court has not determined whether the FHA prohibits housing provid-
ers from employing housing eligibility criteria that have a disparate impact, but the
lower courts have generally ruled that the FHA does do so. See SCHWEMM, supra
note 151, 10.4, at 10-21 to 10-22 (Release No. 7, 1997). Professor Schwemm's trea-
tise cites several cases as among those finding that the FHA prohibits practices that
have a discriminatory effect. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 250-51
(9th Cir. 1997); Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 289 (6th Cir.
1996); Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-51
(10th Cir. 1995); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995);
Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); Orange Lake As-
socs. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1227-28 (2d Cir. 1994); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior
Ct. of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (1st Cir. 1993); Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315,
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lenders to report the reasons they denied a loan.'58 A lender can
report eight specific reasons for denying a loan.1 59 If a lender de-
nies loans to minorities at a disproportionately higher rate than
whites based on the failure to satisfy a particular criterion, that cri-
terion has a disparate impact on minorities. In order to pass scru-
tiny under the fair lending laws, the lender would have to justify its
use of this criterion on the basis that the criterion had a legitimate
business purpose and that there were no alternative criteria that
would serve the same business purpose but would not have a dispa-
rate impact. 160 Table Ten depicts the percentage of applicants that
lenders rejected for each reason by race of the applicant.
TABLE TEN1
6
'
Mortgage
Debt-To- Employment Credit Insufficient Unverifiable Application Insurance
Income Ratio History History Collateral Cash Information Incomplete Denied
African American 19.7 2.6 25.6 9.1 6.7 2.7 4.4 1.2
Latino 18.0 1.6 18.9 11.8 7.5 3.7 5.2 1.3
White 20.0 3.2 15.4 17.4 5.5 3.0 6.5 0.9
323 (3d Cir. 1989); Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dep't, 885 F.2d 1215, 1223
(4th Cir. 1989); Summerchase Ltd. Partnership I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522,
527-31 (M.D. La. 1997); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F.
Supp. 148, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See SCHWEMM, supra note 151, § 10.4(1), at 10-28
& n. 113.1. Similarly, whether the disparate impact theory of discrimination applies to
lending under the FHA has not been resolved. At least one court of appeals has held
that the FHA does prohibit lenders from employing practices that have a disparate
impact based on race. See Simms v. First Gibralter Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir.
1996). District courts have agreed. See Steptoe v. Savings of Am., 800 F. Supp. 1542,
1546-47 (N.D. Ohio 1992); Old West End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan, 675 F.
Supp. 1100, 1105-06 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Thomas v. First Fed. Sav. Bank of Ind., 653 F.
Supp. 1330, 1340 (N.D. Ind. 1987). The courts have made similar rulings regarding
the ECOA. See Miller v. American Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982);
Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980). A federal task force
concluded that the disparate impact theory of discrimination applies to lending. See
Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,268-70.
It is also possible that, rather than applying these criteria equally, resulting in a
disparate impact, lenders apply them differently based on race. One study concluded
that lenders in Botson held marginal African American and Latino applicants to
higher standards regarding credit history and debt-to-income ratios than marginal
white applicants. WILLIAM C. HUNTER & MARYBETH WALKER, THE CULTURAL AF-
FINITY HYPOTHESIS AND MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION (1995).
158. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803(h)(5) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(c) (1999).
159. See 12 C.F.R. § 203, App. A, § V.F.1 (1999). The reasons are debt-to-income
ratio, employment history, credit history, collateral, insufficient cash, unverifiable in-
formation, credit application incomplete and mortgage insurance denied.
160. See Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,270; SCHWEMM, supra note 151,
§ 10.4(2)(b), at 10-37; Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988).
161. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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Lenders rejected African Americans and Latinos more fre-
quently than whites for credit history, meaning poor credit history
or lack of a credit history;162 insufficient cash for closing costs, fees
and reserves; and mortgage insurance denied.163 They rejected La-
tinos more frequently for unverifiable information.
In conclusion, the permanently high denial rate ratios, even
when controlling for income, combined with lenders' failure to re-
port the race of borrowers on a high percentage of loans, lenders'
discouragement of a high percentage of minority applicants from
pursuing their loan applications and lenders' use of evaluative cri-
teria that have a disparate impact based on race are consistent with
the existence of discrimination in conventional home mortgage
lending in the New York City metropolitan area.
Il. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
AND LENDING
Part II of this study reports what appears to be anomalous re-
sults: while the disclosure of expanded HMDA data appeared to
influence private lenders' allocation of credit in terms of increasing
the market share of applications from and loans to African Ameri-
cans, Latinos, LMI and predominantly minority neighborhoods,
other data is consistent with finding that lenders are discriminating
on the basis of race. HMDA data, however, offer an explanation
for this: changes in the market share of applications were more
strongly correlated than changes in denial rate ratios with changes
in the market share of loans. In order to demonstrate this, it is
necessary to examine the relationship between: 1) denial rate ratios
and lending; 2) applications and lending; and 3) denial rate ratios,
applications and lending.
162. See FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, HOME
MORTGAGE LENDING AND EQUAL TREATMENT (1992). In order to alleviate any dis-
parate impact from this criterion, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council ("FFIEC") suggested to lenders that rather than focus on credit history as
defined in a credit report, they should focus on evidence of a borrower's ability and
willingness to repay a loan, including a record of regular payments for utilities and
rent. See id. at 7, 9.
163. See id. at 15-16 (suggesting that lenders may want to use private mortgage
insurance ("PMI") providers that are willing to employ alternate criteria in order to
ensure that PMI denials do not have a disparate impact).
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A. Denial Rate Ratios and Lending
One hypothesis about the relationship between denial rate ratios
and lending is that a decrease in the denial rate ratio' 64 for a sub-
ject community will be associated with an increase in that commu-
nity's market share of loans, and vice versa. The basis for this
hypothesis is that if lenders deny proportionately fewer loans to
one community than another, that community's share of loans rela-
tive to the other community should increase, and vice versa. Table
Eleven depicts the change from the prior year in the denial rate
ratio ("D") and the market share of loans ("L") for each of the five
subject communities in each year from 1991 to 1997.
TABLE ELEVEN
165
African LMI Minority LMI
Americans Latinos Persons Neighborhoods Neighborhoods
D L D L D L D L D L
1992 0.0 (1.1) (21.1) 12.7 26.7 (9.5) 0.0 32.4 (5.6) (22.5)
1993 (10.5) 20.7 6.7 (4.8) 10.5 19.3 (10.5) 1.0 (5.9) (3.8)
1994 11.8 20.7 0.0 28.8 19.0 (19.1) 11.8 13.1 12.5 6.6
1995 (5.3) 10.4 0.0 6.6 12.0 (30.9) (10.5) 8.0 (16.7) 6.2
1996 16.7 (17.6) 6.3 (3.7) . (10.7) (7.9) 17.6 (16.5) 26.7 (15.1)
1997 4.8 (15.6) 0.0 (2.6) (8.0) 111.4 0.0 0.9 (5.3) 8.2
According to Table Eleven, changes in the denial rate ratio are cor-
related with changes in the market share of loans in seventeen of
twenty-four observations, excluding the six observations in which
the denial rate ratio did not change.
B. Applications and Lending
One hypothesis about the relationship between applications and
lending is that when the market share of applications in a commu-
nity increases, its market share of loans will increase as well. The
basis for this hypothesis is the assumption that, all things being
equal, a community that files relatively more applications will re-
ceive relatively more loans. Table Twelve depicts the change from
the prior year in market share of applications ("A") and the mar-
ket share of loans ("L") for each of the subject communities.
164. As a reminder, the denial rate ratio is the denial rate for a subject community
divided by the denial rate for a control group. A high denial rate ratio indicates that
the bank is rejecting applications from a subject community more frequently than the
control group. An increase in the denial rate ratio from one year to the next indicates
that the differential rejection rate is increasing, while a decrease indicates that the
differential rejection rate is decreasing.
165. See supra Tables Two and Three (containing the source of this data).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
TABLE TWELVE16 6
African
Americans
A L
(1.8) (1.1)
13.1 20.7
18.2 20.7
11.9 10.4
(11.3) (17.6)
(13.4) (15.6)
Latinos
A L
3.2 12.7
0.0 (4.8)
20.3 28.8
11.7 6.6
(3.5) (3.7)
(1.2) (2.6)
LMI
Individuals
A L
(1.4) (9.5)
19.1 19.3
(17.3) (19.1)
(29.9) (30.9)
0.0 (7.9)
97.9 111.4
Minority
Neighborhoods
A L
26.9 32.4
(0.9) 1.0
11.6 13.1
8.0 8.0
(6.7) (16.5)
5.6 0.9
LMI
Neighborhoods
A L
(26.1) (22.5)
(4.5) (3.8)
5.9 6.6
6.7 6.2
(6.3) (15.1)
11.2 8.2
Table Twelve shows that changes in the market share of applica-
tions are very strongly associated with increases in the market
share of loans. Excluding observations in which the market share
of applications did not change, changes in the market share of ap-
plications were correlated with changes in the market share of
loans in twenty-seven of twenty-eight observations.
C. Applications, Denial Rate Ratios and Lending
The examination of the relationship between denial rate ratios
and lending and applications and lending has shown that changes
in the market share of applications were correlated more fre-
quently than changes in denial rate ratios with changes in the mar-
ket share of loans. Not surprisingly, when examining the combined
relationship between applications, denial rate ratios and lending,
the change in the market share of applications more frequently
controlled the change in the market share of loans than the change
in the denial rate ratio. Table Thirteen shows the changes in mar-
ket share of applications ("A"), denial rate ratios ("D") and mar-
ket share of loans ("L") for each subject community for each year
from 1992 to 1997.
TABLE THIRTEEN
16 7
African
Americans
A D L
LMI Minority
Latinos Individuals Neighborhoods
A D L A D L A D L
LMI
Neighborhoods
A D L
1992 (1.8) 0.0 (1.1) 3.2 (21.1) 12.7 (1.4) 26.7 (9.5) 26.9 0.0 32.4 (26.1) (5.6) (22.5)
1993 13.1 (10.5) 20.7 0.0 6.7 (4.8) 19.1 10.5 19.3 (0.9) (10.5) 1.0 (4.5) (5.9) (3.8)
1994 18.2 11.8 20.7 20.3 0.0 28.8 (17.3) 19.0 (19.1) 11.6 11.8 13.1 5.9 12.5 6.6
1995 11.9 (5.3) 10.4 11.7 0.0 6.6 (29.9) 12.0 (30.9) 8.0 (10.5) 8.0 6.7 (16.7) 6.2
1996 (11.3) 16.7 (17.6) (3.5) 6.3 (3.7) 0.0 (10.7) (7.9) (6.7) 17.6 (16.5) (6.3) 26.7 (15.1)
1997 (13.4) 4.8 (15.6) (1.2) 0.0 (2.6) 97.9 (8.0) 111.4 5.6 0.0 0.9 11.2 (5.3) 8.2
166. See supra Tables One and TWo (containing the source of this data).
167. See supra Tables One, Two and Three (containing the source of this data).
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Table Thirteen shows that for the fifteen observations where the
change in the market share of loans and the change in the denial
rate ratio would suggest the same result in the change in the mar-
ket share of loans-that is, when the market share of applications
increased and the denial rate ratio decreased, and vice versa-the
change in the market share of loans was correlated. However, in
the seven observations when the change in the market share of ap-
plications and denial rate ratio predicted different results, the
change in the market share of applications trumped the change in
the denial rate ratio, correlating with the market share of loans in
six of the seven observations.
D. The Relationship Between Anti-Discrimination Efforts and
Efforts to Increase Lending
HMDA data depicted in Tables Eleven, Twelve and Thirteen, in
addition to reconciling the apparent inconsistency between the
existence of increased lending and discrimination, offer some in-
sights about anti-discrimination efforts, which are generally di-
rected toward reducing denial rate ratios. First, the data shows that
it was more likely than not that a reduction in the denial rate ratio
would result in an increase in the market share of loans, but this
result was by no means guaranteed. Second, a reduction in denial
rate ratios combined with an increase in the market share of appli-
cations guaranteed an increase in lending. Thus, to be most effec-
tive, these data show that anti-discrimination efforts should be
combined with efforts to generate more applications.'68 Finally, in
fourteen out of twenty-two observations, excluding observations in
which the market share of applications or the denial rate ratio did
not change, changes in the denial rate ratio were correlated with
the scope of the change in lending. That is, more frequently than
not, an increase in the denial rate ratio was associated with a
smaller increase or a larger decrease in the market share of loans
relative to the change in the market share of applications, and a
decrease in the denial rate ratio was associated with a larger in-
crease or smaller decrease in the market share of loans relative to
the change in the market share of applications.
168. This conclusion contradicts a popular hypothesis that efforts to generate more
applications from the subject communities will result in higher denial rate ratios be-
cause more-but less-qualified-individuals apply for credit. See LIND, supra note 53,
at 7-8. In this study, the fifteen increase in the market share of applications were
accompanied by only four increases in the denial rate ratio. See Table Thirteen.
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CONCLUSION
This study makes three primary conclusions. First, the disclosure
of expanded HMDA data in late 1991 had an influence on private
lenders' allocation of conventional home mortgage credit in the
New York metropolitan area. Following the public controversy
about the initial disclosure of expanded HMDA data, increased ac-
tivism and strengthened government enforcement, the market
share of applications from and loans to Africans-Americans, Lati-
nos, LMI applicants and predominantly minority neighborhoods
increased from 1991 to 1997. The increase was strongest from 1993
to 1995, and tailed off from 1996 to 1997. LMI neighborhoods,
however, did not share in these lending increases.
Second, there is evidence that lenders discriminate against Afri-
can Americans, Latinos and predominantly minority neighbor-
hoods in the conventional home mortgage loan market. This
evidence includes persistently high denial rate ratios between these
communities and whites, even when controlling for income, lend-
ers' failure to report the race of applicants on a high percentage of
applications, the relatively high percentage of discouraged minority
applicants and lenders' use of several lending criteria that have a
disparate impact based on race.
Finally, changes in the market share of applications and changes
in the denial rate ratio correlated positively with changes in the
market share of loans, but the correlation between applications
and lending was more powerful than the correlation between de-
nial rates and loans. Changes in denial rate ratios also correlated
positively with the scope of the changes in the market share of
loans.
These conclusions have several policy implications. First, disclo-
sure of lending data is an effective way to influence lenders' behav-
ior and implement policy. Consequently, to the extent that
governmental policy is to influence lenders to make more small
business loans to the subject communities, they should impose
HMDA-like disclosure requirements for small business lending.
Since this study also shows that the effects of the initial disclosure
appear to diminish over time, vigilance and regular publication of
the data is essential to maintaining this policy goal. In this regard,
lenders, the federal banking agencies and community activists in
the New York metropolitan area should work together to publish,
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publicize and analyze the HMDA data each year. A consortium in
Boston has done this since 1995.169
Second, conventional home mortgage loans are not reaching
LMI neighborhoods to the extent they are reaching other subject
communities. This article has suggested that the reason for this
may be that members of the subject communities who live in LMI
neighborhoods are moving into higher income, neighborhoods.
Even if this is the case, this does not excuse the failure to make
more loans in LMI communities. Lenders, government agencies
and community activists should focus efforts to expand lending in
these communities.
Third, the federal banking agencies and other state and federal
government agencies, including the New York State Banking De-
partment and HUD should undertake a comprehensive study of
conventional home mortgage lending in the New York metropoli-
tan area to determine whether lenders are discriminating against
Latinos, African Americans and predominantly minority neighbor-
hoods. If they lack access to all of the necessary information, they
should encourage voluntary disclosure of the data, and if they are
not able to secure this, they should issue the necessary regulations
or propose the necessary laws. In addition, the government agen-
cies should sponsor a comprehensive set of matched-pair tests of
lenders. The government agencies should then conduct a study of
lending similar to the Boston Fed Study in 1992.17° If the study
indicates that lenders discriminate, the government agencies
should work with lenders and community groups to develop a plan
to end the discrimination and compensate for its effects.
Fourth, marketing is a very effective way to increase lending.
Lenders should continue to engage in the various techniques for
marketing their loans in the subject communities that they devel-
oped following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data in 1992.171
Although bank marketing is no longer one of the evaluative crite-
ria under the new CRA regulations, the federal banking agencies
169. See JIM CAMPEN, CHANGING PATTERNS V: MORTGAGE LENDING TO TRADI-
TIONALLY UNDERSERVED BORROWERS & NEIGHBORHOODS IN GREATER BOSTON,
1990-1997 (1998); CAMPEN, supra note 27; JIM CAMPEN, CHANGING PATrERNS III:
MORTGAGE LENDING TO TRADITIONALLY UNDERSERVED BORROWERS AND NEIGH-
BORHOODS IN GREATER BOSTON, 1990-1995 (Dec. 1996); JIM CAMPEN, CHANGING
PATTERNS: MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON, A 1994 UPDATE (1995); JIM CAMPEN,
CHANGING PAITERNS: MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON, 1990-1993 (Dec. 1995).
170. See Warren Traiger, Mortgage Discrimination: Get to the Bottom of It Now,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 4, 1997, at 4.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 115-124.
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should urge banks that have a relatively low market share of loans
in the subject communities to increase their marketing efforts in
those communities. Community groups should work with banks to
provide outreach and marketing in their neighborhoods.
Finally, the federal banking agencies and other government enti-
ties with jurisdiction over lending discrimination should continue
to expand their efforts to detect and eliminate lending discrimina-
tion. Combining these efforts with efforts to generate more appli-
cations will create the best opportunity to increase lending in the
subject communities.
EPILOGUE - 1998 RESULTS
As this article was being completed, the Federal Reserve issued
HMDA data covering lending in 1998. The data does not change
the three main conclusions of the article, that the disclosure of ex-
panded HMDA data in late 1991 had an allocative impact, that
there is strong evidence of discrimination in the conventional home
mortgage lending market and that applications had a stronger im-
pact on changes in the market share of loans than differential treat-
ment of applications, although both were correlated positively with
changes in the market share of loans. Nor do the 1998 results re-
quire a change in the policy recommendations, although the contin-
ued decrease in lending to African Americans and Latinos suggest
that there is more urgency to follow the policy recommendations.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The market share of applications increased in three of the sub-
ject communities and decreased in two.
MARKET SHARE OF APPLICATIONS
Market Share Percent Change Change, 1991-1998
African Americans 11.2 (8.9) 2.8
Latinos 7.4 (9.8) 19.4
LMI persons 11.4 22.3 65.2
Predominantly minority
neighborhoods 14.4 8.3 61.8
LMI neighborhoods 10.8 9.1 (9.2)
The market share of loans decreased in the same subject commu-
nities - African Americans and Latinos, and increased in the other
three subject communities.
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MARKET SHARE OF LOANS
Market Share Percent Change Change, 1991-1998
African Americans 9.4 (8.7) (1.1)
Latinos 6.9 (9.2) 25.5
LMI persons 9.1 (22.9) 44.4
Predominantly minority
neighborhoods 10.7 4.9 44.6
LMI neighborhoods 8.4 6.3 (17.6)
Finally, denial rate ratios increased for predominantly minority
neighborhood applicants, decreased for African Americans and
LMI persons, and remained the same for the remaining two subject
communities:
DENIAL RATE RATIOS
Denial Rate Ratio Percent Change Change, 1991-1998
African Americans 2.1 (4.5) 10.5
Latinos 1.7 - 10.5
LMI persons 2.0 (13.0) 33.3
Predominantly minority
neighborhoods 1.9 5.0 -
LMI neighborhoods 1.8 -
The denial rate ratios also remain high when controlling for ap-
plicant or neighborhood income:
LMI
African Americans
Latinos
Predominantly minority neighborhoods
M1
African Americans
Latinos
Predominantly minority neighborhoods
U1
African Americans
Latinos
Predominantly minority neighborhoods
Denial Rate Ratio
1.8
1.4
1.4
Denial Rate Ratio
1.7
1.5
1.5
Denial Rate Ratio
2.3
1.8
1.9
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The other indicia of discrimination cited earlier in this article -
lenders' failure to report the race of applicants, lenders' discourag-
ing members of the subject communities from applying for loans
and lenders' use of criteria that have a disparate impact - continue
to point toward discrimination. The percentage of applicants for
which lenders did not report race increased significantly from 9.9
percent in 1997 to 14.9 percent in 1998. This was the highest per-
532 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
centage of applicants whose race was not reported during the nine
years such data has been available. Second, lenders discouraged
applicants from the subject communities more frequently than ap-
plicants from control communities in 1998 than the average for
1990 to 1997. Lenders discouraged Latinos 1.3 times more fre-
quently and African Americans 1.5 times more frequently than
whites, and applicants from minority neighborhoods 1.7 times
more frequently as applicants from white neighborhoods. Finally,
lenders continued to reject African Americans and Latinos more
frequently for credit history and insufficient cash and for debt-to-
income ratios.
AN INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE
APPROACH TO SUBURBAN
RACIAL DESEGREGATION
Paul Boudreaux*
vTRODUCTION
Thirty years after the enactment of the Fair Housing Act of 1968
(the "FHA"),' racial segregation in housing persists throughout
America's metropolitan areas.2 Despite the hope that outlawing
housing discrimination would result in desegregation, African
Americans 3 in metropolitan areas continue to live in neighbor-
hoods that are composed predominantly of members of their own
race.4 In particular, the replication of this segregation in the sub-
urbs, to which African Americans are moving in large numbers,
seems to contradict the assumptions of 1968, at which time it was
argued that blacks were trapped in central city ghettos due to dis-
* Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. J.D., University of
Virginia; LL.M., Georgetown University. The author would like to thank Professor
Sheryll Cashin of Georgetown for her comments on an earlier draft of this essay. The
opinions expressed in this essay are the author's alone and not of the Department of
Justice.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
2. See DOUGLAS A. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 67-
74 (1993).
3. The FHA prohibits housing discrimination on account of any racial factor. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3605 (1994). Most commentary on racial integration focuses on
African Americans and whites in large part because of the small numbers of other
racial groups in the United States as recently as 1968. Since then, a surge in immigra-
tion has increased tremendously the numbers of Hispanics, Asians, and members of
other racial groups. See WORLD ALMANAC 379 (1997) (observing that the Hispanic
population was up to 9.0% in 1990 from 6.4% in 1980 and the Asian population was
up to 2.9% from 1.5%). For the sake of simplicity, this paper will concentrate on the
concept of a two-race metropolitan area. Some of what this essay proposes can apply
to other racial minorities, but it has been asserted that no other racial group has ex-
perienced the same level of segregation as have African Americans. See MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 2, at 77. Finally, as a matter of style, this paper employs the term
"African American," which appears to have superseded the term "black" in most
academic writing as of 1998. Exceptions include some references to census data that
uses the term "black."
4. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 221-23 (comparing Census data from
1980 and 1990 and concluding that "segregation [especially in the north] remains high
and virtually constant").
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crimination by the housing industry, hostile white suburbs and
timid government.5
What accounts for the replication of segregation in the suburbs?
The traditional model explaining racial segregation has blamed dis-
crimination by institutional actors in the housing industry and gov-
ernment. The traditional model ignores the individual preference
factors that contribute to segregation. This essay does not deny the
continued existence of institutional discrimination but instead ar-
gues that the traditional model cannot explain all the causes of seg-
regation in housing. Understanding and accepting the importance
of the individual preference factors may change our view and even-
tually lead to more effective means of pursuing metropolitan racial
desegregation in the twenty-first century.
Part I describes the replication of segregation in the expanding
suburban jurisdictions of metropolitan areas and the traditional
legal responses to metropolitan segregation. The part ends by ex-
plaining the implications of suburban migration of African Ameri-
cans and questioning the adequacy of the traditional model.
Part II sets forth the individual preference factors of both whites
and African Americans that contribute to the replication of segre-
gation in suburbs. This part first develops the traditional concept
of the segregation premium in housing prices in predominantly
white suburbs. The premium reflects the personal reluctance of
whites to live alongside African Americans that in turn socially dis-
courages African American migration. Part II then discusses the
personal housing choices of African Americans that play a role in
suburban segregation, such as a reluctance to be an icebreaker in
an all-white neighborhood, a desire not to move too far from pre-
existing social ties, or a preference for building successful suburbs
of African American homeowners. There is currently no method
to compare the relative weight of institutional discrimination
against individual preference factors, nonetheless, if government
and society desire greater racial integration in housing, law and
policy must directly address these individual preference factors.
Finally, in Part III, implications of the individual preference fac-
tors are discussed. In order to break through the segregation pre-
mium dilemma and other preference factors, legislation must
affirmatively attract African Americans to particular suburban re-
gions. Out of the three methods of attack against racial segrega-
tion, enforcement of laws prohibiting institutional discrimination,
5. See id. at 17-59 (tracing the history and listing examples of the discrimination
by institutional actors).
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integration of public housing, and the Mount Laurel-type fair share
approach,6 only the fair share idea holds hope for overcoming the
individual preference factors. Although these state-law mandates
for low-cost housing have failed to create widespread desegrega-
tion, this essay suggests that fair share approaches might be more
successful if they focused less on housing for low-income persons
and more on encouraging the construction of apartment units in
suburban areas. Wider zoning for apartments, while not a cure-all
for segregation in housing, at least holds the promise of being eas-
ier to administer than the traditional fair share mandates by en-
gendering less local opposition and by more effectively creating
desegregation in the suburban realm.
I. IMPLICATIONS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN SUBURBAN
SEGREGATION FOR THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF
METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION
A. The Dilemma of Suburban Segregation
Racial segregation in American culture and society has been well
documented. It has been the essential "American dilemma"
throughout much of the nation's history. 7 The mid-20th century
civil rights decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, which ordered
school desegregation 8 and laws outlawing segregation in employ-
ment and accommodations, 9 have been among the most famous
and significant American legal attempts at social justice. By 1968,
there was even an optimism over eradicating a fundamental and
far-reaching aspect of segregation - residential segregation. 10 At
that time, there had not been much progress in integrating residen-
tial areas. In March 1968, the federally ordered Kerner Commis-
sion Report lamented that the effects of American policy and
culture had made "permanent the division of our country into two
6. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713, 732-33 (N.J. 1975) (requiring, as a matter of New Jersey law, certain subur-
ban jurisdictions to take steps to permit migration of a "fair share" of the region's
low-income persons).
7. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
8. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950) (attacking aspects of segre-
gation of law schools); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding
that racial segregation of schools was unconstitutional); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971) (ordering desegregation plans of school
districts).
9. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h(6) (1994); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973a-1973p (1994).
10. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 59.
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societies; one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities;
the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the sub-
urbs."" The Report concluded that this sharp segregation created
the urban ghettos that trapped and impoverished African
Americans. 12
Thirty years since the passage of the FHA, there has been lim-
ited integration of the races in metropolitan areas. The most signif-
icant recent study of racial segregation is Douglas S. Massey and
Nancy A. Denton's American Apartheid.'3 Sociologists Massey
and Denton detail the disappointing history of American policy
fostering housing segregation,' 4 the persistence of this segrega-
tion,'5 the deleterious effects of segregation on urban African
Americans,' 6 and their prescriptions for change.' 7 They perceive a
decline in interest in residential desegregation in the decades after
the FHA and call for a national refocus on efforts to desegregate
metropolitan areas.' 8
Throughout most of the Massey and Denton study, the work
uses 1980 census figures, but concludes with some preliminary 1990
data that was available before their monograph went to press.
Massey and Denton show that most African Americans in the
thirty metropolitan areas with the largest black populations in the
United States remain highly segregated in terms of isolation and
concentration. 19 For sixteen of these metro areas, Massey and
Denton characterize the pattern of African American living as
"hypersegregation. '' 20 They forcefully dispel the notion that the
Fair Housing laws desegregated metropolitan areas.
A trend not addressed at length by Massey and Denton is the
persistence of residential segregation in metropolitan suburbs.
They show that metro areas with significant African American sub-
urban populations in 1980, such as Washington, D.C., Memphis, St.
Louis and Birmingham, held segregation indices that were some-
what lower than those of the central cities but which were still
11. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 4 (citing U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N
ON CIVIL DISORDERS, THE KERNER REPORT 1 (1988)).
12. See id. at 2.
13. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2.
14. See id. at 16-59.
15. See id. at 60-114.
16. See id. at 115-85.
17. See id. at 186-235.
18. See id. at 7, 16.
19. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 60-82 (1980 figures), 221-29 (1990
figures).
20. See id. at 74-78.
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unacceptably high in their opinion.21 Only suburban regions with
very few African Americans showed significant integration.22 In
the end, Massey and Denton view segregation as still a matter of a
"chocolate city with vanilla suburbs. ' 23
Since Massey and Denton's use of 1980 census figures, African
American migration to suburbs has proceeded rapidly in certain
areas. By the early 1990s, more than half of the Washington area's
African American population lived in the suburbs as well as about
half of the Atlanta area's African Americans. 24 Other metropoli-
tan areas showed similar types of migrations of African Americans
to suburban regions.25 Also following these migrations to the sub-
urbs is the urban pattern of racial segregation. Consider the Wash-
ington, D.C. metro area, the nation's leader in African American
suburbanization. 26 The city is surrounded by three very large sub-
21. See id. at 75-77.
22. See id. (citing examples from Indianapolis and Kansas City).
23. Id. at 61.
24. In the Washington, D.C. area, the number of African Americans in the central
city was estimated in 1996 to be 340,837 (62.7% of the city population), which was
exceeded by the estimated total of 429,371 African Americans in suburban Prince
George's County, Maryland. Compare U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY POPU-
LATION ESTIMATES By RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (visited Sept. 29, 1999) <http://
www.census.gov/population/estimates/county/crh/crhdc96.txt>, with U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES By RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (vis-
ited Sept. 29, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/county/crh/
crhmd96.txt>. The black population of the suburban Atlanta counties of DeKalb
(230,425, some of whom lived in the City of Atlanta), Cobb (44,154), Clayton (43,403)
and Gwinnett (18,175) totaled 336,157 in 1990, which exceeded the black population
of Fulton County (324,008), which includes most of Atlanta. See U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 102 (1994).
25. For example, Burlington County, New Jersey, east of Philadelphia, was esti-
mated to be 16.1% African American in 1996. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES (visited Sept. 29, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/
population/estimates/county/crh/crhnj96.txt>. Burlington County was the home of
the famous "fair share" litigation. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). St. Louis's major suburban county,
St. Louis County, which does not include the city, was 16.0% African American. Bal-
timore County, Maryland, which surrounds Baltimore but does not include the city,
was 14.4% African American. Nassau County, New York, east of New York City, was
9.6% African American, according to the 1996 estimates. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES (visited Sept. 29, 1999) <http://
www.census.gov/populationlwww/estimates/co_crh.html>. These figures compare to
the nationwide figure of 12.6% of Americans who were African American in 1996.
See WORLD ALMANAC 379 (1998) (citing Census data).
26. Prince George's County, Maryland is the nation's first predominantly black
suburban county. See Martin Walker, All the Kings' Forces - Today is Martin Luther
King Day but as His Family and the City of Atlanta Squabble Over His Memorial,
What Does He Now Mean to America's Increasingly Suburban Blacks?, THE GUARD.
I^ Jan. 16, 1995, at T002, available in 1995 WL 7574025.
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urban counties. In 1996, while suburban Prince George's County,
Maryland held a population that was estimated to be 56.0% Afri-
can American,27 neighboring Montgomery County's population
was 14.4% black,28 and that of Fairfax County, Virginia, the na-
tion's richest county per household,29 was only 8.3% black.30 East
of Atlanta, DeKalb County had the highest percentage of African
Americans in the metropolitan population at 45.1% in 1996. 31 De-
spite the fact that Georgia's population as a whole was 28.2% Afri-
can American,32 no other suburban county in the Atlanta metro
area exceeded a 10% black population.33
Suburban living is favored as an ideal residential option. Nearly
a majority of Americans now live in suburban areas.34 Suburban-
ites outnumber city dwellers in nearly every metropolitan area of
the country. With the popularity of the suburban lifestyle, any
future successful racial desegregation program will have to address
the replication of segregation in the suburbs. The Kerner Commis-
sion's prediction that the separation between black city and white
suburb would melt with large numbers of African Americans mi-
grating to the suburbs is far from the reality of the racial separation
recreating itself in the suburbs. Lawmakers and commentators
should reassess the traditional assumptions of racial segregation in
order to find the most effective approaches for law and policy for
the coming decades.36
27. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES (visited Sept.
29, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/county/crh/
crhmd96.txt>. In 1970, only 22.7% of the Washington area's blacks lived in the sub-
urbs, in comparison to the slightly more than 90% of area whites who did so - a
reflection of the traditional dichotomy between heavily black central cities and mostly
white suburbs. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 68. By 1980, after more than
a decade of fair housing laws, the percentage of the area's blacks living in the suburbs
rose sharply, to 46.2 %. See id.
28. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES, supra
note 27.
29. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK xv (1994).
30. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES BY
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/estimates/county/crh/crhva96.txt>.
31. See id. at <http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/county/crh/
crhga96.txt>.
32. See id. at <http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/state/srh/srhus96.txt>.
33. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 31.
34. See William F. Gibson, Self-Governing Movement Mirrors Republican Base,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 23, 1995, at G1 (citing Census estimates).
35. See WORLD ALMANAC 384-85 (1998).
36. This paper proceeds on the assumption that racial desegregation is a signifi-
cant goal of public law and policy. There remains disagreement as to this goal. Since
the passage of the 1960s' anti-discrimination legislation, many reformers have argued
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B. The Traditional Legal Responses to,
Metropolitan Segregation
Traditional legal efforts against residential segregation can be
identified into three broad categories: 1) the outlawing of institu-
tional discrimination; 2) the imposition of an affirmative burden on
the federal government to foster desegregation; 3) and the state
fair share initiatives for spreading low income housing.
1. Institutional Discrimination
Institutional discrimination is discrimination on the part of real
estate agents, lenders, other commercial parties in the housing in-
dustry and by the government. By outlawing such discrimination
in the sale or rental of housing and in real-estate lending, the FHA
offered the promise of desegregating residential patterns. 37 Lead-
ing commentators on racial segregation patterns have traditionally
focused most of the blame for metropolitan segregation on these
institutional parties. 38 Massey and Denton describe the "construc-
tion of the ghetto '39 as the result of historical practices of the real
estate industry and governmental entities. In blockbusting, real es-
tate agents played on racial fears to encourage the panicked flight
of white residents from an area and financially benefited from
that African American urban neighborhoods need to be re-built from within, that
desegregation efforts distract from local efforts and that effective desegregation might
better be achieved as the result of urban policies that accept current racial patterns.
See generally WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (discussing the dilemmas of urban Af-
rican American poverty). Some modern conservatives have suggested that a consid-
erable amount of segregation is the natural outcome of racial and cultural differences
and that economic efficiency is not necessarily harmed but may be maximized by per-
mitting voluntary segregation. See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS (1992). Finally, a growing number of African American leaders see inte-
gration as an outmoded notion that would serve only to disperse racial pride and
hamper the opportunities for the success of an Afro-centric culture. See, e.g., Michael
Fletcher, NAACP Facing New Challenges Over Integration As Group Continues,
Some Seek Greater Focus on Self-Help, WASH. POST, July 14, 1997, at Al. On another
side of the debate, one politically moderate commentator has argued that "building
from within" has not worked and cannot work for racially isolated neighborhoods,
and therefore efforts at integration are more needed than ever. Former mayor and
metropolitan commentator David Rusk has written bluntly that "[b]ad communities
defeat good programs." DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 121 (1993).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994) (outlawing discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing); 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1994) (outlawing discrimination in real estate-related
transactions, including lending).
38. See RICHARD MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING 106 (1969) (summarizing policy
views in the late 1960s that stated that segregation is the result of landlords' and real
estate agents' refusal to rent and sell to African Americans).
39. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 17-59, 186.
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these fears.40 Historian Kenneth Jackson blames the actions taken
by government entities before 1968 for the segregation in the
American suburb. The Fair Housing Administration actively dis-
couraged the mingling of races out of a belief that only white
neighborhoods, and not the redlined areas with a significant black
population, could insure stable property values.41 By forcing the
housing industry to accept African Americans as homeowners and
tenants, de-segregationists hoped that metropolitan neighbor-
hoods, in particular the ever-growing suburban regions, 2 would
become more racially integrated.43
The FHA, however, has accomplished only limited success in
achieving integration. Massey and Denton conclude that the FHA
was "structurally flawed and all but doomed to fail."44 They blame
largely the lack of enforcement under the original FHA: the lim-
ited litigation powers for the U.S. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development ("HUD"), the short limitations provisions for
bringing lawsuits and the expense of bringing private suits against
institutional defendants without providing for attorney's fees or
punitive damages.4 5 The 1988 amendments to the FHA amelio-
rated many of these flaws by extending the time in which to file a
Fair Housing complaint to two years, permitting recovery of attor-
ney's fees, providing for expedited administrative adjudication, au-
thorizing large fines and mandating that HUD bring suit once
discrimination was found to have occurred.46 While there is some
evidence that segregation has slowed since the 1988 amendments,
whether they will significantly alter the patterns and trends of met-
ropolitan housing segregation is yet to be seen.47
40. See id. at 37-38.
41. See KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 207-08, 214 (1985) (criticizing
the Federal Housing Administration's underwriting guidelines in the 1930s and
1940s).
42. See generally GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACrURED METROPOLIS (1991)
(arguing that the political fragmentation of suburban areas into numerous localities
has encouraged locational stereotyping and racial insularity).
43. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 60.
44. Id. at 14.
45. See id. at 193-200.
46. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619.
See also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 210 (discussing the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988).
47. According to census estimates, black household home ownership was 41.6% in
1970 and 34.5% in 1950. The overall rate of African American household home own-
ership rose slightly in the early 1990s, from 43.4% in 1990 to 43.6% in 1995. See U.S.
Bureau of the Census (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hous-
ing/census/historic/ownrate.html>.
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2. Federal Government Responsibilities
The FHA has been judicially interpreted as imposing an affirma-
tive duty upon HUD to promote desegregation in the administer-
ing of its programs and activities.4 8 In Hills v. Gautreaux,49 the
Supreme Court affirmed an order requiring HUD and the Chicago
public housing authority to institute a program to place public
housing tenants in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods.
Other lawsuits over the placement of public housing units have
proven to be among the most contentious in American civil rights
history, as localities have fought fiercely to avoid the placement of
largely African American public housing facilities in predomi-
nantly white neighborhoods.5 °
The executive branch has also pushed HUD to take an active
role in desegregation. President Kennedy's 1962 Executive Order
against discrimination in federally supported housing5 led to HUD
rejecting the placement of largely African American public hous-
ing in largely African American neighborhoods. More recently,
the Clinton administration, through the enforcement of an affirma-
tive mandate, declared its intention to use HUD programs to effect
desegregation. 52  Nonetheless, the affirmative mandate reaches
only HUD programs and activities and is limited due to the small
number of federally supported public housing units. 3
48. In the FHA, Congress declared that "it is the policy of the United States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968). The FHA refers to actions against "discriminatory
housing practices." See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (functions of HUD Secretary); 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613 (private enforcement). Certain courts have interpreted these statements,
along with the command to all federal agencies to "administer their programs and
activities relating to housing and urban development.., in a manner affirmatively to
further the purposes of this subchapter," 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (obliging HUD to con-
duct its operations so as not to result in housing patterns of segregation). See, e.g.,
NAACP v. Secretary of HUD, 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987); Anderson v. City of Al-
pharetta, 737 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1984); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484
F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
49. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). For the most part, the effect of this suburban migration
on those who have chosen to participate has been favorable. See James Rosenbaum
et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Educa-
tion, and Social-Integration for Low-Income Blacks?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1519 (1993).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987).
51. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963 comp.), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 app. at 6-8 (1994).
52. See Exec. Order No. 12,892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 3608
(1994); Memorandum of President, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 3608.
53. Only two percent of the nation's housing units were publicly financed in the
early 1990s. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 229.
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Without effective enforcement, federal plans integrating public
housing recipients will do little to affect the overall level of racial
integration in a metropolitan area.
3. State Fair Share Initiatives
State governments have pursued desegregation through initia-
tives that require localities to provide for a fair share of low and
middle-income housing. Typically, these fair share initiatives have
not been aimed primarily toward racial desegregation, but the ef-
fects of such plans have appealed to progressive advocates.5 4
One of the most notable efforts was New Jersey's Mount Laurel
litigation. Under the New Jersey Constitution, localities were
obliged to accept a fair share of housing for the poor. This litiga-
tion, which dragged on for decades in various incarnations,56
spurred the enactment of state legislation designed to foster the
creation of low-cost housing in growing areas of the state.57 A
number of states have followed New Jersey's lead through their
own judicial and legislative efforts. 8 An example of an interesting
and less politically objectionable approach has been the require-
ment of new private developments to include a share of low-cost
housing. In Montgomery County, Maryland, the area has achieved
a moderate amount of racial integration since adopting this "inclu-
sionary zoning" requirement more than twenty years ago.59 Such
54. See generally CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE (1996) (discussing
New Jersey's initiatives).
55. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
56. More than two decades after the litigation began, the township of Mount Lau-
rel finally approved the construction of low-cost housing in 1997. See Ronald
Smothers, Ending Battle, Suburb Allows Homes for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1997,
at 21.
57. See Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to 329 (West
1986). Under the New Jersey plan, jurisdictions are sometimes entitled to "pay off'
up to half of their fair share duty. See also JACKSON, supra note 41, at 225 (discussing
some suburban opposition to public housing).
58. See Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zon-
ing Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1987) (summarizing the judicial and legis-
lative efforts of several states to limit exclusionary zoning and to increase the
availability of affordable housing). For an assessment of the reported failures of the
Mount Laurel efforts, see Bernard K. Ham, Exclusionary Zoning and Racial Segrega-
tion: A Reconsideration of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 577
(1997); see also W. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA 36-48
(1994).
59. See RUSK, supra note 36, at 64-65 (citing the diverse racial composition of
Montgomery County).
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"inclusionary zoning" puts the burden largely on developers and
avoids the inherent political difficulties in having to secure local
government participation in low-cost housing.6 °
C. Implications for Future Desegregation Initiatives
Advocates of racial desegregation have focused their attention
largely on the desirability for greater enforcement of the laws
against institutional discrimination in the housing market.61 Mas-
sey and Denton call for HUD and the Department of Justice to
"throw their full institutional weight into locating instances of
housing discrimination and bringing those who violate the [FHA]
to justice. '62 They argue for increased use of testers to ferret out
institutional discriminators, greater scrutiny of lending disparities
among the races, improvement in the placement of public housing,
and more efficient means of litigating FHA violations.63 They con-
clude that if the nation as a whole made a firm commitment to
enforcing the FHA, then the money for these federal programs
would follow.'
It is not surprising that leading critics of racial segregation argue
that enforcement of the FHA has been ineffective and that more
effort is needed in order to effect desegregation. What is surprising
is that their prescriptions for change ignore some fundamental ele-
ments of segregation. No attempt is made to assess the relative
weight of the white-reluctance factor and how such reluctance
might work to frustrate the desegregation efforts of those prosecut-
ing institutional discrimination. They also ignore the states' fair
share approach. One may respond that Massey and Denton do fo-
cus on federal efforts at desegregation, but this observation is more
60. See Serena M. Williams, The Need for Affordable Housing: The Constitutional
Viability of Inclusionary Zoning, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 85-88 (1992) (discussing
Montgomery County's ordinance and similar laws); see also RusK, supra note 36, at
64-65.
61. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 195-236 (discussing lack of en-
forcement of the institutional discrimination provisions of the FHA); Florence Wag-
man Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination and Segregation By the Federal
Government as a Principal Cause of Concentrated Poverty: A Response to Schill and
Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351, 1372-75 (1995) (critiquing advocates' focus on en-
forcement as the primary means of ending segregation in housing); Michael A. Schill,
Local Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing: The New York
City Human Rights Commission, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 991 (1996) (citing the ongo-
ing importance of the Commission's enforcement activities); see also MuTH, supra
note 38.
62. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 218.
63. See id. at 229-34.
64. See id. at 234-35.
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of an admission of a drawback than a justification. Many other
commentators either have argued in favor of a national fair share
program or at least have noted the importance of such plans in the
fight against segregation.
If desegregation efforts are to be successful, then what is needed
is an analysis that incorporates the effects of individual private
housing decisions on segregation. The fair share efforts address
this need in part by actively working for the direct placement of the
poor in mostly white and affluent suburbs rather than solely clamp-
ing down on institutional discriminators.
Moreover, an effective policy of metropolitan desegregation will
have to take into consideration the movement of African Ameri-
can suburbanization and the replication of segregation in the sub-
urbs. The traditional assumption that segregation is caused
predominantly by institutional discrimination insufficiently ex-
plains the replication. First, the fact that significant numbers of Af-
rican Americans have achieved city-to-suburb mobility and are
migrating to the suburbs challenges the assumption that segrega-
tion is caused solely by the trapping of African Americans in iso-
lated urban ghettos.66 Second, the fact that home ownership rates
for African Americans continue to rise, especially in the suburbs,67
challenges the traditional assumptions about institutional discrimi-
nation against African Americans in mortgage lending.
Despite such optimistic progressions, this essay does not argue
that institutional discrimination does not exist, but rather that this
discrimination is not the sole explanation for the patterns associ-
ated with segregation of the suburbs. The recognition of an addi-
tional and equally important category of factors in the replication
of segregation is timely and appropriate. This essay proposes the
study of individual preference factors and suggests implications of
these factors on racial desegregation law and policy.
H. INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE FACTORS IN THE REPLICATION OF
RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE SUBURBS
Individual preference factors must be distinguished from those
of institutional discrimination. The latter focuses on the real estate
industry and government's discriminatory efforts to frustrate inte-
65. See, e.g., McDougall, supra note 58; KEATING, supra note 58, at 40 (describing
fair share plans at a regional level as "[t]he most promising method of metropolitan
dispersal of low-income subsidized housing and households").
66. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 70.
67. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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gration. Individual preference factors, in contrast, reflect the pref-
erences of individual residents, both white and black, in choosing
where to live.
There are a number of reasons why commentators on law and
policy may have chosen to rely largely upon the theory of institu-
tional discrimination to explain segregation. First, such laws fit
within the familiar model of anti-discrimination statutes that are
already in place for equality in employment opportunities and at
the polls. 68 Second, accepting that individual preference factors
play a significant role in segregation might lend support towards
the position that segregation is a natural outcome of human af-
fairs.69 Finally, institutional discrimination appears to have a ready
solution in the implementation of laws forbidding the considera-
tion of race in selling, renting, marketing and lending. Individual
preference factors raise a dilemma of response. It is far more diffi-
cult to change or shape individual preferences than it is to target
institutional discrimination. Nonetheless, the difficulties of devel-
oping an effective response should not prevent a complete assess-
ment of the causes of segregation. If law and policy are to be
successful in pursuing desegregation, they must take into account
all of the significant and contributing factors.
The following parts support the theory that distinctive individual
preference factors for whites and African Americans contribute to
the replication of racial segregation in the suburbs. For whites, the
preference for isolation results in a segregation premium for
houses in suburban neighborhoods with few African Americans
that then discourages African Americans from choosing to migrate
to those areas. For African Americans, the preference factors that
work against desegregation include the desire to be near an Afri-
can American community, the reluctance of being an ice-breaker
in an all-white neighborhood and the desire to participate in a
strong African American suburban neighborhood.
A. Whites' Preference for Isolation and the
Segregation Premium
The fact that many white suburbanites dislike the idea of living
in close proximity to African Americans is a sociological observa-
68. See Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-
2000h(6) (1994); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973a-1973p (1994).
69. See EPSTEIN, supra note 36.
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tion that has been noted for decades.7" Massey and Denton cite
compelling empirical studies of this pattern,71 but they fail to relate
their observations to broader theories of residential segregation or
with legal and policy choices. This essay seeks to make these links.
In 1959, economist Gary Becker formalized the study of prefer-
ences for segregation.72 Although his analysis primarily focuses on
employment discrimination, his work is still a valuable reference to
the anti-discriminatory efforts of the 1960s. His principal contribu-
tion to this discussion on residential segregation is his characteriza-
tion of a preference for discrimination: certain persons hold as
part of their economic preferences an affirmative desire to discrim-
inate.73 A racial discriminator "will act [on the basis of race] as if
he were willing to pay something ... to be associated with some
persons instead of others."74
The implications of Becker's theory are far-reaching when corre-
lated to the individual residential choices of those living in subur-
ban neighborhoods. Economist Richard Muth saw individual
prejudice as the primary roadblock to desegregation. He writes,
"If the customer preference hypothesis is correct, then enforced
open-occupancy legislation would have little effect on the residen-
tial segregation of Negroes. ' 75  Becker himself observes that
"[m]any whites do not want to live near Negroes, and this is the
primary cause of residential segregation, not of residential [i.e., in-
stitutional] discrimination (as is often believed). '76 Massey and
Denton express no doubt that suburban white attitudes today re-
main largely hostile to racial integration. "When it comes to deter-
mining where, and with whom, Americans live," they conclude,
"race overwhelms all other considerations. 77 They cite studies
showing that many whites surveyed have little tolerance for neigh-
borhoods that are more than twenty percent black, and that only
70. See, e.g., MYRDAL, supra note 7, at 75; MUTH, supra note 38, at 107-08; MATS
LUNDINAL & ESKIL WADENSJO, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: A STUDY IN THE NEO-
CLASSICAL THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION 21 (1984).
71. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 191-211.
72. See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
Becker published his first edition in 1959. It was useful on a number of grounds,
including the debunking of the inchoate idea that discrimination simply was a means
for whites to improve their financial status. See LUNDINAL & WADENSJO, supra note
70, at 20-21.
73. See BECKER, supra note 72, at 13-14.
74. Id. at 14.
75. MUTH, supra note 38, at 109.
76. BECKER, supra note 72, at 160.
77. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 110.
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twenty-eight percent of those whites surveyed would live in a
neighborhood that was fifty percent black.7 8 According to Massey
and Denton, these white attitudes are shaped by stereotypes that
African Americans are more likely to commit crimes and to be
noisy. In a white neighborhood, such stereotypes create fear of a
decline in demand for property which would then result in lowered
property values.79 "Once one or two black families enter a neigh-
borhood," Massey and Denton state, "white demand begins to fal-
ter as some white families leave and others refuse to move in. "80
Both economic theory and empirical evidence show that racial
integration does decrease property values in many suburban neigh-
borhoods. The resulting disparity in prices between integrated and
all-white neighborhoods further discourages African American mi-
gration to traditionally all-white areas.
Economic analysis of housing prices include a number of vari-
ables, most notably housing prices and what is commonly referred
to as "location, location, location. '8 1 Housing prices are affected
by buyers' desires for certain amenities, such as air conditioning, a
large kitchen or a driveway.82 Housing prices will vary when cer-
tain features rise or fall in desirability. Housing prices are also af-'
fected by whether the location of housing is near desirable or
undesirable metropolitan features. Houses that are close to con-
venience stores and gas stations hold lower property values, be-
cause suburbanites dislike the noise, smells, traffic and human
density associated with these places. 83 Suburbanites tend to have a
preference for quiet, low-density, non-commercial neighborhoods,
because these sorts of neighborhoods command premium prices.84
These preferences also include the preference for discrimination.
If it is true that many whites dislike the notion of living in proxim-
ity to African Americans and desire to live in an all or mostly white
neighborhood,85 then these white suburbanites can be described as
holding a preference for isolating themselves from African Ameri-
78. See id. at 91-94, 213.
79. See id. at 94-96.
80. Id. at 96.
81. See John R. Tarpley, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Substantive Doctrine, and
Power, 21 VT. L. REV. 1107, 1135 n.17 (1997) (citing the adage).
82. See DENISE DIPASQUALE & WILLIAM C. WHEATON, URBAN ECONOMICS AND
REAL ESTATE MARKETS 65-72 (1996) (discussing housing attributes and household
preferences); EDWIN S. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS 120-27 (2d ed. 1980).
83. See DIPASQUALE & WHEATON, supra note 82, at 60-81 (studying urban
density).
84. See id.
85. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 91-96; BECKER, supra note 72, at 160.
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can residences. They prefer to live in segregated neighborhoods
and are willing "to pay something ... to be associated with some
persons instead of others. '8 6 Under fundamental economic theory,
when a substantial group of consumers is willing to pay more for a
certain type of a good, assuming the types of goods cost the same
to produce, this preference will result in commanding a higher
price in the market.8 7 When whites hold a preference for isolation,
they are willing to pay more to live in a segregated neighborhood.
The higher prices commanded in all or nearly all-white neighbor-
hoods is what is called the segregation premium.88
The segregation premium theory may explain, in part, the repli-
cation of segregation in the suburbs. Consider two hypothetical
white suburban neighborhoods, A and B. Assume that each house
in neighborhood A and neighborhood B is identical and that the
market price for each is $100,000. Now assume that an African
American family migrates from the central city to neighborhood A.
Under the preference for isolation assumption, many prospective
white homeowners will now view the houses in neighborhood A as
marginally less desirable than those in neighborhood B. Translat-
ing this change in preference into a change in price, one can as-
sume that the average price of houses in neighborhood A will
hypothetically fall to $95,000.89 In correlation to this price drop in
neighborhood A, the houses in neighborhood B are now relatively
more desirable. The price for the house may rise to $105,000. 90
The discrepancy in price is an example of the segregation premium.
Whites who dislike residential proximity to African Americans
may exit or flee from neighborhood A and thus further exacerbate
the decline in property values in neighborhood A. With lower
86. BECKER, supra note 72, at 14.
87. See generally PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 430-50 (10th ed. 1976) (discuss-
ing how price is determined by the schedules of supply and demand).
88. See BECKER, supra note 72, at 79-81; MILLS, supra note 82, at 127.
89. No claim is made here for the magnitude of the change. It is also important to
note that if African American families prefer an integrated neighborhood to a single-
race neighborhood, they will view neighborhood A as being more desirable than
neighborhood B, an effect that will marginally increase the prices of houses in neigh-
borhood A relative to those in B. This is contrary to the change resulting from white
preferences. Assuming that whites outnumber African Americans, or at least that the
number of whites with a preference for isolation outnumbers African Americans in
the pool of prospective residents, we would expect that the white preferences would
outweigh the African American preferences, and that the prices for houses in neigh-
borhood B would rise in comparison to those in neighborhood A.
90. As noted in the previous footnote, African American preferences would tend
to work in the opposite direction, but we would expect these preferences to be over-
come by the greater number of persons holding the white preferences.
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prices and the racial barrier broken in neighborhood A, the bal-
ance may tip in favor of an ever-greater percentage of African
American residents. 91 A suburban neighborhood can result in tip-
ping towards becoming mostly African American as each new mi-
grant breaks another racial tolerance level among whites. 2
Choices made by prospective African American migrants to the
suburban area also significantly affect the sharp segregation likely
to result in the two hypothetical neighborhoods. When faced with
a choice of entering either neighborhood A, in which the price of
the houses is lower and there is some racial integration, or neigh-
borhood B, an African American buyer may be more likely to
choose a house in neighborhood A. An African American family,
who possesses a particularly strong desire to affirmatively integrate
neighborhood B and a willingness to spend more for the house,
may choose neighborhood B. Realistically, there may be few such
crusaders.93 Thus, African Americans would choose neighborhood
A, while neighborhood B, holding the segregation premium in
higher prices,94 would attract whites with a relatively high prefer-
ence for racial isolation. Under this model, segregation occurs
solely by the preference for isolation and the segregation premium
and without reference to institutional discrimination in selling,
marketing or lending.95
Apparently seeking to debunk a hypothesis that white prefer-
ences result in stable segregation, Massey and Denton argue:
91. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265,
2269 (1997).
92. The "tipping" theory states even if whites have varying degrees of tolerance
for black migration, and even if many whites are somewhat tolerant, a neighborhood
may be "tipped" to becoming nearly all-black. To briefly summarize the theory: as
the first black migrants enter, the least tolerant whites leave, thus shifting the racial
balance further. This shift then encourages the next level of somewhat-more tolerant
whites to leave and so on. Eventually, when the percentage of black residents rises to
a certain level, the bulk of white residents seeks to leave, resulting in tipping the
neighborhood to nearly all-black status. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 96-
97 (citing THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 135-66
(1978)).
93. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 89.
94. The analysis in the text proceeds under the assumption that African American
demand does not exceed white demand. If African American buyers outnumbered
whites, then we would expect that their demand for neighborhood A would eliminate
the gap entirely. If African American demand far exceeded white demand, and Afri-
can Americans held a preference for avoiding all-white neighborhoods (such as neigh-
borhood B) in favor of integrated or all-black neighborhoods, we might expect this
preference to result in a premium for prices in neighborhood A.
95. Of course, the existence of such institutional discrimination would exacerbate
the segregation effect.
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Whites can only avoid co-residence with blacks if mechanisms
exist to keep blacks out of most white neighborhoods. They can
only flee a neighborhood where blacks have entered it there are
other all-white areas to go to, and this escape will only be suc-
cessful if blacks are unlikely to follow. Some method must exist,
therefore, to limit black entry to a few neighborhoods and to
preserve racial homogeneity in the rest. Although white preju-
dice is a necessary precondition for the perpetuation of segrega-
tion, it is insufficient to maintain the residential color line; active
[institutional] discrimination against blacks must occur also.96
The segregation premium theory refutes this argument. Massey
and Denton assume that, absent institutional discrimination, Afri-
can Americans will choose to move into any neighborhood to
which whites may retreat. This assumption is incorrect, because
Massey and Denton have not considered variations in housing
prices, which is the mechanism and method that stabilizes segrega-
tion, even without institutional discrimination. By virtue of a seg-
regation premium for neighborhoods that remain predominantly
white, African Americans are effectively discouraged from enter-
ing such neighborhoods. Without reference to institutional dis-
crimination, variations in preference and price can result in the
replication of segregation in suburbs.
B. African American Individual Preference Factors
The segregation premium hypothesis leads to a conclusion that
African American migrants will be drawn to suburban neighbor-
hoods that have been somewhat racially integrated. This section
argues that individual preference factors of African American sub-
urbanites also contribute to the replication of segregation in the
suburbs. Traditionally, it has been argued that African American
preferences do not contribute to segregation.97 This blanket assess-
ment was made in the context of seeking to debunk conservative
academics who believed that racial segregation was a natural state
of human affairs. 98 Rejecting the argument that segregation is nat-
ural, this essay proposes that certain sociological patterns en-
courage African American migrants to move in greater numbers to
96. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 97.
97. See Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Ne-
cessity and Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REV. 479,
498 (1995) (citing Richard H. Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities:
The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 874, 887 n.97 (1988)).
98. See id. at 498.
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suburbs with substantial black populations than to all or nearly all-
white suburbs.
In arguing that African American preferences do not foster seg-
regation, Florence Roisman cites to surveys showing that most Af-
rican Americans would prefer to live in a neighborhood that is
integrated fifty-fifty between whites and blacks as opposed to a
neighborhood of mostly one race.99 Massey and Denton rely on
similar surveys. 1°° These surveys suggest the idea that African
Americans may not hold the same sort of preference for racial iso-
lation that whites have in America. Their conclusions, however,
that African American preferences do not contribute to the segre-
gation in housing are too abrupt. The analysis is much more com-
plicated than answering the simple question of whether African
Americans prefer to live in a one race neighborhood.
First, the preferred choice of suburban migrants for a fifty-fifty
integrated suburb may not be available. A 1976 Detroit survey,
studied by Massey and Denton, showed a reluctance on the part of
African Americans to move into all or mostly white neighbor-
hoods.10' When asked to rank choices among hypothetical neigh-
borhoods that were 100%, 70%, 50% or 0% black, a majority of
the respondents chose the fifty percent black area. l02 The respon-
dents also evinced a strong reluctance to enter an all-white neigh-
borhood - sixty-two percent chose this as their last choice.0 3 By
contrast, twelve percent of the respondents chose the one hundred
percent black neighborhood as their first choice, and the seventy
percent black neighborhood was preferred in large numbers over
the fifteen percent black area.0 4 In sum, the survey showed a
marked preference for a neighborhood that is mostly black to one
that is mostly white. To the extent that prospective African Ameri-
cans must make such a second best choice because of the unavaila-
bility of their first choice of a fifty percent black area, their
decisions become part of the persistence of segregation in the
suburbs.
99. See id.
100. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 88-89.
101. See id. at 90.
102. See id. at 89.
103. See id.
104. The all-black neighborhood choice sparked the most polarized responses.
While 12% made this their first choice, 27% made it their last choice. By contrast, the
15% black neighborhood choice was ranked first by only eight percent of those sur-
veyed and was ranked last by only three percent. See id.
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A second and related preference factor is the idea that many
African Americans are reluctant to become icebreaker migrants in
an all-white neighborhood. They wish to avoid becoming the first
African American family in such a neighborhood. Massey and
Denton cite to evidence that states that many African Americans
fear hate crimes and other racially motivated behavior towards
them, which may occur when African Americans first move into all
or mostly white neighborhoods.10 5 From this data, they conclude
that African American reluctance to migrate is not voluntary.1°6
For persons of any race, migration from city to suburb typically
does not involve movement to a random neighborhood in the sub-
urban realm encircling the city. Many city residents wish to retain
their ties to jobs, friends, family, churches, favorite stores or social
groups, and therefore, most suburban migrants tend to move to a
suburb not too far from the familiarity of their former city resi-
dence. 0 17 If this migration pattern is correct, then African Ameri-
can migrants to the suburbs would also tend to relocate to areas
not too far from their city residences. In fact, this pattern has oc-
curred in certain metropolitan areas. In the Washington, D.C.
area, most African American suburban migration has been to
Prince George's County, which is an area directly east of the city
and adjacent to the city's African American sectors. 0 8 This evi-
dence is consistent with the theory that migrants tend to move to
suburbs close to their former city homes. As African Americans
migrate in larger numbers to the suburbs, we would expect them to
move disproportionately to the suburbs closest to their former city
homes, thus replicating the city segregation regardless of institu-
tional discrimination.
Finally, there is some evidence that African Americans may
choose a predominantly African American suburb because of pride
in the existence of a successful African American suburb. Com-
mentators have detected such pride among African Americans in
Prince George's County, Maryland, the nation's leader in black
105. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 90-91.
106. See id. at 91.
107. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE TECHNOLOGICAL RESHAPING
OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA 79-99 (1995) (documenting the shift of economic activ-
ity and population to the suburbs).
108. Compare U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES BY
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (visited Sept. 29, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/estimates/county/crh/crhmd96.txt>, with U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY
POPULATION ESTIMATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (visited Sept. 29, 1999)
<http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/county.crh/crhmdmars.txt>.
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suburbanization. 10 9 This county is now home to BET Holdings,
Inc., which operates Black Entertainment Television and recently
moved from Washington"0 and Pulsar Data Systems, a systems de-
sign company that in 1996 was the nation's fourth largest black-
owned company."' Many African American business leaders now
view Prince George's County, not Washington, D.C., as the center
for African American capitalism in the metropolitan area. 1 2 Be-
sides commercial enterprises, the suburban county also provides
upscale social outlets for its affluent African American residents. 1 3
African Americans may prefer to migrate to a town that represents
the pride in the creation of their own successful suburbs and busi-
nesses.114 Such personal preferences also contribute to the replica-
tion of segregation in the suburbs.
In sum, individual preference factors of both whites and African
Americans, even without particular reference to institutional dis-
crimination, foster the replication of racial segregation in the sub-
urbs. Any successful policy effort to combat segregation must take
account of these individual preference factors. The simplistic idea
that segregation is caused solely by institutional discrimination is a
109. See, e.g., Eugene L. Meyer & Peter Behr, In Prince George's, 2 Steps Up, 1
Step Back - High Profile Business Moving to County, But Job Development Isn't
Keeping Pace, WASH. POST, June 16, 1997, at Al (illustrating African American pride
in Prince George's county); Michael A. Fletcher, The Changes; over 30 Years, the
Washington Region's Black Population Has Been Redefined by Its Education and Af-
fluence, WASH. POST MAG., Feb. 1, 1998, at Wll.
110. See Peter Perl, His Way; Bob Johnson Wants To Turn His Washington-Based
Black Entertainment Television into an African-American Disney, WASH. POST MAG.,
Dec. 14, 1997, at 8.
111. See WORLD ALMANAC 121 (1998).
112. See Jonathan D. Glater, The Industrial Strength Move; Black-Owned D.C.
Bank Switches Charter to Tap Growing Market in Prince George's, WASH. POST, July
6, 1995, at D9; Peter Behr, Prince George's Says: Support Your Local Business; Black-
Owned Shops Are Fighting An Uphill Battle, County Residents Complain, WASH.
POST, Oct. 22, 1995, at A21 (discussing Black capitalism); Jason Goins, Black Enter-
prise, FORWARD, June 27, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 11612480; 79 FED. RES.
BULL. 11, Nov. 1, 1993, at 1026, available in 1993 WL 3014008 (referring to.Prince
George's county as having the largest number of black-owned businesses of any
county).
113. See Eugene L. Meyer, In a Tale of Two Mitchellvilles, Similaiities End With the
Name, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1996, at B1 (discussing pockets of Prince George's afflu-
ence); Robert E. Pierce, In Prince George's, The Place to Be: Upscale BET Sound-
stage a Big Attraction for County, WASH. POST, July 7, 1997, at B1; Jackie Spinner,
National Harbor Project Endorsed; Planning Board Urges Conditions Be Set For Final
Approval, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1998, at C4 (discussing "upscale" plans for county).
But see Rudolph A. Pyatt, Jr., Why Are So Many Retailers Still Snubbing Prince
George's County?, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1997, at C3.
114. See KEATING, supra note 58, at 33 (finding that "some African Americans feel
that metropolitan racial dispersion strategies will dilute the hard-won political gains").
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generalization that made more sense in the 1960s. Today, as more
and more African Americans migrate from city to suburb, law and
policy must keep pace. They must recognize that successful efforts
at desegregation in the twenty-first century need to address the in-
dividual preference factors that arise in suburban residential
decisions.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE
FACTORS FOR THE LAW AND POLICY OF
RACIAL DESEGREGATION
A. The Dilemma of Suburban Segregation, Revised
Part II of this paper set forth individual preference factors that
help frustrate efforts to integrate the suburbs. The argument does
not propose that the traditional approaches of fighting segregation
by combating institutional discrimination be disregarded. Institu-
tional discrimination exists and must remain outlawed.
This essay argues that in order to create effective desegregation
in the suburbs, law and policy must consider alternatives to the
FHA's outlawing of institutional discrimination. Distinguishing
whether institutional factors or individual preference factors are
more significant in the replication of segregation in the suburbs is
difficult. This difficulty, however, does not mean that addressing
the individual preference factors has no practical benefit. Some of
the time and money that would be spent in a national action
against institutional discrimination called for by Massey and
Denton'1 5 could be better spent by directly addressing the individ-
ual preference factors.
Since the preference for isolation and the segregation premium
appear to be difficult to change by law, reformers may hesitate to
acknowledge their importance. Reformers may loathe admitting to
other factors, such as the African American pride proposition, out
of the fear of ceding to conservative and libertarian ideas that seg-
regation is a natural result of voluntary decisions in a free mar-
ket.' 16 Finally, reformers may be disinclined to recognize
individual preference factors, because the factors cannot be ad-
115. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 234-35.
116. See id. at 91 (rejecting the notion that African American reluctance to move
into all-white neighborhoods means that segregation is "voluntary"); MUTH, supra
note 38, at 109 (noting that Milton Friedman opposed a law similar to the FHA in the
1960's, because he believed that such a law would be ineffective and would result only
in making real estate agents act in a manner contrary to the presumably prejudiced
preferences of their clients).
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dressed through the traditional civil-rights approaches of outlawing
discriminatory conduct, authorizing lawsuits and relying on federal
judges to spearhead social change.117 This wariness must be over-
come, however, if the sources of suburban segregation are to be
understood thoroughly and the means to adequately address it are
to be found.
B. A Proposal for Indirect Desegregation Through Suburban
Apartment Construction
As summarized in Part I, desegregation efforts of the past thirty
years have followed three broad avenues: 1) outlawing institu-
tional discrimination; 2) fostering desegregation through publicly
assisted housing; and 3) imposing regional fair share requirements
for low-cost housing, which to date have only been at the state
level. Of these three avenues, only the fair share approach is likely
to counteract significantly the effects of the individual preference
factors. Fair housing laws that prohibit discrimination in sales,
rentals, marketing and lending do not address the individual pref-
erence factors.118 For example, they do not make it illegal for a
seller to demand more for a house because of a perception that the
house and neighborhood will command a segregation premium. 119
Likewise, publicly assisted housing does not address individual pre-
ferred factors in suburban housing, because recipients of public
housing assistance are unable to financially afford migration to the
suburbs and are a small percentage of the nation's racial minority
citizens. Such subsidies, therefore, cannot address the breadth of
suburban segregation.12 0
117. The FHA followed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in this regard.
118. Possible exceptions are the various federal and state provisions for hate crimes
against migrating racial minorities may violate a variety of federal and state laws. See,
e.g., Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (1994)
(providing for enhanced penalties for hate crimes in section 280003); see generally
Terry A. Maroney, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 564 (1998) (summarizing state and federal hate crimes laws).
119. Nothing in the FHA, which prohibits racial and other discrimination in the
sale or rental of housing or in making real-estate transactions, as well as interference,
coercion and intimidation, appears to make illegal a decision not to live in a particular
neighborhood because of racist reasons, or to charge the market rate for particular
housing. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3605, 3617.
120. Publicly assisted housing recipients are necessarily very poor. Governmental
efforts to effect integration through them is likely to encounter the greatest opposition
from suburbanites, who link poverty with propensity to commit crime and other social
ills. Consider the depth of local opposition to fairly minor desegregation efforts of
public housing recipients in Yonkers, New York. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987).
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The fair share approach, however, is a promising mean of achiev-
ing a significant amount of racial and class integration. The poten-
tial benefits and proven results of fair share initiatives have been
thoroughly explored in legal and policy literature.121 Considering
the significance of individual preference factors in housing, this es-
say proposes a variant of this fair share approach.
Legislatures should zone for and construct more multi-family
housing to effectively desegregate today's suburban areas, espe-
cially apartment-style housing. Such a proposal is closely related to
the fundamental idea of fair share: localities must provide for their
fair share of low-cost housing needs of an entire region.122 Regard-
less of whether or not they are categorized as housing for low-in-
come persons, this essay argues that the law should encourage the
zoning for and construction of apartments per se.
Two broad observations support the argument that apartment
construction per se will foster considerable racial integration of the
suburbs. First, as explained below, there is a strong correlation be-
tween apartment dwelling and African American residency in
many suburban areas. Second, the proposal for apartment con-
struction per se, as opposed to more traditional fair share initia-
tives, may engender less political opposition in the localities where
the apartments would be built. Apartment zoning is not a silver
bullet against segregation, but the apartment construction proposal
would be more politically feasible than the traditional means of
attack and therefore holds a brighter promise for fostering the de-
segregation of suburbs.
1. The Suburban Apartment/Race Correlation
This essay concludes that there is a strong correlation between
apartment living and race in today's American suburbs. This ob-
servation may at first appear to relate largely to financial distinc-
tions. According to the author's analysis, African Americans tend
to be less affluent than their white counterparts, 23 and the less af-
fluent a person is the more likely he is to live in an apartment than
121. See, e.g., McDougall, supra note 58; KEATING, supra note 58.
122. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Federal Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to
329 (West 1998).
123. As of 1995, the median income of family households led by African Americans
was $25,970, while the median income for households led by whites was $42,646. See
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 469
(1997).
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in a house.'24 In the central urban area of Washington, D.C., there
is only a small difference between the apartment-dwelling rates of
blacks and whites. 25 Using the author's calculations from raw
numbers provided by the 1990 census, 63.6% of whites lived in
apartments, 17.1% lived in single detached houses, and 19.3% in
single attached houses. 26 For African Americans, the figures were
68.1%, 11.0% and 30.9%, respectively. 127 The suburbs, however,
tell another story. For each of the three large surrounding subur-
ban counties, the percentage of African Americans living in apart-
ments was almost or more than double the rate of whites. 128 The
rates are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1. PERCENTAGES, BY RACE, OF PERSONS LIVING IN
PARTICULAR TYPES OF HOUSING, 1990
Fairfax Cty., Montgomery Cty., Prince George's
Virginia Maryland Cty., Maryland
Type of Unit Wh. A.A. Wh. A.A. Wh. A.A.
Single Detached 57.0% 24.3 57.8 26.1 62.4 39.0
Single Attached 21.2 27.8 16.8 19.8 11.8 13.9
Apartment 21.8 47.9 25.4 54.1 25.8 47.1
The suburbanization of African Americans in the Washington,
D.C. area thus appears to be related in large part to a movement to
apartments, at least in comparison to the housing patterns of white
suburbanites. According to the 1990 census, a similar pattern of
African Americans settling in apartments existed for the suburban
counties of Atlanta, New York and San Francisco. 129
124. As of 1995, the median income of households who rent was less than half of
the median income of households who own their own residence. See U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES 190, 140 (1997).
125. The apartment figures cited here also include mobile homes and trailer units,
which form very small percentages of Washington, D.C. area housing units.
126. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 31 (1992) (percentages calculated from raw population data).
127. See id. at 32.
128. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS,
MARYLAND, 107 (1992); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL HOUSING CHARAC-
TERISTICS, VIRGINIA 174 (1992) (percentages calculated from raw population data).
129. In the Atlanta suburb of DeKalb County, 29.4% of whites and 44.9% of Afri-
can Americans lived in apartments, as opposed to percentages of 47.7% of whites and
52.0% of African Americans who live in apartments in the central city of Atlanta. See
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, GEORGIA
183-84, 303 (1992) (percentages calculated from raw population data). In the New
York suburb of Nassau County, only 18.8% of whites but 32.0% of blacks were apart-
ment dwellers, compared with respective figures of 83.4% and 86.2% for New York
City. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS,
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There are many potential factors that account for the greater
propensity of African American suburbanites to live in apartments.
First, as noted above, is the financial factor. The African American
population typically is less affluent than its comparable white pop-
ulation and is therefore expected to occupy apartments more often
than whites. 3 ° Second, African Americans disproportionately live
in suburbs that are closer to the city and hold a larger percentage
of their housing stock in apartments. If suburbs further away from
the city had more apartments, they might attract more African
Americans.13 1 Third, to the extent that a higher proportion of Afri-
can American households in a jurisdiction are single-adult house-
holds, fewer African American households might be expected to
seek the burdens of home ownership. 32 Fourth, the continuance of
institutional discrimination, especially from mortgage lenders, may
make it more difficult for an African American family to obtain a
home mortgage than it is for a similar white family.
These patterns of race and apartment housing support the pro-
posal for the creation of more apartments in suburban regions.
Such construction holds promise for increasing the number of Afri-
can American residents. Particularly for towns that remain nearly
all-white, it is possible that encouraging more apartment zoning
and construction, at any level of rental cost, may be a more effec-
tive means of achieving residential integration of the town than
either greater enforcement of anti-discrimination laws or adoption
of more traditional fair share requirements.
2. Addressing the Roadblocks to Integration
The experience of the fair share efforts to provide low-cost hous-
ing shows that localities will oppose such efforts. Nearly twenty
years after New Jersey's Mount Laurel litigation imposed fair share
requirements, fewer than 10,000 low-cost housing units had actu-
ally been developed as part of fair share plans. 33 Initiatives in
other states have encountered similar roadblocks. Many localities
NEW YORK 327, 590 (1992). In Alameda County, California, which includes Oakland,
34.4% of whites and 55.7% African Americans lived in apartments and closely
matched respective figures of 69.1% and 68.7% in San Francisco. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, CALIFORNIA 216, 650-51
(1992).
130. See supra notes 123-124.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 127-129.
132. As of 1996, 53.9% of African American family households had only one
spouse present, as compared to 18.7% of white family households. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 65 (1997).
133. See KEATING, supra note 58, at 39-40.
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do not want low-cost housing and do not like the idea of the state
imposing these housing requirements upon them. 34 An apartment
zoning and construction plan could be more successful, and three
related arguments support this proposition. All of the arguments
work in conjunction with, as opposed to struggling against, existing
market forces.
First, apartment construction could be spurred by the relatively
straightforward, possibly even politically feasible, method of
amending suburban zoning laws to permit more multi-family hous-
ing units. Most suburban jurisdictions have implemented zoning
restrictions that limit the number of apartments to fewer than
would be constructed in a free market for housing construction. 135
By freeing developers and builders from some of these zoning re-
strictions, the market demand for apartments would presumably
result in the construction of more apartments in suburban areas.
The difficulty lies in convincing or coercing a reluctant locality to
permit such zoning changes. As generations of advocates challeng-
ing exclusionary zoning have learned, there is no easy method to
persuade or force a town to change its zoning preferences away
from detached houses.136 Zoning for apartments, however, does
not necessarily generate the politically poisonous tag of "low-in-
come housing" that often is implicated in traditional fair share
plans. It is possible that apartment zoning changes in the pursuit of
desegregation would be relatively easier for localities to swallow.
This would be especially true for jurisdictions in which a fair share
plan necessitates active participation of the locality through public
financing.
Opponents of re-zoning may also be more willing to accept the
apartment construction if a limited system of compensation for the
parties who are most directly affected was created. If a town re-
zoned a block for apartments, the state or local government, per-
haps partially assisted by a private developer, could provide com-
pensation for the decrease in property values incurred by those
134. See id. at 36-48.
135. See generally Michael Allen Wolf, Euclid at Threescore Years and Ten: Is This
the Twilight of Environmental and Land-Use Regulation?, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 961
(1996) (discussing suburban zoning trends against uses other than single-family
houses). It is often stated that localities oppose apartment zoning because apartments
typically necessitate more local government services per capita, and generate fewer
local taxes per capita, than does detached-house zoning. See, e.g., PAUL KANTOR,
THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 163 (1995).
136. See Wolf, supra note 135, at 974.
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homeowners within one block of the new apartment building.
Compensation costs money, but it is often effective in assuaging
local opposition than a fiat from above without any compensa-
tion.137 Local opposition to apartments in developed areas could
also be ameliorated by locating the apartments in areas that are
currently zoned for commercial use. In many older suburbs, there
is an abundance of underdeveloped land that is zoned for commer-
cial use since retailers and other businesses have de-camped for
outer areas of the suburbs. 138
An alternative to comprehensive zoning reform is inclusionary
zoning, which requires new private developments to include a per-
centage of apartments or other low-cost housing.139 An example of
inclusionary zoning is the Montgomery County, Maryland ordi-
nance which requires that every new housing development of a cer-
tain size include a certain percentage of low- or moderate-cost
housing. 140 While such laws do not integrate already developed
suburbs, they are beneficial, because they do not upset the settled
expectations of residents in already-developed towns. Through the
construction of apartments, the new housing developments might
be successful in encouraging African American migrants to move
out to the less integrated suburbs.
Laws fostering the zoning and construction of apartments would
accommodate the following conservative theories concerning
broad local authority over zoning power. While some federalists
reflexively believe that any governmental authority exercised at a
local level is more democratic than that employed at a higher
137. Money holds the promise of overcoming.a large political hurdle. For example,
to lessen the degree of local opposition to the introduction of wolves into Yellowstone
National Park, an environmental group agreed to compensate nearby property own-
ers for any livestock killed by the wolves. See Defenders of Wildlife Will Compensate
for First Yellowstone Wolf Kill, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL
5619036. But see The Wolf Finds a Home, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1998, at B7 (arguing
that compensation to stock growers for any losses incurred as a result of the rein-
troduction program was a "smart decision and has restored a dramatic feature of
American history").
138. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Met-
ropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1137 (1996) (referring to declining inner sub-
urb phenomenon); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 37 (1998).
139. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 60 (summarizing such laws and ordinances).
140. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 25A-1-12 (1989); see also Philip J.
Tierney, Bold Promises But Baby Steps: Maryland's Growth Policy to the Year 2020,
23 U. BALT. L. REV. 461, 492 (1994); Williams, supra note 60; RusK, supra note 36, at
64-65 (discussing the success of the Montgomery County ordinance).
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level, 141 other more-libertarian oriented conservatives view local
power as equally invasive upon the fulfillment of human desires.142
Theorists also argue that many supposed public welfare plans are
merely the reflection of the political success of well-organized pri-
vate interest groups. 143 The twentieth century's deference to local
governmental authority to zone out apartments and other non-sin-
gle-family uses is the quintessential example of the ambiguity in
the notion of public welfare. 144 In many suburban jurisdictions to-
day, such exclusionary zoning supports the interests of affluent
homeowners at the expense of the public good. Some judges and
legislators might be convinced that limitations on local authority to
zone out apartments would support the principles of free market
and important property rights. 45 Under inclusionary zoning tac-
tics, a coalition of affordable housing advocates and de-segrega-
tionists may be more influential in state politics than under typical
fair share proposals.
Finally, an effort to build more apartments might be psychologi-
cally less troubling to suburbanites than other fair share proposals.
Recent history is replete with examples of suburban jurisdictions'
fierce opposition to the imposition of even small amounts of low-
cost housing. 46 Many suburbanites instinctively associate govern-
ment-sponsored, low-cost housing with stereotypes and urban so-
cial problems. 47  Many of these fears have proven to be
misguided. 148 Such automatic opposition is the first, and often fatal,
roadblock to fair share initiatives. 49 Suburbanites are more likely
to have had some personal experiences with apartment-dwelling
141. See generally John Kincaid, Regulatory Regionalism in Metropolitan Areas:
Voter Resistance and Reform Persistence, 13 PACE L. REV. 449, 467-68 (1993) (discuss-
ing arguments against removing local authority).
142. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND THE LAW 186 (1991) (discussing a former
Solicitor General's reluctance to embrace federalism out of a fear of local governmen-
tal intrusions).
143. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT 283-95 (1962).
144. See Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
145. See Wolf, supra note 135 (discussing the attack by the property rights move-
ment on Euclid's deference to local authority from the property rights).
146. See, e.g., MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS 83, 127-28 (1997) (discussing the
opposition to minor measures in the Minneapolis area); United States v. Yonkers Bd.
of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987).
147. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 94-96.
148. See Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan
Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 865 (1996) (discussing positive changes in attitudes
after the placement of low-cost housing).
149. See McDougall, supra note 58.
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rather than with government-assisted low-income housing. An
apartment-oriented proposal would not be branded with the "low-
income" label and its immediate associations with crime and pov-
erty. A plan to foster more apartment zoning, therefore, might not
instinctively generate the same level of initial antagonism and
would be a more moderate and acceptable approach to easing the
racial segregation in today's suburbs.
Advocating wider zoning for apartments will not be a cure-all
against segregation. It is possible that the individual preference
factors that work to limit integration in traditional suburban neigh-
borhoods will also hamper efforts to integrate apartment housing.
With their preference for isolation, many whites will tend to shun
apartment buildings with significant numbers of African Ameri-
cans and will be willing to pay a segregation premium for buildings
with few African Americans. With the segregation premium in
price, African Americans will be financially discouraged from mov-
ing to such apartment units. This essay, however, argues that
apartment construction will be able to foster integration.
First, construction of new apartments in the suburbs would tap a
demand, which, according to current residential trends, is likely to
be disproportionately African American. 150 Apartments in mostly
white areas may initially hold a segregation premium over those in
mostly African American areas, but the release of the demand with
the construction of new apartments should encourage African
Americans to pay higher prices for apartments in mostly white ar-
eas. The eventual integration of these apartment buildings will in
turn dampen the segregation premium and eventually encourage
further African American migration.
Second, if a state command or a cooperative agreement permit-
ted a large number of localities to construct apartments at the same
time, then roughly equal numbers of African Americans might be
encouraged to migrate to a variety of towns at about the same
time. These simultaneous actions would thus diminish the likeli-
hood that one town would remain nearly all-white or would be able
to gain a segregation premium in housing prices.
Third, migration of African Americans to a specially zoned
apartment area would not trigger the preference for isolation as
strongly as would migration to detached houses. A separation,
both spatial and psychological, between an all-white home-owning
sector and an integrated apartment sector might mitigate the ef-
150. See supra text accompanying notes 123-132.
1999] SUBURBAN RACIAL DESEGREGATION
fects of the preference for isolation.1 51 For example, in an area ad-
jacent to a suburb's commercial complex, white homeowners may
retain a sense of social, economic and cultural distinction from
these apartment dwellers. This distinction may make them less
fearful that their community will become largely African American
and may eventually make them more tolerant of African Ameri-
cans in their community. 152
Would such a spatial and psychological distinction between
homeowners and apartment dwellers undermine the purposes of
desegregation? Although integration through special apartment
construction will be less than completely satisfactory, such integra-
tion would hold some real benefits. African American residents
would gain greater access to the booming employment markets
that have left the central city for the suburbs. Socially, shoppers
would encounter persons of other races at the suburban mall, and
perhaps most significant of all, children would likely experience ra-
cial integration in their public schools. These possibilities hold the
promises of diminishing, in generations to come, the individual
preference factors that continue to stand in the way of residential
desegregation.
CONCLUSION
As experience, logic and the law have shown, there is no magic
bullet to solve metropolitan residential segregation. Thirty years
after the FHA, new demographic trends pose new challenges and
should spur innovative thinking. African Americans are migrating
from cities to suburbs in increasing numbers and are challenging
the traditional idea that they are trapped in urban ghettos. Con-
current with this migration movement is a replication of segrega-
tion by race in suburban housing patterns. These trends should
lead to a re-evaluation of the traditional idea that institutional dis-
crimination is the overriding source of segregation. This essay has
suggested some individual preference factors that contribute to the
replication of segregation in the suburbs. The most notable of
these is the segregation premium which is created by whites' pref-
151. These apartment zones hopefully will attract significant numbers of African
Americans to an otherwise nearly all white town. Some might view such zones as the
town's "ghettos." Accepting such apartment "ghettos," however, may be the best way
to integrate a town and reverse the replication of segregation in the suburbs.
152. To the extent that significant numbers of African Americans were limited
largely to the apartment zone, residential organizations such as homeowner's associa-
tions would remain largely white.
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erence for isolation and simple economic forces. This premium
contributes to the replication of segregation in the suburbs. Indi-
vidual preferences of African Americans also contribute to the rep-
lication of suburban segregation. For a de-segregationist policy to
be successful, the policy must acknowledge the trends in
suburbanization and must address the individual preference fac-
tors. This essay does not claim to offer the definitive solution.
Nonetheless, the strong associations between apartment-dwelling
and African American suburbanization offer support to pursuing
the apartment fair share type of plan as an effective means of de-
segregating the suburbs in the coming century.
